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Abstract 
The current study attempts to analyse the learners' right to freedom in education in order to 
determine the nature and content of their education. This analysis will be in relation to the 
philosophy of education in Egypt to improve the efficiency of the educational system. In 
this sense the aims of the study can be determined as follows: first to propose a theoretical 
framework of freedom in education in relation to its meaning, conditions, restrictions and 
value, secondly, to develop this theoretical framework of education based on freedom so 
that it suits Egyptian society, can improve the efficiency of the educational system through 
the idea of freedom, and thirdly, to identify the difficulties and challenges that might 
confront the claim to freedom in education in Egypt. 
To achieve these aims the study contains seven chapters, an introduction, a conclusion and 
appendix that are necessary to achieve its aims and answer its questions. The introduction 
discusses the general outline of the study and the major issues, questions, aims, 
methodology and plan of the study. The main aim of chapter one is to analyse the concept 
of freedom in western and Islamic thought to build a theoretical framework of the meaning 
of freedom, its conditions and value, which is necessary and important to construct a 
theoretical framework of the meaning, conditions and value of freedom in education for 
learners at school level. Chapter two aims to construct a theoretical framework of freedom 
in education that will depend on the analysis of the concept of freedom made in chapter 
one. This analysis will deal with the implications of freedom in education with respect to its 
conditions, restrictions and value in education. Through this analysis, chapter two aims also 
to analyse and examine the learners' rights to be free regarding their education. To have a 
complete theoretical framework of freedom in education, chapter three discusses other 
implications with respect to restrictions which might limit learners' freedom by being 
subject to state authority. 
Chapter four investigates and analyses freedom in educational theory and practice in the 
history of Egypt from 1805 to 1991, whereas chapter five focuses on the period from 1992 
to 2000. Following the analysis of the concept of freedom and its implications in education 
that will be made in the first five chapters, it would be sensible to construct a framework of 
educational theory based on freedom that, on one hand, should suite the Egyptian context in 
chapter six, on the other hand, that guarantees a range of freedom that allows learners and 
society derive benefit from its value in education. Having proposed a framework of a 
theory of education based on freedom that suits the Egyptian context to improve the 
efficiency of its educational system chapter seven will discover and examine the conditions 
and difficulties which need to be considered for the successful implementation of freedom 
in education. Also, the study will attempt to give some suggestions that might help to 
reduce the gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the conditions that 
must be satisfied for the successful implementation of freedom in education. 
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Introduction 
1. Introduction 
Freedom is a perennial issue in the life of human beings. They look for and demand 
freedom throughout their lives. The question of why freedom is important to an individual 
is complicated, and cannot be given a simple straightforward answer. It might be true that 
agitation for freedom arises when people actually want to do things which they are 
prevented from doing. When people demand freedom they usually look for freedom of 
speech and movement - freedom from arbitrary, cruel and unusual forms of punishment, 
and freedom to discover and act in accordance with their purposes. In this sense freedom 
can be justified on the grounds that it not only tends to promote people's interests, but it 
also maximises their opportunities for doing what is worthwhile. 
Freedom is one of the fundamental ideals of modern democratic states. It is perhaps the 
most difficult of all political concepts to explain. As Barry (1995: 204) notes 
liberty tends not to become a separate principle or value, to take its place alongside others, 
but rather a shorthand expression for a closely related and allegedly symmetrical set of 
values: a surrogate term for a complete social philosophy. 
The value of the individual's freedom comes from the belief in the intrinsic and ultimate 
value of each individual, and so the freedom of human beings is at the heart of political 
philosophy, especially liberalism. 
it constitutes the grounds for the celebration of individual freedom, and is liberalism's 
fundamental moral and political value (Ramsay 1997: 38). 
The implications of the concept of freedom in education appear in a learner's right to be 
free to learn what is of interest to him with help from other people, for example, teachers, 
parents and so on, but not control or under influence. Teachers and parents should listen to 
the child in order to learn more about the child's views. The notion of freedom in education 
might help learners to develop their potentiality and make them autonomous, creative, self- 
learning, continuously learning, responsible and to help them to enjoy greater academic 
achievement. Moreover, in this way learners can understand their world and can make 
rational life-choices (Wringe, 1984: 38). 
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2. Issue of the study 
The importance of applying freedom in education becomes a necessary condition to deal 
with the massive changes taking place all over the world in every field. These 
developments demand a free mind to understand what is happening in one's surroundings 
and discover the factors and conditions that determine global conditions. As most other 
countries, Egypt is also undergoing extensive changes and challenges such as the effect of 
globalisation, the revolution of knowledge, information, human rights and democracy 
alongside a market economy. The issues of freedom in society and its use in the theory and 
practice of education have been widely debated. For example, the value of freedom in 
education has been understood as a means to give children the chance to choose; they have 
to take the risk and it does not matter whether they make the right choice or not. If they 
make the wrong choice, they will learn from their mistakes. When children have the chance 
to be a chooser, they will be responsible for their lives and their choices. Education is 
responsible for building and developing the personality, abilities, and capabilities of an 
individual to his or her highest potential. This means he will discover, build and develop 
himself. Society needs people who are autonomous, creative, self-learning, continuously 
learning, responsible and to help them to enjoy greater academic achievement. This claim 
indicates that education needs to create a climate in which the children have the opportunity 
to exercise freedom to derive benefit from its value in education. In this sense the right type 
of education is linked to one which makes the children free beings who are free to love, to 
be happy, think, choose and to make their own decisions. Any development in education 
has to aim to develop the potentiality of the individuals themselves, by themselves and for 
themselves. According to the above views, the claim of freedom in education could be the 
core of radical changes which the society needs for development. 
Therefore, in this study I will attempt to analyse the learners' right to freedom in education 
in order to determine the nature and content of their education. This analysis will be in 
relation to the philosophy of education in Egypt to improve the efficiency of the 
educational system. In this sense the aims of the study can be determined as follows: first to 
propose a theoretical framework of freedom in education in relation to its meaning, 
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conditions, restrictions and value, secondly, to develop this theoretical framework of 
education based on freedom so that it suits Egyptian society, can improve the efficiency of 
the educational system through the idea of freedom, and thirdly, to identify and consider 
the difficulties and challenges that might confront the claim to freedom in education in 
Egypt. The theme of the study can be formulated in the following double question; what are 
the meaning, conditions, restrictions and value of freedom in education?, and how can the 
efficiency of the educational system in Egypt be improved in the light of this idea of 
freedom in education? This raises the following questions; 
(1) what is the meaning and what are the conditions, restrictions and the value of freedom 
in western and Islamic thought? 
(2) what are the implications of the concept of freedom in education regarding its 
conditions, restrictions and value regarding learners and educational processes? 
(3) what is the place of freedom in Egyptian history of educational theory and practice in 
Egypt (1805-1991)? 
(4) what is the place of freedom in Egyptian current educational theory and practice in 
Egypt (1992-2000)? 
(5) in what ways can the efficiency of the educational system in Egypt be improved in the 
light of the idea of freedom 
(6) what are the conditions and difficulties that affect the implementation of freedom in the 
Egyptian context? 
3 
3. Methodology and plan of study 
The current study contains seven chapters, an introduction, a conclusion and appendix that 
are necessary to achieve its aims and answer its questions. The introduction discusses the 
general outline of the study and the major issues, questions, aims, methodology and plan of 
the study. A criticism which can be made for this kind of research is that it might not be 
possible to apply a western idea of freedom in education, that depends on a western concept 
of freedom which might be different in a different context such as Egypt. Thus an initial 
aim of the study and the main aim of chapter one is to analyse the concept of freedom in 
western and Islamic thought to build a theoretical framework of the meaning of freedom, 
its conditions and value, which is necessary and important to construct a theoretical 
framework of the meaning, conditions and value of freedom in education for learners at 
school level. The significance of analysing the concept of freedom in both traditions is to 
make sure that the proposal of freedom in education as a western idea the study will 
suggest suits the Egyptian context to improve the efficiency of its educational system. In 
short, it is important to identify whether there are religious obligations that might limit 
learners' freedom in Islam as a religion and practice in Egypt. 
Chapter two aims to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in education that will 
depend on the analysis of the concept of freedom made in chapter one. This analysis will 
deal with the implications of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, 
restrictions and value in education. Through this analysis, chapter two aims also to analyse 
and examine the learners' rights to be free regarding their education. This is because it 
might be difficult for someone to accept the claim of freedom for young learners at an early 
age to be equal with adults. This refers to three important factors: the nature of the subject, 
the purpose of education and the sort of restrictions that limit learners' freedom. The 
analysis of learner's right regarding their education in this chapter will deal with learners at 
school. I investigate this particular age group for two reasons; firstly, unlike young 
children, learners at the university are mature enough to exercise their freedom and to fight 
for it. Secondly, although the learners' rights to freedom may be acknowledged in current 
Egyptian legislation, it is ignored in real educational practice. 
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To have a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education, chapter three discusses 
other implications with respect to restrictions which might limit learners' freedom by being 
subject to state authority. This is because for learners to exercise freedom in terms of non- 
interference and availability of making choices and decisions and to derive benefit from its 
value, they might be restricted by the nature of the curriculum, assessment, and teacher 
training. The significance of this chapter is that, first, it attempts to build a complete 
theoretical framework of freedom in education that provide the required conditions in 
which learners and society can benefit from the value of freedom to be able to satisfy their 
interests. Secondly, to try to suite the Egyptian society and its educational system to 
improve the efficiency of the educational system according to the idea of freedom in 
education 
To achieve the aims of the first three chapters a philosophical approach is suitable to 
provide a high degree of understanding in defining the concept of freedom and its 
implications in education (see Scriven, 1988: 132-6). Although there are many methods that 
can be used in philosophy there is one common method which is called analysis and 
construction. According to Peters (1966a: 78-84), Peters, Woods and Dray (1987: 26-9), 
Reid (1965: 23-8) Hirst and Peters (1970) and Best (1965: 46-54) philosophical analysis 
refers to the critical reading, and understanding of literature on the meaning of a particular 
concept, its implication and value in a particular field. In relation to the current study, 
philosophical analysis is suitable to build a theoretical framework of freedom in education 
in relation to its conditions, restrictions and value for learners and society. Then 
philosophical construction of the elements of the analysis will be suitable to build a 
theoretical framework of freedom in education that fit the Egyptian context to improve the 
efficiency of its educational system. 
Chapter four investigates and analyses freedom in educational theory and practice in the 
history of Egypt from 1805 to 1991, whereas chapter five focuses on the period from 1992 
to 2000. The aims of chapter four can be summarised as follows; firstly, to discover and 
analyse the conditions of freedom in relation to Egyptian society and its educational 
system. In other words, to investigate how far learners have been interfered with and are 
D 
subject to the authority of adults in their choices and decisions about what they study, what 
they are interested in and what they want to be or become? Secondly, to identify such 
educational practices that reflect the features of freedom. This will help to understand how 
the present educational system has come about, which is necessary to establish a sound 
basis for the implementation of freedom in chapter six and seven. Thirdly, to discover the 
sort of restrictions that determined learners' freedom in educational policy and practice. 
This will help to avoid such restrictions and prepare for such conditions as are important in 
the implementation of the idea of freedom in the Egyptian context in chapter six and seven. 
Fourthly, to identify the implications of freedom in education regarding its value in theory 
and practice. Also, to investigate whether the demand for learners' freedom in Egypt is 
desirable and valuable for learners and society according to educational thought. The 
significance of this aim is to give an indication of the suitability and validity of the 
implementation of freedom in education in the Egyptian context. 
It might be important to note that a long historical period gives a wider range in which to 
examine how freedom in education has been developed and to identify its conditions, 
restrictions and value. The reason behind taking the year 1805 as the starting period is that 
it is the beginning of the building of Egypt into a modern nation. `Egypt in 1805 achieved a 
certain level of modernisation and this was followed by development in education' 
(Hajar, 1991: 90-1). No significant implications of freedom in education can be recognised 
before that year. `Egyptian society was under the Ottoman occupation for the previous 
three centuries. Ottoman policy aimed to isolate Egypt from the rest of the whole world and 
from the industrial development that started at that time in Europe. This policy was 
reflected in an education that aimed to keep society as it was without any attempt to 
develop the society' (`Ali, Hilmi, Aimam, 1996: 17). For this element of the research, and 
based on the work of Best (1981: 132-4), Borg and Gall (1989: 808-11), Hopkins 
(1976a: 117-8), Cohen and Manion (1994: 45-46) and Bedalla, 1992: 163-6) a historical 
approach was selected because it would help to illustrate the implications of the idea of 
freedom in education, provide the foundation for better understanding the question of the 
lack of learners' freedom in education, contribute to a better understanding of the idea of 
freedom in present theory and practice, help to illustrate how the present educational 
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system has come about, help to establish a sound basis for further progress in relation to the 
idea of freedom in education, and show how and why an idea such as freedom in education 
developed. Then, it helps to use former practices to evaluate newer, emerging ones. To 
achieve the aims of this chapter the period of the study will be divided into different 
periods according to the political situation. As I will show in this chapter the political 
situation had a great effect on determining the learners' freedom in education. 
Egypt's current educational strategy, which presents a comprehensive framework of 
educational reform, was initially articulated in 1992. Thus the main concern of chapter five 
is to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in educational theory and practice in Egypt 
from 1992 to 2000. This chapter details the current educational situation in which the new 
proposed framework would be promoted, eliminated or modified. The year 2000 was 
selected as the end point of the current study because it is a crucial year in the development 
of Egyptian education. This is because many promises and hopes for great development in 
education were expected to be in place by that year. The descriptive inquiry method will be 
suitable to achieve the aims of this chapter that can be summarised as follows; firstly, to 
investigate and analyse the conditions of freedom related to Egyptian society and its 
educational system. In other words, to examine how far learners have been interfered with 
and been subject to authority by adults with their choices and decisions to study what they 
are interested in and to be or become what they want? Secondly, to discover such 
educational practices as reflect the features of freedom and unfreedom. This will help to 
understand the present educational system and establish a sound basis for the 
implementation of freedom in chapter six. Thirdly, to discover the sort of restrictions that 
determined learners' freedom in educational policy and practices. This will help to avoid 
such restrictions and prepare for such conditions that are important in the implementation 
of the idea of freedom in the Egyptian context in chapter six. Fourthly, to identify the 
meaning, features and the value of freedom in educational thought in the light of the 
theoretical framework that will be made in the first three chapters. The significance of this 
section is to give an indication of the suitability and validity of the implementation of 
freedom in education into the Egyptian context. 
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Following to the analysis of the concept of freedom and its implications in education that 
will be made in the first five chapters, it would be sensible to construct a framework of 
educational theory based on freedom that, on one hand, should suit the Egyptian context in 
chapter six, on the other hand, that guarantees a range of freedom that allows learners and 
society derive benefit from its value in education. Firstly, this framework treats the general 
components and aims of the purpose of education. Secondly, it will deal with the nature of 
the educational system, school curriculum, assessment and teacher education. Having 
proposed a framework of a theory of education based on freedom that suits the Egyptian 
context to improve the efficiency of its educational system chapter seven will discover and 
examine the conditions and difficulties which need to be considered for the successful 
implementation of freedom in education. Also, I will attempt to give some suggestions that 
might help to reduce the gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the 
conditions that must be satisfied for the successful implementation of freedom in education. 
As important methodological notes: firstly, Arabic literature used mainly in chapter one, 
four and five will be translated by the researcher. The translation will be in the form of a 
literal translation to the meaning of the Arabic text so as to give the real meaning intended 
by the author. To distinguish between the researcher's ideas and the translated quotations, 
the latter will be put between single commas. This will also distinguish them from direct 
English quotations. Secondly, the researcher will calculate some statistical data in chapters 
four and five with star mark `*'. Thirdly, the statistical data introduced in chapters four and 
five will be used, collected and organised in a way that makes the data more useful for the 
purpose of the study. 
Fourthly, because of the nature and aim of the current study the researcher has used the 
Arabic and English literature related to the topic of the study, to build the arguments 
needed to construct a theoretical framework of education based on freedom, rather than 
having the literature review in a separate chapter. In analysing the idea of freedom in 
education in the historical and present situation of educational theory and practice in Egypt 
the researcher used also the studies and research that are important to investigate the idea of 
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freedom because the current study is the first one to investigate this idea in the Egyptian 
context. 
Chapter One 
An analysis of the concept of freedom 
in Western and Islamic thought 
I. I. Introduction 
One criticism that can be made about this kind of research is that it might not be 
possible to apply a western idea of freedom in education to a different context such as 
Egypt. Thus, the main aim of this chapter is to analysis the concept of freedom in both 
western and Islamic thought to build a theoretical framework of the meaning of 
freedom, its conditions and value. This is necessary and important in order to be able to 
construct a theoretical framework of freedom in education for learners at school level, 
in chapters two and three. The significance of analysing and examining the idea of 
freedom in both traditions is to make sure that the proposals for freedom in education as 
a western idea which the study will suggest suit the Egyptian context and will improve 
the efficiency of its educational system. Officially Egypt is an Islamic country where 
religion has a strong social and legal impact. In other words, all the Egyptian 
prescriptions relative to marriage, divorce, and inheritance are taken explicitly from the 
Qur'an, Sunna, and some prescriptions of Islamic law which the legislature has 
considered to be the most adequate to the needs of society' (Al-'Ashniawi, 1998: 52) and 
(Al-Ashmawy, 1994: 95). For example, the claim to freedom in education for girls so 
that they are equal to boys might not be applicable if it is shown that girls have less 
value and rights in Islam. Consequently, the implementation of freedom in education 
might not be possible in Egypt. In short, it is important to identify whether there are 
Islamic obligations which might limit the learners' freedom in Egypt. 
To achieve these aims this chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section 
analyses the concept of freedom, its condition and value in western political thought. 
The major difficulty in doing this is whether there is one concept of freedom, which 
analytical philosophy can reveal, or whether there are a variety of concepts each of 
which depends upon certain other theoretical presuppositions. Therefore, this section 
analyses the concept of freedom that is central to the liberal tradition. According to 
Hallowell (1942: 330) 
liberalism espouses freedom for the individual from all authority that is personal, 
arbitrary, or capricious. As the political expression of an individualism that has 
as its first premise the absolute value of human personality, liberalism demands 
freedom for the individual from ever other individual, from the state, and from every 
will that is arbitrary. 
The second section analyses the concept of freedom in Islam. Islam is a monotheistic 
religion, which lavishes great respect and care on individual rights. `It considers 
mankind as free, responsible, and autonomous (Al-Mubarak, 1981: 135). The first thing 
that should be known about Islam is that there is no single interpretation. Islamic 
thought on the interpretation of the Qur'an might be classified into two traditions: that 
concerned with the linguistic meaning of the verses of the Qur'an; and that concerned 
with the meaning of the Qur'an itself and the contextual meaning of the verses. 
Tradition calls everyone to think and use their minds to examine the Qur'an and the 
traditions of the prophet. It calls on people to follow the Islamic principle of thinking 
which is known as ijtihad (Islamic interpretation). This means an independent 
judgement and thus identifies that the Qur'an can be discussed, questioned and 
developed. In this sense, the Qur'an can never be finally and conclusively explained. I 
will analyse the meaning of freedom by following the second tradition which is the one 
I find most compatible with the nature of contemporary Egyptian society and the 
purpose of this study in which people are invited to free their minds in order to examine 
the Qur'an. However, through the analysis I will show several faces of the conflict 
between the two traditions. 
1.2. Meaning of freedom in western liberal thought 
From among the many ways freedom is understood, the following part of this chapter 
will be concerned with two points; the first takes freedom to be the absence of human 
interference and restrictions with an individual's actions. This is the way freedom has 
been understood by liberal tradition from Hobbes in the seventeenth century to Mill in 
the nineteenth, to the contemporary period by political philosophers such as Berlin, 
Rawls, Hayek and MacCallum. The second describes freedom in terms of what the 
individual can do. In other words, it is concerned with the process of being free to 
choose and act on one's own initiative and, the opportunity to pursue various specific 
human activities. For obvious reasons, these two different accounts have come to be 
called `negative' and `positive' freedom respectively. The division among political 
philosophers on positive and negative freedom reflects, though only roughly, 
differences with respect to political sympathies as well. Negative freedom is concerned, 
almost exclusively, with limiting government. Laws, bureaucracies, and centralised 
power are taken to be the chief sources of the interference that destroys freedom. In the 
positive view of freedom, the state might be thought to have a wider role in securing the 
conditions, powers, resources and opportunities for individuals to become autonomous 
and self-directing. For most readers of political philosophy, Berlin's celebrated lecture 
(1969) `Two Concepts of Liberty', comes immediately to mind when positive and 
negative freedom are mentioned. I will first discuss the negative concept and turn 
afterwards to the positive one. 
1.2.1. The negative concept of freedom 
According to Berlin (1969: 121) `negative freedom is involved in answering the 
question of the area within which persons should be left to do what they want without 
interference by others'. In Berlin's words, to be negatively free essentially means not 
being prevented by other persons from doing whatever one desires to do (Berlin, 
1969: xxxviii-xl). Russell (1942: 231) mentions the same idea by saying `freedom in 
general may be defined as the absence of obstacles to the realisation of desire. "A man 
is free only when he does exactly what he wants to do, without let or hindrance" 
(Macmurray, 1932: 163). In this sense "freedom is simply the total absence of external 
constraint" (Horsburgh, 1956: 93). For Cobb (1941: 13) freedom is "the right of the 
individual to exercise unrestricted control over the things which belong to him, 
unhampered by the constraints of arbitrary, man-made laws". For Hampshire (1965: 93) 
and Brenkert "if people are stopped or diverted in what they are doing by someone else, 
it their efforts are made difficult, if the range of their choices or alternative is made less 
extensive, they are less free" (1991: 65). "The individual agent is the final authority for 
declaring and identifying his or her wants" (Taylor, 1975: 436). Accordingly, the 
physically handicapped, who do not have the capacity to perform some actions can be 
described as free unless it could be shown that their inability to do such things resulted 
from the interference of others. For Gill (1972: 6) freedom stands for relief from some 
restriction. 
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Hobbes (1968: 262), Parent (1974a: 433) and Gray (1991: 30) in their work on freedom 
did not agree with Berlin in identifying negative freedom with non-interference by the 
state and other individuals with a person's desires because there are different ways to 
restrict a man's available options without depriving him of or interfering with his 
freedom. According to Hobbes (1968: 262) only a certain class of impediment can limit 
freedom and it does not incorporate any reference to a person's doing what he wants. 
For Hobbes someone might very well be rendered unfree to do what he dislikes. In this 
sense being free is fundamentally a matter of doing what one wants to do 
(Frankfurt, 1988: 137). Parent (1974b: 151) believes that interfering with a person's 
desires, though sometimes sufficient to curtail his freedom, is not necessary. This means 
that non-interference is all that is necessary to be free and it has nothing to do with 
one's desire to do something. Berlin's definition implies that one way to render a man 
free is to extinguish all his desires, which is not acceptable. As this definition has been 
heavily criticised, in his latest work Berlin (1969: xxxix), appears to reject his old 
definition and maintain that freedom properly conceived is the absence of obstacles, 
resulting from alterable human practices, to possible choices and activities. 
Another criticism can be levelled at the negative definition regarding the notion of 
interference. According to Berlin (1969: 122) and other defenders of the negative view 
of freedom, such as Hayek (1960: 19) and Plant (1999: 229), such interference must be 
deliberated. The notion of intention in Berlin's definition, according to Parent 
(1974b: 159), is irrelevant to the question of freedom; X cannot be unfree only through 
the intentional actions or omissions of others. In Dixon's (1986: 18) view, we live in 
complex social structures in which the intentions of legislators and others are not 
always and everywhere fully realised. In this sense X can be unfree by both intentional 
and unintentional actions. This might lead one to accept that all natural impediments are 
restrictions on freedom. However, White (1969: 192) and Dyer (1964: 445-6) disagree 
with Parent's argument. They think that unintentional action makes a person unable to 
do what he wants to do but not unfree. In this sense, Dyer's argument implies that there 
are no circumstances in which unintentional impediments can reduce freedom. This is a 
difficult issue to resolve. Both arguments are persuasive but each of them entails 
difficulties. Although others have offered some solutions even these solutions have 
some difficulties. Therefore, I will take Parent's view that interference by intentional 
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and unintentional action can reduce the individual's freedom because both actions 
prevent him from doing (or not doing) something he wants to do (or not). 
1.2.2. The positive concept of freedom 
The positive concept of freedom, according to Berlin, is the sense that "derives from the 
wish on the part of the individual to be his own master". I am free, in this sense, "if my 
life and decisions depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind". If I am 
free "the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will... a subject, not an 
object... moved by reasons, by conscious purpose, which are my own, not by causes 
which affect me, as it were, from outside... deciding, not being decided for, self-directed 
and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, 
or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of 
my own, and realising them" (1969: 1) 1). Freedom, in this sense, consists essentially of 
rational self-government (Dewey, 1942: 76). Christman (1991: 345-6) argues that. 
for an individual to be self-governing it at least must be the case that she is not moved 
by desires and values that have been oppressively imposed upon her, even if she faces 
no restraints in performing actions such desires motivate 
Similarly, Baier (1968: 83), Hospers (1967: 331) and Edwards (1969: 64) argue that an 
agent is free only if he/she is self-determined and self-controlled for his/her desires and 
actions. For Feinberg (1975: 159) "it is often said that the individual person is free when 
his ruling part or `real self' governs, and is subject to no foreign power, either external 
or internal, to whose authority it has consented". According to Lotz, (1994: 52), 
Berenson (1976: 115) and Waldron (1987: 132), to talk about freedom is to talk about the 
role an agent plays in the determination of his action. In Charvet's (198 1: 11) and 
Milne's view "to the extent that he directs his life wisely and prudently, he achieves a 
degree of self-determination and hence of personal freedom" (1968: 148-9). In Taylor 
(1979: 193), understanding the positive view of freedom argues that one must actually 
exercise self-understanding of what he wants and the nature of external and internal 
restriction on him, in order to be truly or completely free. Parent (1974b: 152), in his 
critique of Berlin's definition, mentions that the 
loss of rational self-mastery may well lead to but is not constitutive of unfreedom as 
we ordinarily conceive of it. Conversely, some prisoners might somehow manage to 
acquire an understanding of and control over their base criminal impulses through 
rehabilitation. These considerations indicate that freedom cannot be adequately 
elucidated as a rational self- mastery. 
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In Norman's view (1982: 91) positive freedom links with the possession of social and 
institutional power; with material and economic requirements; with the possession of 
education and acquisition of knowledge, power, wealth and education. "When people 
have access to social power, material wealth and education, they are in a better position 
to make choices for themselves and therefore enjoy greater freedom". Ramsay 
(1997: 40) argues that because positive freedom is concerned with identifying the 
ability, powers, capacities, opportunities and resources necessary for self-determination, 
or self-realisation, it is associated with an interventionist government and a wider role 
for the state in both public and private life. In this sense "the crude positive freedom 
concept seems to open the way for any dominant group to decide what is in the interests 
of the rest" (Jonathan, 1997a: 117). For Berlin (1969: 162-6) freedom increases when 
sovereignty is put into the right hands. In this view, then, the freedom of an individual 
depends on who has control. Indeed, a great deal of personal freedom might be 
impossible under authoritarian regimes. In this sense an individual's freedom can be 
sacrificed by a despotic government and can be diminished by a democratic government 
as well. In this sense, Dixon (1986: 17) argues that defining freedom in terms of self- 
realisation or self-mastery allows the possibility in theory at least that external control 
over individual desire can actually be justified in the name of enhancing freedom. 
Similarly, Ramsay (1997: 39) for the same reason also sees external control as an 
imposition of people's real selves over their actual selves. Plant (1999: 249), however, 
argues that the positive view of freedom is both paradoxical and dangerous: 
paradoxical, because it can justify the use of coercion to secure someone's freedom, or 
in the famous phrase of Rousseau to force someone to be free; and dangerous, because 
of the licence it gives a particular group who think that they know what is good for man 
to force these values on him in the interests of freedom. 
In the preceding section I have discussed in brief the main characteristics of the 
negative view of freedom and the positive one. Now I will consider whether it is true 
that there are two concepts of freedom, as Berlin suggests, or just one. 
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1.2.3. One concept of freedom or many? 
One of the most important criticisms made for the two concepts of Berlin's definition 
can be seen in Gray's argument. Gray (1991: 8) argues that negative concept of freedom 
does not imply who rules the other. Hence negative freedom is compatible with 
autocracy, provided the autocrat limits the extent of his/her interference. What matters 
for the positive concept of freedom is not the area of non-interference, but the fact of 
self-government. Hence positive freedom is compatible with extensive constraint, 
provided it is self-imposed. At their root, these two concepts of freedom - area of non- 
interference and self-government- may not seem very far apart, no more than negative 
and positive ways of saying much the same thing. Berlin (1969: 127-31) himself deals 
with this problem by employing two terms, which appear to signify the well-known 
contrast between freedom `from' (negative freedom) and freedom `to' (positive 
freedom). Gray (1991: 8), however, argues that these labels are quite unhelpful, since 
virtually any kind of freedom could be expressed in terms of either freedom from or 
freedom to. For Crocker (1980: 6) "the positive and negative liberty are not wholly 
different phenomena, and... the distinction has sometimes produced historical 
classifications of dubious utility". In this sense Feinberg (1980a: 5) and Teichman and 
Evans (1996: 119) suggest that freedom from and freedom to are two sides of the same 
coin, each involved with the other, and not two radically distinct kinds of freedom. For 
Nadia (1991: 41-2) and Feinberg "a free man all-told will be free on balance to do what 
is most worth doing and from those constraints most being without" (1975: 167). 
According to Hunt (1991: 300) the distinction is not between two types of freedom, but 
a distinction between two kinds of condition of freedom: the presence of enabling 
conditions of our capacity to pursue our interests; and the absence of countervailing 
conditions of such a capacity. In this sense freedom from implies no new freedom to 
other that the freedom to be without the thing one is said to be free from. The idea of 
two concepts of freedom has also been rejected by Feinberg (1975: 143-4) who argues 
that a man is free if he is, happily without impediment or constraint to a desire that he 
has or might have to do, or omit, or be, or have something in particular (---- is free from 
---- to do (or omit, or be, or have) ----). For Oppenheim (1981: 64-5) there is 
just one 
concept of freedom which he calls social freedom. He believes that social freedom is a 
relation between three kinds of factors which are determined in the following form: 
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with respect to P, R is free to do or not to do X if with respect to P, R is neither unfree 
to do X nor unfree not to do X. 
For Levine (1981: 36) "when A is coerced by B to do X, usually, A is rendered unfree 
by B not to do V. This means that there are two ways to say that an actor R is free to 
do or not to do X. The first is that P does not make it impossible for R to do or not to 
do X. The second is that P does not make it punishable for R to do or not to do X. Dyer 
(1964: 444) has a similar definition of social freedom to Oppenheim which is based on 
the same three factors R, P and X given below. Dyer's meaning of social freedom can 
best be understood by noticing what would be regarded as diminishing or impairing 
freedom. 
if R is forced to do X his freedom is impaired. It may also be impaired by R's being 
prevented from doing X. Now R cannot properly be said to be forced to do X unless it 
is impossible for him to do anything else instead. And he cannot be said to be 
prevented from doing X unless it is impossible for him to do it. 
The notion of impossibility has also been discussed by Day (1977: 261) and Steiner 
(1974: 33). Steiner says that an individual is `unfree if, and only if, his doing of any 
action is rendered impossible by the action of another individual. That is, the unfree 
individual is so because another prevents the particular action'. In this sense, 
Oppenheim, Dyer, Day and Steiner emphasise the relation between unfreedom and 
impossibility. In Dyer's thesis, R is unfree only if others by their actions or missions 
intentionally make it impossible for persons to do something they would choose to do. 
So is there one concept of freedom or many? Oppenheim's, Gray's, Feinberg's and 
MacCallum's arguments all claim that the two concepts (negative and positive) are two 
sides of the same coin. It seems that factor P is explicit (non-interference), factor R is 
understood as a human being and factor X is not explicit, but it is implicit, in that 
freedom is interpreted as interfering with a person's desires. This enables one to 
conclude, as Swanton (1979: 337-8) argues, that there is only one concept of freedom, 
which implies all three factors. 
From the above discussion, it can also be concluded that any concept of freedom has to 
explain the nature of each factor and the relation between them. If not, it will result in 
difficulties in understanding the concept in a theoretical and practical way. In 
MacCallum's (1967: 314) view, there is only one concept of freedom, but at the same 
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time it is important to recognise that there are a number of different conceptions of 
freedom, which Berlin vainly tried to polarise into two categories, but which stand on 
their own as alternative explanations of agents, obstacles and objectives. MacCallum 
challenges the view that it is possible and useful to distinguish between two kinds or 
concepts of social freedom (negative and positive concept). He argues that there is only 
one concept of freedom. In his view (1967: 314) social freedom of some agent or agents 
is always freedom from constraint or compulsion on, interference with, or barrier to 
doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something. Social freedom is thus always 
of something (an agent or agents), from something, to do, not to do, become or not 
become something. It refers to a triadic relation whose form can be schematised as 
follows: 
X is (is not) free from Y to do (not do, become, not become) Z. He argues that 
freedom of agents can be meaningful and rationally assessed only after each terns of 
the triadic relation is specified or at least understood. 
According to MacCallum's view a genuine statement about freedom always contains 
three elements: (a) of something (the agent - X); (b) from something (the constraint -Y); 
(c) to do or to be something (the objective - Z). Concerning the freedom of agents, 
MacCallum (1967: 320) argues that it can be meaningful and rationally assessed only 
after each term of the triadic relation is specified or at least understood. Nevertheless, 
MacCallum's definition of freedom focuses on two points; freedom from what and 
freedom to perform what activity. With respect to the second point MacCallum does not 
mean that one is only free to do something but also X is free not to do something. 
Steiner's definition (1974: 35) focuses also on the same point by saying that the agent 
cannot only be free or unfree with regard to those actions which he wants or believes he 
ought to do. He can equally be free to do actions which he does not want to do 
(Steiner, 1974: 35). Parent (1974b: 154) in his analysis of MacCallum's triadic relation, 
states that it is significant because it emphasises a much overlooked truth: translatability 
into the XYZ schema is a necessary condition of the intelligibility of any claim about 
social freedom. 
However, MacCallurn's definition has not gone unchallenged. He has been criticised for 
it in some areas; firstly, philosophers who interpret freedom as absence of impediments 
deny the claim that all genuine statements about freedom must contain the third of the 
three factors that make up the triadic- the Z factor. For example, Berlin (1969: xiiii) 
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suggests that someone may want to be free from something without aiming at any 
particular objective. According to Berlin a genuine statement of freedom must be 
regarded as basically a dyadic rather than as a triadic concept. However, it could be 
argued that freedom from constraints might be an end in itself (Skinner, 1984: 194). The 
views which deny the triadic statement claim that the meaning of freedom is different 
from the value of freedom, which is related to the third factor. It might be satisfactory to 
say that usually the need of freedom arises in order to do or not to do something. But 
there is always freedom to achieve particular objectives. For Crocker (1980: 6,10) "if 
freedom is a triadic relationship, then an argument about the ranges of the three 
variables is, in the most straightforward sense, an argument about which triadic relation 
freedom is". Therefore, he examines the truth conditions of sentences of the form of `A 
is free to do X. 
Secondly, for some philosophers the triadic formula eliminates conceptual issues in 
relation to freedom such as what is freedom from and what is an agent or constraint. It 
establishes X or Y or Z factors as conceptual issues. However, it does not help to 
resolve conceptual issues at the heart of debates about freedom, as there still remains 
controversy over the substantive meaning of freedom (Ramsay, 1997: 65). Focus on what 
the variables are, according to Gray (1991: 13-4) does not mean that conceptual disputes 
about the nature of freedom itself have disappeared. It may (and does) mean that dispute 
over the nature of freedom as a concept has ended, but it may not have ended (and does 
not mean that disputes over conceptions of freedom have ended). On the contrary, 
disagreements about what constitutes X, Y and Z factors are themselves a subsumed 
form of disputation about the nature of freedom. In this sense Parent (1974b: 154) claims 
to specify or at least be able to specify who is free from what conditions to perform 
what activity when freedom is used in a social sense. 
Thirdly, it is true that the triadic concept does not suggest the nature of freedom itself. 
Indeed, MacCallum has not eliminated all conceptual controversy about freedom. On 
the contrary, the essential conflictability of freedom as conception, not concept, is 
confirmed rather than removed by essential contestability of the term - variables. Weale 
(1983: 51), for instance, argues that MacCallum's triadic analysis does not in fact offer 
us a definition of freedom, but simply a specification of the form of sentence about 
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freedom with which an adequate definition should be consistent. From the above it is 
clear that the differences of opinion over freedom depend on different interpretations of 
what purpose of freedom counts as an agent, a constraint, or an objective. In this sense 
Kymlicka (1990: 146-7) argues that 
every claim about freedom, to be meaningful, must have a triadic structure-it 
must be of the form X is free from Y to do Z where X specifies the agent, Y 
specifies the preventing conditions, and Z specifies the action. 
Having analysed the meaning of the concept of freedom. I will now turn to specify the 
conditions of freedom. 
1.2.4. The required conditions of being free 
My purpose in the following pages is to examine the truth conditions of an individual 
being free from any constraints to do what he/she wants to do and how these conditions 
can make an individual's freedom worthwhile. It might be true to say that the meaning 
of freedom cannot be separated from its conditions. In this sense Gray (1991: 44) argues 
that conditions of freedom are so integrally related to the concept of freedom that they 
cannot be separated from it. The meaning of freedom necessarily embraces its 
conditions, and if someone ignores these conditions, he/she leaves out of account a vital 
part of its essential meaning. Freedom has a context, and that context includes the 
essential conditions under which it exists. 
1.2.4.1. Freedom and non-interference 
The main point in this section is to argue in more detail that being free from interference 
is a necessary condition for someone to be called free to do (not do) become (not 
become) what he/she likes. In my argument, I will discuss the notion of interference by 
other human beings. This means that I will not consider the argument about whether 
natural restrictions limit the individual's freedom or his ability. As my thesis is 
concerned with the learners' freedom in education at educational institutions, the 
restrictions on their freedom can be imposed by the government, teachers or parents or 
any social value. Therefore, the natural restriction does not apply here. 
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The traditional concept of freedom, according to Hobbes (1968: 261) is that "liberty or 
freedom signifies the absence of opposition". What Hobbes means by opposition is 
`external impediments of motion'. For Emmet (1968: 206) agents are free when their 
choices are not determined by forces from outside, that agents are free from external 
compulsions, that their decisions are made by themselves. Peters, however, disagrees in 
part with Hobbes' and Emmet's definition, especially, with the section which 
emphasises external restrictions as being the only restrictions on an individual. Peters 
(1966b: 180-4) believes that both external and internal constraints limit the scope of an 
individual's freedom. Similarly, Dewey (1938: 69), Taylor (1979: 176), (Dixon, 1986: 17- 
8) and Ramsay (1997: 55) seem to agree that freedom means the absence of constraints, 
but they do not agree with the neglect of internal obstacles. Therefore, it is important to 
specify what is meant by external and internal restrictions. By external restrictions, I 
mean, any kind of intentional or unintentional action by another human being, or by 
cultural and social arrangements. Ramsay (1997: 63) notes that lack of resources, 
abilities and opportunities, which are the result of inequalities in political, economic and 
social power, are also external obstacles to freedom. By internal constraints, I mean, 
any inability of the agent which results from lack of awareness, or false consciousness 
or repression, or other inner factors of this kind, as suggested by Taylor (1979: 176). 
Interference by others can also be exercised by making threats or offers. The argument 
about whether threats or offers limit freedom or not has been discussed widely by 
political philosophers such as Steiner. He believes that neither the making of threats nor 
that of offers constitutes a diminution of personal freedom (1974: 43). Oppenheim 
(1981: 63), Benn and Weinstein (1971: 201-4) and Day (1977: 257) believe that threats 
limit freedom but offers do not. Frankfurt (1973: 67-71) and Nozick (1969: 447-52) 
argue that both threats and offers limit freedom. But no one maintains that offers limit 
freedom and threats do not. Whatever the relationship between offers and threats and 
freedom, it is my contention that both offers and threats can limit an individual's 
opportunity of having freedom that is worthwhile. The next example illustrates how 
both threats and offers reduce the individual's opportunities. Let us take a situation in 
which a lecturer threatens his students by giving them the option of buying his book or 
failing in that particular subject. In that case, the students have the freedom of choice to 
not buy the book and be free. But in this case they have to take the risk of failing in that 
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particular subject. On the other hand, they can buy the book and forget about freedom. 
In the first response it is true that the agent can act freely and according to his own 
choice but in this case freedom loses its value to satisfy his own desires. In the second 
response the agent's freedom has been limited and also freedom loses its value for the 
individual. 
Similarly let us look at another example in order to examine whether making offers can 
reduce an individual's opportunity or not. For example, let us take the case of a poor 
student who can hardly afford to go to school. If this learner receives an offer from 
someone to work for him, his response might be to accept the offer although he wants to 
continue his studies, as he is in need of money. In this case the student might be 
described as free as he was free to make his own choice to accept the offer but actually 
his choice was impeded by his poverty. In such a case his freedom might not be of any 
value, as it does not enable him to do what he really wants to do. 
It might be concluded now that interference limits the individuals' freedom and their 
opportunities to have worthwhile freedom. However, this does not imply the demand to 
remove all the obstacles on the individual to enjoy absolute freedom. The unqualified 
demand of absolute freedom according to Barrow (1975a: 77) and Henderson (1958: 87) 
is unacceptable, as people's freedom is always in conflict. In talking about Hobbes, 
Pennock (1965: 103-4) notes that he [Hobbes]'valued security far more than liberty, and 
wished to define the latter in such a way that it would be at once widespread and of little 
importance'. "What a man primarily demands from civil society is protection; and he is 
willing to pay for this by forgoing whatever liberty it costs. But, of course, he would 
like to buy protection as cheaply as possible" (Watkins, 1973: 85). The claim of 
individual freedom in society is one in which each individual discovers himself only 
against the backdrop of the community, therefore, any conception of the individual as 
isolated from the community would be an illusory abstraction. Similarly, Barnes' 
(1980: 553) notes that, "freedom has no intrinsic connection with what is in conflict with 
what another wants, so, `X' should not do what he wants, because this is good for 
society". Freedom can never be absolute because what one wants to do might prevent 
`Y' from doing what he wants. It is thus extremely difficult to draw the line between 
one's freedom and another's. 
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"That this freedom is not absolute does not mean that it is non-existent" 
(Magid, 1941: 156). This conflict can only disappear if we say that every one will 
exercise his freedom in a way that will not impinge on the freedom of others or harm 
them. For Thomas (1972: 209) people should be free "to satisfy their wants unless... the 
satisfaction of one person's wants leads to the frustration of the wants of others". This, 
then brings us to the question of how freedom can be protected from those who cannot 
control themselves, strong people who take it for granted or from people whose acts are 
intrinsically immoral and, therefore must be punished irrespective of whether they 
affect anyone else or not. As Karasimenov (1994: 125), Berenson (1976: 119), Beard 
(1942: 8-9) and Gill argue laws, rules, principles, norms and rights are intended to 
protect freedom (1972: 10) and can be seen as a means of organising the way people live 
in a society, especially, if we consider that acting freely does not imply that one's acts 
have to be right. Freedom is necessary but it involves freedom to do wrong and to make 
mistakes and social progress depends upon this. 
One of the biggest problems in defining freedom in terms of non-interference is that it 
demands us to limit the role of the state in securing a framework of mutual non- 
coercion and to protect individuals rights and civil liberties. Graham (1982: 113) 
believes that there is no justification for obedience to the state. However, individuals 
cannot exist outside society, therefore, they are necessarily subject to law 
(Stankiewicz, 1993 197), and (Brenkert, 1991: 65). "No government can afford to let 
everyone do as he likes; anarchy is not a practical policy in any existing society" 
(Hannay, 1939: 1). Because as Russell (1942: 236) argues, when men are lawless only the 
strongest are free, and they, only until they are overcome by someone still stronger. In 
this sense (Barrow, 1975b: 97) and Komba argue that "although liberalism espouses 
individual choice, it recognises the inevitability of state authority as protector of the 
common good" (1990: 196). "Man can never live socially without some kinds of 
authority and organised systems of behaviour" (Deininger, 1965: l21). Thus, Mill 
(1974: 68), offers a solution to the problem through the principle of self-protection 
where society has the right to delimit the individual's freedom or punish him, in case his 
action harms other people. In Mill's view, self-protection could be a law. In relation to 
this, Russell (1942: 236), Kilcullen (1981: 292), Dworkin (1987: 243) and Peters 
(1966b: 186) note that laws 
are not made primarily to restrain those who follow the moral law within: they are 
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made to protect ordinary people against those who acknowledge no such code or are 
free to abide by it only haltingly. 
However, "any society which observes the principle of freedom is at least minimally 
emancipated" (Barnes, 1980: 554). The law, in this sense, does not limit the individual's 
freedom. On the contrary, it protects the individual's freedom from other people who 
exercise licence. For Gray (1981: 77) rules possessing certain formal attributes cannot 
restrict freedom inasmuch as they cannot be treated as truly coercive. Furthermore, the 
law may be a necessary condition for liberty, since one man's freedom depends on the 
law's restraints on others but the law must restrain some to protect the liberty of 
others, as liberty cannot mean submission to law (Benn and Peters, 1973: 213). 
In this sense, freedom may be sacrificed in the interests of promoting social harmony, 
full employment, equality of opportunity or some other perceived socially desirable 
end. In this sense Barry argues that for the benefits of freedom to be enjoyed there must 
be a legal framework within which action can take place. The existence of a legal 
system means that one person's freedom is another's restraint (1995: 212-3). Then, if 
both internal and external obstacles prevent the individual from doing or not doing 
something they limit the individual's freedom. The impediments must satisfy three 
conditions to be restrictions on freedom. The impediments must be imposed by a human 
being; and it must prevent the agent from doing or not doing something with impunity 
and whether the person imposing the impediment does so deliberately or not. 
1.2.4.2. Freedom and availability of making choices 
Those who agree that negative freedom refers to the absence of interference see a 
simple or direct relationship between the range of available alternatives and the extent 
of freedom. According to Norman (1982: 87), Kelley (1984: 110) and Weiss (1942: 186) 
unless agents can choose freely, their actions are not really free. Freedom of choice is 
not freedom of action; it is its pre-condition. However, Partridge (1967: 224) does not 
agree that freedom will exist only where there exists the possibility of choice, and the 
possibility of choice in turn implies not only the absence of direct coercion and 
compulsion but also that the availability and the characteristics of alternatives must be 
capable of being known. For Carr (1982: 39) 
it cannot be said that [a man] is free to do as he wants if all alternatives to a given 
course of action are denied him - if he either lacks opportunities to do otherwise, is 
physically disabled or psychologically impeded from doing otherwise, 
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or is, in some other fashion, constrained from the pursuit of any other course of action. 
For Crocker (1980: 36) if someone is not in a position to choose to do X, then he/she is 
not in a position to do x at all. Similarly, Hayek (1960: 17), Oppenheim (1981: 67) and 
Plant (1999: 248) the lack of opportunities does not limit an individual unless it is done 
intentionally to make it impossible or punishable for the individual to do or not to do 
something. On the other hand, those who agree that positive freedom is a process of 
choosing and acting on one's own initiative have been inclined to assert that a man is 
free only when he is actually allowed to choose, exercise his initiative and act 
deliberately or responsibly. For Mill (1974: 123) the conception of freedom is firmly 
rooted with the notion of choice: 
he who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no 
need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses to plan 
for himself employs all his faculties. 
Thus, an agent who has been so moulded and manipulated always wants what his ruler 
or superior wants him to be is hardly surprising. From the above discussion it becomes 
clear that defining freedom in terms of the availability of making choice is unacceptable 
to proponents of both negative and positive freedom. However, both sides agree that 
there is a direct relation between freedom and the availability of choice in terms of the 
value of freedom. This means that freedom becomes more worthwhile with the 
existence of wider possibilities for choices and individual initiative, which was what 
MacCallum considered to be factor Z in his triadic statement. In his latest work, Berlin 
(1969: liii) also argues that the lack of opportunities and options restricts the worth of 
freedom, but not freedom itself. On the other hand, Weinstein (1965: 158-160) and Gray 
(1991: 31) claim that the more numerous the alternatives are, the greater the freedom is. 
Therefore, Barry (1995: 210) argues that freedom requires positive action from the state 
to increase the opportunities of individuals. State action is said to increase freedom and 
not merely to reduce inequality. The main issue, which arises out of the availability of 
choices, is the question of which choices are relevant to freedom. Some choices, such as 
killing people are not relevant to freedom. In the general sense of freedom of choice 
which has so far been considered "a decision is free merely because it proceeds from 
the self and not from any external conditions" (Stout, 1940: 221-2). 
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1.2.4.3. Freedom and having ability 
Liberal people who define freedom as the absence of restrictions, as mentioned earlier, 
such as Parridge (1967: 222), Steiner (1974: 35), Day and Oppenheim completely reject 
the conception of freedom as ability. As Day (1970: 180) points out that "the truth of A 
can do D is a necessary condition not only of the truth but also of the falsity of A is free 
to do D. That is to say, if somebody is able to do some thing, but is prevented by 
another person or group from doing what he wants, in this sense, he is not free despite 
having the ability to do whatever it is that he wants to do. By the same token, if he does 
not have the ability to do what he wants and nobody prevents him from doing it, then, 
the question of freedom does not arise. For Neely, (1974: 34) agents are free to do only 
those things which their skills permit. Although Oppenheim (1981: 67) agrees with Day 
and Neely that freedom does not imply ability; nor does ability imply freedom, he 
believes that one is still free if he does not have the ability to do so and nobody prevents 
him from doing it. Plant (1999: 228) argues that if there is link between freedom and 
ability, then the degree to which an individual is free will depend on whether a person is 
able to fulfil his or her desires. This can be seen to make freedom variable between 
individuals. The degree to which each individual is free then turns upon the relationship 
between our desires and our abilities which is a subjective matter, rather than the 
objectivity which comes with the idea of coercion as an intentional action, rendering it 
impossible for someone to have done what he or she would otherwise have done. In 
addition, if freedom is our capacity to satisfy our desires then this could mean, as Neely 
(1974: 38) has argued, that one could become freer by eliminating or reducing a set of 
desires which one did not currently have the capacity to fulfil. 
However, there is one situation in which it is legitimate to equate lack of effective 
ability with unfreedom. This is the situation in which the lack of effective power in 
question is caused by human agency. For Vihvelin (1990: 374-5) there is distinction 
between having an ability and being able to. "An agent is able to do X just in case she 
has the (unconditional and categorical) ability to do X and there is, on the occasion, no 
impediment to the exercise of the ability". If, for example, a poor student can attribute 
his lack of ability to the fact that the educational system has been rigged against people 
like him, then lack of effective ability is equivalent to unfreedom. On the other hand, for 
some writers, especially defenders of positive freedom, freedom is synonymous with 
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the ability: the possession of freedom presupposes the possession of ability, and vice 
versa. It seems that liberals who uphold this distinction want to make clear a conceptual 
distinction between freedom (not being restrained) and the conditions which make 
freedom worthwhile. In other words, it focuses attention upon the issue of how freedom 
can become a reality rather than a formality. Ability is essential if an agent's freedom is 
to be valuable or meaningful to him/her (Parent, 1974b: 164). For Benson (1987: 312) 
free action demands ability to do otherwise in the ordinary sense. When one performs 
an action freely one has a certain control over whether or not one performs it. But one 
can have that control only if one would intentionally refrain from the action in all 
likelihood upon setting oneself resolutely to do so. 
Rawls (1972: 204) and Simpson (1977: 5) state that the inability to take advantage of 
one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance are not among the 
constraints of freedom, they ought to be interpreted as affecting the worth of freedom, 
or the value of freedom to individuals. According to Gray (1991: 45) there is a 
straightforward correlation between a person's ability and the value of freedom to 
which that ability gives access. Although I do not consider freedom and ability to be the 
same, on the other hand an individual's freedom requires ability in order for him/her to 
enjoy and exercise a high degree of freedom and satisfy his/her desires. However, this 
does not mean that ability is a necessary condition to be free or unfree. But it is a 
necessary condition to have worthwhile freedom. That means worthwhile freedom can 
be seen as having ability. Having ability is seen by McCloskey (1965: 504) as a 
necessary condition of freedom rather than synonymous with it. Accordingly, Gray 
(1991: 44), concludes that although free is not identical to can, free does imply can and 
that the two notion are necessary related, in that an increase in ability entails more 
freedom, and a reduction in ability entails less freedom. 
The conclusion might be drawn from the previous section that non-interference (by 
human beings and social values) and the availability of making free choices are 
necessary conditions for someone to be called free and exercise freedom. However, 
having a variety of options and ability to perform such actions can be considered as 
conditions for someone to have and exercise greater freedom rather than being free. In 
talking about the purpose of the current study I will consider that non-interference and 
the availability of making free choices are necessary conditions for learners to be called 
free in their education. In addition, I will consider having a wide range of alternatives 
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in education as a necessary condition for learners to find out their interests to be able to 
decide what they want to do with their lives. With respect to the notion of ability and its 
connection to freedom it might be possible to argue that it has no place in talking about 
the conditions of learners' freedom. This is because, unlike adults education for young 
learners, it is mostly about building and developing their ability to be able to do what 
they want to do with their lives by allowing them freedom. 
1.2.5. The value of freedom in western liberal thought 
According to Ellrod (1992: 137) and Feinberg "it would be impossible to demonstrate 
that freedom is good for its own sake" (1980b: 20). Thus, Carter, (1995: 845) argues that 
"freedom is valuable as such, or as having value independently of the value of things it 
leaves us free to do". There are others arguments, by for example Mill (1974: 72-4), 
Feinberg (1980b: 20-2) Ellrod (1992: 137), Kymlicka (1988: 183-9), Crocker (1980: 116) 
and (Norman, 1987: 9-11) that imply that freedom is instrumentally, unconditionally or 
intrinsically valuable. For Crocker (1980: 116) 
liberty is valuable because it is a non-casual precondition of autonomy. Without 
something to choose, one cannot go one's own way. Since, excluding causal 
consequences, there is no reason one ought not to desire liberty and since, in the 
absence of such reasons, it is rational for the desire for autonomy to extend to this 
necessary condition, liberty is itself intrinsically valuable. 
For Ellrod (1992: 137) 
freedom is primarily an instrument good, a power which is good insofar as it allows us 
to attain something else which is good in itself, and this is why it must guide itself by 
reference to some independent standard. 
Discussing the value of freedom in terms of instrument will be compatible with the 
purpose of this study that su Bests that allowing learners freedom in education is an 
instrument to help them to do or become what they want according to their interests. In 
others words the more learners exercise their capacity to make choices and decisions, 
the more they are free, the more valuable their lives are. In this sense Sutton (1978: 108) 
argues that "the value of choosing for oneself resides not in the production of better 
decisions, but in the improved quality of life of the man allowed the opportunity to 
exercise his options". This might make them happy and might be followed by more 
achievement in their education. If freedom is merely absence of coercion as defined by 
negative libertarians, it is useful to question why it is important to be free from 
28 
constraints or coercion. As liberals believe in the intrinsic and ultimate value of each 
individual, they emphasise the value of individual autonomy, respect for individual 
judgement and the importance of individuals pursuing their own self-interested desires 
as they define them. Marshall (1997a: 47) and Norman (1987: 9) appear to consider this 
question when they claim that people need freedom to live a fully human life, to achieve 
human happiness, and to make their own decisions and judgements. 
A similar view is expressed by Plant (1999: 246) who says that the value of freedom is 
to be able to live a life shaped by one's own purposes and values, by one's own projects 
and ideas of what is worthwhile. The individual should be free from interference to 
pursue their own interests and their own conception of good. The only reasons for 
denying people freedom to make their own decisions, as noted by Mill, is when this 
harms others or when they are not fully rational. Mill (1974: 72) believes that the only 
freedom is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt 
to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. "This is to say, sane 
adults should be free from legal or social constraints to do what they want to, provided 
that their chosen actions do not adversely affect others" (Archard, 1990,453). 
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1.3. Meaning of freedom in Islam 
Having analysed the concept of freedom in western liberal thought, I am turning now to 
discuss freedom in Islam. I will build up my arguments in analysing freedom in Islam, 
starting with its meaning in the Qur'an and Islamic thought. With respect to the 
meaning of freedom in the Qur'an `the word free (hour) as an adjective, an adverb and 
verb is mentioned four times' (Rabah, 1986: 38). The word free as an adjective can be 
found in sura 2, verse 178 (PIRICG, 1985) "0 ye who believe! The law of equality is 
prescribed to you in cases of murder: the free for the free, the slave for the slave, the 
woman for the woman". In this sense, free individuals are legally different from slaves 
who belonged to their master and can not determine their own lives. Unlike free 
individuals no freedom is allowed to slaves to be free from interference by others and to 
make their own free choices and decisions. `Wherever the institution of slavery existed, 
the definition of freedom presented no difficulties. It is the legal status of free 
individuals as opposed to that of slaves' (Al-`Invi, 1983: 13). Sura 4, verse 92 uses the 
word free as a verb in "never should a believer kill a believer; except by mistake, and 
whoever kills a believer by mistake it is ordained that he should free a believing slave". 
This sura shows that freedom equates with life and slavery equates with death. From the 
preceding verses discussed above, it appears that the Qur'an considers freedom and life 
to be synonymous. According to the previous meaning of freedom in the Qur'an `it 
seems clear that it differs from the meaning in European terms and modern civilisation' 
(`Abud, 1979: 62). Although the Qur'an does not explicitly define freedom in terms of its 
meaning, restrictions, conditions and value, this does not mean that the issue has not 
been discussed. On the contrary, the core meaning of freedom and its value has been 
included in several places. This is why in the history of Islam, as will be argued later 
freedom was widely debated in Islamic thought. 
1.4. Meaning of freedom in Islamic thought 
The issue of freedom in the Qur'an can be seen in many verses although these verses do 
not especially mention freedom. This can be found by equating the freedom with the 
right to make free choices and being free from constraints for someone to determine 
his/her own life. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the issue of freedom in Islamic 
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thought that interprets the Qur'an to identify the meaning of freedom and its value. In 
the following pages I will discuss the meaning of freedom in Islamic thought in relation 
to being free from constrains and doing free choices 
1.4.1. Freedom means absence of constraints 
Islamic thought has defined freedom as the absence of any kind of obstacle or any form 
of interference. In this sense Qutb (1981: 40-54) mentions that `the true individual's 
freedom is being a slave to only Allah. Freedom means being free from fear, desires and 
a slave to social values'. For example, in sura 18 verse 46 it mentions that "wealth and 
sons are allurements of the life of this world: but the things that endure, good deeds, are 
best in the sight of thy Lord, as rewards, and best as (the foundation for) hopes". In this 
sense freedom means that no one has the right to compel any person to obey orders. `It 
is not possible for any human being unto whom God has given the Scripture and 
wisdom and prophet-hood that he should afterward have said unto mankind; be slaves 
of me instead of God' (sura 3, verse 79). 
Islamic thought finds freedom from interference is valuable for the individual to do or 
not to do something he wants. According to An-Na'im (1998: 225), "to be free means 
that there are `no physical constraints and to be secure in food, shelter, health, and all 
other preservations of life'. These physical or external constraints can be through 
someone's interference". In defining freedom, An-Na'im's points out that "if human 
beings are not secure in the preservation of life there is no obligation from any kind on 
them. They are still unfree because they obliged to obey others in order to feel secure". 
This can be considered to be a form of authority which is exercised without resistance 
from people. To say people are free means that "there is no class oppression, no pagan 
thoughts which had been imposed upon them, no ordinances and laws which had been 
imposed for the benefit of one group, or one class, over others" (Talegani, 1998: 47). 
According to An-Na'im and Taleqani, external restrictions can be social, cultural and 
political. Besides external restrictions there are also internal ones which have been 
neglected by previous views. Shari'ati illustrates one of these restrictions and called it 
the prison of the self. He argues that `it is possible for someone to liberate himself from 
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history, nature or an existing social condition with the help of science. He cannot, 
however, extricate himself from the prison of the self by seeking help from science, 
since the latter is the possession of the prisoner' (1998: 193). This idea leads to a 
definition of freedom in terms of desire. Thus, it is possible to say that an individual is 
free if that individual is not a slave to desires. "This means that man should not wish to 
obtain things that it may be difficult for him to obtain, this would force him to search 
after those things and leave him deprived of his liberty (Rosenthal, 1960: 85). 
There are restrictions on people's actions which prevent them from harming or 
offending others. If there are no restrictions, 'as the Mu'tazila shows, strong people or 
groups will exercise absolute freedom and authority against weak people or groups 
('Imara, 1984: 208-9)'. The prophet told his people that in the past in such a community 
'if the rich or strong one steals they would not judge him. On the other hand if the poor 
and weak person did it, they would judge him' (Farahat, 1986: 253). In fact, individual 
freedom is a fundamental right with a corresponding duty, namely, the proper exercise 
of such freedom. This means that there are some conditions or restrictions on the 
individual to protect others' freedom and not to restrict them. In this sense Al-'Alim 
(1970: 199) argues that 'there is no absolute freedom, it is a responsible freedom that 
increases by being aware of rules and necessities that determine life'. This leads to the 
fact that the state has the right to legitimate and apply law which makes all people, 
equal. However, 'Asfwr (1961: 80) argues that 'the authority of the state that aims to 
protect and organise freedom should be limited. Also, he points out the difference 
between protection of individuals' freedom and limitation of freedom in order to protect 
others' freedom'. Therefore, he further (1961: 82) argues that giving relative authority to 
the state does not guarantee protection of freedom but it might limit it. In this sense 
'freedom might be recognised as a lift the state offers to the individuals or 
organisations which has nothing to do with being free or not' 'Ali (1978: 174-5). When 
the state has the authority to protect freedom it will also have the authority to put 
obstacles to it. This leads to the fact that the state has the right to legitimate and apply 
law under certain conditions, which do not limit individual freedom. Firstly, the 
sovereignty of the law, which makes all people equal (Al-Bana, 1999: 101). Secondly, 
Al-Sanhuri (1952: 10) argues that the state should not have absolute authority, but it 
should have relative authority that it is necessary to limit the state's authority by 
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creating a constitution or declaration of rights determined freedom. Then the state's role 
will be limited to organising these rights and freedoms'. Also, `freedom should be 
protected by the judicial authorities. In case there is a conflict between state's authority 
and freedom, freedom should be the value to be protected' (`Asfwr, 1961: 86). Although 
it seems very difficult to recognise the line between protection of freedom and 
limitation of freedom, having a constitution and judicial authorities should limit the 
authority of the state and achieve more protection of freedom. 
In talking about being subject to absolute authority under shari'a (Islamic Law) to 
determine life's affairs, it is true that there are verses which order the Muslims to obey 
God, the prophet and those in authority over them. Some interpreters find a conflict 
between these verses. It might be true to say that obeying God and the prophet is a 
consequence of the individual's choice to believe in God or not. Also obeying those 
who are in authority has conditions mentioned in the Qur'an. Firstly, the individual is 
free to choose people who will be in authority over him/her. Secondly, the individual is 
free to evaluate, object to or remove the ruler. As long as the governor is fair the 
individual has to obey him. All these characteristics can be classified under the broad 
term Shurah that `takes into consideration people's rights and freedoms' (Al- 
Sharyda, 1999: 23). 
Moreover, in Al-Bana's view (1999: 101), because shari'a derives from the Qur'an and 
the Sunna, then, it is for everybody not for certain people. On the one hand this leads to 
a guarantee of the achievement of the first condition mentioned above. On the other 
hand, it is necessary to point out that someone might find the Islamic law limits his/her 
freedom because it derives from the Qur'an and the Sunna which it is not possible to 
follow because it is not compatible with the modern life. In this manner An-Na'im, and 
others point out that `it is true that shari'a is a restrictive view of human rights within 
the historical context and that it also ceases to be so justified in the drastically different 
context of the present'. However, Al-Qurashi (1986: 111-2), points out that `Islamic law 
can be revised to enable Muslims to seek to achieve their right to self-determination in 
terms of an Islamic identity, including the application of Islamic law, without violating 
the rights of others to self-determination'. However, this does not mean that all 
perceptions in Islamic law should be changed. It is only the idea of making 
33 
modifications in some parts that suits the present context without changing the 
fundamental principles. This is the case of an Egyptian society that has revised many 
prescriptions of Islamic law to be adequate for the needs of society and allow people 
more freedom to adapt Shari `a law to the context of the present. 
1.4.2. Freedom means the right to make choices 
In Islamic literature freedom has been equated with the notion of making choices. In 
this sense Khalaf-Allah argues that `people have absolute freedom to choose, otherwise 
the question of submission to God or somebody else will not arise' (1998: 43). It might 
be true to say that if someone chooses to believe in a particular religion, s/he will 
submit to that religion according to his/her free will. This submission does not contain 
any obligation from God. If the individual has absolute freedom to choose what religion 
to follow, then, s/he has to act according to his/her choice. In other words, the meaning 
of submission will not conflict with the meaning of freedom. In fact, submission in this 
case equates with absolute freedom to choose. However, as Al-Khwli (1990: 55) notes, 
`this submission is not absolute, as the individual has a variety of options open to him'. 
Islamic thought, in relation to the notion of being a chooser or not, can be divided into 
three doctrines. 
According to the Fatalism doctrine `an individual has no power over his action. He/she 
has no choice in their actions. Also they believe that God has determined everything 
even reward and punishment' (Rabah, 1986: 62). This doctrine cannot accept that the 
individual is a creator of his/her choices. This is because it conflicts with the idea that 
`there is one creator who is Allah that creates human's action' (Al-Shahristani, 1976: 87) 
and (Al-Bughdadi, 1978: 199). The defenders of this doctrine find their evidence in some 
verses that show that the individual has no freedom of choice. For instance, verses such 
as, "say, nothing will happen to us except what Allah has decreed for us" (sura 9, verse 
51). "Say I have no power over any good or harm to myself except as Allah willeth" 
(sura 7, verse 188) and (sura 32, verse 13) as well as (sura 74, verse 31) are some of the 
verses interpreted in this way. By explaining these verses in this manner, they show that 
`the individual has no freedom to make choices. Because everything that happens in the 
world was written down in the distant past' (Al-Shahristani, 1976: 83-88), (Al- 
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Bughdadi, 1987: 99) and (Diraz, 1982: 184). Sometimes this is said to be the direct work 
of God, sometimes it takes place through a Pen writing on a preserved table (Lawh 
Mahfuz). 
The Mu'tazila doctrine is completely opposed to fatalism and believes in the absolute 
free will of the individual (Gar-Alla, 1984: 98) and (Al-Fakhwri and Al-Bahr, 1957: 163) 
In this sense the action belongs to the individual him/herself ('Imara, 1984: 91). In 
Talking about Muhammad `Abdu, `Irrara (1980: 156) says that God has given the 
individual a mind and the ability to think and the freedom to choose and act, otherwise 
he will be like an animal. Mu'tazila's new interpretation, for instance, emphasises the 
individual's free will to make choices, which can determine his life as follows: (a) If the 
individual does not enjoy free will, then why does God make the individual responsible 
for his actions, create rewards and punishments? (Subhi, 1982: 148), (Madkur, 1976: 117) 
and (Nadir, 1950: 105); (b) Why does God send prophets and advise people? 
(`Imara, 1988: 98-9); (c) The Mu'tazila's interpretation suggests that certain verses in the 
Qur'an have been interpreted out of context. However, in the context in which it was 
written, it seems to be meant for non-believers who have the freedom to think and 
choose, but who choose not to believe. In life, they have the freedom to choose but will 
be judged by God after death (`Imara, 1988: 98-9); (d) The ability of the human being is 
insufficient to do particular things, which God can do. This means that the individual 
can make his own choices according to his ability (Al-Nashar, 1981: 436). The defenders 
of this doctrine find their evidence in some verses that show that the individual has the 
right to make his/her own choices. For example, "say, the truth is from your lord, let 
him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject (it)" (sura 18, verse 29). "We showed 
him the way: whether he be grateful or ungrateful" (sura, 76, verse 3). Also this right is 
mentioned clearly, in sura, 10, verse 108, sura 41, verse 46, sura 74, verse 38. In this 
sense `Abud (1979: 66) states that `freedom does not mean to do what one wants, it is 
the right to make a responsible choice in the light of the religion's limitation'. 
Interpreters of these verses such as Qutb (1983: 24) and Aibn Hazm (1975: 23) believe 
that 'man has power over his actions. Also, they believe that the individual has freedom 
of choice'. Mankind was not born good or bad, free or slave. Nothing makes an 
individual good or bad unless the individual so chooses. God gives everyone the 
potential to be what s/he likes. The Qur'an mentions that "by the soul, and the 
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proportion and order given to it; and its inspiration as to its wrong and its right; truly he 
succeeds that purifies it, and he fails that corrupts it! " (sura 91, verses 7-10). Human 
beings are not absolutely bad, so they have to be punished or controlled and vice versa. 
Human beings are mixed between bad and good and have their own minds to choose 
what they prefer to be. 
The contrast between the Qur'anic conceptions of human freedom and being a chooser 
can be concluded by answering the following two questions. Is it true that agents must 
be responsible for their action because they were the ones who chose to do them? Or are 
agents so completely subordinate to this overruling power of God, that they cannot do 
anything unless God wills it, at least in the sense of permitting. In answering these 
questions the Qur'an mentions in sura 33 verse 72 that God did indeed offer the 
responsibility to heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused to undertake 
it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook it. This means that human beings are 
responsible for their lives. In this sense Saliba argues that to be responsible for one's 
life freedom is an essential condition. In other words the restricted agents can not be 
asked to be responsible for their actions (1972: 768). Similarly Al-Hababi (1972: 22) 
mentions that to call someone responsible means that he/she is rational, mature and free 
to determine their own lives. This leads us to maintain that human beings are free to 
enjoy self-determination. However, it seems that there are some actions that agents 
cannot be free to do. In this sense Aibn Rushd states that human actions can be 
classified into two styles; there are some actions over which individuals have no power 
and some others actions over which individuals have power (Aibn Rushd, 1964: 228) and 
(Al-'Iraqi, 1980: 99). For example individuals have no power over their bodies, for 
example, they can not stop their heart beating but they have freedom to determine their 
lives' affairs. The defenders of this belief called Al-'Ash'ari reject the idea that 
individuals have absolute freedom to do what wants. They also reject the idea of being 
completely unfree (Al-'Ash'ari, 1928: 52) and (Zydan, 1982: 191). They believe that 
individuals have free will to choose between alternatives, but that these choices are 
determined by the will of God (Al-'Ash`ari, 1928: 52) and (Al-Ahwani, 1962: 156). 
According to `Abd Al-Sattar (1973: 108) this group believes in the doctrine of 
acquisition, whereby all acts are created and produced by God but attach themselves to 
the will of the man who thus acquires them. In Rahman's view (1979: 92) Al-'Ash'ari 
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confirmed the absolute power and grace of God as orthodoxy had maintained it. All acts 
take place by the will and good pleasure of God, whether good or evil. 
1.4.3. Freedom does not mean ability to do such actions 
Freedom and ability are two different things but it might be true to say that having the 
ability makes the freedom one has more worthwhile. Shari'ati points out that the 
individual can liberate him/herself with the help of science (1998: 193). Although it is 
clear that progress in science increases the ability of the individual to remove some of 
the restrictions, this does not in any way suggest that the individual was unfree before. 
Similarly, the Mu'tazila finds that ability is not analogous with freedom. It is their view 
that ability is not more than a means to make right choices and achieve them (AI-`Iraqi, 
1979: 160-161) and ('Imara, 1984: 92). If freedom and ability were the same then only 
God would be free in this sense because only God would be able to do all that he is free 
to do. Also it should not be overlooked that there are many types of inability which it 
would be absurd to regard as restrictions on freedom such as being unable to fly. 
Mu'tazila finds that `in order to exercise freedom individuals have to act according to 
their ability. The only limitation to freedom, then, is what God forbids' (Al- 
Qazwyni, 1981: 143). 
1.4.4. Women's freedom in Islam 
The significance of discussing women's rights in Islam is to find out if there are 
religious obligations and restrictions that place women in an inferior position to men. 
As a consequence, they would have less freedom to obtain the same rights to be equal to 
men. In other words, if the following arguments indicate that women have less rights 
and freedom in any field than men have, then, it will not be possible to inquire gender 
equality in claiming freedom for girls to be equal to boys in education. 
Some scholars make much of the fact that women have less rights and freedom than 
man. Maybe this is true if they look at certain verses in the Qur'an in isolation, but not 
if they take an overall view. There are no special considerations set out for the male sex 
to show that in the eye of God they are deserving of special considerations. God does 
not differentiate between them for his esteem. The difference might come from man- 
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made law or some people's interpretation in favour of the conservatives. It has nothing 
to do with a woman's faith or her intelligence. In no way was the inequality between a 
helpless slave and powerful free man a result of mental or spiritual deficiency so that 
inequality between man and women should result from her mental and spiritual 
capacity. It might be necessary to argue that Qur'an does not mention any differences 
between women and men. Firstly, Women and men are equal and God in his book 
speaks to them without any differences. For example the Qur'an says, for Muslim men 
and women, for believing men and women, for devout men and women, for true men 
and women (sura 33, verse 35) 
Secondly, as far as opportunity is concerned, in Islam there is equal opportunity for both 
men and women. I refer to sura 4, verse 32 "To men is allotted what they earn, and to 
women what they earn". An example can be shown in sura 36, verses 34-35, "we 
produce therein orchards with date-palms and vines, and we cause springs to gush forth 
therein: that they may enjoy the fruits of it". According to Bhutto (1998: 108) "God does 
not give fruits, orchids, or the fruit of the soil just for men to enjoy; he gives it for both 
men and women. What there is in terms of income and opportunity, is available to both 
man and woman". 
Thirdly, As far as forgiveness and reward are concerned, similar conditions are set 
down for both men and women. I refer to sura 33, verse 35 "for Muslim men and 
women, for believing men and woman, for devout men and women, for true men and 
women, for men and women who are patient and constant, for men and women who 
humble themselves, for men and women who give in charity, for men and women who 
fast, for men and women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage 
much in Allah's remembrance, for them has Allah prepared forgiveness and great 
reward. Finally, if it is a matter of giving advice, entering paradise, giving punishments, 
being responsibility and behaving toward parents, again emphasis is laid on equality 
between men and women. I refer to sura 9, verse 71, sura, 31, verse 8, sura 5, verse 38, 
sura 24 verse 2, sura 41 verse 46 and sura 17, verses 23-4. 
In most of the articles written against women and their liberation, the authors boast of 
the fact that in his Holy Qur'an, God favoured men over women - mind and soul - in 
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three different matters. Firstly, God makes a women entitled to inherit only half of what 
a man inherits. Secondly, God considers her testimony (legally) worth only half of man. 
Thirdly, he allowed a man to marry up to four wives and divorce them at will, without 
their consent. These will be discussed in more detail. 
Firstly, inheritance law gives twice the amount to a son, and half the amount to a 
daughter (sura 4, verse 11). According to Bhutto it is made abundantly clear that the 
"woman's share is for the use of the woman alone. A man gets two thirds. One-third, 
the equivalent of third that a man gets is to provide provision for his wife and children. 
This is the obligation on the man. He gets that extra share so that he can provide for the 
family, the wife and the children. The wife is not responsible for the welfare of the 
husband and children. The wife is not even responsible for suckling her own child. If 
she chooses not to suckle her child, she does not have to. If she chooses to suckle her 
child, it is for the husband to supply her with provisions" (1998: 108), for instance, the 
Qur'an says, "for parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each if the deceased is left 
children. " (sura 4, verse 11). "It does not say the father must get double and the woman 
must get half' (Bhutto, 1998: 108). It does on again to make an equal application when it 
says in sura 4, verse 12 "if the man or woman, who has left neither ascendants nor 
descendants, but has left a brother and two brothers and sisters, they shall share (one 
third of the estate after payment of legacies and debts)". Moors (1995: 48-49) states that 
"anthropological literature on rural areas, on the other hand, emphasises the great divide 
between Islamic law and inheritance practices, with women often not receiving their 
share in the estate". Similarly, Granqvist (1935: 256) in his research indicates that in the 
1920s in Artas, "a village near Bethlehem, women rarely inherited. Still, this does not 
imply that urban women generally received their inheritance share while in the rural 
areas they consistently did not do so". For Gerber (1980: 233) not all town women 
inherited. Even if it is so, Moors (1995: 49) indicates that this depends on the nature of 
the property involved. Also it depends on other factors such as class, the absence or 
presence of competing heirs, and the stage in the life cycle. 
Secondly, the Qur'an says in sura 4, verse 3 `marry as many women as you wish, wives 
two or three or four. If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with them, then 
marry only one'. In verse 129 in the same sura, God says, that you are never able to do 
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justice between wives even if it is your ardent desire'. If God himself says that he 
doubts that someone can be equal, it is not possible to agree with any man can turn 
around and say that God has given him this right to get married more than once. 
According to Bhutto (1998: 110) it is not often that those among the vast Muslim 
population marry two, three, four wives. It is something that is related just to the 
privileged class. They can afford to do it. And they did not, as the capacity and the 
Muslim empire ruled, just marry two, three or four women, they went on to keep 
harems with hundreds of concubines. None of that had any thing to do with Islam, 
either. On the other hand, it might be true to say that this promotion gives the man the 
chance to marry another in case his wife has a terrible illness for example. In such a 
case he can keep the first one and marry another instead of having an illegal 
relationship. Also the first wife has the right to accept that or not. Women have the right 
to choose their husbands: if they are not happy with their spouse they do not have to 
keep them. When the divorce law is written, it is a contract of how you live together; 
you can write in the contract that "I want the right to divorce you"; you can write in the 
contract that in the event of divorce I want to be maintained according to the style that I 
am accustomed to". 
Thirdly, the Qur'an mentions in sura 2, verse 282 "get two witnesses, out of your own 
men. And if there are not two men, then a man and two women, such as you choose, for 
witnesses, so that if one of them errs, the other can remind her". Some scholars who 
interpret this verse argue that in case one forgets the other can remind her. This 
argument leads to describing women as weak, inferior, inherently evil, intellectually 
incapable, and spiritually lacking (Zein-ed-Din, 1998: 106). It is necessary to point out 
that there are several verses in the Qur'an and the Sunna that have to be interpreted in 
their historical context rather than looked at in isolation, because it leads to 
misunderstanding of their meaning. In this sense, it might be true that there are reasons 
behind making a woman equivalent to half man in the matter of testimony. First, 
`women in the past had not as much experiences and education as men to let her be able 
to take this responsibility. Second, the man had absolute authority over the women to 
oblige her not to say the truth. So if one could not say it, the other one could do so. 
Third, the position of woman was so bad by the time Islam came that it was difficult to 
make her equal to man in this matter' (Al-`Adli, 2000: 18,31,229). In this sense it might 
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be true to say that the matter has been left for people to change according to new 
circumstances and changes in life. This explains why it is not mention in the Qur'an that 
there are differences between men and women regarding their abilities to make rational 
decisions and act according to them. 
A woman has the same rights as a man not because there are no differences between 
them. If there are differences between man and women, they relate to the experience 
that the man has. The differences are not to do with their essential nature. According to 
Muhsin "the Qur'an acknowledges the anatomical distinction between male and female. 
It also acknowledges that members of each gender function in a manner which reflects 
the well-defined distinctions, held by the culture to which those members belong which 
has not restricted women by functions related to her biology" (1998: 131). It is true that 
there are functional distinctions between individuals, but these do not depend on 
specific values for males and females. Also "there is no term in the Qur'an which 
indicates that childbearing is `primary' to a woman. No indication is given that 
mothering is her exclusive role. Although it does not restrict the female to functioning 
as a mother, the Qur'an is emphatic about the reverence, sympathy, and responsibility 
due to the female procreator. However The Qur'an does not propose or support a 
singular role or single definition of a set of roles, exclusively, for each gender across 
every culture" (Muhsin, 1998: 133). In particular, several verses from the Qur'an indicate 
value in the functional distinction between individuals and groups. An individual or 
group can earn or be granted a `daragah' (step, degree or level) over another. The 
Qur'an specifies, for example, "to all are degrees (or ranks) according to their deeds" 
(sura 6, verse, 132). According to Muhsin, "distinguishing between individuals or 
groups on the basis of deeds involves problems with regard to the value of women as 
individuals. Although the Qur'an distinguishes on the basis of deeds, it does not set 
values for particular deeds. This leaves each social system to determine the value of 
different kinds of deeds at will. It does not matter how the deeds are divided between 
the males and the females (Muhsin, 1998: 133). The Qur'an acknowledges the need for 
variations when it states that the human race is divided "into nations and tribes that you 
might know one another: (sura 49, verse 13). It shows that the Qur'an does not divide 
labour and establish a monolithic order for every social system which completely 
disregards the natural variation in Society. The Qur'an does not specifically determine 
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roles, and the individual nations have not considered all the possibilities. (sura 4, verse 
34) "Men are Qmvivanni ra of women, on the basis of that God has (preferred) some of 
them over others, and on the basis of what they spend of their property (for the support 
of women)". `The verse says that the position between women and men is based on 
what God has preferred. Second what they spend of their property for the support of 
women. Many men interpret the above passage as an unconditional indication of the 
preference of men over women. Quwwamuna does not mean as some scholars think that 
men are in charge of the affairs of women or that the men are protectors and 
maintainers' (Al-'Adli, 2000: 67). However, `Imara (1995: 142) argues that even if there 
are differences and distinctions between men's and women's roles equality in rights is 
considered. 
Fourthly, it is not Islam which is averse to women rulers, it might be men. For example, 
`A'isha (wife of the prophet) after the death of the prophet, was responsible for many of 
the traditions that have been handed down to us (Bhutto, 1998: 110). The Qur'an does 
not mention any details related to this matter. Therefore, scholars who argue against the 
rights of women to share decision making and be politicians depend on one of the 
traditions of the prophet. They consider it as a good justification for their arguments. It 
says "Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity". This 
hadith is so important that it is practically impossible to discuss the question of 
women's political rights without referring to it, debating it, and taking a position on it. 
Mernissi (1998: 120) in her article has made a double investigation-historical and 
methodological-of this hadith and its author, and especially of the conditions in which it 
was first put to use. Who uttered this hadith, where, when, why, and to whom? She 
closed her investigation by saying that the religious scholars of the first century did not 
agree on the weight to give that hadith on women and politics (1998: 120). In talking 
about Muhammad `Abdu, Baywumi (1983: 113-4) argues that there are no restrictions 
that might prevent a woman from working as a politician. 
From the previous arguments women in Islam have the same rights and freedoms as 
men. Also Islam gives more freedom and rights to women than they had before the 
existence of Islam. However, the practices in many Islamic societies do not consider 
these rights and freedoms. Therefore, women are suffering from discrimination in the 
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favour of men. This means that many features of woman's freedom do not come from 
religious obligations or restrictions but they are political and social. 
1.4.5. The value of freedom in Islamic thought 
The different perceptions of freedom as liberation from restrictions, makes it necessary 
to ask the question what is freedom for? The notion of freedom in the Qur'an can be 
seen by equating freedom with the right to think freely. The Qur'an stresses the need for 
woman/man to `listen, be aware, reflect, penetrate, understand, and mediate. All these 
verbs refer to intellectual activities leading to a kind of rationalisation based on 
existential paradigms revealed with the history of salvation' (Al-Ghazali, 1984: 71) and 
(Zagzwq, 1996: 40). God says " do they not look at the camels, how they are made. And 
at the sky, how it is raised high and at the mountain, how they are fixed firm and at the 
earth, how it is spread out? " (sura 88, verses 17-20). Other verses such as sura 6, verses 
76-79 show that freedom to think is a duty to know God, and then, to decide to believe 
in him or not, according to the outcomes of this thinking. Also there are no restrictions 
on the individual's thinking or choices. `Man should not accept Islam with passive faith, 
without the active application of his intelligence' (Al-`Agqad, ND: 25). Rather, `it invites 
him to understand it, to meditate on it to the limit which human intelligence and reason 
permits, and it challenges him to find a way to deny its superiority, or find a work 
which could be its equal' (Wafi, 1980: 79). 
As An-Na`im (1998: 225) says, "the will to be free exceeds the will to live in that it is 
the driving force behind the pursuit of spiritual, moral, and artistic well-being and 
excellence. " Indeed the literature in Islamic thought stresses the value of freedom as a 
means to free the mind. Free will and freedom as Bazargan (1998: 77) notes are means 
to concentrate, think, decide, and move. As such, they are the tolls of extraordinary 
evolution and progress among human beings as compared to animals. According to 
Bazargan freedom is a necessary condition to think and act freely. shari'a according to 
Kurzman (1998: 23) encourages individuals to investigate and reflect. This is why the 
Qur'an does not mention every small detail. Therefore, even the Qur'an, the Sunna (The 
practice of the prophet) and shari 'a can be discussed, questioned and developed 
(Igbal, 1998: 263). The principle of thinking in Islam is known as ijiihad which it can 
considered as an independent judgement encouraging people to think and not 
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accept any other judgements. For instance, "when Mu'adh was appointed ruler of 
Yemen, the prophet is reported to have asked him how he would decide matters coming 
up before him. He is reported to have responded by saying, "I will judge matters 
according to the Book of God. " When he was asked what he would do if the book of 
God did not contain any guidelines, he had answered with the words "Then I will act on 
the precedents of the prophet of God. " But if the precedent fails, he had said, "Then I 
will exert to form my own judgement" ('Igbal, 1998: 256). In another sense Muhammad 
'Abdu points out that 'mind and critical thinking is not only a way to have faith in God 
and understand other subjects, but also to have independent judgement, particularly, if 
there is confusion in following the shat-Pa ('Abdu, 1998: 130). Further, 'Abdu sees ' 
ijtihad as a mode of thinking which is not only associated with religious interpretation, 
but also with life's affairs. Therefore, it requires intellectual freedom, movement and 
change to new interpretation of Islamic principles and all other human interests. It is a 
way to discover new views on life, [to feeling uneasiness in its presence]. Unfortunately 
the closing of the door of ijtihad turns great thinkers into idols. In this sense, everyone 
is free to appreciate his position, re-construct his social life in the light of ultimate 
principles, and evolve out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam, that 
spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam' (1998: 131). 
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1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to analyse the concept of freedom in western and Islamic 
thought to build a theoretical framework of the meaning of freedom, its conditions and 
value, which is necessary and important to construct a theoretical framework of the 
meaning, conditions and value of freedom in education for learners at school level in 
chapters two and three. Firstly, the analysis of the concept of freedom in this chapter 
indicates that the two traditions have similarities in relation to the definition of freedom, 
its conditions and value. 
(1) Both traditions point out that any definition of freedom should treats three areas; 
who should be free? What constraints should the individual be free from? And what 
is the individual free for? With respect to the first area, both traditions argue that a 
certain minimum degree of rationality is necessary for a person to be free. Who is in 
a position autonomously to choose to do or not to do, who has the desire to do or not 
to do something and who can determine his own life and make his own decisions. 
This means that both traditions argue against the freedom of the irrational person 
who cannot do so and accordingly cannot be responsible for his actions. Regarding 
the second area, both traditions consider that non-interference (intentional or 
unintentional) from others is a necessary condition to make an agent free. But in all 
such situations, when human begins are gathered together, it is completely 
unrealistic to suppose that individuals are ever, as a matter of fact, free to do what 
they like simply because of the inherent decency and good sense of all concerned. 
They are in fact free because some rule or other, in addition to the moral law, is 
effectively enforced which prohibits interference. The practical choice is never 
between simply doing as one likes and being constrained; it is rather between being 
subject to different types of constraint. From the point of view of freedom it is a 
better bet for the individual to accept a system of levelling constraints which limit 
his freedom of action but limit also the freedom of action of others to interfere with 
him, than to commit himself to a state of nature in which he runs the risk of being 
arbitrary coerced or subjected to merciless group pressure. 
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With regard to Islamic thought, it is argued that religious restrictions cannot limit 
freedom inasmuch as they cannot be treated as truly coercive, the individuals have 
absolute freedom to choose what religion to follow, then, they have to act according 
to their choice. 
Regarding the third area, the two traditions argue that freedom is valuable as such, or as 
having value independently of the value of things it leaves us free to do. There are 
others arguments which imply that freedom is instrumentally, unconditionally or 
intrinsically valuable for the individual to do or not to do something he likes. In other 
words the individual has the chance to make his own choices and decisions. Islamic 
thought stresses the value of freedom as a means to liberate the mind. Free will and 
freedom are means to concentrate, think, decide, and move. As such, they are the 
consequence of extraordinary evolution and progress among human beings as compared 
to animals. Reason, perception, will, and morality is the result of free will and freedom. 
According to this view freedom is a necessary condition to think and act freely. 
(2) Both traditions argue against the claim of absolute freedom. The unqualified 
demand of absolute freedom is unacceptable, as people's freedom is always in conflict. 
(3) The two traditions distinguish between freedom and ability. Both arguments do not 
consider freedom and ability to be the same, on the other hand an individual's freedom 
requires freedom in order for him/her to enjoy and exercise a high degree of freedom 
and satisfy his/her desires. 
The conclusion of this investigation means that implementation of the western concept 
of freedom in the sense it has been defined in the current chapter is not that different 
from the concept of freedom in Islamic religion and thought. Therefore, it might be 
possible now to make a decision to implement a western idea of freedom in education 
that depends on a western liberal concept of freedom in the Egyptian context without a 
feeling of unsuitability. In this sense Enslin (1999: 185) states that "liberalism ought no 
longer to be seen as a doctrine that is put into practice and developed only in western 
societies". 
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Secondly, it has been argued that women in Islam have the same rights and freedoms as 
men. Also Islam gives more freedom and rights to women than they had before the 
existence of Islam. However, in practice many Islamic societies do not consider these 
rights and freedoms. Therefore, women are suffering from discrimination in favour of 
men. This means that features of women's unfreedom do not result from religious 
obligations or restrictions but they are political and social. 
According to the analysis that has been made in the current chapter it might be difficult 
for someone to accept such a claim that learners at an early age have the same claim to 
freedom as adults. This refers to three important factors; the nature of the subject, the 
purpose of education and the sort of restrictions that might limit the learners' freedom. 
Therefore, the next chapter aims to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in 
education that will depend on the analysis of the concept of freedom it has been made in 
this chapter. This analysis will deal with the implications of freedom in education with 
respect to its conditions, restrictions and value in education. Through this analysis, the 
next chapter aims also to analyse and examine the learners' right to be free regarding 
their education. 
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Chapter Two 
The implications of the concept of freedom regarding its conditions, 
restrictions and value with respect to learners 
2.1. Introduction 
In the first chapter of this study I concluded that there was a possibility of implementing a 
western idea of freedom in education. This comes as a result of the analysis of the concept 
of freedom, its conditions and value that indicates that there are similarities between liberal 
western and Islamic political thought. Through this analysis and investigation the previous 
chapter built a theoretical framework of the concept of freedom and its conditions and 
value which would be required to build a theoretical framework of freedom in education. 
The aim of this chapter is to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in education that 
will depend on the analysis of the concept of freedom made in chapter one. This 
examination will deal with the implications of freedom in education with respect to its 
conditions, restrictions and value in education. Through this analysis the current chapter 
aims also to analyse and examine the learners' right to be free regarding their education. 
This is because it might be difficult for someone to accept the claim of freedom for young 
learners to be equal to that of adults. This refers to three important factors; the nature of the 
subject, the purpose of education and the sort of restrictions that limit learners' freedom. 
The analysis of learner's rights regarding their education in this chapter will deal with 
learners at school level. 
2.2. The implications of the concept of freedom in education regarding its conditions 
In chapter one I analysed the concept of freedom in relation to its meaning, conditions and 
value. With respect to the conditions that limit freedom, it was argued that the concept of 
freedom joins together two main components: first the absence of constraints upon or 
interference with, and second, the notion of availability of making choices. When analysing 
the implications of the idea of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, I will 
focus on the learners' right to be left free from interference with their interests and choices 
in their education. 
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2.2.1. Freedom in education and non-interference with the learner's interests 
According to the analysis of the concept of freedom in the previous chapter, non- 
interference (intentional or unintentional) from others is a necessary condition to describe 
an agent as free. The most important exception for interference is the prevention of the 
license of others. The claim for learners' freedom in education requires also that they 
should be left free to do (or not to do) to be (or not to become) what they want to be 
without interference from adults. With respect to children interference is not justifiable 
only for the prevention of license on others, which is, of course, an important exception. 
Despite remarkable stories of children surviving without adult help it is still the case that 
because of their size, inexperience and less-developed rationality they are more vulnerable 
than most adults and need protection and guidance. However, adults' right to make 
decisions for children's should be limited to making decisions in children's interests and to 
the provision of the necessary protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to 
rights over children, regardless of what is in children's interests. 
Amongst the important things children need to learn are how to find out information for 
themselves, study independently, pursue interests, make their own growth, and to build up 
their experience' so as to be able to make choices and decision for themselves. They cannot 
do this without having the opportunity to exercise freedom. In this sense Dearden (1972: 64) 
recognised that the child's growth is one of the main components of the value of non- 
interference with learners' interests and wants. In his view "only the child can do his own 
growing; there is no sense in which an adult can do it for him. In this sense development 
and growth is a process which is logically non-transferable from someone to another". 
Moreover, Dearden (1972: 75) argues that "growth is realising one's own pattern of 
potentialities and, thus, finding and forming one's own individual identity". Similarly, 
Downey and Kelly (1979: 24-5) argue that 
for the child to develop and function as a person. he needs to be treated as one. He needs 
to be able to develop the kind of self-concept that allows him to regard himself as of 
value. To treat children as persons in their own right... involves regarding them as 
responsible for their own actions and therefore having some control over what they do. 
According to Carr (1985: 60) 
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The child requires to learn to stand on its own two feet, but this will happen only if it has 
occasions for genuine discovery and experiment in which there is a real risk of failure as 
well as opportunity for success; for if it is to learn to accomplish what is right for correct 
it also needs room to experiences mistakes. 
Peters (1966b: 289) says that if learners are treated progressively, as persons, by being 
encouraged to plan their lives and to discover what is worth-while in spheres that are within 
their experience and competence, they will surely learn to be persons under a stable system 
of rules that guarantees a predictable environment. 
Gradually their sphere of discretion is widened as their experience and knowledge of right 
and wrong increase and their competence and control over themselves and their 
environment is enhanced. They do not learn this either by being conditioned like 
performing seals or by being allowed simply to do what they want. 
Another justification can be seen in Hopkins's (1979: 11-2) argument when he states that 
freedom to direct one's own learning and non-interference with learners' desires to learn 
what they want allows learners to reap the benefits of intrinsic motivation. For example, he 
argues that learners will engage in a learning activity if that activity holds the promise of 
attaining results or rewards that will satisfy his drives and desires. For Neill (1992: 104) 
preventing learners from being free to choose what they are interested in studying by 
interference means they will not be able to achieve the aims of what they are learning. In 
another sense Holt (1983: 175) rejects the ideal of schools and classroom as places where, 
most of the time, children are doing what adults tell them to do because there is no way to 
coerce children without making them afraid. Being afraid as Neill thinks will make the 
learner even after starting work "docile, prone to obey authority, fearful of criticism, and 
almost fanatical in his desire to be normal, conventional, and correct. He accepts what he 
has been taught almost without question; and he hands down all his complexes, fears and 
frustration to his children" (1953: 29). He further notes that giving learners freedom and not 
interfering with their choices leads the learner not to feel fear, which is the finest thing that 
can happen to a child. In his opinion this makes the child more free to express him self 
(Neill, 1992: 14). In this sense it might be argued that this type of individual will not be in 
charge to determine his life and take his responsibility towards the development of society. 
For the development of the child's personality, the learners' thinking should be left free 
from interference by others' thinking. It is the learners' right to think, investigate, examine 
and believe whatever they want to. They should also know that the only right opinion is not 
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necessarily the one that belongs to the people who are in a position to influence them, such 
as teachers, parents, writers and others. Young people in schools should be aware that there 
is no one reality or fact, or one way of doing something. This idea is supported for example 
by `Ammar, (1998a: 33) and Kingdone (1942: 145) who believe that the aims of education 
should be made to liberate the individual's thinking from the interference to exercise his 
own thinking, to be a free chooser and be independent in his thoughts and actions. 
Similarly, Macmunn (1926: 30) argues that "the unfree mind is the typical mind of the 
examine-combined formula with formula and fact with fact, but does not bring to its work 
that intensity of varied associations, sensory and emotional, present in the less formalised 
mind". 
Although Haldane (1942: 116) rejects the idea of complete freedom for children, he argues 
that 
children can, in practice, be given freedom at early age if their training is directed to 
teaching them the recognition of necessity. This means that they must be allowed to see 
and feel the consequences of their own actions 
Children should be given opportunities that allow their own experiences and other people's 
ideas and beliefs to influence their lives and development, but they do not need to be told 
who to be or what to become. From the previous arguments the defenders of the learners' 
right to be free regarding their education reject the idea of making the child fit the school 
instead of making the school fit the child. Therefore, they have paid serious attention to the 
claim for learners' freedom not to be subject to interference from others. For example, with 
reference to the philosophy used at Summerhill, Neill (1961: 114) points out that "the child 
should not do anything until he comes to his own opinion". He also believes that the child 
can develop himself if adults let him be without suggestion of any kind (Neill, 1992: 9). 
Further Neill (1992: 103) argues that the "community has the right to restrain the antisocial 
boy because he is interfering with the rights of others" but adults have no right to interfere 
with his/her choices and decisions. In Hopkins's view (1979: 48) non-interference in 
education means that 
there is no discipline or control aimed at determining another's behaviour in other ways- 
except for the prevention of license on others, which is, of course, an important exception. 
No individual can control another's beliefs. Every individual has the right to his or her 
own point of view, but he or she must protect the right of others to decide for themselves. 
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There is, then, no use of positive reinforcement or punishment, nor behaviour 
modification, aimed at determining or controlling another's actions-except, again, for the 
prevention of license on others. 
Similarly Rousseau (1950: 48-9), believes that a child should be nothing but a child: 
he feels his weaknesses, but not suffer through it; he must be dependent, but he must not 
obey; he must ask, not command. He is only subject to others because of his needs, and 
because they see better than he. No one, not even his father, has the right to decide for the 
child what is of no use to him. 
From the previous quotations basically the idea of freedom in education rests on a belief 
that children should have the same rights to determine their own lives as adults. The child 
should no more have to submit to an adult's preferences than the adult should to the child's. 
However, there is argument against that right which refers to the nature of the children, 
whereby they need to be interfered with for their own good. Gribble (1969: 160-1) argues 
that it may often be necessary to constrain children in schools and defends his position by 
referring to the intrinsic value of the development of rationality and understanding, and 
the need to exert authority and impose constraints in order to lead children to what is 
worthwhile. 
It might be argued that this justification destroys the necessity for freedom as a condition 
for learners to develop their rationality and understanding of things and people. It is 
important for learners' development to find out what is worthwhile for them instead of 
leading them to it by interfering with their thinking and actions. For Devi (1998: 172) no 
real and worthwhile education is possible without freedom in learning and teaching. In 
other words, learners must be free while participating in the dynamic process of education. 
Another argument is made by Chamberlin (1989: 63) who states that 
there are some circumstances in which we are justified in coercing people for their own 
good, and that anyone who is concerned about the welfare of others should not always 
stand by and watch them conic to some predictable and preventable harn. 
In Chamberlin' (1989: 51) view, "adults have the right to make decisions on behalf of 
children because they need protection and guidance, but this right has to be limited to 
children's interests and to the provision of the necessary protection and guidance". Dearden 
(1972: 56) distinguishes between giving learners the freedom to do what they want and 
giving them the chance to do what they need. Also Dearden notes (1972: 56) that to 
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motivate children by inducing or capitalising upon their states of need is something that 
should be regarded as immoral. Moreover, it might be possible to argue that the 
justification has been given by Chamberlin is an attractive one however, it does not give the 
adults the right to make decisions on behalf of children for the same reason. It is true that 
learners need guidelines and protection but this requires giving them the chance to act on 
their own with help from adults, not by giving them the right to interfere with their choices 
and decisions. 
The main problem in exercising interference with children is that unlike children, adults 
can refuse any kind of interference which prevents their freedom, and moreover, they have 
the ability to fight for their rights. The matter is more complex in the case of children, as 
more often than not, they are ignorant of their rights. Even if they are aware of them, it is 
unlikely that they would have the necessary ability to fight for them. Therefore, adults are 
able to exercise power and authority over children with or without protest from them. 
However, unlike what Neill believes that learners in schools could manage without adults' 
dictation and, perhaps, without direction. I believe that learners need suggestions from 
others, and that they should be given guidance and help rather than merely being interfered 
by adults. Young people need adults' suggestions to develop their full potential. For 
example, a child will intuitively know what he is interested in learning. But as Holt 
(1983: 175) points out, "he may not do it very well, but he can do it a hundred times better 
than we can. The most we can do is to try to help, by letting him know roughly what is 
available and where he can look for it". Likewise, MacCallister (1931: 535) argues that 
"learners desire greater freedom to explore un-trodden paths. But learners also need 
guidance and must be willing to receive help". According to Devi learners are free to study 
any subject they choose at any given time; but this freedom has to be guided; the learners 
should experience freedom; but it might be misused: the learners have therefore, to be 
watched with care, sympathy and wisdom; the teacher must be a friend and guide, must not 
impose himself, but may intervene when necessary (1998: 170). 
This leads us to argue that relationships should be an equal, co-operative give-and-take 
between children and adults just as they should be between adults. There is no doubt that 
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children start out helpless and dependent, but needing help and even needing some control 
at first to ensure safety are not the same thing as adult controls over how a child will 
develop, what he or she will make. There would be no need for interference if the 
relationship between adults and children were equal in terms of having the same right to be 
left free to think, choose, object and express themselves. "The relationship between adults 
and children does not suggest that children are not persons in their own right but the 
property of someone, if not the parents then the state" (Wringe, 1981: 94). According to the 
idea of freedom in education, the relationship between adults and children should not be 
one-way from adults to children. Freire (1998: 63) argues that "it is important to live the 
balance between harmonious experiences between talking to learners and talking with 
them". 
According to the idea of freedom in education analysed so far, it is the responsibility of 
adults to show learners what kind of opportunities and options they have, and what kind of 
consequences these will result in. Adults have a responsibility to help children to express 
themselves without exercising control over them. What adults can do is to listen to them 
and find out their interests, needs, frustrations and satisfactions about their lives and 
education. In this sense, Marshall (1997b: 94) suggests that "adults may have to be taught 
how to listen to children and how to seek their opinion without loading all the 
responsibility on to them". In conclusion, it might be noticeable that non-interference with 
learners' choices and decisions is a necessary and required condition for learners to 
exercise their freedom in education and get benefit from its value as it will be examined 
later in this chapter. However, adults' right to make decisions for children's should be 
limited to making decisions in children's interests and to the provision of the necessary 
protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to rights over children, regardless of 
what is in children's interests. 
2.2.2. Freedom in education and availability of making free choices and decisions 
As discussed in chapter one, the availability of making choices and decisions is one of the 
required conditions for someone to be free. Also discussed was the relationship between 
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freedom and the availability of choices in terms of the value of freedom. This means that 
freedom becomes more worthwhile with the existence of wider possibilities or choices. 
However, it is important to note that because of the nature of the subject here, which is 
young people, it might not be easy for someone to accept the claim of freedom of choice 
for learners especially at an early age. Therefore, In this section I will argue for the right of 
learners to make free choices and decisions. 
Hopkins argues that in an educational setting, "children have to be left free to learn, to 
make their own choices, and to stand on their own feet" (Hopkins, 1979: 47). Each 
individual should have the right to learn and become what he so chooses. Children should 
have the same right to freedom as adults. In terms of equal freedom, "the child therefore 
has claims to freedom co-extensive with those of the adult" (Spencer, 1970: 172). 
Restrictions on this right should be minimised and the opportunity to fulfil it should be 
maximised" (Hopkins, 1976b: 190). In Hopkins' view, to be free is to be a chooser; the 
capacity for choice will be compatible with the idea of personal autonomy, which is a 
development of some of the potentialities inherent in the notion of man as a chooser. 
Although the notion of freedom in education implies that learners need the right to be 
choosers, they need help at the beginning to be good choosers, especially, at an early age 
when they are still immature. Thus learners need open options and a variety of 
opportunities and suggestions from adults. As Rousseau (1950: 49) points out, children have 
to depend on things only in order to be good choosers and to learn to make good choices. 
Peters (1966b: 197) suggests that learners must live in a fairly predictable environment so 
that they can learn to make realistic assessments of the consequences. Hopkins (1979: 47), 
in his philosophy of freedom in education, says that 
learners should be left free to choose, to decide for themselves all things that affect only 
them. Others may influence their decision, but the individual makes the final choices. 
What one learns essentially affects only oneself. Indeed. to some degree, learning can be 
seen to affect how one fulfils one's responsibilities to others, but there are many ways of 
fulfilling one's social responsibilities allowing for a multitude of possibilities for what 
one learns. We may require that a person fulfils his or her responsibilities, but we have no 
right to require how he or she fulfils those responsibilities. 
It is noteworthy that freedom in education rests on a belief that children should have the 
right to determine their own lives as adults. The objection, as Chamberlain (1989: 109-10) 
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notes, which always arises here, is that children start out helpless and dependent, but 
needing help. Bantock (1970: 68) makes a similar point when he claims that "no child is 
free to choose by the light of nature alone". According to him, the "child's capacity 
depends entirely upon the choices that have previously been made for him, by other people 
to enable him to be free to choose anything". Thus, in this view, no child is free to choose 
until he is already `sufficiently disciplined to see the implications of his choice'. Similarly, 
Wringe (1981: 110) argues that children's freedom is limited by both his incomplete 
rationality and by the justifiable protection of the rights of others". This does not mean that 
only adults can make good or rational choices, however. In fact, adults can be seen to make 
wrong choices as much as children. Hence, it is possible to argue that, unlike children, 
adults have more experience and might possess more knowledge to make good choices, but 
they acquire this capacity by learning through mistakes made in previous choices. 
It can be argued that children should be allowed the right to take the same risk to choose, 
whether they succeed or not. If they make the wrong choice, they will learn from the 
experience and perform better next time. In this sense, Chamberlin (1989: 63) argues that 
"the value of individuals in making their own choices is, simply because they are their own, 
and that for these always to be made by someone else, no matter how wise, would be in 
some way demeaning". According to this line of reasoning, learners should be left free in a 
way which encourages independence of mind to make their own choices. As a result, they 
will learn how to be responsible for their actions. Similarly, Al-Khwli (1987: 444) and Al- 
Zarnwji (quoted in `Uthman, 1989: 118) states that `learners are free when their actions 
come from inside them not from control from outside'. By having freedom, their 
responsibility for education will rise and grow. This responsibility will enable a child to 
choose what he wants to learn, the type of school he wants to attend and the teacher. 
Following Gibbs's view on `rational reasons' it could be said that learners need a kind of 
education that can help them to develop their ability to make rational choices so that these 
choices can be justified. In this sense, freedom in education can help learners to make the 
choice they want through the development of reason. 
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After having discussed the right of learners to make their own choices, I argue that having 
this right may not be worthwhile unless it is followed by giving learners the opportunity to 
make their own free decisions according to their choices. From this notion follows the idea 
that `learners also need opportunities to acquire the skills and experiences needed to make 
their own decisions according to their own choices' (Salam, 2000: 112). The initiative to 
involve children in decision-making processes is sure to encounter much resistance 
because, in general, children lack the skills and experiences necessary. According to 
Charlton "this may be the case. It may be also be that this unpreparedness exists because 
schools have been unable, or unwilling, to provide opportunities for pupils to acquire the 
skills and experiences needed" (1996: 63). Therefore, Cowie (1994: 161) argues that 
the ability to make decisions is best learned through experience. It is indeed an essential 
part of education that young people learn how to come to a decision in a logical manner 
which shows awareness of the situation, sensitivity to other people and a realistic 
understanding of the resources which are available. The great advantage of giving pupils 
this experience is that it encourages them to take their own ideas and those of their peers, 
seriously. Pupils who participate in a decision-making process of this kind are more likely 
to be committed to the procedures that ensue. 
Similarly, Fitzell (1997: 14) illustrates how children become `empowered' when they are 
allowed to make decisions and take responsibility for those decisions. According to him, 
when children feel powerless, they cannot act on their own behalf. It is evident that in 
developing self-determinism children will initially make a great number of mistakes due 
to their lack of knowledge and experience. However, this will give them an opportunity to 
learn from their own experiences. This means that it is impossible to expect too much 
from them at the beginning, but it is important that society allows them to be free to find 
their own way without any external control. 
In conclusion it should be noted that the availability of making free choices and decisions is 
a necessary condition for learners to have freedom that enables them to determine benefit 
from its value in education. 
2.3. The implications of the concept of freedom in education regarding its restrictions 
In the previous chapter the necessary conditions of being free have been discussed. 
However, it has not discussed its restrictions because they are different according to the 
field of exercising freedom and who are in a position to exercise such restrictions. For 
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example, restrictions of freedom in the field of education are different than restrictions in 
the field of economy. Therefore, in the following pages the restrictions of learners' freedom 
will be discussed. 
2.3.1. Learners' freedom and being subject to authority 
The application of the principle of freedom in an educational situation is not so 
straightforward. It is a situation in which constraints are imposed upon children's wants. 
Holt (1973: 27) believes that "the kind of influence or control or coercion that most adults 
exercise over children is wrong". According to him this is because authority allows little 
freedom of choice and more fear. According to Smith (1985: 46) "if children are treated in 
an authoritarian manner they will learn little, for it is the nature of authoritarianism not to 
base itself on reasons, and children learn from being given reasons". Smith argues that 
freedom gives learners the opportunity to learn through reason. This suggests that learning 
should not obey authority for the sake of obedience. This idea in clearer in Haydon's 
statement (1999: 113) when he states that 
accepting uncritically what someone tells you because the-, - are seen to be in authority is 
not a good thing... Doing what is right cannot be a matter of doing what one is told. 
Schools must produce people who are able to think for themselves what is right... to ask 
'how do we know this is right or that is wrong? ' Any pupil who is being taught to think 
ought to be asking such questions. And the same pupil ought to see that 'because I say so' 
is not an acceptable answer. Nor is 'because these are the values of your society'. 
Similarly, Straughan (1982: 65-6) states that a child appreciates the reasons which justify an 
edict and accordingly make it authoritative rather than merely authoritarian. However, if he 
obeys rules or authorities as such he is doing what he sees there to be good and sensible 
reasons for doing so. The core idea of Haydon's and Strauýhan's argument is that for 
learners to be able to exercise freedom rather than license and derive benefit from the value 
of it, they have to be in a position not to obey authority. 
However, freedom in education does not mean that there is no authority over learners. This 
is because they are immature and inexperienced and so they need guidance and protection. 
Restrictions of children's freedom are important and must be justified to achieve certain 
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important ends. If present restriction is justified on the grounds that it will enhance future 
freedom, then the education provided must have this an one of its aims, and must work 
towards its realisation. 
As Smith (1985: 4 1) argues, authority should have grounds, some sort of rational justifying 
basis which can be demonstrated. "In a broad sense, this is how exercising authority can be 
seen as different from wielding power". Similarly, Freire argues that 
without authority it is very difficult for the liberty of students to be shaped. Freedom 
needs authority to become free. It is a paradox but it has its foundation in the freedom of 
others, and if authority denies this freedom and cults of this relationship, this founding 
relationship with freedom [... J is no longer authority but has become authoritarianism 
(Freire, 1987: 91). 
For learners to have a worthwhile account of freedom there has to be a right balance 
between freedom and authority (Power, 1982: 359), between pressure and permissiveness, 
between self-expression and submission to discipline, which will enable each child to find 
the best for himself. For learners to do this they need to exercise the rights of being free 
from restraints by authority to be able to exercise it. In short, school should be an 
environment for learners to learn how to be free and how to submit to justified authority in 
the sense mentioned before. In this sense Macysino (1979: 180) argues that 
By a certain twist of opaque thinking, it is assumed that adults cannot be expected to 
exercise rights properly in a democracy unless as young people they were allowed 
practice in these rights in educational institutions. 
At this point it is pertinent to ask, who has the right to exercise authority? Since parents, 
teachers and the state in general have authority over learners, in the following pages I will 
discuss the notion of authority by parents and teachers in more detail. Regarding the 
restrictions that might limit the learners' freedom by the state in areas of curriculum, 
assessment and teachers' preparation, this will be examined in chapter three. 
2.3.1.1. Learners' freedom and being subject to parents' authority 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights legitimises the idea that "parents have a prior 
right to choose the kind of education that should be given to their children" 
(Arajarvi, 1992: 3). Similar declarations are to be found in the European Convention for the 
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom and The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Although these declarations vest the parents' right to 
be responsible for their children's education it does not give them the prior right to make 
such choices and decisions for children without listening to them and finding out what they 
want and what they are interested in doing at school. In this sense David, Davies, Edwards, 
Reay and Standing (1997: 405) and Hargreaves argue that 
parents make early educational decisions without much discussion with the child, but as 
the child grows, he or she will be assigned increased rights to share in educational 
decisions (Hargreaves, 1997a: 512). 
The justification that always gives parents the right to make decision on behalf of their 
children is as Harris (1982: 35-6) and Almond, argue that "children, especially in their early 
years, are too young, too inexperienced, and above all too infinitely malleable and 
adaptable, to determine the conditions and content of their education for themselves" 
(1991: 195). This is why parents in the name of love and protection have to determine 
everything for their children regarding their education. If the justification for adults ever 
having the right to override children's wishes and make decisions for them is that this is in 
children's interests because they need protection and guidance, then adults' right to make 
decisions for children's should be limited to making decisions in children's interests and to 
the provision of the necessary protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to 
rights over children, regardless of what is in children's interests. 
The worst effect here is to see the children trapped between their own will and their 
parents, with no way out. It is evident that parents desire to see their children in good 
positions in society. This wish to see their children educated drives them to push their 
children to do things that they often resent doing. This might be in the interests of the 
parents, but a natural consequence of this forced education/schooling is an understandable 
lack of readiness on the part of the child to co-operate. It is arguable that parents do not 
always do what is in the best interests of the child. Even parents can be misguided and 
make such decisions that might be in conflict with the child's best interests. 
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However, this does not mean that parents have to allow their children to do as they want 
and do nothing. For instance, Sutherland (1988: 78-82) notes, that "parents have the right to 
advise their children when the schools offer some options, to express their views about 
matters which affect their own children, to evaluate the work of the school in general or the 
performance of the educational system in general and to discuss the progress of their 
children with teachers and make enquiries or complaints about it". Similarly, Darling 
(1992: 48) points out that "the mere absence of adult authority is not enough and that 
sometimes more positive action is required". This means helping children to grow rather 
than controlling them. As discussed so far, parents have to understand that their children 
can make their own choices and decisions according to their interests and wants. It is true 
that they might need help. 
2.3.1.2. Learners' freedom and being subject to teachers' authority 
Freedom in education implies that no unjustified authority should be exercised by teachers 
in the classroom. According to Downey and Kelly (1979: 137-8) and Silk (1976: 273) if the 
teacher is responsible for imparting knowledge, arranging examinations, and managing the 
learning situation this would automatically give him/her a certain degree of authority. This 
means that the teacher is an authority in his/her subject (White, 1985: 200). For example, a 
language teacher of either Arabic or English can be expected to exercise his/her authority in 
deciding what aspect of the language should be taught first. However, "the more 
knowledgeable a student is in a subject the less authority need be exercised over him. And 
thus, the need of authority here becomes a function of the inexperience of the subject" 
(Silk, 1976: 275). But, in cases where the learners have the opportunity to choose between 
the two languages, he/she does not have the right to exercise his/her authority on what 
language they should choose. 
However, Bantock (1970: 194-5) holds that "schoolchildren are confronted with the 
unknown of the subject or area of study, which requires them to make a leap of faith. 
Before any learning can begin they must simply accept the authority of the teacher, who is 
therefore, an authority in the sense that he possesses knowledge beyond the present grasp 
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of his pupils. They are in a position to understand any justifications he might offer for 
calling it knowledge rather than just something he felt inclined to say". Smith (1985: 53) 
disagrees with Bantock's view and argues that the fact that the teacher is an authority in the 
classroom should not be regarded as a matter of his simply knowing more than his pupils. 
According to Smith, 
They [children] are not barbarians at gates of knowledge who must put their trust in the 
teacher's cognitive authority before they can be admitted to learning. The extent to which 
children already possess knowledge, concepts and understanding and are capable of 
receiving explanation and perceiving the point of activities forbids this picture. 
The point that begins to emerge from the process of teaching is that it is not just a matter of 
knowing one's own subject, nor even of understanding it deeply enough to be able to 
produce reasons for what one says based on its distinct logic or fundamental procedures. 
Teaching seems to involve understanding what learners are making of their experiences, 
including their schooling. In Langford's (1971: 145) and Peters's (1973: 47-8) view 
teachers are put in authority by the community because they have qualified as authorities, 
to a certain extent, on those forms of knowledge with which educational institutions are 
concerned. This does not mean that their job is to stuff the minds of the ignorant with 
bodies of knowledge which they themselves have managed to memorise. For they are 
concerned with teaching others how to think, not just with telling them what to think. 
They should try, in other words, to introduce others to the critical procedures by means of 
which such bodies of knowledge have gradually been established and can be challenged 
and transformed. This is what makes their authority only provisional (Peters, 1973: 47-8). 
According to Hopkins (1976b: 198), the teacher is an important resource for the learners, 
but that does not give him the right to control them "The teacher may initiate and argue for 
certain activities but not require them. The line is between influence and control. The 
teacher's ideas and beliefs may influence a learner's actions; if the learners so choose they 
may be used to determine a student's actions for them". For Reddiford (1971: 17) the 
teacher "has a right to make pronouncements and issue commands because he has special 
competencies, training and insight". In this sense, Rose (1999: 63-4) notes that "the teacher 
and learner relationship is at the hub of any successful learning process, and that it is 
dependent upon the ability to provide learners with the freedom to learn". It is, therefore 
the teacher's responsibility to make use of "whatever possibilities of self-determination the 
learners have to promote their aim of autonomy" (Haydon, 1983: 227). 
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Among the many arguments about the teacher's role is the idea that teachers should be 
neutral in their teaching. Learners should learn by discovering things for themselves rather 
than by being told; and this course of discovery will include among other items the 
discovery that it is possible to hold different views about a vast number of subjects, 
between which views they will have to choose (Warnock, 1979: 160-1). In philosophy, for 
example, the neutral teacher will present to his learner the different views that exist, then, 
sit back and allow them to make up their own minds to discover evidence or other 
considerations which might favour the different views. For Nordenbo (1978: 130) 
there has been a growing demand for the teachers to refrain from inculcating in the pupils 
any special life philosophy, and in particular any special political viewpoint; in short, any 
particular system of values. 
Also Falk (1996: 26) states that the role of the teacher "is to give the students centre stage in 
the classroom, providing a setting in which the students play an active, inquiring role in 
their learning". 
In line with others Degenhardt (1976: 112) also says that apart from providing learners with 
challenges and opportunities to be creative, "a teacher aiming at creativity must 
continually look for ways of teaching which combine a maximum of passing with a 
minimum of restriction. The relationship in the classroom has to have love, which may be 
as Entwistle (1974: 70-1) suggests the key to discipline: it is only instrumental to a 
relationship which exists for purposes other than the development of personal rapport. It is 
fundamental to the character of the teacher-learner relationship that it must ultimately be 
dissolved'. On the contrary Rousseau's (1950: 84-5) advice to the teacher is in complete 
opposition to that of Entwistle. 
Let him always think he is master while you are really master. There is no subjection so 
complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is 
taken captive. 
The teacher's role in the classroom in the light of freedom in education is to make learners 
feel free to try things out. According to Kelly learners need to be confident that the teacher 
will look sympathetically on their failures as well as approvingly on their successes. Such 
work, then, requires teacher-learner relationships that are based on collaboration and 
mutual understanding rather than on distance and control (1990: 125). The teachers have to 
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involve their learners in the decision-making process by asking them their views on lesson 
planning, determining activities to be done, choosing evaluation methods and even to 
evaluate their work. Neill (1992: 104) mentions that in his school he never asked any of his 
teachers how s/he teaches. This was because Neill gave the learners the chance to evaluate 
their teachers and find out about their positive and negative characteristics in teaching. To 
do so, teachers should listen to the learners and find out about their interests and the 
difficulties they might have in learning what they are interested in. In doing so, the teacher 
does not have to exercise authority over the learners. On the contrary, the relationship 
between the teacher and the learners should be built on equality and respect towards each 
other. But as discussed before, freedom does not mean that the teacher should not be in 
authority at all. There must be some authority exercised by the teacher in the classroom. 
But if this is to happen, as Downey and Kelly (1979: 141) argue, authority must be 
exercised in reasonable or justifiable ways. In this manner, Smith (1985: 42) argues that 
"intellectually and morally the teacher is the sort of person to have good reasons for what 
he says and does". Accordingly, a teacher must exercise authority over learners in the 
classroom only if s/he has adequate reasons for doing so, for example; if a learner breaks 
the rules. Rules can be considered an essential element in our social lives and experiences. 
The point of following the rules is not to conflict with the freedom of the learners. The 
learners must know what the rules are and why they have to obey them. They also have to 
share with the teacher in making the rules. Straughan (1982: 66) argues that children should 
not obey a rule merely because it is a rule, nor that he must learn to obey it for that reason. 
It is only when rule-following is interpreted as obeying rules because they are rules that it 
becomes a conceptual non-starter; also, if a learner's actions harm others or if a learner 
does not respect other people's freedom. 
After having discussed the relationship between authority by parents and teacher and 
learner's freedom it is worthwhile discussing punishment in which authority can be 
exercised over learners. In this case the relationship between freedom and punishment has 
to be examined to find out if punishing the learners will or will not limit their freedom and 
what is the value of it. 
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2.3.2. Learners' freedom and being subject to punishment 
The definition of punishment as Smith (1985: 61-9), Flew (1973: 85-87), Mabbott (1973: 41- 
6), Marshall (1975: 150-4) Peters (1966b: 267-9), Kasachkoff (1973: 364-370), Deininger 
(1965: 205-9), Glover, (1970: 199) and Hamm (1989,111-2) have suggested contains `five 
necessary elements'. Firstly, the act of punishment cannot be a fortuitous event or 
happening. It cannot be done accidentally. Secondly, punishment must be painful or 
unpleasant. Thirdly, punishment must be enacted by someone whose authority to do so has 
been established. Fourthly, the infliction of pain or unpleasantness must be on an offender. 
Finally, punishment entails infliction of pain on an offender for a breach of a social rule. 
This condition is actually an elaboration of the fourth condition, since the notion of 
offender already entails the kind of culpability which deliberate breaching of rules results 
in. 
The concept of freedom for learners in education also rejects the idea of inflicting pain as a 
form of punishment. Especially that they "probably do not prevent immoral actions... in 
fact they may elicit bad feelings in a child" (Pickering, 1998: 66). This kind of punishment, 
i. e. inflicting pain, as Wringe (1981: 116) notes, "treats individuals as if they are not rational 
and not capable of desisting from the offence in question either through being persuaded of 
its wrongness or out of a prudent regard for their material interests". This kind of 
punishment is almost universal in state schools especially, in lower-class schools or 
working-class areas where the population has long been conditioned to accept physical pain 
as the normal means of socialising children. 
Al-Qurashi (1986: 173) believes that young people should feel secure from being punished, 
to think, object and express their own thinking and objections. According to Calvert 
(1975: 11-3) it is true that learners, especially at an early age, do not have enough 
experience and knowledge to realise the difference between what is right and wrong. But 
this does not give adults the right to punish them. It is indeed, not logical to punish a young 
learner for doing something he or she does not know is wrong. For example, Neill and 
Rousseau completely reject the idea of punishing children on the grounds that they do not 
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know what is wrong and what is right. Rousseau (1950: 56) maintains that teachers and 
parents should not make children ask forgiveness for wrongs that they did not intend to 
commit. It is true that a child does not have sufficient knowledge of right and wrong. At the 
same time, children do not have much control over their impulses and bodily movements. 
Neither are they able to predict the future and they have no notion at all of long-term 
consequences of their actions. In Peters' view, (1966b: 288) even when a child has 
developed quite a good sense of what is right and wrong, it can still be reasonably argued 
that 
he is so susceptible to peer-group pressure that it is only the very unusual and independent 
child who can stand out against his peers and refuse to do what he knows to be wrong. At 
an early age this type of pressure comes very near to coercion which is an accepted plea 
for diminished responsibility. 
Similarly, Lewis (2001: 317) argues that 
There is a need to encourage teachers to avoid becoming coercive in the face of increasing 
in student misbehaviour and to rather respond by calmly punishing misbehaviour while 
rewarding good behaviour, discussing with students the impact their misbehaviour has on 
others and involving them in some of the decision-making surrounding rules and 
consequences. If teachers do not, it means less students time on task, and possibly more 
significantly, less responsibility. 
However, although Wringe (1981: 114) argues against punishment, in particular, physical 
punishment, he also talks about some instances in which punishment can be seen as 
justifiable. According to Rawls (1975: 459) and Quinton (1973: 62) no one should be 
punished unless the punishment has valuable consequences. For example, Wringe 
(1981: 114) argues that the significance of punishment is to protect the rights of others 
"from the acts of a child not yet rational or at the level of morality, or to protect the child 
from the consequences of acts he would avoid if he were rational or at the level of 
prudence". Downey and Kelly (1979: 156) and Freire and Shor (1987: 93) point out, learners 
must be warned that freedom does not mean complete lack of punishment. The point is 
children should not be punished for the sake of punishment they have to be told that certain 
acts may warrant punishment. 
When unjustified punishment prevents learners from doing what they want, it is not 
possible for them to learn to be self-controlled and self-determined. When learners are 
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given the freedom to learn, they should also be given the right to establish their own rules; 
this will allow them to be completely free to determine, accept and obey the rules. The idea 
of freedom, as mentioned above, is concerned with allowing children to acquire benefit 
from the value of freedom without the fear of external punishment. The idea of freedom 
upholds the necessity of involving children in making rules and determining the type of 
punishment for breaking them. If children are involved in determining their own rules and 
punishments, it will not in anyway inhibit their freedom, as they will be aware of what 
wrong they have committed to deserve being punished. In addition, Fitzell (1997: 6) notes 
that involving children in making their own rules and punishments will help in their 
individual growth: 
When children are involved in developing rules and consequences, they learn to use 
words to solve problems, to govern themselves, and to feel empowered. When rules 
deemed necessary by the teacher are explained and consequences are logical, children 
learn to be fair and trusting. When children who break the rules are involved in 
determining ways to solve their own problems, they learn to control their own behaviour. 
When children are taught to see situations from another child's point of view and are 
required to make restitution to the hurt party, they learn empathy, forgiveness, and caring. 
In this manner, learners will learn the importance of rules in their lives as well as other 
people's lives. Following certain rules can be considered important for exercising freedom 
as it gives learners a guide to do what they want, without any comments or objections from 
other people such as teachers or parents. When learners follow rules that they themselves 
have determined, their actions will be acceptable and reasonable to other people or at least 
their actions will be justified and have moral causes. In such a context, punishment can be 
justified only if learners break their own rules. If they do not obey their own rules then they 
are clearly making a choice between following the rules and punishment. The significance 
of giving children the freedom to make and follow their own rules will teach them self- 
discipline. Self-discipline is thought to be educationally desirable because the submission 
to rules springs from the individual's own decisions in which some kind of autonomy is 
displayed (Hirts and Peters, 1970: 124-7). Self-discipline or self-restraint encourages 
autonomy in the individual and makes him a better achiever. Accordingly, the ability to 
exercise self-restraint and to behave autonomously depends to a large extent on the 
conviction that learners are responsible for their actions. This does not in any way suggest 
that discipline limits freedom, on the contrary, it helps the person to extend a number of 
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alternatives and, at the same time, it implies what Aviram (1995: 71) calls the `notion of 
commitment'. For Thompson (1980: 117), "discipline and order create the boundaries 
within which particular freedoms operate". Similarly, Macmunn (1926: 43) argues that the 
only true liberty is through discipline. Jeffreys (1971: 30) uses the term `self-limitation' to 
talk about freedom in a deeper sense. Moreover, in the same line Hannabuss (1987: 17) 
argues that "freedom consists in: an ability to observe rules and an ability to make one's 
own rules". By the same token, Neill (1966: 8) argues that by being free learners acquire 
self-control in which they will have the ability to think of other people and respect their 
rights. 
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2.4. The implications of the concept of freedom in education regarding its value 
In this section I will analyse and examine the value of freedom in education. In this sense it 
might be argued that giving learners freedom has a value for them and value for their 
society as well. It will be an examination of whether; (a) happiness is the only aim of 
freedom in education when learners are allowed to do what they want, (b) autonomy, 
responsibility and creativity are valuable as educational aims. Then the following section 
will examine if that freedom is a necessary condition to achieve these mentioned aims, (c) 
allowing learners more freedom brings better academic achievement when the pressure of 
controls is blocking it and when there are a variety of options. 
2.4.1. The relationship between being free and being happy 
As discussed in chapter one, the value of freedom in its simplest terms as an instrument that 
leads someone to do something he/she wants to do. Accordingly, for someone to do what 
really interests him/her produces feelings of happiness. Therefore, it will be argued in this 
section that giving learners freedom to determine their education will make them happy. 
Also it will give learners the chance to have happy educational experiences which helps 
them to satisfy their interests and society's interests also. It might be important to note that 
many children find school and education as a generally unhappy experience because they 
do not feel happy in learning when they are not that interested in anything they are doing. 
In this sense Neill argues "happiness is not only the aim of the idea of freedom in 
education, but also the only goal of life (1961: 24)". Likewise, Hopkins (1979: 121) argues 
that freedom is the only means to happiness, and academic achievement "comes as a part of 
happiness, self-directed, and self-disciplined, not instead of them". However, I disagree 
with Neill and Hopkins that happiness can be an aim in the implementation of the idea of 
freedom in education 
Freedom is only a means to let learners feel happy when they do what they like. Also 
because, as discussed in chapter one, it gives learners the opportunity to increase their 
powers and capacity through education to do things that they could not do before. When 
education reduces the gap between the learners' interests and their ability, it might increase 
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their happiness, but happiness in this sense will only be one product of education but not its 
aim. Moreover, freedom maximises the choices and opportunities that might lead to 
happiness, but it does not guarantee happiness. In this sense happiness might be a necessary 
condition for the learners to achieve other educational aims but it is not an aim in itself. 
According to O'Hear one can not aim at something which is necessarily a by-product of 
something else, and happiness is essentially a by-product in this way (1981: 41). As 
Bantock (1970: 64) argues, "happiness comes as a by-product of the achievement of some 
end, and the more we consciously wish to be happy, the more it eludes us". At the same 
time, Peters (1981: 35-6) discusses three logical reasons against considering happiness as an 
aim of education. Firstly, education is not a necessary means to happiness, for many 
uneducated people are perfectly happy. Secondly, happiness is a complex state of mind that 
depends at least in part on having some desires fulfilled. Finally, it depends on objective 
conditions having to do with circumstances, which may change because of events for which 
the individual may not be responsible, and there is nothing much that education can do 
about these (see also, Chamberlin (1989: 107-8) and Rafferty (1973: 13)). 
Moreover, happiness is changeable; it is a feeling that can change when the context or the 
circumstances change. What made the learner happy once might not make him happy again 
in another context. The learner will be happy, for example, if he does not attend a Maths 
class. But when faced with a particular situation that requires the skills provided by those 
classes, this non-attendance might result in his failure in dealing with the situation. The 
inevitable effect of such a failure is the learner's feelings of unhappiness. 
It is noteworthy, however, that freedom is only a means to happiness. For instance, people 
who are not free to do certain things are still happy in doing other things. In this sense, 
freedom to learn might be one way to feel happy during the period of learning. The point is 
that learners need freedom to do or not to do something they like, and in being able to do 
what they want they will feel happy. 
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2.4.2. The relationship between being free and being autonomous 
The value of autonomy as an educational aim has been emphasised by a number of 
professionals in education, for example, Strike (1972: 276-7), Hannabuss (1987: 17), Ridley 
(1990: 138), Wringe (1997: 115), Dearden, (1975a: 7) and Oliver (1985: 13 1). They state that 
one of the central features of the progress of learners is the development of their capacity to 
act autonomously. Therefore, Blenkin and Kelly (1983: 85), Gardner (1985: 242), Dearden 
(1975b: 58) Hargreaves (1999: 122) argue that schools must prepare learners to be 
autonomous and self-organised, networking, entrepreneurial in order to share in this world. 
This is because, firstly, as Neill (1966: 8), Heathcote (1997: 167-8), Allen (1982: 205), 
Indabawa (1997: 191-2) and Peters, Woods and Dray (1987: 22) suggest, it is `self 
organisation', `self government' self-determination or `self-realisation' that allows learners 
to ascertain things for themselves and learn by making their own mistakes. Because "the 
autonomous man has a mind of his own and a will of his own. He exercises independence 
in his thinking and in his decisions about practical affairs" (Benson, 1983: 6), Dearden, 
(1975a: 7) and (Prin. -,, 1984: 72). In other words, the virtue of autonomy 
is a state of 
character linked to reliance on one's own powers in acting, choosing and forming opinions. 
For Downie (1987: 79) and Croce "when we educate a child, we aim to make of him a 
person able to go his own way as a free and autonomous being" (1942: 63). In this sense 
Wambari (1991: 197) believes that the autonomous person knows himself, understands who 
is, what he would like to make of his life and how best he can make of his life what he 
believed it should be. He also has a clear picture of the life he wishes to lead, his place in 
his community: he makes carefully reasoned choices that guide him towards the realisation 
of the aspired for life 
Secondly, an individual who is autonomous is `self-directed', has reasons for his actions 
and makes rules for himself (Atherton, 1978: 96), (Galston, 1995: 519), (Mason, 1990: 435), 
(Barrow, 1975a: 134), (Peters, 1974: 34 1) and (Arneson 1985: 433). Thirdly, an autonomous 
individual can exercise his freedom in a food way according to his own desire, and 
therefore will be responsible for the consequences of his actions. This is because as Martin 
(1988: 68) and Smith (1997: 130) believe, autonomous behaviour is based on "reason". 
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Therefore, the actions of an autonomous individual can be seen to be justified and 
responsible. Because "autonomy means that we are subjects of a moral law made by 
ourselves, and so imposed on us by ourselves" (Miller, 1998: 77). 
My argument here is that according to Telfer (1975: 27-8), Crocker (1980: 114), Kelly 
(1990: 125), Wringe (1997: 115) and Dearden (1975a: 11) for learners to act autonomously 
they need to be free to trust in themselves and express their needs, wills and beliefs. In 
order to do this, learners need freedom to make up their own minds about what they would 
like to do and to do it (Phillips, 1997b: 245). When individuals rationally and freely choose 
for themselves between many options rationality and freedom can be considered as 
necessary and sufficient conditions for performing autonomous actions (Bonnett, 1978: 54), 
(Bridges, 1997: 155-6) and (Gewirth, 1975: 4 1). 
In the event of being unfree, it will be impossible for learners to act autonomously. 
Autonomy is possible only if learners are given the opportunity to exercise their own free 
will in determining their education. According to Cuypers's (1992: 7) definition of 
autonomy, he believes that a person can be called autonomous only if "he is not alienated 
from himself, neither on the natural side by physical causes or blind drives nor on the social 
side by other people's opinions". Furthermore Benson (1983: 9) argues that "to be 
autonomous is to trust one's own powers and to have a disposition to use them, to be able 
to resist the fear of failure, ridicule or disapproval that threaten to drive one into reliance on 
the guidance of others". Accordingly, giving learners freedom in education will help them 
to express themselves, to learn independently, make their own decisions and manage their 
lives. 
Similarly, Dearden (1972: 74-5) sees education as a process of growth which can be 
determined as self-realisation (the self to be realised is not the one which he is, but the one 
which it is desired that he should become) being oneself (Children need to be themselves), 
and being a chooser. To achieve these processes of growth, freedom is a necessary 
condition, Al-Said (1989: 13) believes that freedom in education helps learners to be 
autonomous, to have a mind of their own and that it enables them to think for themselves. It 
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means that learners can make up their own minds on moral questions, and can choose their 
own moral views, and so on. Having a mind of their own may well mean having the wit to 
adapt, having the courage to take the initiative and having the ability to think out the 
solution to a new problem. 
From the previous arguments it has been argued that freedom is a necessary condition for 
someone to be autonomous and act according to his/her own will and reason. It has been 
also examined that freedom is a necessary condition for exercising that activity. In short, 
achieving autonomy as an educational aim can not be done until learners have freedom to 
act, in the way argued before. 
2.4.3. The relationship between being free and being creative 
"Now, more than ever, the needs of a rapidly changing world require creative responses. 
Thus, educators are called upon to furnish conditions that support creativity in their 
students" (Weinstein, 1993: 275). In this sense Hopkins (1979: 10) argues that rapid change 
in a complex society and its culture calls for great adaptability and creativity in its 
individual members, not only to enable those individuals to find their way in that society 
but also to help that society adjust institutions and cultural mores to successfully meet the 
changing circumstances. 
The following argument aims to investigate whether freedom is a necessary condition for 
creative action. For example, Foster (1971: 37), Freire and Shor (1987: 20), Kelly 
(1990: 125) and Wilson (1977: 113-5) state that nobody expects creative work from learners 
in a strict, authoritarian situation since this is likely to inhibit rather than promote the 
freedom that creative work requires. Similarly, Hopkins (1979: 10) argues that "one of the 
most important circumstances necessary to develop creative people is freedom". For 
Radford and Burton (1974: 105) and Tischner (1994: 15-7) there is relation between 
creativity and thinking which act simply by assuming freedom and self-direction. Similarly, 
Kleinig "the exercise of authority in teaching stifles creativity and the development of 
autonomy, leads to indoctrination, and substitutes for relationships of mutual respect and 
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interests, relationships of domination and subservience" (Kleinig, 1982: 210). "Other 
observers of the education scene detect a deadening of students imagination which seems to 
result from heavy classroom regulation and discipline of behaviour, and emphasis on 
memorisation and the authority of the teachers and printed sources" (Pfeiffer, 1979: 134). 
I will discuss some evidence which demonstrates the importance of freedom for being 
creative. Firstly, as Suchman (1967: 89) argues, non-interference and non-control are 
necessary conditions for being creative: "creative thinking is autonomous; that is, it is 
neither random nor controlled by some fixed scheme or external agent, but is wholly self- 
directed". Therefore, freedom is a necessary condition in giving learners chances to 
"preserve their creativity by non-authoritarian attitudes on the part of parents and teachers, 
especially by not having negative evaluations put upon their initial efforts" 
(Gowan, 1967: 11). Accordingly, Barrow, Anderson et al note that creativity is `spontaneous 
behaviour', where spontaneity is defined as `behaviour in the relative absence of 
environmental threat or coercion' (Anderson, 1965: 47). Further, AI-Faywumi (1991: 227-8) 
believes for learners to be creative they need to be left free, without interference to observe 
things on their own and develop self-discipline. They also need to be given the chance to 
ask questions, make choices on their own and to learn how to think. `All these skills must 
be learned in a free atmosphere in the classroom' (Silim, 1999: 122). 
However, non-interference and non-control do not mean that there are no rules at all, and 
there is no control on the child and his environment. For Entwistle (1974: 60-1) rules and 
constraints are necessary for creative activity. In fact, Entwistle and White disagree with 
the conventional rule that "creativity requires being free from conventional rules" 
(White, 1975: 131). Thus, freedom does not mean the absence of rules, but it gives learners 
the opportunity for broadening the rules, ideas or conceptions in order to create new rules 
for new work. Exercising freedom allows learners to `exercise control within themselves' 
(Butcher 1969: 94). This means that they make their own rules to control their thinking and 
actions. This type of freedom is compatible with self-control and is the core of the claim of 
freedom in education. In this connection, Dewey (1938: 60) notes that "no rules, then, no 
games; different rules, then a different game". Similarly, Poole (1980: 12) notes that "some 
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children produce most newness in a setting that is open and free, in which the child has the 
opportunity to produce what has meaning and significance for him or her. [... ] Children 
produce more creative responses when they are forced to break through old conceptions 
and ideas in order to find newness". 
Secondly, the concept of freedom provides opportunities for learners to do what they want. 
Hence, the question of creativity is reasonable where there is no creative activity without 
the opportunity to think in different/new ways, to use different approaches or knowledge 
without any external control from others. Like Poole, Simon (1967: 50) argues that another 
possible source of creativity would be to "draw on a mixture of ideas and cues garnered 
from different fields of knowledge". In their discussion about creativity, Lytton (1971: 104) 
and Stoddard (1959: 187) mention that education has to provide opportunities for learners to 
live a creative life that demands the chance to make free choices. The notion of creativity is 
compatible with the findings of psychologists, who refer to the processes of self-regard, 
self-respect, self-realisation, self-expression, self-production, self-direction and self- 
actualisation, as creative processes. Evidence relating to the conception of opportunity 
suggests that when a learner is given freedom to do what he wants, he will be able to 
express himself in his own way, thereby using his own thinking. Similarly, Rogers 
(1970a: 147-9), Suchman (1967: 92-3) and Barrow and Woods (1988: 140-1), hold the view 
that creative persons must do their own thinking and not simply parrot the thinking of 
others. For instance, when learners are given a certain amount of scope for free expression 
in the art room, they grow up less restricted in their artistic expression than those who are 
not given such freedom (Barrow and Woods, 1988: 140-6). 
Finally, freedom in education gives the learners a chance to be themselves and to learn on 
their own. Thus, it is clear that one cannot talk about the notion of creativity without talking 
about freedom. In this sense, Torrance (1962: 114) maintains that many creative students 
prefer to learn on their own. According to him, when education does not give the learners 
freedom to learn on their own, not to be told what they do, there is a possibility of losing 
the potentially creative learners. This is because doing creative work is not that simple and 
requires doing may actions which can not be possible without freedom. For example 
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Torrance (1965: 9), states that "the creative reader produces a variety of possibilities, uses a 
great variety of approaches, looks at the available information in a variety of ways, breaks 
away from commonplace solutions into bold new ways, and develops his ideas by filling in 
the details and making the idea attractive or exciting to others". For someone to do so, 
freedom is a required condition that helps him to do creative work. 
From the previous arguments it has been examined that freedom is a necessary condition 
for someone to perform creative action and develop that capacity. Also it has been argued 
that freedom is a necessary condition for exercising creativity. In short, achieving creativity 
as an educational aim can not be done until learners have freedom to act in the sense argued 
before. 
2.4.4. The relationship between being free and being responsible 
The value of responsibility as an educational aim can be seen in the arguments by 
Hannabuss (1987: 17), `Usman (1979: 292) and Diraz (1982: 166). They state that one of the 
central features of the progress of learners and their society is the development of their 
capacity to be responsible for their actions. Talking about teaching learners responsibility 
as an educational aim requires that they should be free to make choices and decisions in 
which they learn how to take responsibility. Because as Hannabuss (1987: 17) argues 
responsibility presupposes the exercise of free will and choice. In exercising choices, 
learners will not only come to a cognitive understanding of the tension between freedom 
and constraints but also, knowing the rules, choose to obey them. This requires freedom for 
learners to learn and exercise responsibility that helps them to make their own choices and 
decisions without interference from others. 
To achieve responsibility as an educational aim the next argument aims to investigate the 
relationship between being free and being responsible. According to Strike's view 
(1972: 268) `Usman (1979: 299) and Al-Hababi (1972: 22), the idea of being responsible is 
compatible with that of being free to choose and being able to make-decisions. For 
Schofield (1973: 259) 
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if we are free to act, we are free to do wrong or right. If we are constrained to do right, we 
lose our freedom of choice and consequently a very important type of freedom. Freedom 
of action makes responsibility for action inevitable. 
According to Schofield and Gray there is logical connection between the two concepts: 
responsibility and freedom. On the one hand, the logical connection is centred in the 
concept of a person's action. "If you are morally responsible for your action then... the 
action must have been done freely" (Rowe, 1991: 237), Weiss (1942: 186), Mason 
(1990: 437), Taylor (1944: 89) and Hallowell (1942: 330). "When we have an obligation, we 
are required to do or omit some type of action" (O'Neil, 1988: 447). But a person's sense of 
responsibility will be complete if his action is ultimately and irresistibly unconditioned 
(Kristjansson, 1992: 104) and (Scheffler, 1973: 109). If choice is an illusion, there can be no 
praise or blame, and no responsibility (Glover, 1970: 198). The choices have to be ultimately 
and irresistibly unconditioned. Responsibility can be seen to be diminished if a person is 
under another's influence. "if there is virtue in having options between which free agents 
can make autonomous choices, this must surely be because exercising freedom is a means 
to personal commitment, satisfying pursuits and rewarding ways of life" 
(Jonathan, 1997b: 215-6). 
On the other hand, If we accept Ayer's (1984: 2,15) statement that it is a necessary 
condition for a man to have acted freely that he could have acted otherwise, then one 
should accept that the rational agent must be responsible for his free actions because 
according to Gibson when an agent chooses, he/she chooses for a reason (1936: 257). 
According to Ellrod (1992: 126) "the person with the power of free choice... is a source of 
actions... and a producers of results. The will is a sort of causal power: it gives rise to 
effects". This means that one's choice was under his/her control, therefore, he/she is held to 
be responsible. Smith (1985: 104) argues that being able to give an account for his/her 
action is to be able to give reasons that hold for his/her action This is in case there are no 
factors which prevent agents from exercising control over choices, "for they either are 
unaware of crucial aspects of the situation which might lead them to alter their actions, or 
are compelled to perform certain deeds by force" (Ellrod, 1992: 124). For Chisholm 
(1976: 23-4) 
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if a man is responsible for a certain event or a certain state of affairs... then that event or 
state of affairs was brought about by some act of his, and the act was something that was 
in his power either to perform or not to perform. 
For Smith (1985: 93-4) to treat someone as a responsible person in the first sense is 
to regard him as one who has acted knowingly and willingly, when he could have acted 
otherwise. A responsible person has the capacity to make choices, to deliberate and act 
deliberately. The actions he performs are done under one intention or another, even if the 
intention is not always explicit: they are responses to the world as viewed under some 
description, rather than mere reflexes. 
However, there is an almost universal belief that children do not have the capacity to be 
responsible persons. For example, Rosenake (1982: 95) believes that children are "more 
likely to harm themselves and less likely to promote their own interests because of their 
cognitive and moral deficiencies". He also shows that both children and adults are more 
competent than is generally thought in the relevant respects and that adults are less so. 
"Neither in their ability to make reasoned choices, nor in their tendency to make bad 
choices, are the majority of children clearly inferior to many adults". In reply to this belief, 
Gray (1991: 31) argues that being responsible does not mean that the subject of freedom (X) 
has to make only right and good choices; whether a person's choices are good and right 
will depend on the person's personal experience in making choices. Similarly, Harris 
(1982: 38-45) points out that children are capable of planning systematic policies and 
strategies requiring a high degree of rationality. With reference to child psychology, 
Donaldson (1978: 33-59) notes that with children aged between 7 and 11 years' intellectual 
status `is best understood and even defined by its being essential by only a preparation for, 
and so is necessarily inferior to, that of the adult'. Also she believes that `the gap between 
children and adults is not as great as has recently been widely believed [and that] children 
are not so limited in ability to reason deductively'. 
This means that learners need the freedom to learn by their own experiences how to take 
responsibility. In short, to accept that learners have the right to be left free is to accept that 
they can be responsible for their choices and decisions. In an educational setting we cannot 
blame a person for failing in a particular subject if he/she was not given the choice to 
decide for him herself. In such a situation, it would be more logical to lay the blame on the 
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person who had the opportunity to choose such a programme but still failed. In this sense 
Wringe (1981: 113) argues that the child does not become rational and responsible for his 
acts all at once. 
There may be some areas in which he is not competent to decide what he should do, and 
in which adults must assume responsibility for his actions. Simultaneously, there may be 
other areas in which he perfectly well understands the consequences and implications of 
his acts. In such areas it is quite in order to speak of his being punished by way of the 
forfeiture of certain rights when he does what he knows to be wrong. Normatively 
speaking, he is not a child, but an adult in respect of such acts, even though he may still 
be a child according to some institutional criterion such as age. 
For Suliman (2000: 180-196), Nwr-Al-Din (1997: 200-4), Al-Said (1989), Gad (1996: 149) 
and Pringle 
the child who is denied the opportunity to exercise responsibility will fail to develop a 
sense of responsibility, for himself. for others or for material subjects (Pringle, 1982: 103). 
From the previous arguments it has been argued that there is determined relationship 
between being free and being responsible, whereby nobody can be seen as responsible 
unless he/she can carry out such free choices and actions. Moreover, it has been argued that 
for young learners to learn how to take responsibility they need to act freely in which they 
will exercise responsibility at their early age. 
2.4.5. The relationship between being free and academic achievement 
Many traditional educationalists are deeply interested in the effect of freedom in education 
on academic achievement because it is their primary goal in education. I will investigate 
this relationship between freedom and academic achievement, but not because achievement 
will be greater by allowing learners freedom in their education. I intend to demonstrate that 
giving learners freedom in education will help them in their academic achievements up to a 
point, since giving them freedom will enable them to be autonomous, creative, and 
responsible, as discussed in the preceding pages. In Hopkins' (1979: 121-2) view, no claim 
can be made that freedom will necessarily produce greater achievement than other 
educational philosophies. However, allowing freedom would bring more achievement 
when the pressure of control is blocking that achievement. 
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Hence, it is clear that freedom might be the only way to break away from older 
philosophies, which stress passivity and receptivity in the classroom. Freedom gives 
students the chance to acquire knowledge, discover facts, think critically and search for 
order, system and precision, in other words, it gives them `intellectual education' as 
Dearden (1984: 120) describes it. In some ways, as in creative accomplishment, 
achievement may be greater in an environment of freedom, but in other ways, as in rote 
learning, achievement may be less. 
The fact that allowing more freedom brings more achievement when the pressure of 
controls is blocking it, has been demonstrated by Hopkins (1979: 122-6). Hopkins presented 
many studies relating freedom to academic achievement. For example, studies of 
progressive education, open education, studies investigating the results of even more self- 
direction in education and studies investigating the relationship between the child and 
rearing practices and achievement. Recently there have been many studies investigating the 
relationship between freedom and learning different skills in particular subjects such as 
Schee (1999) and Lai (1999). Talking in a practical sense about the role of freedom in 
bringing more academic achievement can be seen in the free progress system as practised 
by the Sri Aurobindo International Centre of education Pondicherry (Devi, 1998: 168-9). In 
this system, the two central fundamental concepts are freedom and progress. In this system, 
it is accepted that no progress is possible without giving students freedom in learning. They 
have found that there is a positive relationship between giving learners freedom and their 
progress. According to this system, progress means several things; an increasing amassing 
of information, development of certain skills, development of psychological abilities, 
development of body and life and mind, the training of the mind to deal with large and 
universal ideas and so on. Another example where freedom in education is at the core is 
Summerhill School as practised by A. S. Neill. The learners who have graduated from 
Summerhill include university professors, doctors, engineers, teachers, painters and writers. 
If the object of education is to give people the opportunity to take up such careers, in these 
cases Summerhill has succeeded, but from a Summerhill point of view that is not 
particularly important (Gribble, 1998: 8). Moreover, many practices of freedom in education 
have been studied by Gribble (1998) such as Dartington Hall School (England, 1926), 
so 
Tamariki School (New Zealand, 1967), Sudbury Valley School (USA, 1968), Bramblewood 
School (USA, 1969), Countesthorpe Community College (England, 1970), Neel Bagh and 
Sunavanam (India, 1972), The Pestalozzi School (Ecuador, 1977), Kleingruppe Lufingen 
(Switzerland, 1977), Mirambika (India, 1981), The Barbara Taylor School (USA, 1985), 
Japan: Tokyo Shure, Nonarni Children's Village, the Global School, Kinokuni 
(Japan, 1985), The Democractic School of Hadera (Israel, 1987) and Sands School 
(England, 1987). It is clear from the previous evidences that the idea of freedom in 
education will not diminish learners' achievement. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
The current chapter was a attempt to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in 
education that depends on the analysis of the concept of freedom made in the previous 
chapter. This analysis treated, firstly, the implications of freedom in education with respect 
to its conditions, restrictions and value in education. Moreover, through this analysis of 
freedom in education the current chapter aimed also to analyse and examine learners' right 
to be free regarding their education. Some conclusions can be derived from the previous 
examination as follows. Firstly, with respect to conditions of freedom, (a) it has been 
argued that non-interference with learners' choices and decisions is a necessary condition 
for learners to exercise their freedom in education to gain benefit from its value. However, 
interference is not justifiable only for the prevention of license on others, which is, of 
course, an important exception. Despite remarkable stories of children surviving without 
adult help it is still the case that because of their size, inexperience and less-developed 
rationality they are more vulnerable than most adults and need protection and guidance. 
Also, it has been argued that although restrictions of children's freedom are sometimes 
justified, this is not because children are inherently subject to adults' authority or incapable 
of freedom or in some way less worthy of respect and consideration than adults. 
Restrictions of children's freedom are important, just as restrictions of adults' freedom, and 
must be justified. If the justification for adults ever having the right to override children's 
wishes and make decisions for them is that this is in children's interests because they need 
protection and guidance, then adults' right to make decisions for children's should be 
limited to making decisions in children's interests and to the provision of the necessary 
protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to rights over children, regardless of 
what is in children's interests. 
(B) it has been argued that the availability of making free choice and decisions is a 
necessary condition for learners to have freedom enabling them to acquire benefit from its 
value in education. But it is completely unrealistic to suppose that children are ever, as a 
matter of fact, free to do what they like simply because of the inherent decency and good 
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sense of all concerned. The practical choice is never between simply doing as one likes and 
being constrained; it is rather between being subject to different types of constraint. 
Secondly, with respect to the value of freedom in education for learners, it was seen that: 
(A) happiness is not the only aim of freedom in education when learners are allowed to do 
what they want. Happiness is only a product of being free to do what they are interested in; 
(B) autonomy, responsibility and creativity are valuable educational aims. Moreover, the 
current chapter noted that freedom is a necessary condition to achieve these aims; (C) It 
was shown that allowing learners more freedom brings greater academic achievement when 
the pressure of controls blocks it and when there are variety of options. This leads us to 
recognise that freedom in education has great value for society. Educating learners to be 
happy, creative, autonomous, responsible and achieving greater academic progress will be 
valuable aims for society to satisfy its needs and interests for the sake of development 
without forcing learners to do particular things. Through the arguments it is suggested that 
children should have freedom regarding their education not for its own sake but because it 
has value for them and their society. 
To have a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education, it is necessary to 
discuss other implications with respect to restrictions which might limit learners' freedom 
by being subject to the state's authority. Because for learners to exercise freedom (in terms 
of non-interference and availability of making choices and decisions) and to derive benefit 
from its value there are other implications in the areas of curriculum design, evaluation, and 
teacher training which should be examined. By having a complete theoretical framework of 
freedom in education it will be possible to propose one suits Egyptian society and its 
educational system and improve its efficiency. 
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Chapter Three 
The implications of the concept of freedom in educational processes 
3.1. Introduction 
In chapter two the theoretical framework of freedom in education that was constructed 
depended on the analysis of the concept of freedom that was made in chapter one. This 
analysis treated the implications of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, 
restrictions and value. Through this analysis chapter two aimed also to analyse and 
examine the learners' right to be free regarding their education. To have a complete 
theoretical framework of freedom in education, chapter three discusses other 
implications with respect to restrictions which might limit learners' freedom by being 
subject to state authority. This is because for learners to exercise freedom in terms of 
non-interference and the availability of making choices and decisions and to derive 
benefit from its value, they might be restricted by the nature of the curriculum, 
assessment, and teacher preparation. The significance of this chapter is that, firstly, it 
endeavours to build a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education that 
provides the required conditions, in which learners and society can derive benefit from 
the value of freedom so as to be able to satisfy their interests. Secondly it tries to suit 
Egyptian society and improve the efficiency of its educational system. 
3.2. The implications of the concept of freedom regarding curriculum content 
In the previous chapter I examined how far learners, if they are to derive benefit from 
the value of freedom in education, have to be left free to make free choices and 
decisions without interference from adults. In line with these previous arguments it can 
be further suggested that learners should be the group that decides what is actually to be 
included in the curriculum content, with help from adults. 
This is the way of determining the content of the curriculum has been understood by the 
defenders of the notion of freedom in education, such as Neill (1953,1961,1966 and 
1992), Holt (1983) and Hopkins (1976b, 1979). According to them learners at school 
should have the freedom to determine what they want to study and what they are 
interested in. Therefore, no one should interfere with the learner's choices and decisions 
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regarding what should be included in the curriculum content. The proponents of this 
view believe that learners should create the curriculum content themselves (Brandes and 
Ginnis, 1986: 12). Hopkins (1979: 47) for instance, states that 
it is the individual who decides what he or she will-or will not -learn as it becomes 
important to him or to her. The focus is on the self-directed exploration and 
investigation of what the individual student finds relevant to his or her own interests 
and goals, not on what society or teachers feel is important to learn. 
Similarly, Holt (1974: 183) maintains that 
young people should have the right to control and direct their own learning, that is, to 
decide what they want to learn, and when, where, how, how much, how fast, and with 
what help they want to learn it. 
This view suggests that it is the responsibility of the educational system to facilitate 
such investigation, opening up opportunities for the learners to determine what they are 
really interested in studying (Brent, 1978: 215) and (Brandes and Ginnis, 1986: 13) and to 
choose the curriculum content. Education based on freedom, which gives learners the 
right to choose their own content is a method of developing autonomy, creativity, 
responsibility and a feeling of happiness because of doing something they like. 
There are some experiences which apply the notion of giving learners freedom to 
determine what should be included in the curriculum content. One example can be seen 
from Summerhill School as practised by Neill, (1954,1961,1966 and 1992). Another 
example can be seen in Professor Collings' school. He did not teach subjects, as these 
are commonly understood. The actual aims of his school were not conventional 
knowledge or skills, but the bettering of the present life of his pupils. In Kilpatrick's 
(1975: 269) words: 
his starting point accordingly was the actual present life of the boys and girls 
themselves, with all their interests and desires, good and bad. His first step forward 
was to help guide these learners to choose the most interesting and fruitful parts of 
this life as the content of their school activity. Following this, his aim was twofold, 
first to help the boys and girls do better than they otherwise would the precise things 
they had chosen, and second, by means of the experience of choosing and through the 
experience of more effectual activity gradually to broaden the out-look of the boys 
and girls as to what they might further choose and then to help them better effect these 
new choices. 
According to the defenders of the right of learners to determine what they want to study, 
education should not lead to ends or certain aims such as the development of the 
industry of the society or the transfer of society's cultural values from generation to 
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generation. In our rapidly changing, pluralistic society, learners need to learn to be 
flexible, open, and tolerant of others, and to develop the capacity for living with others. 
Blenkin and Kelly (1983: 50) claim that "education can have no end outside itself, it is 
its own end. It can only be viewed, then, as a continuous and life-long process of 
growth". 
It can be argued that this tradition provides the required conditions for learners to derive 
benefit from the value of freedom in education (non-interference and the availability of 
choices) However, it has its own criticisms. The main criticism of this approach is that 
giving individuals freedom in education to satisfy their interests might conflict with the 
satisfaction of society's interests. As argued in chapter two, giving learners freedom is a 
necessary condition for being happy, creative, autonomous, responsible and academic 
achievement satisfy society's needs. In this sense it might be argued that giving 
individuals freedom in education to study what they are really interested in does not in 
any way destroy the fabric of society. In fact, education and freedom, as Hopkins 
(1976b: 199) shows, can be seen as "the interface between an individual and his society 
that gives him the tools to work with and in his society for his own self-determined 
benefit and for the benefit of others". Neill (1992: 103) proposes that the "community 
has the right to restrain the antisocial boy because he is interfering with the rights of 
others; but the community has no right to compel a boy to learn something he does not 
like". Peters (1973: 246), offers a solution to this problem by stating that it will be in the 
individual's interest to acquire certain types of knowledge and skills that are considered 
to be socially beneficial. He further maintains that if one possesses knowledge and skills 
that are in demand in society, he would be likely to earn prestige and reward by 
exploiting these skills. According to Shotton (1998: 188) giving learners freedom to 
study what they are interested in does not mean necessarily that their interests will be 
followed in isolation because, in any population of young people, some interests will be 
shared, so group work can be undertaken. Another criticism made against giving 
learners freedom is that children, especially at an early, age are too immature to be able 
to decide on their own what they are interested in studying. These arguments are 
rejected by Bantock (1970: 62-8), Chamberlin (1989: 106-7) and Dearden (1967: 54). For 
example Dearden (1967: 54) states that 
we cannot ensure that in pursing their interests children will acquire knowledge across 
that range of areas that some feel to be desirable, whether this is interpreted as 
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meaning a grounding in basic skills or initiation into discrete forms, understanding or 
realms of meaning. 
The justification for the previous criticism can be seen in Thompson's argument 
(1980: 57), in which he states that learners at school lack the basis for making rational 
choices. He observes that that is why they are being educated. They are consumers, who 
cannot be told fundamentally what is to be made available for them. There are certain 
things children need to know in order to survive in their state, to become part of the 
community and play their part in it, and to be able to make reasoned choices as 
individuals. Of course, an argument can be made that there is important knowledge that 
learners should learn, and that they do not have adequate experience to decide for 
themselves what this knowledge is. Bantock (1970: 194), for instance, completely 
rejects the idea that learners should have the academic freedom to decide for themselves 
what they want to learn or even the idea that they must be shown the nature of what 
they are studying and the reasons for studying. While many educationalists do not 
totally reject the idea like Bantock, they take the position that there should be no 
conflict when it comes to deciding what kind of knowledge learners should be taught. 
This argument appears to be intended as a warning to show that following their interests 
will not necessarily result in children acquiring the knowledge or skills which are 
desirable as an important aim of education. Moreover, Blenkin and Kelly (1983: 51) 
postulate that children must have some knowledge and experiences before interests can 
be aroused. It is true that children need some knowledge and experiences before they 
can know their interests. However, this does not go against giving the right of learners 
to choose what they are interested in. Also this tradition does not deny the need for 
learners to obtain help from others to make such a choice especially at an early age, 
without interference with the choices and decisions they might need. For Young 
(1998: 87) the idea of active learners who take responsibility for their own learning is an 
attractive one and is a recognition of something which traditional content-dominated 
models of education have all too easily forgotten. However, he notes some problems 
that may arise when this idea is put into practice. 
firstly,... the capacity to make learning decisions can not be separated from the level 
of learning reached. The ability to make learning decisions is itself something which 
has to be learned, something recognised in the fashionable idea of learning to learn. 
Secondly it has been argued that they neglect the need for new roles for teachers and 
trainers. 
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It can be argued that the core idea of Young's argument leads to recognise another 
criticism to this approach. According to the rejecters of this approach learners are not 
mature enough to take the responsibility to determine on their own what they want to 
study. Likewise Norman (1979: 180) argues that learners can find no academic subject 
in which they can engage in which interests them. Reid (1992: 108) notes that 
[the] Curriculum is a matter for experts, and if teachers are not expert, students are 
even less expert. If experts see a need for innovation, why should this be blocked by 
students who are in no position to understand the goals and processes of curriculum 
planning? But these same experts would no doubt claim that what they were doing 
was for the benefit of the student. 
If we follow Reid's argument, then it is possible to say that both learners and parents 
and even teachers are not experts in this matter, but this does not mean that their 
suggestions should be neglected. It is clear that they can make a big difference when it 
comes to determining the content. Similarly, it can be argued that if the learners do not 
play a role in determining the content, they might not be interested in what they are 
studying and so might learn nothing. But when learners have the chance to determine 
the content with help from their parents and teachers they might succeed in determining 
what they are interested in to be included in their curriculum. 
The second problem has been issued by Young concerns neglecting of the need for new 
roles for teachers and trainers when children have the freedom to determine their own 
content. As argued in chapter two the need for new role by teachers is a required 
condition for education based on freedom in which they have to provide their learners 
with the required conditions to exercise and to derive benefit from the value of freedom 
in education. In other words, the learners have to be educated in a way that they will not 
be a source of restriction on their learners' freedom, for example, by exercising 
authority over them. Moreover, they will have a serious role in decision making, as will 
be proposed in chapter six. 
However, giving learners freedom to choose the content of their curriculum will not be 
suitable to be applied in Egyptian society because it might not contribute to the 
development processes. As will be discussed in chapters four and five, Egyptian policy 
is concerned with industrial development, therefore, it needs to interest children in 
following particular courses for the benefit of that development. This raises the issue of 
implementing an approach that suits Egyptian society, and which satisfies the interests 
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of both the state and learners in which it helps both to benefit from the value of freedom 
in education. This tradition takes the interests of the state as well as those of the learners 
to be the core of the curriculum content as can be seen in the work of Bantock (1970), 
Smith & Stanley & Shores (1957), Peters (1966b) and Chamberlin (1989). 
Because of the changes in the social and economic circumstance which characterise the 
present period, it becomes essential to modify the relation of curriculum, its purposes 
and shapes, to the social and economic environment of the near future. In this sense 
Kress argues that "the new circumstances demand a response: new goals and new 
curricula which are appropriate to these new goals" (2000: 134). Also these new 
circumstances produce new interests for the individuals which are connected to this new 
environment. Therefore, in the designing of a curriculum for the future, it is necessary 
to meet the interests of the individuals and the society. In a significant and crucial way 
learners are the central element in the educational process. Hence, education should be 
based on the nature of the child- a recommendation that we should base our decisions 
concerning the content of the curriculum on a consideration of the interests of the child. 
For Blenkin and Kelly (1983: 48) the emphasis in education should 
be placed on the development of the child... this vie%%, of education regards it as of 
central importance that the choice of educational experience be made by reference to 
the child as the recipient of those experiences... that choice must be based on the 
needs of children and their interests. 
This was a feature of Dewey's (1938: 1973) philosophy of education, and this theory has 
been recently developed more fully in an attempt to resolve some of the difficulties that 
a child-centred approach to education presents. For instance, Kelly (1977: 66-7) and 
White (1973: 7) suggest that the plan for choosing the content of the curriculum has to 
be in response to the actual interests of children. In this sense Gingell and Brandon 
(2000: 528) argue that the notion of an educated public does not call for uniformity but 
rather for serving people interests. Similarly, Doll (1978: 24) suggests that real 
education involves experiencing freedom from imposed authority, with full opportunity 
to pursue one's interests and to develop one's potential. For Straughan (1978: 151-3) if 
we wish children to act for reasons which they can see as reasons, accelerate their moral 
and rational development and make moral judgements and decisions, then we will have 
to take some account of what children want. Although Bantock (1970: 62-8) and 
Chamberlin (1989: 106-7) oppose the notion of giving learners academic freedom, they 
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consider the fact that the curriculum is made for the learner, not the learner for the 
curriculum: "Neither, in a sense, is made for the other; but both exist; and in some sort 
of way, they must be made to come into a relationship; a relationship not to be effected 
always at the expense of the curriculum" (Bantock, 1970: 62). For Beyer and Liston 
(1996: 216) curriculum effort ought to be accomplished not for the economy, not for 
parents, but for students. However, this should have nothing to do with making learners 
interested in what the state feels they should be interested in or by starting from their 
interests and leading them on to what the state wants them to do. 
The stress placed upon freedom in education by the preceding arguments implies an 
increase in the choices that students can make with regard to curriculum content. In this 
sense, this has nothing to do with using these interests to achieve the state's own 
purpose, but to help the children to pursue their interests to achieve more effectively 
and with more discrimination and to organise their experiences. Also, determining the 
curriculum content to serve both the interests of society and learners does not mean, as 
Chamberlin (1989: 113) states, that learners should be given enough freedom to learn 
what society needs them to learn. 
Freedom in education implies that adults have a responsibility towards advising, 
encouraging and motivating learners to fain the kinds of knowledge in which they are 
interested. As Reimer (1974: 90) puts it, freedom in education does not mean "to 
motivate learners to learn what others want them to learn. It is rather to provide the 
resources, which enable them to learn what they want". But it may at times be necessary 
to exert pressure on children so that they master something irrespective of what they 
want. Many learners, for instance, have been told to write an essay on something in 
which they were not at all interested and, as a result, have developed a new interest in 
something. However, children should not be forced too much to do something adults 
think they will be interested in it. 
The idea of freedom in education means that the learners should not be treated as a 
means to others' ends, but as an end in themselves, for example, learners must not be 
prepared for certain needs of the society. 
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Determining the curriculum content to serve both the interests of society and learners 
seems an attractive approach which could be applied in the Egyptian context to allow 
learners more freedom for two reasons: firstly, it implies that the content of the 
curriculum will be chosen in the light of the interests of the state, so that children will 
acquire knowledge and skills the state wants them to do. Secondly, it implies that the 
content will be chosen according to the interests of learners as well so they will work 
better and learn more effectively because they will be interested in what they are 
required to do. Although this approach gives more freedom for learners to find a content 
compatible with their interests, there are no guaranties that can be seen. Moreover, there 
are no guaranties that learners will have the availability of choices between alternatives 
to exercise freedom and to derive benefit from its value. Therefore, in the following two 
sections I will argue, first, for the learners' right to be involved in determining their 
curriculum content. This is the only guarantee learners can have to protect their freedom 
in their education and to satisfy their interests. In the second section I will examine the 
truth of the statement: if having a national curriculum limits learners' freedom and in 
sequence raises the claim for different curricular to provide learners with a variety of 
options in an educational system based on freedom. 
3.2.1. Learners' freedom to share determining the curriculum content 
In answering the question of who should determine what is to be included in the 
curriculum content, for the state to guarantee that the content will be designed in a way 
that satisfies its interests, Barrow (1981: 104) states that "a core curriculum and its broad 
framework is a matter for the state to decide". In others words, government, 
businessmen, public people and all kinds of professionals in the state can share in 
determining the interests of the state. Of course each of these groups can defend itself 
and find a way to achieve its own interests. Moreover, this view implies that it is also 
the state that can determine the content to satisfy the learners' interests. In doing so 
educationalists, philosophers, sociologists and psychologists can be involved. In this 
sense, Nelson, Carlson and Palansky (1996: 270) argue that "we educate for some 
purpose we consider to be good and what we teach is what we think is a good thing. To 
do otherwise is an absurdity". However, this does not guarantee that the mentioned 
groups are able to find out about the learners' interests to plan the curriculum content. 
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According to Pring, what is judged valuable by the state may not then be valued by the 
learners (1976: 53). 
Therefore, determining the content of the curriculum should be shared between learners 
and the state to satisfy the interests of both. This requires as Carnie (1996: 50-1) 
believes, that children should be included in curriculum design through active 
participation in decision-making. Having learners as a very active element in 
determining the curriculum content will guarantee that it will satisfy their interests. In 
other words, their choices reflect their actual interests, rather than those perceived by 
the state. Also by involving them in this process some educational problems will be 
solved. For example, Passe (1996: 9) observes that "the possibility of making poor 
curricular decisions is reduced when students are given the responsibility of choosing 
the content". As Passe notes, when learners are allowed to choose the content, they tend 
to select topics that interest them, thus avoiding motivation problems. 
However, are the learners the best judge of what their interests are, or are the adults who 
stand in some teaching relationship to the learners, whether that of parent or 
schoolteacher? Few would claim that a child is always the best judge, without 
qualification. For example, Dearden (1975a: 18) contends that learners might not be 
aware of their interests and goes on to say that children are not aware of what they are 
capable of, even if it is explained to them. However, it is also difficult for adults to 
decide on behalf of learners what they are interested in. If adults decide what children's 
interests are, it is likely that the percentage of their failure might be higher than if 
learners decide for themselves. Kelly (1977: 67) and Blenkin and Kelly (1983: 49) 
address another problem, which is somewhat different from that discussed before. This 
is not just that problem of who knows what learners' interests are in but the problem of 
determining the choices between the many interests that learners will undoubtedly have. 
The idea is that learners are the best judges of what interests them. 
To answer the second question concerning the guarantees learners should have to 
protect their freedom, it is important, in the following section, to discuss a suitable way 
to deliver such a content. In other words, does having a national curriculum limit 
learners' freedom and in consequence raise the claim for different curricula that provide 
learners with a variety of options? 
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3.2.2. Learners' freedom and national curriculum 
The answer to the previous question might be straightforward where having different 
curricula is more compatible with the idea of freedom in education. This is because it 
provides learners with a variety of options from which they can choose what they are 
interested in. However, as argued earlier the interests of the state in terms of preparing 
generation of scientists for the occupational needs of satiety are also a very important 
consideration. Therefore, the question that might be raised is, what is the guarantee that 
the state should have. The answer that might be given is that having a national 
curriculum is the way that the state can be sure that learners will do what is the best for 
the development processes, whereby are committed all learners to derive a particular 
standard of knowledge and understanding. In this sense it should also be mentioned that 
having a national curriculum can be acceptable, especially in Third World countries 
(including Egypt), where there is a lack of educational funds and variety in the sources 
of knowledge. Planning a national curriculum can be seen as the only possible option 
since the resources are insufficient to offer different curricula. Also it is for the public as 
Nelson, Carlson and Palansky (1996: 241) believe, to have some assurance that learners 
are learning something. 
However, education based on freedom can not be implemented in the form of a 
compulsory and national curriculum unless there are guarantees that it does not limit 
learners' freedom. Moreover, such a national curriculum should provide learners with 
the required conditions to exercise freedom and to derive benefit from its value in 
education. Firstly, a national curriculum should be planned in a way that achieves equal 
opportunity for learners, especially in a country such as Egypt when there are various 
forms of inequality, for example between urban and rural areas. In response to these 
conditions, it might be argued that equal opportunity strategies have typically taken the 
national curriculum as their focus and have attributed discriminatory effects against 
class, gender, race and colour to its content and to the manner of its transmission in the 
classroom (Jones and Moore, 1996: 312-3) and (Riley, 1992: 1-2). This requires as, Harris 
(1995: 222) and Kelly maintain that "the curriculum should be planned in such a way as 
to ensure that all learners have the opportunity to develop to a certain standard the skills 
and knowledge that will enable them to meet the demands of a technological state" 
(1977: 164). This suggests that only the practice of a national curriculum will allow all 
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students to reach the same standard. Because "it gives equal access to essential 
knowledge, skills, attitudes and values" (Tomlinson et al, 2000: 248). 
Secondly it should be planned in a way that takes into consideration the differences 
between the local provinces in the state. This is because as `Ali points out, that having 
the same curriculum for all `might produce the same types of thinking and minds even 
if the regional differences are not that great' (1998: 17). Therefore, as McLean suggests, 
all learners in a province should follow the same basic core curriculum (1996: 39,45) 
with the curriculum planned in a way that provides 
suitable differentiation in detailed content and presentation, and still with some 
provision for choice, to match different abilities, aspirations and needs. It also seeks 
greater coherence and continuity in school education as a whole. It is concerned with a 
framework for the curriculum and therefore, rightly leaves many details to be 
determined (Inspectors, 1985: 41). 
Thirdly, the state has to provide learners with a variety of choices so they can choose 
between them what they are interested in. Gill proposes that learners should have the 
right to pick and choose what they want to study within the national curriculum they 
that will study (1990: 407). "Such educational principles then follow, as that there 
should be much freedom of choice, many chances to pursue interests, and rich 
opportunities for discovery and self-expression" (Dearden, 1976: 53). Chanan (1981: 205- 
9) in his argument for the need to extend the range of curricular diversity plus basics, 
holds that we are educating a community of complementary people, not a mass of 
interchangeable individuals. In this way, the national curriculum should give a chance 
to learners to learn and exercise how they make choices and decisions through the 
curriculum. Furthermore, it should help the learners, with help from their teachers and 
parents, to find out about their real interests. It is important that the curriculum gives 
opportunity for learners to meet their interests by opening opportunities, alternatives 
and choices. This leads to the statement that "a child's environment should be rich in 
materials and possible experiences" (Hopkins, 1979: 55). 
Fourthly, the national curriculum should be neutral in that it does not affect the learners' 
freedom to choose what they really want and not because there are some hidden aspect 
that lead them to choose otherwise. In other words, it should have nothing to do with 
making learners interested in what the state feels they should be interested in or by 
starting from their interests and leading them on to what the state wants them to do. 
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This makes it clear that the state should not interfere with learners' decisions about what 
interests them. In this sense, Blenkin and Kelly (1983: 49) reject the idea of deciding 
what they ought to be interested in and imposing that willy-nilly upon them rather than 
knowing what they are really interested in. 
Fifthly, when there is a national curriculum there is call for a textbook. The textbook is 
considered a very important resource in delivering the knowledge the learners have to 
know (Slater, 1992: 11), Johnsen (1993: 24), Richaudeau (1980: 28) and Chambliss and 
Calfee (1998: 6). `For the teacher and pupil, the textbook can be seen as a working tool 
and as an instrument of communication' (Mitaw`, 1995: 230). It is true that textbooks are 
also very important to achieve equal opportunity in the Third World. Firstly, as Castell 
and Luke, and Luke (1989: vii) argue, the textbook claims "to represent to each 
generation of students an officially sanctioned, authorised version of human knowledge 
and culture". Secondly, Chambliss and Calfee (1998: 7) argue that textbooks offer 
learners a rich array of new and potentially interesting facts, and open the door to a 
world of fantastic experiences. For instance, in developing countries where learners do 
not have the same facilities as learners in developed countries, to read and get the 
knowledge they want textbooks play a very important and significant role. In the view 
of Altbach and Kelly (1988: 3) in third world countries there are few instructional 
materials available at all. In many schools children share texts; in some they have none 
to share and the teacher writes the daily lessons from a textbook on the blackboard. 
However, it might be argued that having textbooks in the previous sense limits learners' 
freedom to look for and discover knowledge on their own in which they are trained to 
be self-learning and to be choosers and decision-makers. Moreover, textbooks, because 
they are written under supervision from the state cannot be seen to be neutral. They 
"reflect the state's interests, beliefs, and values" Chambliss and Calfee (1998: 168). This 
means that they limit the learners' freedom to make and follow interests, beliefs, and 
values. Also these authors observe that "children [... ] know what they know, think what 
they think, and value what they value in some measure because of the textbooks they 
use" (Chambliss and Calfee, 1998: 168). 
In the Egyptian context, as I will explain in chapter five, learners are not really badly in 
need of the kind of textbooks mentioned above. However, this is not to suggest that 
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there is no need for textbooks in schools. On the contrary, textbooks are important for 
learners, teachers and public, to teach and assess learner achievement with respect to 
knowledge acquisition, as the textbook provides all the information they are expected to 
acquire. Also, it is to help, firstly, to find out the kind of knowledge, skills and 
experiences previous learners had. This helps to predict what learners should study now. 
Secondly, to help parents to know what their children are learning and how they can 
help them with it. Finally, textbooks are important in given learners the guidelines as to 
what knowledge they have to look for and what they have to do with such knowledge. 
This means that learners will not depend only on their textbooks but they will have to 
look at different resources. This activity will help learners, for example, to be self- 
learning and be engaged more effectively in the teaching and learning process in the 
classroom. 
Sixthly, a national curriculum based on freedom should pay serious attention to extra 
curricular activities, especially because as will be shown in chapter five these activities 
have no place in Egyptian education. The significance of engaging in such extra 
curricular provides learners with the opportunity to exercise freedom and derive benefit 
from its value to satisfy their interests and also society's interests. This takes place 
when learners have the opportunity to exercise freedom to choose the kind of activity 
they are interested in. For example, learners learn how to act freely and without 
conflicting with others peoples' freedom, when they are involved in teamwork, for 
example, to do a particular project. Also, it helps them towards self-discipline and self- 
learning when they do things with their hands and make their own choices and decisions 
about the activities they do. 
Therefore, in education based on freedom there are some preparations to be made, 
especially in the Egyptian context. (A) It is important to note that learners, teachers and 
parents should be prepared for having extra curricular activities as a necessary and 
important part of the teaching and learning process. In other words they should be 
helped to understand the importance of extra curriculum activities, in which they can 
play their role as learners. Otherwise learners will miss great opportunities to exercise 
and enjoy freedom in education. (B) To fix the time for the learner to engage in free 
activities. Every learner can do whatever activity he/she wants to do with help from 
their a particular teacher who will be the organiser of these activities. This requires that, 
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in turns, every teacher takes responsibility to supervise these activities and help their 
learners without interference or asking them to do what they want them to do. (C) For a 
more effective functioning of the extra curricular activities these have to be guidelines 
for the organiser-teacher, learners and parents, to introduce them to the various 
activities and the equipment that the learners might need. However, it should only be a 
guide, not telling them exactly what they have to do, in order to give them the chance 
for creative work with their learners. (D) Activities can take place in the classroom and 
also in special rooms for doing such activities that requires more space and equipment, 
such as music and cooking. (E) The school will have to provide learners with all the 
facilities they might need for such activities. (F) The learners should not be required to 
pay for any of the activities. School should provide them for free, otherwise, not all 
learners will be able to have same opportunity which goes against freedom in education. 
(G) The learners should have opportunities to take a part in different activities in 
different fields such as culture, art, health and sport. `Activities can be related to the 
curriculum subjects, such as collecting information, being involved in arts, taking 
photos, collecting stamps, cooking, visiting factories, museums, gardens, companies 
and hospitals' (Qassim, 2000: 187). (H) The activities should take place in the summer as 
well as during school term and outside as well as inside school. (I) `The activities 
should be compatible with the learners' interests, abilities and suitable to their age' 
(Qassim, 2000: 187). (J) Fieldwork activities should take place to facilitate active and 
deep learning. In the more free learning environment, learners are found to be more 
proactive and teacher-learner rapport improves. 
Seventhly, the national curriculum based on freedom should pay attention to the 
teaching methods that allow learners the opportunity to exercise freedom and get the 
benefit from its value, especially, as will be examined in chapter five the teaching 
methods used by Egyptian teachers are mainly lectures which do not help learners to 
feel free to engage in intellectual and practical processes. Therefore, the teaching 
methods wanted are those that allow learners to engage in such processes should be 
designed to support the view that learners learn more when they engage in two main 
activities; trying things out through practice and inquiring into things on their own 
through discussion. According to Arends (1994: 337-8) for learners to be engaged in 
such processes they need an active involvement, and an atmosphere of intellectual 
freedom. This means that learners should be occupied in such processes such, 
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observing, predicting, hypothesising, raising questions, interpreting, evaluating, 
communicating. Moreover, learners will have the opportunity to participate in the 
inquiry process, to apply reasoning processes to particular questions and to understand 
and emulate the research skills of such fields to think rather than merely to remember. 
The significance of engaging learners in the two processes mentioned is demonstrated 
in the work of Foley (1999: 82), Cook (1999-84-89), Schee and Dijk (1999: 266), Lai 
(1999: 252-3), Orton (1987: 35), Solomon (1998: 384-7), Waterson (1993: 116), Watt 
(1999: 185-6), Shemilt (1984: 44), Pushkin (1998: 195), Eggen and Kauchak (1988: 207- 
10) and Romberg (1994: 287). They hold that learners do not learn from talk, they learn 
to talk and do things on their own. What a teacher should do is to encourage them to 
join in with particular ways of talking about things they are doing. In other words 
learners will be engaged in both minds-on and hands-on science activities. Minds-on 
activities will involve learners in using their mental processes to think through a 
scenario in relation to developing understanding. Hands-on activities will involve 
learners in using the types of practical activities to learn through their own experiences. 
Participation in teaching and learning processes in the classroom requires methods that 
allow more freedom for learners to induce them to ask questions, select and collect data 
to help answer questions, and to choose techniques to display and comment in particular 
terms about their findings. Through discussion things are learned and processes are 
developed. Through discussion growth is also enhanced, their own and their group's, 
and matters are resolved or made more satisfying. Thus the consideration in favour of 
discussion counts not just as products but also processes, and not just intellectual ones 
but also attitudes and behavioural ones, and further, not just individuals but also 
communal ones. (Dillon, 1994: 108). In helping learners to do so teachers should be able 
to formulate questions on each of these six levels in order to encourage their pupils to 
employ a variety of cognitive processes. The six levels according to Perrott are: 
knowledge (to determine whether learners remember certain specific facts), 
comprehension (to help learners organise facts in such a way as to make some sense of 
them), applications (to encourage learners to apply information they have learned to 
reach an answer to a problem), analysis (to help learners to analyse information for 
underlying reasons such as cause and effect), synthesis (to help learners to form 
relationships and put things together in new or original ways) and evaluation (to help 
99 
learners choose among alternatives by judging which best fits some started value 
(1990b: 3 8-41). 
However, as it will be discussed in chapter five Egyptian learners are not used to 
discussion and they always feel too ashamed to engage in any activity in which they 
might give a wrong answer. Therefore, it is important first of all to help them feel 
powerful and able to engage in such a discussion then, as Perrott argues, help them to 
give a more complete and thoughtful response through pausing, promoting, seeking 
further clarification and refocusing their response; also to increase the amount and 
quality of learners' participation through redirecting the same question to several 
learners, framing questions that call for sets of related facts and framing questions that 
require the learners to use high cognitive thought (1990a: 52). 
In addition, it might be argued that the world will be more complex in the future when 
not only individual work will be needed but they will also be a need for group work. To 
work as part of a team learners need to be engaged in working as a group at school so as 
to prepare them for such a situation in the future. This is because working in a group, 
according to Sands helps learners to learn by co-operation, learning partly from each 
other and gaining respect for each other's strengths and weaknesses. It removes the 
sense of failure from slow learners and encourages learners to be come self-reliant and 
work at their own space. It allows teachers to be available, to deal with individuals and 
to tailor a range of tasks for learners' needs and abilities more conveniently and 
appropriately (1990: 146-7). In this work the teacher is only a facilitator and guide of 
learners (Arends, 1994: 377-8). 
From the above it might be concluded that teaching methods should focus on engaging 
learners in doing and thinking of things on their own with a little help from their 
teachers. This requires making them feel free to make such choices and decisions with 
regard to what they want to do and discuss. Moreover they need to be engaged in 
working as a group as well as working as individuals. Having discussed the implications 
of the idea of freedom in determining curriculum, who should chooses its content and 
how can it be delivered to learners brings the argument to the idea of the value of 
knowledge when the idea of freedom is implemented. Therefore, in the following 
sections I will examine this value in the light of freedom in education. 
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3.2.3. Learners' freedom and the value of knowledge 
As examined in chapter two, freedom is a necessary condition for learners to become 
happy, creative, autonomous, responsible, self-learning and acquire a good level in the 
academic sense. This requires that learners should not be slaves to the kinds of 
knowledge prescribed in the curriculum and imparted by teachers to free their minds to 
achieve the mentioned aims. (Al-Said, 1989: 207-10). In other words, freedom in 
education is against the view whereby more attention is given to the value of acquiring 
knowledge, rather than that of gaining experience through performing new activities, 
and it can be seen as a restriction on learners' freedom. This is usually because 
traditional educationalists tend to see the imparting of new knowledge as the ultimate 
value of education. As I will show in chapters four and five, the value of knowledge as 
the ultimate aim of Egyptian education is one of the restrictions that limits learners' 
freedom, in the sense mentioned above. Thus, I will examine in this section the idea that 
freedom in education does not in any way suggest that learners should not be taught any 
knowledge. It is concerned with questions like, what is the function of knowledge for 
learners in deriving benefit from the value of freedom? And how can it be introduced to 
learners in schools? 
Education based on freedom does not consider knowledge as an end in itself but as a 
means to other ends. Likewise, `Ammar (1998a: 64-5) has also put forward the idea that 
knowledge is just a means to other ends. For example Thomson (1967: 190) argues 
creative thinking, as an aim of education, is unlikely to be productive without 
collecting, selecting, and analysing data. This implies that the learners' minds should be 
left free without having to memorise large amounts of knowledge, as it does not make 
any sense merely to store information in the brain like an encyclopaedia. Also it implies 
that freedom allows learners the opportunity to use their minds to discover new 
relationships between isolated facts and to find out new knowledge about those facts. In 
other words, knowledge should be a means of acquiring new abilities and skills. As 
Cooper (1987: 62) argues "to have knowledge is to have capacities and being educated 
consists of acquiring new capacities". Degenhardt (1982: 81-2) also rejects the notion of 
knowledge as an end in itself and notes some of the ambiguities connected with this 
notion. He convincingly argues that the mere fact of someone acquiring knowledge is 
not useful in itself, and that freedom in education implies that teaching knowledge is not 
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an aim in itself. His argument is that an individual can achieve certain aim by different 
kinds of knowledge. 
The learner's brain has to be left free to examine such knowledge and find links 
between different kinds of it to create new knowledge. Similarly, Darling (1984: 167) 
states that 
it is not profitable to spend a lot of time acquiring information which may become 
discredited. Instead children should be equipped to assimilate and cope with whatever 
new knowledge they may need in the future 
Breese (1973: 21) agrees with this argument when he says that "children should spend 
little time being required to learn isolated facts by heart; instead they should spend a 
great deal of time engaged in activities both mental and physical where they are 
required to master details". The point that must be made here is that knowledge in itself 
should not be the purpose of education. Knowledge should be a means to an end. For 
instance, `Ammar (1999a: 98) notes, that knowledge can be changed and modified 
according to new information and other new knowledge. He says that this kind of 
information revolution does not mean that learners need to collect all this information, 
instead what he stresses is the need for a methodology for dealing with it. In doing so 
learners will learn how to make a rational decision, solve problems and discover 
alternatives. Freeing the learner's minds and the development of their thinking should 
be the most important function of education. 
Similarly, Young (1999: 469-70) asserts that a curriculum for the future expresses "a 
transformative concept of knowledge which emphasises its power to give learners a 
sense that they can act on the work; a focus on the creation of new knowledge a well as 
the transmission of existing knowledge; an emphasis on the interdependence of 
knowledge areas and on the relevance of school knowledge to everyday problems". For 
example, Scheffler (1973: 124) argues that "content should enable the learners to make 
responsible personal and moral decisions". This implies that freedom gives learners the 
opportunity to use their minds to discover new relationships between isolated facts and 
to find out new details about those facts. In other words, knowledge should be a means 
of acquiring new abilities and skills. It does not matter how much information the 
learners should know but it is the question how to use that information to achieve the 
aims of freedom in education. "if education is concerned with the development of the 
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rational mind..., then many of the difficulties over curriculum planning are solved" 
Downey and Kelly (1979: 210). 
For knowledge to be a means to different ends Bailey (1984: 22) notes that the principles 
must be as fundamental as possible, so they can have general applicability: 
principles are more fundamental than the particulars subsumed under them, though the 
principles may, in some cases, have to be arrived at by a study of particular cases; and 
those general clusters of rules and principles which we refer to as disciplines are more 
fundamental than any isolated facts of items of knowledge unrelated to anything else. 
To learn by learning principles is not just to learn the same content by different 
methods, it is actually to learn a different content for a different purpose. 
There are many arguments that can be made to justify the previous idea which considers 
knowledge as a means for learners to derive benefit from the value of freedom. For 
example, knowledge is not static, and according to Langford (1970: 107) it is difficult to 
create a curriculum for learners which can teach them all the new knowledge that is 
created every second. This makes it possible to argue that even if the curriculum is 
designed very well, it cannot cover all the kinds of knowledge, skills and desirable 
experiences defined as educational. Macmunn (1926: 30) makes a similar statement 
when he claims that "a child is not a passive machine to set working out human 
knowledge by the yard: he has a living mind impatient to build up a store of imagery, to 
weave it into the general fabric of his brain". What is important here is not so much the 
kind of knowledge that should be taught, but how that knowledge can be used to allow 
learners freedom to obtain benefit from its value in education. One of the ways in which 
knowledge can be used to its full potential is by promoting imagination and ingenuity. 
This will give learners, as Woods and Barrow (1975: 151) suggest, the capability to 
make the necessary imaginative leaps for breaking new ground. 
The second argument has been recognised by Kelly (1977: 168) and Beyer and Liston 
(1996: 193) who note the difficulty of demonstrating "the superiority of certain kinds of 
knowledge and human activities over others to be included in the curriculum". 
Similarly, Holt (1983: 173) and (`Ammar, 1998a: 89-93) discuss the question of how we 
recognise one piece of knowledge as more important than another, or indeed, what we 
really mean when we say that some knowledge is essential and the rest, as far as school 
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in concerned, worthless? Holt also notes that since we cannot know what knowledge 
will be most needed in the future, it is senseless to try to teach it in advance. Holt 
further notes that the crucial question we must ask is what knowledge the schools 
should teach from the vast array of available intellectual resources, and goes on to say 
that the accumulated and ever-growing knowledge in all fields has reached such 
proportions that a comprehensive grasp of the total range of knowledge is out of the 
question for any one individual. This raises the question of how we can distinguish 
knowledge which is worthwhile from knowledge which is not. As previously 
emphasised, it is important to teach learners how to acquire the knowledge on their own 
instead of giving them the knowledge through the teacher or the curriculum. Spencer 
(1932: 109) claims that 
any piece of knowledge which the pupil has himself acquired, and any problem which 
he has himself solved, becomes. by virtue of the conquest, much more thoroughly his 
than it could else be. The preliminary activity of mind which his success implies, the 
concentration of thought necessary to it, and the excitement consequent on his 
triumph, conspire to register the facts in his memory in a way that no mere 
information heard from the teacher, or read in a school-book. can be registered. 
The argument however does not end here, as I have mentioned before, determining the 
curriculum content in the light of the idea of freedom in education is sharing between 
state and learners. Therefore, the state should be neutral in introducing the type of 
knowledge in school which does not affect learners' choices. In this sense Pring 
(1976: 28) maintains that subject-matters should be drawn upon to extend and refine 
further the life of the mind - the capacity to think, reflect, make choices, evaluate, 
criticise. In might be argued that although most literature claims that in school learners 
have to learn different kinds of knowledge related to different subjects to cover the 
whole area of knowledge, Young suggests that all curricula involve the assumption that 
some kinds and areas of knowledge are more worthwhile than others (1998: 17). Since 
certain kinds of knowledge have a status and value greater than others they have a prior 
claim for inclusion in any curriculum. This is supported by Peters (1966b: 28-32) who 
asserts that education is concerned only with those activities which have an intrinsic 
value. If this is the view that one takes of education, then it will follow that the 
curriculum for all learners must consist of these intrinsically activities and of all these 
form of knowledge or understanding (Hirst, 1975: 181-193) and (Hirst and 
Peters, 1970: 62-73). 
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According to this kind of argument, any learner whose curriculum excludes him from 
any of these areas of human knowledge and understanding is being offered an 
educational provision that is by definition inferior or is not receiving an education in the 
full sense at all (Kelly, 1977: 165). For instance, Hirst argues that syllabuses and 
curricula must be constructed so as to introduce pupils as far as possible into the 
interrelated aspects of each of the basic forms of knowledge, each of the several 
disciplines. And they must be constructed to cover at least in some measure the range of 
knowledge as a whole (1974: 47). 
Dearden (1976: 33) and Blyth, for example, suggests that the essential elements of the 
national curriculum should be language, history, geography, science, mathematics, 
physical education, moral education, religious education, art and craft (1984: 29-30). 
Hirst, too finds that that knowledge is divided into eight discrete forms of rationality 
(mathematics, physical science, human sciences, history, religion, literature, the fine 
arts and philosophy), each distinguishable from the other through its unique logical 
structure, and of education as the initiation of pupils into all these forms (1974: 46). For 
White they are communication, mathematics, the physical sciences, arts appreciation 
and philosophical thought (1973: 61-3). For Bellack (1964: 265) and Lawton (1973: 18-9) 
the curriculum should contain six core areas-five disciplines and one interdisciplinary 
unit. The six areas he suggests are mathematics, the physical and biological sciences, 
the humanities and social sciences (including history, geography, classical studies, 
social studies, literature, film and TV and religious studies), the expressive and creative 
arts, moral education and interdisciplinary work. The prescribed national curriculum 
subjects in England are; Mathematics, English and Science as the core subjects. The 
foundation subjects are History, Geography, Technology, Music, art, a foreign language 
and Physical education (Martin, 1988: 103) and (Anning, 1991: 101). 
However, in practice it is clear that valuing the sciences gives subjects such as physics 
or mathematics more recognition than other subjects thereby making them compulsory, 
whereas arts and humanities are just options, as is the case in Egypt. This is a matter 
that has to be determined by the state. One reason that is constantly cited is the need for 
certain subjects such as physics, and computer studies as being important for the 
development of industry. Apple (1979: 37-8) for instance, notes that there is a relation 
between economic structure and high-status knowledge. A capitalist, industrialist, and 
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technological society values the knowledge that most contributes to its continuing 
development. Mathematics, science and computer studies have demonstrably more 
financial support than do the arts and humanities. This leads to two important questions: 
first, whether this method of selection limits the freedom of those learners who want to 
study arts or humanities. The opportunity to study these subjects will be more than the 
opportunity to study arts and humanities. Second, whether learners feel that studying 
arts and humanities will be of less value than studying other subjects since these 
subjects are not given the recognition they deserve by the state. Nonetheless, the 
development of human beings cannot take place unless learners have an equal 
opportunity to study both sciences and humanities. 
Even if learners are interested, it is likely that they will lose their interest in these 
subjects, because making certain subjects optional indicates that they are of less value. 
Dearden (1968: 84-6) for instance suggests that a subject like creative art work should 
not be included in the curriculum as a compulsory subject. He observes that children 
should paint, write verse, sing, dance, play, play trumpets and throw pots voluntarily as 
much as they want to, but that it is not something that should be planned for them and 
made compulsory by the school. Although Bellack (1973: 108) and Schwab (1978: 377) 
argue that all material should be planned and made available to be used in the service of 
the student. Even if it is not compulsory it might not be possible to believe that it will 
not effect learners' decisions to choose such subjects when it is not fundamental or 
compulsory. 
Having discussed the implications of the idea of freedom in determining the curriculum 
content I will turn now to discuss its implications regarding learners' assessment. 
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3.3. The implications of the concept of freedom regarding learners' assessment 
As argued earlier, teaching and learning knowledge should be considered not as an end 
in itself but as means to such end. Therefore, the defenders of freedom in education 
argue against the significance of, for example, testing learners to find out how much 
knowledge they were able to memorise during the school year. For example, Holt 
(1970: 55) maintains that 
there are two main reasons why we test children: the first is to threaten them into 
doing what we want done, and the second is to give us a basis for handing out the 
rewards and penalties on which the educational system-like all coercive systems- must 
operate. The threat of a test makes students do this assignment. The outcome of a test 
enables us to reward those who seem to do it best. 
At the most, a test may measure performance on a given day which has no connection 
with long-term retention by the learner. Learners may be bored or disaffected and not 
engage to the best of their ability with the test or examination. They may find the 
questions confusing or ambiguous. They may not be able to apply their knowledge 
because of the limitation of handwriting or other mechanical abilities. Many 
achievement tests merely measure endurance or persistence rather than learning. Some 
learners who are divergent thinkers may read too much into the question. Some learners 
become frightened and freeze up in the testing situation, especially, those who have 
little self-confidence or some kind of emotional or family disturbance (Broadfoot 
1996b: 36-7). On the other hand, Breese (1973: 25) notes that examinations can be 
considered to be just one type of assessment, in so far as they provide information about 
how far each of the teacher's specific objectives have been attained by each individual 
and by the class as a whole. It is worth noting, however, that examinations are a poor 
form of assessment, as they do not reliably test the different abilities that students may 
possess. Likewise Hextall and Sarup (1977: 155) and Clough and Davis and Sumner say 
that "assessment is put to no effective use other than to discriminate between children" 
(1984: 71). 
For instance, in talking about assessment, Holt (1970: 53) asserts that 
a best, testing does harm more than good; at worst, it hinders, distorts, and corrupts 
the learning process. Testers say that testing techniques are being continually 
improved and can eventually be perfected. Maybe. - but no imaginable improvement 
in testing would overcome my objections to it. Our chief concern should not be to 
improve testing. but to find ways to eliminate it. 
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Some problems in testing learners at a particular time, i. e. at the end of each school year 
are noted by Mathews (1985: 52). Firstly, he says that we can only be concerned about 
what learners can do at the particular moment at which they sit the examination, but it is 
difficult to be concerned also about what they have done in the past, or what they may 
be able to do in the future. Hargreaves (1982: 55) says that the everyday experience of 
young people has often been systematically excluded from the curriculum when we 
apply the public examinations. Secondly, then there is the need to distinguish between 
actual performance, what is actually set down on the script, and assumed characteristics 
which give rise to performance such as the ability to remember or assess. Thirdly, the 
need to distinguish the particular qualities within a narrowly prescribed area such as 
geography or physics, and general qualities, which are displayed in examinations as a 
whole. Finally, there is the need to distinguish between those qualities which examiners 
intended to test, the objectives and those which are actually displayed, the outcomes. 
Although many argue that one important function of examinations is to confer a licence 
to practice. For Wilmut (1980: 34) and Cotgrove (1972: 80) examinations provide a 
framework to act as selection mechanisms. Similarly, Dore (1976: 31), Burgess and 
Adams (1980: 3 1) and Freeman and Lewis (1998: 12-3) see schools as places where one 
gets certificates or passports to even better jobs. Broadfoot (1996a: 32) notes that "the 
certificate process is in the epitome of the apparently meritocratic basis of contemporary 
society, since in theory it allows free competition based on academic ability and 
industry and thus is regarded as the fairest basis for the allocation of opportunities for 
high status or remunerative careers". For Wilmut (1980: 37-42) and Brown (1990: 6) 
examinations are very important in providing an objective, reliable and precise measure 
of achievement. He further goes on to say that the use to which such measures were put 
was primarily one of selecting young people for such things as further study, training 
courses, apprenticeship or careers. This does not, however, mean that when learners get 
their certificates, they are necessarily qualified for what they have been studying. It 
might be possible to say that schools become a place to obtain a certificate rather than 
acquire good qualifications in particular subjects. Unfortunately, this century, 
especially, the last two decades have shown that certificates do not maintain a stable 
value. This leads Dore (1976: 31) to call this a `terrible disease'. Mathews (1985: 25) 
appears to agree, when he says "the decline in the value of certificates, and the 
associated demand for higher qualification as payment for access to careers, has led to a 
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level of certificates inflation which may undermine the educational systems notions just 
as surely as financial inflation can undermine their economic system". As mentioned 
before, having a certificate does not necessarily mean that a person is qualified. 
However, this does not suggest that freedom in education means that there should be no 
assessment as a result of giving learners the freedom to do what they like, but that the 
function of it should be changed to help learners to perform. In his work, Ormell 
(1980: 93) observes that assessment is very important because nobody can tell whether 
learners are achieving except by assessing them in some way. Therefore, as Flew 
(1976: 81) states, an intention to assess is intrinsic to the intention of education. This is 
because assessment can "make statements about the recipients of an educational 
services, statements about their actual and potential accomplishments in relation to the 
opportunities for learning provided by that service" (MacDonald, 1985: 163). Further 
MacDonald (1985: 163) states that "assessment is the basis for decisions about what 
students will get in the way of further provision, and for predictions of their future 
accomplishment". Assessment can be of significance if its aim is to give the learner, 
"good assessment information about his or her progress and successful, and 
unsuccessful, learning strategies, then this will be of assistance, even if in any 
individual case the desired end may be a different one from that intended by those 
planning the programme" (Murphy and Torrance, 1990: 13). 
Therefore, the assessment in education to achieve the aims of education should be to 
answer the question of how a particular course could satisfy the learners' interests and 
help them to think, discover, and make responsible choices and decisions. The answer 
to this question will show that assessment, as Hopkins (1976b: 198) points out, 
"becomes the examination of the learning environment in its ability to facilitate the 
investigations the students desire and find rewarding". This means that assessment 
becomes a process for finding out how far the developed and organised learning 
experiences actually produce the desired results, and that the process of assessment can 
be used to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the educational process. This 
requires as Salvia and Hughes (1990: 15-17) argue, listening to a child and watching 
them. Therefore, a negative assessment of work does not indicate that the learner is 
inefficient or foolish. Assessment is important to find out about the success or failures 
in determining the educational processes. Further, Rogers (1970a: 142-3) observes that it 
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is important that some degree of self-assessment be built into any attempt to promote an 
experiential type of learning. In his view, "when the individual has to take the 
responsibility for deciding what criteria are important to him, what goals he has been 
trying to achieve, and the extent to which he has achieved those goals, he truly learns to 
take responsibility for himself and his directions". When learners are given the freedom 
to decide the criteria on which they feel they should be assessed, it might be possible to 
assess the different abilities possessed by learners. In this sense, Black (1994: 130) 
argues that learners have to develop their own understanding of what their learning is 
meant to achieve for them, and to be as clear as possible about their own progress: so, 
learners have to be involved in their own assessment. Similarly, Harding & Beech 
(1991: 3) argue that 
assessment is desirable if the focus is to be on benefiting the child. The 
encouragement of different types of thinking and concepts development or enabling 
potential, reflect pupil-focus assessment. Where information is needed regarding the 
next steps to be taken in teaching, criterion referenced assessment comes into its own. 
To assess learners in the previous sense of achieving the aims of freedom in education 
does not require the cancellation of examinations. On the contrary, examinations are 
very important procedures to make well-informed decisions about the achievement of 
the aims of education. However, examinations have to be modified to achieve the 
mentioned aims otherwise they will be one of the restrictions that limit learners' 
freedom to achieve the value of freedom in education. This is to say that assessment 
procedures especially at an early age should not focus on direct questions and answers 
but teachers should make observations for the learners to find out how they use their 
freedom, how they manage it without conflicting with others, how they engage in 
teamwork, and how they respond to new information. Therefore, observations and 
everyday experiences should be systematically included in the assessment procedures 
beside the public examination, whereby avoiding the disadvantages of examinations 
they are noted by Broadfoot (1996) and Mathews (1985). In this sense, Shorrocks 
(1993: 17-5) maintains that "observing children in an objective way, then, in class or 
anywhere else in school, is important... for assessing academic progress". This means 
that assessment should be a continuous process throughout the year in which make 
learners engage in assessment situations and feel that it is part of their learning. In doing 
so learners will gradually lose the scared feeling they experience when they sit the 
public exams. Moreover, the certificate that learners receive at the end of each stage 
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will be more valuable in that it shows that a particular learner is qualified in particular 
subjects. Moreover, the types of examination questions should not aim to find out how 
much knowledge learners were able to memorise but what changes taken place in their 
minds after studying a particular course, especially since the aims of freedom in 
education can not be assessed by having the traditional types of direct questions and 
answers. 
Having discussed the implications of the idea of freedom regarding learners' 
assessment. I will now turn to discuss its implications regarding teacher education 
3.4. The implications of the concept of freedom regarding teachers' education 
What we want to do with the teacher will be different according to what we want them 
to do in and outside the classroom. According to Bantock (1969: 123) and Hoyle 
(1969: 14) if the role of teacher can be understood as an authority, someone who simply 
hands on ready-made knowledge, then they have to be trained to be food in particular 
subjects and to know how to teach them. Therefore, teachers have to use the skills they 
have been trained in to transfer the knowledge they are supposed to teach. Similarly, 
Wilson (1975: 108) and Stewart (1969: 18) hold that teachers are trained for a particular 
job or task: to know their subject matter and how to teach it. For, Lipman (1988: 152) 
teachers do what they have been trained to do- they teach as they have been taught. 
Moreover, McMullen (1969: 37) argues that the teacher must understand children's 
needs, have a good knowledge of the material and an intensity of personal experience 
and knowledge, and have the ability to control learners, and to criticise their skills and 
judgement. Britton (1969: 182) states that the failure to provide a good standard of 
subject knowledge is far more serious than failure to produce class control. 
This makes it possible to say that the most important characteristic that can be used to 
describe a teacher is whether they know their subject or not. But according to John it is 
not by academic knowledge and thinking that teachers become effective or become 
good teachers (1996: 96). This view of teacher preparation produces teachers who have 
similar ways of teaching, although they are going to teach different learners in different 
environments. This manner of training teachers can be seen to help candidates to be 
good in their subject but it does not guarantee that they will be able to teach that subject. 
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Also it could be argued that learners do not have freedom to be an active element in the 
classroom. Teachers are the ones who have to do everything and learners have to listen 
to what the teacher says without questioning him. The role of the teacher and the kind 
of relationship between teachers and learners do not seem to be a suitable way of 
handling such aims, and the curriculum concerning freedom in education is discussed in 
chapter two and the current chapter. This type of preparation does not help to educate 
candidates to help their learners to exercise the required conditions to derive benefit 
from freedom in education. For the idea of freedom to be implemented teachers, 
Stewart (1969: 18) argues, have to be educated as individuals, not merely trained for the 
profession of teaching. Similarly, Peters (1977: 137) states that " an `educator duty is to 
educate teachers as persons". This required that teaching candidates (i) should have a 
free choice to do a particular course in the teacher's institutes (ii) be free to think and 
express their thoughts regarding their education. To prepare teachers to help learners to 
be independent thinkers requires, as Silim (1999: 121) and (Shawqi and Abw Al- 
Su`wd, 1997: 320) state, a free atmosphere in which teachers can be taught and also be 
free during their own teaching. (iii) be free to make their own choices, judgements and 
decisions. In short, they have to be educated in the same way as they are going to teach. 
That is to say, freedom in education in the teacher's institutes is a required condition in 
which to produce free, creative, responsible, choosers and autonomous teachers who 
can achieve the aims of freedom in education in schools with their learners. This, also, 
requires teaching candidates to study and understand what freedom in education, its 
conditions and its value is, so that they can have a full understanding of the nature of 
their role in implementing this theory. It might be possible to argue that it is not 
satisfactory to train a large number of people in the same way to do the same job, which 
is the transfer of knowledge. They have to be different because they will teach different 
learners in different environments. Also they have to be able to manage a class; they 
have to know how to do things without the class getting out of hand; to know how to set 
or mark an examination; how to record learners' progress; how to spot which children 
are working and which are not. Thus, to educate people in the mentioned way as free 
individuals means that they must perform their role in implementing freedom in 
education, whereby they will be able to provide their learners with the required 
conditions to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to investigate the implications of freedom in education in 
relation to the curriculum, assessment and teacher's training, which provide learners 
with the required conditions, in which they and society can derive benefit from the 
value of freedom so as to satisfy their interests. Some conclusions can be drawn from 
the earlier examination as follows. Firstly, it is important to help learners to determine 
for themselves what they would like to do, what they need to know next and how to go 
about pursuing their individual investigations, but until they are equipped with the 
necessary skills and knowledge for this they should not be allowed complete freedom. 
The freedom to choose what line of study to pursue and how best to pursue it is 
inappropriate for children whose intellectual skills are relatively underdeveloped and 
who have insufficient experiences to know what choices are available. This means that 
several suggestions for possible choices should be sought by the teacher and considered 
by the children before the choice has to be made. In such circumstances adult 
suggestion, or adult instigation, which might theoretically be though to narrow the range 
of choices and limit freedom, in fact enlarges it. 
Secondly, I suggested that the curriculum content should be chosen with reference to 
the interests of the state so that children will acquire the knowledge and skills that the 
state wants them to have. Also it should be chosen according to the interests of the 
learners as well, so they will work better and learn more effectively because they are 
interested in what they are required to do. However, it is important to note that learner 
sharing should be essential and effective. 
Thirdly, it was argued that having a national curriculum does not limit learners' 
freedom if it was planned in a way that guaranteed the required conditions for learners 
to obtain benefit from the value of freedom in education. Regarding textbooks, it can be 
seen that they are important for learners, teachers and public as guidelines but not for 
teaching and assessing learner achievement with respect to knowledge acquisition, as 
the textbook provides all the information they are expected to acquire. In this sense 
textbooks should not be the only resource learners depend on but they should be 
required to look at different resources. Fourthly, this chapter provided evidence that 
exercising authority in the consideration of knowledge as an end in itself and forcing the 
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learner to be slave to gain and memorise such knowledge, restricts the children 
intellectually and puts them in a particular formulation. However, education based on 
freedom pays attention to knowledge as means to reach such ends. 
Fifthly, it is argued that freedom in education does not mean that there should be no 
assessment as a result of giving learners the freedom to do what they like, but that its 
purpose should be changed to evaluate the teaching and learning process and help 
learners to perform. Moreover, the types of examination questions should not aim to 
find out how much knowledge learners can memorise but what the changes have taken 
place in their minds after studying a particular course, especially that since the aims of 
freedom in education can not be assessed by having the traditional types of direct 
questions and answers. 
Finally it suggested that implementing freedom in education requires teachers to be 
educated as individuals, not merely trained for the profession of teaching. This required 
that teaching candidates (i) should have a free choice to do a particular course in the 
teacher's institutes (ii) be free to think and express their thoughts regarding their 
education. To prepare teachers to help learners to be independent thinkers requires a 
free atmosphere in which teachers can be taught and also be free during their own 
teaching. (iii) be free to make their own choices, judgements and decisions. In short, 
they have to be educated in the same way as they are going to teach. That is to say, 
freedom in education in the teacher's institutes is a required condition in which to 
produce free, creative, responsible, choosers and autonomous teachers who can achieve 
the aims of freedom in education in schools with their learners. This, also, requires 
teaching candidates to study and understand what freedom in education, its conditions 
and its value is, so that they can have a full understanding of the nature of their role in 
implementing this theory. 
Merely having a theoretical framework of freedom in education and its conditions and 
value it might not be sufficient for its implementation in the Egyptian context without 
analysing and examining the idea of freedom for the history and the present situation of 
Egypt. It will be necessary to find out, firstly, if there are other implications and factors 
that should be considered before implementing the idea of freedom. Secondly, to 
discover the features of freedom and unfreedom in the Egyptian system, which need to 
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be promoted in the case of the former and avoided in that of the latter. Therefore, in the 
next two chapters I will examine the idea of freedom from 1805 to 2000. 
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Chapter Four 
Freedom in education in Egyptian history (1805 -1991) 
4.1. Introduction 
The main concern of this chapter is to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in 
educational theory and practice in the history of Egypt from 1805 to 1991, whereas the next 
chapter focuses on the period from 1992 to 2000. The aims of this chapter can be 
summarised as follows; firstly, to discover and analyse the conditions of freedom related to 
Egyptian society and its educational system for learners to get benefit from the value of 
freedom in education. In other words, to investigate how far learners have been interfered 
with and been subject to authority in their choices and decisions to study what they are 
interested in and to be or become what they want? Secondly, to discover such educational 
practices as reflect the features of freedom and unfreedom. This will help in understanding 
how the present educational system has came about. This is necessary so as to establish a 
sound basis for the implementation of freedom in chapter six. Thirdly, to discover the sort 
of restrictions that determined learners' freedom in educational policy and practice. This 
will help to avoid such restrictions and prepare for such conditions as are important in the 
implementation of freedom in the Egyptian context in chapter six. Fourthly, to examine the 
idea of freedom in education regarding its value in theory and practice. Also, to investigate 
whether the claim for learners' freedom in Egypt is desirable and valuable for learners and 
society according to educationalists' thinking. The significance of this aim is to give an 
indication of the suitability and validity of the implementation of freedom in education into 
the Egyptian context. 
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4.2. Freedom in education regarding its conditions 
This section investigates and analyses the idea of freedom in education regarding its 
conditions. Firstly, it will examine learners' freedom to study what they are interested in 
and to be or to become something they want; in other words to answer the question of 
whether the state had taken into consideration learner's interests It will discover the 
learners' freedom in making their own free choices to have a particular opportunity in 
education in accordance with their wills and interests. 
4.2.1. Learners' freedom to determine what they are interested in studying 
This section will investigate if learners' freedom to study what they are interested in and to 
be or to become something they want was interfered with. In other words to answer the 
question of whether the state had taken into consideration learners' interests? In the period 
from 1805 to 1848 Muhammad 'Ali's attempt to build Egypt into a modern nation did not 
consider the interests, wants and needs of the individual. `Elite modernisation and 
education rather than public education were his main concern' (Sabri, 1996: 54-55). 
Heyworth-Dunne says that 'Ali's efforts to reform education reflect his desire to build the 
military and ensure his security (1968: 104). Therefore `Ali built military schools to fulfil 
his aims' (Hajar, 1991: 35). "But even those that were not actually providing officers and 
men for active service were intended for some auxiliary service connected with the supply 
and demand of the force, either directly or indirectly. Not a single institution was set up 
philanthropically or for the sole purpose of improving the intellectual outlook of the 
people" (Heyworth-Dunne, 1968: 152). It is true that `Ali allowed more freedom for learners 
to be educated in well-organised free schools and acquire new knowledge. However, he 
denied the importance and the necessity of the learners' role in determining their own 
learning; what, where and why they want to learn particular subjects. 
On the one hand, `Ali did not consider the question of learners' freedom to choose to go to 
a particular school or not. Moreover, learners did not have freedom to choose the type of 
subject they were interested in, `social sciences, history or philosophical subjects had no 
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weight in the curriculum The types of sciences that had to be taught were to facilitate the 
achievement of `Ali's aims' (`A1i, 1989: 71-2). In this sense it might be possible to argue 
that learners and their families had started to believe that the natural sciences were more 
valuable than the social ones. On the other hand, learners were under the absolute authority 
and control of `Ali to achieve his goals. `They had to do what `Ali wanted them to do, 
otherwise they were physically punished. Therefore, `Ali treated schools like a military 
unit. Learners had a fixed time to do all activities such as studying, eating, or sleeping. 
Young learners used to study nine hours a day with very short breaks compared to the 
efforts they made' (`Ali, 1989: 67). This regime required learners to leave their families and 
live in schools for years until graduation. They did not have the freedom to leave schools 
for even a short time to visit their families or for their families to visit them. `Every school 
was surrounded by barriers to prevent learners from thinking of running away from school' 
(`A1i, 1989: 67). It might be argued that this type of education had a bad effect by turning 
learners into obedient clerks, as `Ali wanted them to be. They did not have the ability to do 
critical thinking, make decisions for themselves or to be responsible for their action. 
Moreover, it was impossible for them to be the technically and scientifically trained leaders 
so badly needed to develop their society because they had not been educated for that 
purpose. 
After `Ali's death new leaders ruled the country (Abbas and Sa'id). 'Abbas and Said 
`replaced most of the Egyptian employers of high rank by Turkish ones. Therefore, they 
saw no need to waste money in educating Egyptian people' (Al-Figi, 1997: 69,72). 
Consequently, in the educational policy at that time neither the interests, wants or needs of 
individuals and society nor their right to education were considered. In 1863, when Ismail 
took over, he realised the importance of education to satisfy society's needs. Also `he found 
that employing Egyptians rather than Foreigners was very important for his security' (Al- 
Fiqi, 1997: 80). Therefore, `his policy stressed on expansion of free primary education as his 
main concern' (Sabri, 1996: 132). However, the idea of learners' freedom to study what they 
were interested in had no place in his educational policy. As I will argue later this might 
refer to the narrowness of educational thought at the time which did not realise the 
importance of considering learners' interests as the core of educational planning. 
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"By 1876, the Egyptian government was almost bankrupt. In 1882, British troop entered 
the country to suppress rebellion and consequently, the British became the actual governing 
forces behind the Ottoman Khedive" (Cochran, 1986: 9). The British implemented an 
educational policy with the aim of controlling the Egyptian community and training a 
section of the population to serve in the lower ranks of the government 
(Hargreaves, 2001: 248-9). Therefore, `the occupation's policy meant allowing the minimum 
level of education for learners only to be able to do government jobs' (Abw-Al- 
Ais'ad, 1993 a: 114-5). From the point of the occupier there was no need for learners to have 
freedom to become interested in what they were studying because it did not serve British 
aims. It was not the British concern to educate the Egyptians in way that developed their 
thinking, experiences, knowledge and skills. 
In 1923, although Egypt officially gained independence, the country continued to remain 
under British authority until 1952. (Szyliowicz, 1973: 180). Therefore, education continued 
to neglect the freedom of learners to develop their thinking, experiences, knowledge and 
skills or to consider these as central to its processes (Hargreaves, 2001: 248). However, 
unlike under the British occupation, education considered, for the first time in the history of 
Egypt, the needs and interests of society. Therefore, it aimed `to provide Egypt with 
technical leaders to meet her development needs' (Nisim, 1984: 200) through preparing the 
children for practical life, not through learning a trade, but rather through increasing their 
interests in practical subjects such as manual skills (Cochran, 1986: 23-24). This continued 
to be the main aim of education even after full independence in 1952 `when for the first 
time Egypt came under the control of Egyptians' (Raghib, 1980: 31-2) and continued until 
1991. `Education focused on providing learners with knowledge and skills to suit the needs 
of the industrial and agricultural development rather that the individual' (Al-Fiqi, 1997: 240- 
1). Being a free society was not really reflected in the way the educational policy thought 
of learners, their freedom and the role they can play for themselves and their society. 
According to Hargreaves (2001: 250) "the aim of education was indirectly to serve the state. 
The improvement the revolutionaries sought was national and political improvement". As 
under the British occupation, educational policy did not pay attention to learners' interests, 
wants and needs. That is to say, `education did not focus on helping the learners to act 
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according to their free will, know their duties and their rights, be responsible for their 
actions, respect others, perform organised activities, follow their personal initiatives, make 
their own decisions or explore and discover things for themselves' (Khidr, 1992: 135-140). 
However, the state could not achieve its main aim, so Egyptian commercial and industrial 
expansion was hampered by the lack of adequate trained personnel. This led to a state in 
which any effort spent on technical education was wasted because graduates were not 
qualified enough to perform their expected role in development. In 1970, when Sadat took 
over he "concentrated more openly on economics, recognising that both social and political 
aims depended on it. He sought the economic improvement of both the country as a whole 
but more especially the education sector" (Hargreaves, 2001: 251). The aim of education put 
in place by Sadat was to meet his aims of national economic improvement without paying 
attention to whether learners were interested in what they were studying. This continued to 
be the case when Husni Mubarak became president in 1931. Learners continued to study 
what the state wants them to do whatever their interests were. Moreover, individuals failed 
to play their roles in the process in development due to the poor quality of the education 
system at the time. Moreover, `Ammar (1996a: 25) observed that, `there was no 
comprehensive philosophy for what the society and the individual needs from education. 
Every new government has a new and different policy for education. This produces 
confusion throughout the educational system'. 
4.2.2. Learners' freedom to have free and equal educational opportunity 
This section will investigate the learners' freedom to make free choices to have a particular 
opportunity in education in accordance with their wills and interests. This analysis is 
necessary to achieve the third aim of this chapter which is concerned with discovering such 
educational practices that reflect aspects of freedom and unfreedom in terms of the 
availability of educational opportunity. It will also investigate girls' freedom to find out 
whether there are social or political restrictions limiting their freedom, whereas chapter one 
indicated that there were no religious restrictions limiting girls' freedom. 
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4.2.2.1. Learners' freedom under Muhammad `Ali (1805-1848) 
For the first time in Egyptian history, learners had the chance `to study new sciences, 
having many translated books from different languages into Arabic and being sent abroad' 
(Al-Fiqi, 1997: 49-52). 'Ali's policy in education was based on `sending delegates to 
European countries to learn military sciences' (Qurani, 1995: 164). `Ali (1995a: 20-1) 
mentions that `between 1826 and 1847 `Ali sent 281 learners to different European 
countries'. Most of the learners were `sent to study military science and few of them 
studied civil sciences which were also required for 'Ali's military personnel' (Al- 
Fiqi, 1997: 49-1). To produce the technical and military personnel `Ali sat up many special 
schools. Heyworth-Dunne mentions that in 1821, he established a military school and 
others were to follow. In 1827, a school of medicine was founded. In 1829, a school of 
pharmaceutics was opened and from 1827 a school of veterinary studies was created. 
Within the military several schools were opened: there was a cavalry school, a music 
school and schools for the artillery, the infantry and the navy. Technical schools for 
mineralogy, engineering and applied chemistry followed. `Ali developed civil schools to 
improve the skills of his administrators and several other specialists institutions were 
developed, for example, a school of agriculture, school of translation and a school of 
irrigation (1968: 117-151). `Because this emergent higher education had been established 
before primary and secondary schools' (Hilmi and Nuwir, 1987: 20), 'Ali was forced to use 
`the existing religious education network as the sources of learners' (Al-Fiqi, 1997: 65). It 
was evident, however, `those learners were not qualified to learn at the special schools' 
(Badran, 1996: 77). Therefore, in 1825, `Ali sat up two preparatory schools' 
(Sabri, 1996: 56). However, `Ali' thought that it was useful for a more effective military 
education that learners should be prepared for a few years in what were called maktabs 
before enrolling in the preparatory school. `Between 1833 and 1837 Ali set up 67 maktabs 
for 5,500 learners to provide the preparatory schools with learners who could read, write, 
do simple mathematical functions and knew a little about the principles of religion. Also he 
intended by setting up these maktabs to improve the skills of his administrators and several 
other specialist institutions' (Sabri, 1996: 57). With the establishment of mnktnbs `Ali had 
his own new educational system. 
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Under `Ali's regime Egypt had two complete national educational systems. The traditional 
system where learners start their education in what were called krrttabs and continue their 
education at Al-A--har, and the new system where learners start their education in the 
maktabs and continue through preparatory and special schools or go abroad. `Traditional 
educational system in kuttabs was run privately by jurists and old men' (`Ali, 
Hilmi, Aimam, 1996: 37), this means that they were not under supervision from the state. 
Moreover, `there were no transfer channels between `Ali's system and the traditional one' 
(Al-Batriq, 1999: 41). In this sense it might be argued that having two systems in the country 
produced `a dualism in education that has continued until the recent period' 
(Qurani, 1995: 165). The dualism in education limited the freedom of learners who attended 
the traditional system for two reasons; first, although `Ali did not put any obstacles in the 
way of any learner who wanted to learn in his system, the educational opportunities he 
offered were very limited for the number of officers he wanted to do so. Second, he did not 
pay attention to the traditional system because `it was not suitable to achieve his aims. In 
the main, he provided learners at his schools with clothing, food and everything they might 
need for studying' (Al-Batriq, 1999: 40-42). Although these features of inequality and 
unfreedom between two the systems were obvious, Egyptian families did not complain or 
claim the freedom to obtain equal opportunities for their children. Unfortunately, `Egyptian 
families preferred to send their children to work rather than to school, because they were 
not aware of the importance of being educated' (Al-Figi, 1997: 63). Interestingly, `the 
government obliged most children to attend school. Officers had to take them by force and 
put them in schools' ('Ali, 1989: 68-9). This reflects the importance and necessity for 
society to be prepared for such a new system, otherwise learners will not derive benefit 
from it. 
4.2.2.1.1. Girls' freedom under Muhammad 'Ali (1805-1848) 
Girls did not have the range of freedom as boys, for two reasons: first, no claim for girl's 
freedom had been made by society because `nobody wished to send his daughter to study at 
school, because they thought that girl's education was a bad thing' (Mursi, 1993: 101). 
Second, `Ali did not pay attention to their education because he did not need girls as part of 
his military. It was only, `in 1832, that `Ali set up free midwives school' (Hassan, 1980a: 36) 
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and tried to force families to send their daughters to this school First, `he forced his military 
officers to send their daughters otherwise they had to pay a big fine. Second, at a public 
party he commanded doctors to marry graduates from this school and provided every 
couple with all that they needed' (Hassan, 1980a: 36). As a result a number of poor families 
sent their daughters, especially after they realised that education helped girls to be 
independent and get well paid. Also, `in 1835, a foreign school was set up to educate 
aristocratic girls' (Hassan, 1980a: 37). This reflects the effectiveness of political efforts to 
change social views towards such values. 
1.2.2.2. Learners' freedom under Muhammad'Ali's successors (1849-1881 
During the Abbas and Sa'id regimes `less attention was paid to education and many schools 
were closed down' (Qurani, 1995: 165). At the end of Sa'id's term office there were 'two 
schools in Egypt: a military school and a medicine school' (Tawfiq, 1984: 3). Therefore, 
unlike the previous era, learners' freedom in education was limited in terms of the 
availability of educational opportunity. In the main, Abbas and Sa'id 'supported foreign 
schools rather than state ones' (Al-Figi, 1997: 75). This reflects the fact that learners' 
freedom to gain a place at school was dependent on the political will to offer such 
opportunities. `The limitation of educational opportunity met with an objection from some 
educationalists who studied abroad' (`Ali, 1989: 99). However, their efforts were not 
adequate to claim freedom for learners in education. This might refer to the fact that the 
community was not sufficiently aware of the significance of being educated, to support 
such efforts. 
In 1863, when 'Isma'il took over he `set up one preparatory school for 185 learners and 
two technical schools in 1878' (Sabri, 1996: 133), in addition to special schools, such as 
those of medicine, law, pharmacy, engineering and translation. Just as his grandfather 
'Isma`il gave attention to the military schools' (Al-Sahm, 1997: 81-8) and `sent 162 scholar 
to study military sciences in Europe' ('Abd-Al-Karim, 1945: 775), for primary education 
`Isma`il `reopened all the schools had existed before under `Ali, and built new ones. These 
new schools not only covered big cities only but also most small villages' (Al- 
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Batriq, 1999: 145). This means that learners in rural and poor areas enjoyed an equal 
opportunity with their peers in the cities, unlike earlier times. `In 1878,53,700 maktabs 
were opened for 137,553 learners' (`A1i, 1995a: 82-3). `The percentage of enrolment at 
schools reached 41% for the total number of learners of the required age' ('Ali, 1995a: 83). 
From the information given above, on the one hand learners' enjoyed more freedom in 
terms of having more educational opportunities, on the other, they enjoyed more forms of 
freedom. Firstly, `learners had the freedom to choose to go to school or not. There was no 
compulsion for learners to remain at school until graduation' ('Ali, 1995a: 73). Unlike the 
`Ali period schools changed from being military units to being institutions for learning, for 
those who had the free will to learn. 'Isma`il' `forbade physical punishment and made sure 
that teachers treated learners kindly' ('Ali, 1995a: 73-4). In addition, `learners had equal 
opportunities to enrol in school because there were no requirements for enrolment' (Al- 
Figi, 1997: 89). Also, `schools accepted any learner who chose to learn, whatever his/her 
religion, race or class' (`Abd-Al-Karim, 1945: 52-5). Secondly, learners enjoyed freedom in 
relation to finding resources for knowledge since 'Isma`il 'established a library in every 
single school to make knowledge available for learners' (Al-Figi, 1997: 105). 
4.2.2.2.1. Girls' freedom under Muhammad 'Ali's successors (1849-1881) 
Girls enjoyed more freedom than they had under 'Ali's regime in terms of educational 
opportunity. `In 1872, `Isma`il's wife opened the first Islamic school for girls' 
(Hassan, 1980a: 36). The number of girls at this school was very small compared to the 
foreign one; for example, in 1878, `the number of girls in foreign schools was 4,625 
comparing to 248 in the Islamic one. Unfortunately, the number of girls in the Islamic 
school was reduced to 206 in 1980 because of the unsuitability of its curriculum to the 
Egyptian girls' habits and needs' ('A1i, 1995a: 85). 'Another was set up in 1874' (Al- 
Figi, 1997: 94). Unfortunately, at the end of Isma'il's time 'one school was closed for lack 
of funds' ('Ali, 1995a: 85). However, these two schools were limited to rich families rather 
than the community, because girls' education was recognised as privilege for aristocratic 
girls. Also it was limited in terms of knowledge and subjects. Girls used to study 'a little 
mathematics, art, and geography, plus music, needlework, food science, the language and 
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Our`an'(`Ali, 1995a: 85-6). This reflects the low position that girls had in relation to the 
importance of their role in society. The community believed that their role was in the home 
to look after their husbands and children, not to be a social participator. In this sense, it is 
important to note that 'Isma'il did not make any effort to encourage the community to send 
their daughters to school. 
4.2.2.3. Learners' freedom under the British occupation (1882-1922) 
British policy meant to limit the number of educational opportunities to the number they 
needed for government jobs. Most of special schools, preparatory schools and maktabs 
created by `Ali and his successors were closed. `They established only four new primary 
schools between 1882 and 1924' (Mursi, Hilmi and Jamal Al-Din, 1991: 421). In 1916, 
many kuttabs changed to what were called elementary schools, whose duration was four 
years increased to six by 1925 (Cochran, 1986: 23). By 1911, the state set up 10 agricultural 
schools and one commercial school (Cochran, 1986: 15-16). Clearly, state schools provided 
an education suited to the needs of the British. In 1913, as a result of the British policy, 
"the number of students in Egyptian schools was 3.5% of the eligible population, compared 
to 15% in Italy and France, 16% in Austria, Germany and Japan, 17% in England and 24% 
in the U. S. A" (Cochran, 1986: l7). Moreover, `the British policy in education can be 
reflecting in the serious `rate of illiteracy that reached 99.7% in 1907' ('Ali, 1995a: 107). 
For higher education the British had no financial investment at all. Cochran mentions that 
in 1908, "a group of Egyptian notables and leaders paid subscription and begun a public 
university. In addition, only the wealthy Egyptians could afford to have their children 
educated abroad at their parents' expense" (Cochran, 1986: 16). 
The British policy to limit learners' freedom in terms of educational opportunity took the 
following forms. Firstly, prior to British occupation, education had been totally free. Also, 
`learners did not have to pay even a small amount for any other educational services' 
('Ali, 1998: 5). But, by 1907, `free education was entirely prohibited' (Hassan, 1979: 16). 
Education was mainly for the wealthy as most schools levied fees. `Even those educated in 
modern primary or elementary schools had to be at least middle class, while the poor 
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Egyptians went to kultabs which were founded at various levels by the endowment of each 
mosque or church' (Tawfiq, 1984: 6-15). As a result, not many families could afford to 
educate their children beyond primary schools. This policy resulted in privileging the 
wealthy by giving them a good education that was not available to those learning basic 
skills at kuttabs. Moreover `the British had more financial investment in foreign schools 
rather than state schools' ('Abd Al-Karim, 1945: 833). As a result of the occupation's policy 
in controlling Egyptian society and limited the educational opportunity, individuals who 
believed in the importance of education in their fight against occupation to gain 
independence established a number of free schools for the public (see table 1). 
Table I 
Miniherr of cchnnlc and learners in state and public schools (1882-1920) 
Tv e of school State schools Public schools State learners Public learners 
Elementary 139 2940 18303 21349 
Primary school 39 86 11592 14638 
Total 178 3026 29895 35987 
Al-Figi, H. (1997: 148) 
The previous information shows that big public efforts were made to offer free educational 
opportunities for the public in elementary and primary education. Moreover, `they 
established secondary, technical and adults education' ('All, and Hilmi and 
Aimam, 1996: 67). These efforts increased the learners' freedom to know and understand the 
society's problems and claims under the British. Especially since `the British continued to 
control the Egyptians and isolated them from their society and its problems' (Suliman et 
al, 1966: 125) and ('Ali, 1995b: 98-9), they avoided offering a way of democratic life at state 
schools. `Life at these schools was very restricted and learners used to receive physical 
punishment without justification' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad, 1993a: 243). 
Secondly, unlike `Ali and his successors regime, `the British changed the language of 
instruction from Arabic to English' (Hassan, 1979: 9). Moreover, the number of hours for 
teaching Arabic was decreased in favour of English, for example, `in 1907, the number of 
teaching hours in secondary schools was 36 for Arabic and 94 for English' (Ali, 1995b: 98- 
9). Recognising the foreign influence in the education of young people, the Egyptians 
claimed that Arabic should be the language of instruction in schools. As a result, `in 1907, 
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English became a mere subject to be taught at school, instead of being the medium of 
teaching' ('Ali, 1995b: 127). 
However a close look to the data in table 1 shows that although there was a great difference 
between the number of state and public schools it did not meet with the expected increase 
in the number of learners. This was due to the fact society was not yet aware of the 
importance of education to send their children to school. When the number of educational 
opportunities had increased, education increased the learners' freedom to read, write, think, 
criticise, know their rights and duties, fight for their rights and freedom and organise 
themselves to work toward independence. For example, `in 1906, learners in law school 
were able to organise a strike against the British occupation which made the occupier 
considers learners as a source of trouble. Also, in 1909, the learners were able to organise 
many peaceful demonstrations to express their anger about the British presence in Egypt, in 
addition to their role in the 1919 revolution' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad, 1993a: 247-251). 
4.2.2.3.1. Girls' freedom under the British occupation (1882-1922) 
As in previous periods, girls' education continued take place in foreign schools until 1900. 
`From 1909 to 1920, the state established a few primary schools and one secondary school' 
(`Ali and Hilmi and Aimam, 1996: 83)'. This means that `the establishing of state primary 
education for girls came 40 years later than boys' school and 90 years later than secondary 
schools' (Hassan, 1980a: 37). Table 2 shows how far girls' education was behind boys' in 
primary state schools. 
Table 2 
Numbers of boy and girl learners and schools at state and public primary levels between 1882 and 1920 
Type of sex State schools Public schools State learners Public learners 
Bovs 34 61 10,749 11.770 
Girls 5 25 843 2,868 
Al-Figi. H. (1997: 148) 
In terms of knowledge girls' freedom continued to be limited to `particular subjects that 
prepare them to be wives and mothers rather than social participators' (Mursi, 1993: 227). 
Gender inequality might be put down the inability of most families to afford the required 
educational fees for their daughters. In fact, they preferred to pay for their sons rather than 
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their daughters. This might reflects the fact that Egyptian society continued to think that 
girls' education had no value for them, their daughters or society. Also they did not accept 
the idea of educating their daughters by male teachers. With `the appearance of the feminist 
movement and the opening in 1900; - of a department for female teacher's education' (Abw- 
Al-Ais'ad, 1993a: 145-6) some families especially in big cities began to rethink positively 
about the education of girls and to send their daughters to be educated. This increased girls' 
freedom in terms of educational opportunity. As a result, the demand for more educational 
opportunities for girls was more than the state could supply. Therefore, a number of free 
public schools for girls were established (see table 2) to meet the new needs of the 
community. However, the opportunities for girls continued to be less than that for boys. 
This emphasises to the fact that any undesirable social value needs a long time and great 
effort until it can be changed. Moreover the previous two tables show how far public efforts 
helped in increasing girls' freedom compared to the state's efforts. 
4.2.2.4. Learners' freedom during limited independence (1923-1951 
The change that was seen with respect to freedom in education was the increase in this right 
when education at elementary and primary education level was made free, unlike education 
under the British occupation. This came as a result of wide debate that was concerned with 
individuals' rights in society, as will be examined later in this chapter. Therefore, the 
Egyptian constitution of 1923 mandated that elementary education should be free and 
compulsory for all children from 6 to 12 (Williamson, 1987: 107). `Primary school became 
free in 1944, but secondary and higher education tuition fees were charged' 
(Tawfiq, 1984: 15-6). 
As a result the state established 762 four-year compulsory schools, and 600 additional 
schools were started in 1936 (Cochran, 1986: 23). However, this freedom was an illusion for 
two reasons; firstly, the state established the primary school, another state system, and had 
offered `a four-years course in which a tuition fee was charged' (Tawfiq, 1984: 15). The 
existence of the latter produced inequality between poor and rich learners in education. For 
example, `elementary schools taught no foreign language and were operated for a half-day. 
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They were limited in facilities, curriculum and instruction. Further, they received only 2 
pounds per learner from the government, as compared to 20 pounds per student in the 
primary schools. `Instruction in the primary schools was notably superior to instruction in 
elementary schools as they had adequate financial resources' (Fathi, 1999: 89). Moreover, 
because primary schools taught English and French, language learners were able to pass 
enrolment examination to secondary school, whereas those who had gone to elementary 
school or kuttab did not have the same opportunity. Otherwise they had to pay for extra 
tutoring in order to pass the language examination which was difficult. 
Furthermore, although `primary school became free in 1944, and officially the two schools 
became one school in 1951, they continued to remain separated and different in terms of 
building, curriculum and quality of teachers' (Fathi, 1999: 91). `Primary schools continued 
to be the best, and available only for rich families, because they were limited in number 
compared to elementary schools. This means that learners living in urban areas were the 
most likely to begin education in the primary school. ' (Fathi, 1999: 91). In this sense Fathi 
(1999: 89) argues that the `the dualism between elementary and primary schools means that 
there is one school for the poor and another for rich'. This type of inequality can be 
considered as one of the restrictions on poor learners which limits their education. 
The second aspect of having the illusion of freedom can be seen in the insufficient number 
of schools that allowed places for only a limited number of learners (see table 3). "By 1930, 
only 18% of the primary population were estimated to be enrolled in elementary or primary 
school" (Hargreaves, 2001: 249). 
Table 3 
Numbers of learners in elementary and nrinmarv (1925 -1950) 
Level 1925 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Elementary 190,677 740,138 682,180 709,390 818,774 838,937 862,929 
Primary 31.053 46,776 82.369 95.400 105,014 116,482 122.144 
Total 222.761 796,695 775,981 818.091 939.006 974,759 1,030.486 
Al-Qusi. A. (1952: 451) 
The previous data shows that although the primary fees had been abolished in 1944, it did 
not result in a dramatic increase in the number of primary learners, as was expected. Al- 
Fiqi (1997: 206) argues `that this refers to the insufficient number of schools because the 
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state did not prepare for an increase in the social demand for education' (Taweefq, 1984: 15- 
6) as a result of having free primary school for free. For example, it had `no plan to 
investigate each county's needs, conditions, history, material and population' 
(Taweefq, 1984: 15-6). The failure in the preparation for such decisions can be seen as a 
restriction that limited the learners' freedom. 
Thirdly, secondary education can be seen to reflect more freedom in terms of having free 
opportunities in 1950 (see table 4). The increase in enrolment might refer to the abolishing 
of educational fees in primary schools in 1944. This was followed by increase of number of 
higher education learners, though it still charged fees. 
Table 4 
Numbers of le=itirre in ctnte crrnnrlnrv crhnnl (I Q) i_ I Q-; f11 
Year 1925 1945 1946 19417 1948 1949 19 0 
No. of learners 8,100 38,823 44,810 50,279 60,047 70,234 93,767 
AI-Qusi. A. (1952: 451) 
4.2.2.4.1. Girls' freedom during limited independence (1923-1951) 
As under the British occupation, girls' education continued to focus on learning skills such 
as embroidery, needlepoint and home economics. In terns of educational opportunities 
although girls' freedom had increased with the expanding of free primary education girls' 
education kept far behind that of boys (see table 5). This might have been because; (A) they 
had very limited opportunities in past history compared to boys. (B) as in 'Ali's and his 
successors' regime, British policy also hired men for government positions which limited 
female educational effectiveness. Furthermore, having girls enrol and pay for education 
which trained them for the government positions available only to men, made little sense 
either culturally or economically. (C) the lack of official effort to help girls and their 
families to change their view towards female education. (D) the traditional view towards 
girls' education continued to limit their freedom especially in rural areas. In fact `there was 
strong relationship between limited girls' freedom in education and their feeling of being in 
a low position as a social participator. Unfortunately, this affected the way girls used to 
think of themselves and how men think of their abilities' (ALECSO, 1990: 146). 
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Table 5 
Numbers of boys and girls enrolment in state secondary school (1925-1950) 
Year 1925 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Girls 41 3.388 4,071 5,336 6,330 8,103 12.810 
Bovs 8.059 35.435 40.736 44.943 53,717 62,131 80,957 
Al-Qusi, `A. (1952: 451) 
4.2.2.5. Learners' freedom after the socialist revolution (1952-1970) 
According to Cook after the revolution free educational opportunities were increased 
dramatically at all levels (2000: 479), which increased learners' freedom. Firstly, `A 1953 
law extended compulsory education from four to six years and it was provided for free' 
('Abd Al-Nasir, 1968: 20). `In 1962, a far-reaching law was passed that extended free 
public education from the existing six-years primary school through preparatory, 
secondary, and higher education to the doctorate level' (Tawfiq, 1984: 75). Although 
education at all levels became free, learners had to pay fees for other educational services. 
For example, `they had to pay for sport, food in science activities, health services, social 
insurance, insurance against lab accident, textbooks, using the library and sitting for 
examination. Also when the learner left the school for any reason, he/she had to pay to re- 
enrol in the school' (Tawfiq, 1984: 46,51,98,101,106), in addition to the expenses needed for 
the stationary material learners needed. Therefore, education was not free since many poor 
families could not afford to pay for the above mentioned educational services. As a result 
the freedom of millions of poor learners was restricted, especially in the rural and poor 
areas. 
Secondly, learners were allowed more freedom to receive a worthwhile educational 
opportunity by introducing a new stake called preparatory (academic and vocation) (3 
years) between primary (6 years) and secondary education (3 years). It was 'the product of 
the revolution of 1952, having been created in 1953/4, but it did not became independent 
until 1957' (`Ali and Hasan, 1983: 48-9). Cochran states that education "was severely 
restricted by a lack of facilities and teachers, for only 20 percent of the primary learners 
could be absorbed into preparatory schools" (1986: 49). Even later the state could not 
increase the percentage of enrolment as was expected. For example, `preparatory enrolment 
which was 15.8% in 1960 increased to 29.3% in 1965' (Ratib, 1998: 63). This is a reflection 
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of the fact that the state was not prepared to introduce the new stage. Regarding vocational 
schools, it might be possible to argue that these schools provided more freedom for learners 
to choose to do technical or academic subjects. However, it might be argued that `six years 
of primary education is not adequate to provide learners with the minimum of basic 
knowledge and skills that are important to build their personality' (Muhammad, 1991a: 105) 
and find out their interests to make the choice between academic and technical subjects. 
Therefore, `in 1967, the state abolished that type of school' (Al-Figi, 1997: 259). 
Thirdly, the provision for free public education through to the doctorate had led to 
dramatically increased enrolment at all levels. Therefore, it was unlike the earlier occasion 
when any learner whatever his class, place, race, religion had the freedom to attend school 
(see table 6). However, this increase was not followed by an increase in the number of 
schools because the state could not manage to achieve universal enrolment in the primary 
school although it was compulsory (see table 7). 
Table 6 
Numbers of schools and learners in nrimnrv and nrenaratorv level (1953-1964) 
Year Primary schools Primary learners Preparatory schools Preparatory learners 
1953 6.751 1.392,741 379 348,574 
1954 7,152 1.580.089 643 346.376 
1955 7.366 1.860.942 758 328,470 
1956 7,701 1.975.874 743 318.243 
1957 7,422 2.086.704 748 278,224 
1958 7.312 2.286.067 771 247.792 
1959 7.213 2.452.377 807 249,129 
1960 7.159 2.610.169 876 253.737 
1961 7.273 2.754,566 918 300,853 
1964 7.698 3.294.832 1,045 472,568 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1964: 67-9). (ME) Ministry of Education. (1970: 4) and (ME) Ministry of 
Education. (1961: 52) 
Table 7 
Percentaec of enrolment in nrimarv schools 
Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
% 69 69.8 71.8 74.6 76.8 78.8 83 71.9 74.4 76 
Mursi. M. M. (1974: 57) 
As a result of insufficient number of schools, millions of children, especially in the rural 
and poor areas were kept out of school. Unfortunately, the state gave more attention to big 
cities and urban areas rather than rural and poor areas and this resulted in inequality. To 
solve the problem in 1968, a large number of schools and teachers had to work double or 
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treble shifts. It might be argued that this solution produced a kind of restriction on the 
learners' freedom to enjoy an equal opportunity. 
Table 8 
Comparison between one. double and treble shifts schools 
Type of school Len li of lesson Long of school day 
One shift 45 5.5 
Double shifts 40 4.5 
Treble shifts 35 3.5 
Ratib. N. (1998: 122) 
From a close look at table 8, it is clear that learners who had a place in the double and 
treble shifts schools had a shorter school day and lessons than their peers in the one shift 
schools. According to Hargreaves "children in multi-shift schools are calculated to lose five 
hours per week of instructional time and nearly all extra curricula activities. Buildings are 
often in bad repair and, in addition, the shortage of space leads to larger class sizes, 
frequently reaching 60 or 70" (2001: 253). In addition these schools have a shortage number 
teachers, administrators and facilities which affects learning and teaching processes. 
Another aspect of learners' lack of freedom in relation to the shortage of schools can be 
seen in the serious rate of illiteracy. For instance, `Population figures for the year 1960 
indicate an illiteracy rate of 76%' (GAIAE, 1996: 194). My argument is that illiteracy is one 
of the restrictions which prevents learners' from having worthwhile freedom. This is 
because, as discussed in chapter one, it limits the ability of the individuals to have such 
things. In this sense it is important to mention that the state failed to reduce illiteracy. This 
refers to the inability of the state to achieve universal enrolment at the primary stage with 
an increased number of illiterate people every year. This means that without having full 
enrolment at primary school any effort to eradicate illiteracy has no meaning. 
Fourthly, the policy of classification after the preparatory school interfered with the 
learners' freedom to choose the type of education they were interested in. `The highest 
scoring students were encouraged to attend general secondary school, which, leads to 
higher education. The lowest scoring learners had to attend the technical secondary school, 
which specialised in industrial, commercial or agricultural studies, primary teacher-training 
college, and training institutions attached to other ministries' ('Ali and Hasan, 1983). That 
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is to say that learners were prevented from making free choice between these different 
paths because this policy affected their attitude towards such education. For example, 
learners and their families classified technical education as of less value than academic 
because the high-scoring learners were encouraged to attend the latter rather than the 
former. What supported this attitude was the fact that technical education was limited as 
regards facilities, curriculum, teachers and instruction. This might be because of the small 
amount of attention paid to it, although main concern was to satisfy the need for 
development. This reflects the separation between theory and practice in official thought 
that leads to failure to achieve such an aim. As a result, the percentage of enrolments in 
general secondary was far ahead of the technical percentage until the end of this period (see 
table 9). 
Table 9 
lumber o f secondary schools and learners in (industrial 1). (Commercial 2 ). (Agriculture 3) and ( General 4 
Year 1 Learners 2 Learners 3 Learners 4 Learners % T* %G* 
1953 29 9.007 20 4.042 12 5.095 200 92.062 16 84 
1954 28 6.846 21 4.517 12 3,669 197 106.095 12 88 
1955 28 7,192 25 8.428 12 3.738 208 107.612 15 85 
1957 24 11.594 31 17,104 14 6.119 202 109.395 24 75 
1958 25 13.735 34 23.030 18 7.443 199 115.608 28 72 
1959 25 15.722 34 27.159 21 9,001 211 120.767 30 70 
1960 25 19.968 34 32,633 21 10.543 225 132.161 32 68 
1961 26 22.626 44 34.220 22 11,149 240 131.885 34 66 
1964 29 30.286 54 45.159 26 14.810 251 172,229 34 66 
AF. h Ministry of Education ( 1964: 97.171) and (ME) Iv linistn" of Education (1970: 34-5). 
Fifthly, learners' in the second year of the secondary school had freedom of choice between 
the study of arts or sciences. However, the government interfered with their freedom by 
encouraging them to concentrate on science and technology. `The government provided a 
greater number of openings and better pay to those secondary learners who majored in 
science compared to fewer job opportunities available to those who had followed literature 
studies' ('All and Hasan, 1983: 1 14-5). In this sense someone might argue that learners were 
still free not to accept the government's offer, although refusing this offer seems a great 
price for the learners to pay for their freedom at any moment in time. However, as argued 
in chapter one offers are considered as indirect restrictions that limit individuals' freedom. 
Sixthly, unlike the previous regime learners had more freedom in higher education. This 
can be seen in the increase in the number of learners at higher education (see table 10) and 
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the establishment of regional universities, plus the national university which opened in 
1925. Although there was an increase in the number of learners, the higher education rate 
of increase was not high as was expected, especially after abolishing the fees in 1962, 
because of the inadequate number of universities and higher institutes. 
Table 10 
Numbers of learners enrolment and percentages of increase in higher education (1953-1969) 
Year Universities %* Higher institutes %* 
1953/1954 50.495 4,871 - 
1954/1955 54.978 9 6.125 26 
1955/1956 58.357 6 6.078 -0.8 
1956/1957 63,454 9 6.445 6 
1957/1958 73.870 16 7,447 16 
1958/1959 76.638 4 9.785 31 
1959/1960 82,705 10 11.857 21 
1960/1961 86.539 5 15.520 30 
1961/1962 91.363 6 20.335 31 
1962/1963 97.927 7 22,498 11 
1963/1964 110.394 13 25.779 15 
1964/1965 119.305 8 26.605 3 
1969/1970 140.210 18 32.118 21 
Al-Fiqi, H. (1997: 273) 
4.2.2.5.1. Girls' freedom after the socialist revolution (1952-1970) 
Girls' freedom in terms of educational opportunity remained far behind what boys had (see 
tables 11 and 12) although the state made education a high priority, with emphasis on 
compulsory education for both boys and girls. This can be seen in the level of girls' 
illiteracy. For example, `in 1960, the illiteracy rate of boys was 56.2%, compared to 83.1% 
of females' (GAIAE, 1996: 194). Unlike the previous period it might be argued that the state 
did not create obstacles to prevent girls from going to school but neither did it make any 
effort to remove obstacles that were inherited from the past. In this sense it might be argued 
that the limitation of freedom in education is not only made by creating obstacles but also 
by not removing such restrictions that prevent learners from enjoying their freedom. 
Moreover, girls are still slaves to `the traditional view which believes that they have to take 
particular subjects that suite their abilities' (`Ali and Hasan, 1983: 55-6). 
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Table 11 
Numbers and percentages of girls and boys in primary (1), preparatory (2) and general secondary education 
(3) 
Year Girls 
(1) 
% 
* 
Boys 
(1) 
% 
* 
Girls 
(2) 
°/a 
* 
Boys 
(2) 
% 
* 
Girls 
(3) 
% 
* 
Boys 
(3) 
% 
1953 526,110 38 866.631 62 72.406 21 276.112 79 12.903 14 79,159 86 
1954 595,674 38 984,415 62 71.657 21 274,719 79 16,326 15 89,769 85 
1955 685,703 37 1,175,239 63 73.288 22 255.182 78 17,047 22 60,566 78 
1957 783,961 38 1.302.743 62 69,470 25 208.754 75 18.723 17 90,672 83 
1958 860,388 38 1,425,679 62 65,343 27 182.449 73 20,706 18 94,902 82 
1959 927,863 38 1.524,514 62 68.757 28 180,372 72 23,471 19 97.296 81 
1960 997,266 38 1,612,903 62 71,294 28 182,443 72 27.748 21 103,413 79 
1961 1.054.451 38 1,700.112 62 85,947 29 214.906 71 35,738 27 96,148 73 
1964 1.285,008 39 2.009,824 61 142,236 30 330.332 70 47,517 28 124,712 72 
(ME) Ministry of bducatton (1904: 19). (Mt) Ministry of taucauon tt )o i au f ana t1VL) ministry vi 
Education (1970: 6) 
Table 12 
Numbers and percentages of girls' and boys' enrolment in universities (1) and higher institutes (2) 
Year Girls (1) %* Boys (1) %* Girls (2) %* Boys (2) %* 
1953 4028 8 46467 92 1392 29 3479 71 
1954 4970 9 50008 91 1741 28 4384 72 
1955 6365 11 51992 89 2106 34 3972 66 
1956 7773 12 55681 88 2213 34 4232 66 
1957 9320 13 63550 87 2388 32 5059 68 
1958 10693 11 65945 86 2782 28 7003 72 
1959 11539 16 71166 84 3055 26 8802 74 
1960 13680 16 72859 84 3774 24 11746 76 
1961 14923 20 76440 80 4140 20 16195 80 
1962 17464 18 80463 82 4601 20 17897 80 
1963 22098 20 88296 80 5297 21 20482 79 
1 669 37750 27 102460 73 8922 28 23196 72 
Al-Fiqi. H. (1997: 273) 
4.2.2.6. Learners' freedom at the beginning of the market economy (1971-1991) 
Freedom in education had been increased in some aspects and limited in others. Firstly, 
learners were enjoying freedom with respect to having free educational opportunities at all 
levels, where `the state issued the statement that public education is free from primary 
school through preparatory, secondary, and higher education to the doctorate level' 
(ARE, 1999a: 4). However, as in the previous period, this right was limited by the other 
expenses the learners had to pay for other educational services which restricted the poor 
learners' freedom to go to school. 
Secondly, unlike earlier times, learners had more freedom as regards having educational 
opportunities in the kindergarten, especially in the 1980s. For example, in 1985/1986, there 
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were 128,272 children compared to 120,411 in 1984/85 and 96,059 in 1983/1984" 
(Wilcox, 1988: 9). However, only a certain class enjoyed this freedom because it was neither 
free nor compulsory and it was only available in big cities. Poverty might not be considered 
a restriction on one's freedom, however it produces inequality where poor learners can not 
compete with their peers who had the opportunity. Both have different abilities and needs 
regarding learning and teaching through all levels which might affect their performance. 
Thirdly, as a result of a wide debate that was concerned with the insufficient length of the 
primary stage to provide learners with the minimum basic knowledge and skills that were 
important to build their personality, learners' freedom was extended by the introducing of 
what was called basic education. In 1981, the state combined the first nine years of 
education and regarded them as a compulsory stage (Wilcox, 1988: 9). `Separate primary 
school and preparatory school buildings continue to exist but new schools are being 
planned that will provide all nine years of basic education in a single building' 
(ME, 1983: 10). It might be argued that the introduction of basic education as free and 
compulsory increased the learners' freedom to prevent backsliding into illiteracy and 
meaningful participation in practical life. However, this freedom was diminishing `in 1988, 
by reducing this stage to 8 years instead of 9, for economic reasons' ('Izzat, 1990: 96). An 
important indication related to the idea of freedom that can be recognised here is that the 
development of the learners' potentiality was not the priority of the state. Instead and 
finding new resources of fund they cut back one year from the most important stage in the 
learners' lives at school. 
Fourthly, `in 1988, the state reopened the vocational preparatory school to receive those 
who had failed in level six, seven and eight to complete their basic education' 
(Surwr, 1989: 118). From the point of view of the state, vocational education aims to help 
learners to gain the minimum training they need to start their practical life after basic 
education. According to `Ammar (1996a: 38) it does not seem as `if education is helpful. It 
is just a matter of whether the school can keep learners until they complete the compulsory 
period. This is because the market does not need those learners because they are not 
qualified enough. This is because these schools lack good equipment, qualified teachers, 
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trainers, and above all learners have no motivation to study'. Moreover, this policy 
supported the negative view towards technical studies in term of its value because it 
accepted the weaker learners who were unable to continue their academic studies. 
Fifthly, learners' freedom in terms of educational opportunity in primary and preparatory 
education was increased dramatically especially after the introducing of basic education 
(see table 13). However, the state failed to achieve universal enrolment where the 
percentage of enrolment in primary education was 66 %, 65.4 %, 66.5 %, 84 % in 
1970,1974,1975,1984 respectively. `For preparatory it was 50.2 %, 60 %, 49.2 % in 1975, 
1978,1983 respectively' (Ratib, 1998: 7 1), (Khatir and others, 1979: 10,16), 
(UNESCO, 1976: 107) (Hilmi, 1978: 54), (Badran, 1996: 244) and (`Ali, Hilmi, 
Aimam, 1996: 137). As a result `the rate of illiteracy for these over the age of 10 reached 
56.6%' (ARE, 1990: 3 11). 
Table 13 
Development of numbers of learners in nrimarv and oreoaraton- education (1970-19891 
Educational level 1970/71 1973/74 1976/77 1979/80 1988/89 
Primary 3.740.551 3.918.396 4.151,956 4.300.000 6,955 , 
455 
Preparatory. 848.587 1,099,291 1,435,529 1,600,000 2,383.336 
Caneron. J. and Hurst. P. (1983: 633-5) and Al-Fiqi. H. (1997: 304.308) 
Regarding educational opportunity in secondary education, as shown in table 14, the 
number of learners increased but it was still a very low percentage of the eligible group that 
was offered this opportunity. For example, `in 1978 only 33% of individuals between 15 
and 17 years old enrolled in secondary school' (Khatir and others, 1979: 17). 
Table 14 
Numbers and oercentaees of Learners in secondary schools (1970-1986) 
Educational level 1970/1971 1973/1974 1976/1977 1983/1984 1984/1985 1985/1986 
General 290,117 323.603 392,861 542,227 563.792 569,366 
%* 51 50 49 42 41 39 
Tecluiical 271.639 321,327 403,550 759.666 802.847 877,399 
%* 49 50 51 58 59 61 
Caneron. J. and Hurst. P. (1983: 633-5) and (NCER) National Centre for Educational Research. Arab Republic 
of Egypt. (1986: 114) 
A close look at the previous data shows that unlike the earlier times the percentage of 
enrolment in technical secondary increased compared to the general secondary school. A 
decreased enrolment in the general secondary school was made intentionally by the state, 
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especially, `in the 1980s, to reduce the percentage of enrolment in higher education, 
although that percentage was not high (see tables 15 and 16). This means that the state 
purposely limited the learners' freedom in terms of educational opportunity in higher 
education. Moreover, the state determined the number of learners who were to enrol in each 
college or institute' (ARE, 1999b: 127) and (ARE, 1999c: 43) without giving any attention to 
the learners' interests. 
Table 15 
Learners' nercentaee of the nonulation 18 -22 in universities 
Year 1974 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 
% 9.9 12.4 12.9 13 12.9 12.9 13.4 13.9 14.6 13.1 
(ARE) Arab Republic of Egypt (1989: 230-1) 
Table 16 
Numbers of enrolled in universities 
Year 1986 87 88 89 90 
Enrolled 661.347 629723 604846 587033 569126 
(CIGMS) Central Institutes of General Mobilisation and Statistics (1992: 56) 
One indication related to the idea of freedom according to Wilcox is that learners admitted 
to technical secondary schools were those who scored on the (BECE) but this did not 
qualify them for admission to a general secondary school (1988: 19). This means that 
technical education usually begins with the weaker learner who receives instruction from 
less qualified instructors, reflecting an acute shortage of technical and vocational teachers. 
This means that although technical educational expansion was still crucial for the 
development of the country, the admission process discouraged talented learners from 
selecting it. 
4.2.2.6.1. Girls' freedom in the beginning of market economy (1971-1991) 
Girls' freedom in education in terms of educational opportunity was increased compared to 
the previous regimes, especially after the introduction of basic education. However, girls' 
freedom in education lagged behind that of boys (see tables 17 and 18). The limitation of 
girls' freedom in education can be seen in their high rate of illiteracy. For example, 
`illiteracy rate was 71% in 1976 comparing with 42% for boys reduced to 62.2% compared 
to 37% for boys in 1986' (GAIAE, 1996: 194). This refer to the same reasons discussed in 
the previous regime 
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Table 17 
Percentage of eirls' and boys' enrolment (1970-19861 
Educational level Gender 1971 74 77 84 85 86 
Primary Girls 38 38 39 42 - - Boys 62 62 61 58 
Preparatory Girls 32 34 35.5 61 - - 
Bovs 68 66 64.5 39 
General secondary Girls 33 33 34.5 37 37 37.5 
Boys 67 67 65.5 63 63 62.5 
Technical secondary Girls 31 33 35 38.5 39 40 
Bovs 69 67 56 61.5 61 60 
Teachers institutes Girls 45 43 44 55 57 59.5 
Boys 55 57 56 45 43 40.5 
Caneron. J. and Hurst, P. (1983: 633-5) and (NCER) National Centre for Educational Research, Arab Republic 
of Egypt. (1986: 114) 
Table IS 
Percentage of girls' and boys' enrolment in universities 
Gender 76/77 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 
Girls 30 32.5 33.3 33.5 33.7 34.9 
Bovs 70 67.5 66.7 66.5 66.3 65.1 
(CIGMS) Central Institutes of General Mobilisation and Statistics (1992: 25) and Caneron. J. and Hurst, P. 
(1983: 633-5) 
4.3. Freedom in education with regard to its restrictions 
In this section, I will investigate and analyse the idea of freedom in education with regard 
to its restrictions. This investigation will be concerned with making decisions, teacher 
preparation, examination regulations and educational budgets. This study endeavours to 
achieve the third aim of this chapter which is concerned with discovering the restrictions on 
learners' freedom in educational policy and practice in Egypt in the period between 1805 
and 1991. 
4.3.1. Freedom in education and decision-making 
This section will examine the learners' freedom to share in the making of educational 
decisions as a means to guarantee that education is planned in accordance with their 
interests. Also, this analysis will attempt to find out parents' and teachers' contribution to 
make educational decisions. From 1805 to 1882 'Ali and his successors 'considered 
themselves as the only authority in education, who decided its aims, set up schools, 
prepared a suitable budget and organised schools' affairs' ('Ali, 1989: 14) and (Al- 
Ayubi, 1989: 48). `Within centralisation in education learners, teachers, parents and schools 
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did not have freedom to share in the making of educational decisions for two reasons; first 
they rules did not allow anyone to share this authority to achieve their particular aims' 
(`Ali, 1995a: 14) and ('Abd Al-Min`im, 1997: 33). Second, `the community was not aware of 
the significance of their roles in education and left it to the ruler' ('Ali, 1989: 14) 
During the British occupation the minister of education was the only official authority. 
However, `he did not have freedom to make such decisions without obtaining the British 
consultant's approval' (Muhammad `Abdu quoted in Amin, 1960: 62) and (' Awad, 1996: 64). 
There was no local authority to share educational planning and decisions. Moreover, there 
was no law made to establish the community's right to participate in making decisions. 
Therefore, the British were able to avoid any objections against their educational policy. 
However, `some writers and Press leaders claimed the right of the public to express their 
opinions on their children's education' (Shinwda, 1987: 92) as a result, local `authorities 
appeared for the first time in the history of Egyptian education. However, their role was 
very limited and `they were abolished in 1914' (Tawfiq, 1985a: 5). 
Unlike the situation under the British occupation, the period between 1923 and 1950 gave 
more freedom to the minister of education, the local authorities and schools to share in 
educational decisions. `After the constitution of 1923, there was a demand for non- 
centralisation in education, and for the community to share in educational planning and 
decisions' (Tawfiq, 1985a: 40). For example, Taha Husayn pointed out `centralisation in 
education gives the right and freedom for only one person to determine education for 
everyone else' (Husayn, 1993: 111). As a result, `the local authorities appeared once again in 
1939' (Tawfiq, 1985a: 42). On the one hand, for the first time in the history of education in 
Egypt, the public had the right and the authority by law to share in their children education. 
However, the communities were not very effective and the decisions continued to be made 
by the minister of education. Of course, the learners' freedom to play a part in sharing 
educational decisions was totally neglected in both theory and practice in education. 
Although, in 1954, `the ministry of education allowed freedom to local authorities and 
schools to share educational plans, the relationship between the local authority and the 
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ministry was not that clear' (Tawfiq, 1985a: 88). `On many occasions the ministry denied 
the right of the local authorities and schools to share in educational decision and the 
carrying out of plans' (Al-Ayubi, 1989: 99) and (Tawfiq, 1985a: 88-9). This of course reveals 
the absolute power of the political leadership to control society and education. With respect 
to learners, teachers and parents there was no declaration of their right to share making 
decisions and judgements about educational practices. `The period between 1971 and 1991 
saw the extending of the range of freedom in society and the acknowledgement of 
individuals' rights' (ARE, 1999a: 3-7). The state declared that the minister of education is 
`responsible for planning, follow-up, evaluation, development and provision of educational 
materials as well as for determining the standards and qualifications of the teachers. The 
law entrusts the local authorities with the responsibility for implementation and follow-up 
at the local level (while taking into consideration the national guidelines), the supervision 
of activities during the school year, the development and administration of examinations 
according to the present guidelines for the various levels, and to recruitment of teachers' 
(ME, 1999a: 11-2). In this sense, the state continued to be the only authority in education. 
The learners, teachers, head-teachers, administrators and parents had no freedom to 
participate in decision making or to object to decisions that had already been made. 
Moreover, Hyde (1978: 56) stated that "students had no freedom of speech about the policy 
and had no real power to change their world. They had no freedom to demand any rights in 
education or any other field and were compelled to obey the rules laid down by the leader". 
In conclusion, although it was stated by law that the local authority had freedom to share 
state educational planning and practices, the role of the local authority was limited to 
carrying out decisions rather than sharing in making such decisions. Moreover, learners, 
parents, teachers and school had no freedom in making educational decisions. This absolute 
authority can be considered as a restriction on learner's freedom to be heard regarding their 
education. Also, the educationalists had no freedom to share in making decision or even to 
be consulted in such decisions. This is because the results of their research were always 
against the will of the state. The state had its own research centre to support its policy 
which always came out in support of the state rather than the learners. 
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4.3.2. Learners' freedom and teachers' preparation 
Under `Ali's regime a learner's freedom to have a qualified teacher was limited especially 
in maktabs and preparatory schools because `Ali did not set up particular institutes for 
teacher's preparation. `In maktabs and preparatory schools teachers were not specialists in 
teaching particular subjects. They used to teach particular books in different fields instead 
of teaching particular subjects' (`Ali, 1989: 75). In military schools `Ali `employed foreign 
teachers to teach until Egyptians teachers could be trained abroad and take over' (`Ali, 
Hilmi and Aimam, 1996: 40). This reflects `Ali's concern to train individuals for service in 
his military rather than develop their potential by given them the minimum basic education 
they might need in the early stages. Under 'Isma'il's regime it was believed that teachers 
should be qualified to teach and help learners act in proper manner. Therefore, he `opened a 
first teacher preparation school in 1872' (Al- Figi, 1997: 96). 'Isma'il's main concern was to 
prepare teachers to be specialists in particular subjects and follow a particular educational 
course so as to be able to deal with children. `This was the first attempt in the history of 
Egypt for teachers to study particular course in educational science' (`A1i, 1989: 88). 
However, he did not pay attention to the teacher's preparation for the kuitab. `The only 
requirement for teaching in the knuab was having a `particular certificate confirming that 
the candidate is acceptable by his community' ('Ali, 1995a: 75). 
Under British occupation and unlike the previous regime learners had the chance to be 
educated by qualified teachers. British `set up a school for krrtlah teacher's preparation' 
(Tawfiq, 1985b: 9), `one for primary teacher's' (Tawfiq, 1985a: 18-9) and `one for the higher 
school' (Tawfiq, 1985b: 22). For technical teacher's preparation, the learners `who were 
experienced and graduated from high technical schools used to teach in the same type of 
schools' (Tawfiq, 1985b: 55-6). `Education in these schools was free because the 
government was desperate for teachers. In addition `the state used to give learners awards 
to encourage them to attend that type of education' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad, 1993a: 146). Therefore, 
`the state obliged candidates to work for five years before they could leave for another job. 
Female teachers were obliged to remain single for the same period' (Abw-Al- 
Ais'ad, 1993x: 147). It might be argued that this policy encouraged many candidates to 
142 
attend teachers' school, however, the quality of teachers was very low in term of academic 
and professional attainment because the British only wanted them to transfer a particular 
kind of knowledge to the learners. As a result, the learners' freedom to be taught by 
qualified teachers was limited. Also, this policy produced the type of teacher who hated 
being a teacher because it was not his free choice. The candidate accepted it as the state's 
offer of a free opportunity which affected their performance. Moreover, a negative social 
view had crystallised towards the teaching professional because it was very low by 
profession in terms of salary and prestige. 
Compared to the British policy the learners had more freedom in term of having an 
adequate number of qualified teachers between 1923 and 1950. For the elementary school 
`the state had established a six-year training school for male teachers who had completed 
two years in the elementary school. In addition, a three-year school for female teachers who 
had the elementary certificate' (Tawfiq, 1985b: 79-89). For the primary school, `the state 
established a two year course in a teachers' institute for those who had completed 
secondary education. For the secondary school, there was a two-year course in the teachers' 
institute for those who had a first degree in art or science. This meant that there were three 
resources for teacher's preparation according to school level' (Tawfiq, 1985b: 79-89). 
Teacher's preparation in this manner reflects some indications related to the idea of 
freedom; firstly, there was inequality between the learners in elementary, primary and 
secondary schools which limited the freedom of the learners of the first two schools to that 
of being educated by a less qualified teacher. Secondly, it created a belief that teaching at 
primary level only needed a minimum qualification although it was a very difficult stage 
and needed more qualified teachers than the higher level. Thirdly, it created an attitude 
among teachers that secondary teachers enjoyed considerable social prestige compared to 
primary though they were of the same government rank. Fourthly, the erroneous belief that 
knowing an academic subject was more important than being able to teach because the 
learners used to study academic subjects for four or five years then join the teachers' 
institute for two years for professional preparation. In fact this belief was not only the 
product of that period, it had existed from the time of 'Ali's regime when he paid no 
attention to social sciences and favoured the natural ones. Fifthly, the learners and their 
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families had a negative attitude towards teaching as a profession because the learners who 
had a higher degree joined a teacher's institute only when they could not find a better job 
especially as it was a low-paid profession. It might be argued that the teacher's preparation 
policy, as in the previous regime, continued to produce the type of teacher who hated being 
a teacher and consequently this affected their performance. 
After the socialist revolution the learners enjoyed less freedom in terms of having an 
adequate number of teachers, due to the inability of the state to train a sufficient number, 
especially after expanding education (see table 19). Unlike the previous regime there were 
two resources for teacher's preparation instead of three. `The secondary teacher's institute 
for primary teachers accepted candidates who had a preparatory certificate with a low score 
that did not allow them to enter the general secondary school' (`Ali, Hilmi and 
Aimam, 1996: 145-8). As I have suggested, this policy continued to make learners and their 
families believe that the teaching profession was inferior because its institute accepted 
learners with low scores who were unable to join the general secondary school. Moreover, 
having a primary teacher's preparation in the secondary school rather than a higher institute 
supported such a belief that teaching at the primary level needed only minimum 
qualification. `The higher teacher's institute for the preparatory and secondary level also 
accepted low-score secondary learners who could not join another institute college' (`Ali, 
Hilmi and Aimam, 1996: 145-8). This meant that the candidates continued to join this kind 
of educational establishment because they could not choose otherwise. Another aspect of 
limited freedom of the learners can be seen in the high percentage of unqualified teachers 
due to an insufficient number of qualified teachers (see table 20) which meant that out of 
necessity, many unqualified teachers with less than 14 years of education were hired. This 
policy produced inequality between learners in which those especially in rural and poor 
areas, had less freedom than their peers who had qualified teachers in urban cities. This 
meant that teaching was a profession that required no qualification, which supported the 
community's belief about its low position. 
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Table 19 
Numbers of orimarv teachers and percentage of increase 
Year primary %* Preparatory %* General Secondary %* 
1953 45.869 - 9.780 - 7.401 - 
1954 43,461 -5 14.154 45 7.271 -2 
1955 48.173 10 16,018 13 8,238 13 
1956 51.131 6 16.058 0.2 - - 
1957 55,766 9 15.754 -2 7.981 -3 
1958 60.942 9 15.977 1 8.411 3 
1959 63,428 4 15,040 -6 8,734 4 
1960 67.688 7 14.125 -6 9,105 4 
1961 70,068 4 14.724 4 10.108 11 
1964 - - 19,716 33 10.401 3 
1969 - - 27.625 40 14.324 38 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1964: 77). (ME) Ministry of Education (1970: 10) and (ME) Ministry of 
Education, (1961: 55) 
Table 20 
General secondary education: teachers and its rates by qualified 
Year 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1970 
Qualified 7,097 7.822 8,553 9,407 10.400 10,731 10,702 
% 74 75 79 79 80 79 80 
Unqualified 2530 2579 2439 2527 2638 2815 3238 
% 26 25 21 21 20 21 20 
Hyde. G. D. M. (1978: 91) 
With the changing of political and economic conditions in the 1970s and 1980s the learners 
had more freedom in terms of having an adequate number of qualified teachers, due to the 
increase of number in the teacher's institutes and colleges (see table 21). Although the 
percentage of enrolments at these institutes was high it did not reflect the free will of 
learners to be trained to work as teachers. This might refer to the guaranteed job the state 
offered the candidates. Also it might refer to the low score that was required for these 
institutes. In this sense the candidates were not free to choose to be teachers because they 
had to accept the state's offer, especially since the rate of unemployment in most other 
fields was high. Unlike the previous regime, the learners' freedom was increased in terms 
of having higher-degree primary teachers by 1988. For example, in 1970s "Only 1 percent 
of the primary school teachers were university graduates, though some 25 to 30 percent of 
the teachers in the primary and preparatory schools had less than the desired professional 
preparation" (Cochran, 1986: 66). 
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Table 21 
Numbers of teachers in teacher's institutes (1970-1986) 
Educational level 1970/71 1973/74 1976/77 1983/1984 1984/1985 1985/1986 
Number of teachers 25,526 31,288 32,744 71,545 77,535 84,587 
Caneron, J. and Hurst, P. (1983: 633-5) and (NCER) National Centre for Educational Research, Arab Republic 
of Egypt, (1986: 114) 
In conclusion, as has been shown, there were policies concerning the teacher preparation 
that affected the quality of the teacher and the value of the teaching profession compared to 
other professions. Firstly, until 1990 the teacher continued to be thought of as a person who 
delivered knowledge and information to learners without allowing them to share in the 
teaching and learning process. Secondly, these policies made people think that it was very 
poor profession in terms of social prestige and salary. Thirdly, teachers were not free to 
choose to be trained as teachers and the process of teaching treated them as persons who 
had only to deliver such knowledge to the learners. Fourthly, admission policies prevented 
talented candidates from applying to teacher's institutes, which limited the learners' 
freedom to have good-quality teacher. As mentioned earlier, these institutes started with 
weaker candidates. It might be argued that this type of teacher limited the learners' freedom 
by exercising unjustifiable authority on them because they thought that they were the ones 
who knew everything so the learners should listen to what they were saying. 
4.3.3. Learners' freedom and the assessment system 
`The British intentionally used the examination regulations to limit individuals' freedom by 
reducing their chances to continue their education at higher levels' ('Ali, 1986: 188). For 
example, according to Tawfiq and Khalil (1986: 3-10,54); (a) `the examination system did 
not consider the differences between counties, therefore, the learners, wherever they were 
living, had to sit for the same examination, ' although they had been taught under different 
circumstances. In fact, this shows that village learners had less freedom and suffered 
inequality compared to their peers from urban areas. (B)'learners were obliged to sit for an 
oral exam in the English language that was difficult for them to', especially since `passing 
the oral examination in all subjects was a condition for sitting the written ones. If the 
learners failed the oral, they were compelled to leave school. (C) learners had to sit an 
examination at the end of the primary and secondary stages in all subjects'. This required 
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them to be examined in what they had been taught for many years. In addition, the learners 
had only one opportunity to sit the examination, those who failed were compelled to leave 
school. (D)'although there were some subjects divided into many branches the learners had 
to gain a minimum score in each branch to pass instead of obtaining a minimum score in 
the subject. In addition, the learners had to have mark of at least 50% in each branch to 
pass'. Moreover, there was no course work required under this policy. (E) `the learners 
were obliged to produce an official certificate stating that they were in good health to sit the 
examination'. This meant that sick learners did not have the freedom to demand education. 
By limiting the learner's freedom in terms of having the required conditions to derive 
benefit from the value of freedom, `the process of learning was seen as that of memorising 
the content of textbooks which learners were required to reproduce in examination' 
(`Ali, 1995a: 135-6). In other words, education aimed only to prepare learners for 
examinations. In short, learners were restricted by the value of certain type of knowledge 
needed by the occupier and they had no freedom to make free choices and decisions. 
During the time of limited independence, on the one hand, as under the British, `the aim of 
education was limited to obtaining a certificate that was the only means to secure a 
government job' (Hassan, 1971: 89). The importance of the certificate `produced fear in the 
learners towards examination that made them spend the whole year preparing' 
('Ali, 1989: 176), because `the type of examination and the nature of the questions continued 
to be the means to find out how much knowledge the learners could memorise' 
(Nisim, 1984: 161). This meant there was no time left for the learners to engage in other 
activities except that of memorising textbooks, especially since `the curriculum were 
overburdened with too much knowledge' ('Ali, 1989: 170) which made them think of 
knowledge as an end in itself rather than a means to others ends. On the other hand, unlike 
the British period the examination regulations were changed to allow more freedom for the 
learners to receive a type of educational opportunity that suited their abilities and was 
compatible with their performance. According to Tawfiq and Khalil; (A) `the learners had 
two chances to sit the examination. (B) they were required to obtain only a minimum score 
in each subject to pass, instead of having a minimum score in each branch of the subject. 
(C) the minimum score was reduced, especially in subjects that required a special talent, 
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such as art or music. (D) learners were allowed to sit the transfer examination to move from 
level to another instead of having only one exam at the end of each stage. (E) primary 
school learners all over the country did not have to sit for the same examination, unlike the 
secondary school learners' (1986: 12,63,64). 
The examination regulations did not change much after the 1952 revolution, in which the 
state did not intentionally use examination regulations to limit the learners' freedom. 
However, as before, the examination regulations continued to limit learners' freedom in 
that they focused on how much knowledge the learners had acquired which gave more 
value to knowledge as an end in itself. In other words, the purpose of the examination was 
not to answer the question of how a particular course could satisfy society's interest in 
producing the technicians who were badly needed for development. As before, the aim of 
education was limited to obtaining a certificate that was the only means to land a 
government job, rather than concentrating on assessing the skills the learners should 
acquire. This leads to state that reform in education was not comprehensive, it was a partial 
reform that concentrated on one aspect rather than on the whole process of education. 
The examinations' regulations between 1970 and 1991 did not limit the learners' freedom 
in terms of educational opportunity, as was clear under British policy. For example, firstly, 
"students were graded on the basis of a final test in each subject, `which accounted for 60 
% of the final grade, and assessments throughout the year, which accounted for 40 %" 
(Wilcox, 1988: l0). This was the first time course work was introduced. On the one hand, 
the introduction of course work did not help the learners to exercise freedom to make their 
own choices, decisions and be responsible for their actions, because it took only the form of 
monthly examination. On the other hand it made learners more comfortable and secure in 
sitting the final exam because their assessment was not based on it alone. However, the 
learners lost this opportunity in 1988 when `the state abolished the required course work at 
all pre-university levels to eliminate the problem of private tuition' (Surwr, 1989: 119). This 
is because the practitioners thought that teachers used this learning pattern to oblige 
learners to attend private tuition. Although, as will be discussed in chapter five, private 
tuition limits learners' freedom, the cancellation of course work was a big price to be paid, 
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especially since it did not eradicate this problem, because it was not its main cause. 
Secondly, according to Wilcox learners at grade 6 and 9 sat for an examination at the 
governorate level (Wilcox, 1988: 10) which took into consideration the differences between 
counties and their needs. However, `the learners had only one chance to repeat the 
examination, otherwise they had to join the poor vocational preparatory school, and for 
learners at grade 9 to obtain a certificate, they had to complete their compulsory education' 
(Surwr, 1989: 117) and (ARE, 1999a: 144). Unfortunately, this policy was an easy way to 
discharge learners who had problems in learning rather than investigating the reasons 
behind their failure. `In 1988, learners who failed twice in any year in general secondary 
education were allowed to join technical education' (ARE, 1999a: 5). This policy again 
supported the negative attitude towards technical education as of less value and suitable for 
weak learners. 
In conclusion, firstly, as can be seen, the learners' assessment took the form of 
examinations that were held at the end of each year. Secondly, the purpose of the 
examinations was limited to obtaining a certificate that was the only means to land a 
government job. The importance of the certificate produced feelings of fear in the learners 
towards examination which obliged them to spend the whole year preparing. Thirdly, the 
nature of the examinations questions was to find out how much knowledge the learners 
could memorise. As discussed in chapter three, the assessment's purpose in this sense, 
limits learners' freedom to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. Fourthly, 
until 1991 the assessment regulations continued to limit learner's freedom in terms of 
having educational opportunities. 
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4.3.4. Freedom in education and educational budgets 
Although 'Isma`il's educational policy aimed at expanding primary education `he did not 
prepare the appropriate budget' (Al-Figi, 1997,101-2) therefore, as mentioned earlier the 
state failed to achieve universal enrolment at the primary stage. Moreover the budget was 
unstable (see table 22) and this limited learners' freedom in terms of receiving educational 
opportunities. 
Table 22 
Educational budget (1R(R-1RRr) 
Year Budget Year Budget Year Budget Year Bud et year Bud ct 
1868 67,000 1870 66,473 1872 48,341 1874 51,820 1976 61,302 
1869 91.242 1871 50,000 1873 49.240 1875 61.302 1980 59,415 
'Abd Al-Karim, A. A. (1945: 89-92) 
During this period Al-Fiqi notes that `a large share of the educational budget was saved for 
foreign schools rather than state ones' (1997,101) although the former did not need such 
support compared to the latter, especially since all its learners belonged to rich families 
who had the ability to pay for their education. For example, `in 1875,93 foreign schools 
were available for 8,916 learners compared to 36 state schools that opened for 4,878 
learners' ('Abd-Al-Karim, 1945: 275-6). This meant that the Egyptian learners' freedom was 
limited in of terms educational opportunities and good jobs `where as foreign school 
graduates used to enjoy the best prestige and salary job' (Al-Figi, 1997,101-2). 
Under the British occupation the lack of an adequate budget was one of the tools to limit 
learners' freedom to receive educational opportunities. There was no investment in 
education by the state, where a large share came in the form of obligatory fees paid by 
families (see tables 23 and 24). 
150 
Table 23 
Develooºnent in educational budget between (1RR3-19221 
Year Budget Year Budget Year Budget Year Budget 
1883 99,549 1994 99,977 1885 84,689 1886 68.492 
1887 68,452 1888 69.544 1889 69,846 1890 80.338 
1891 88.478 1892 90.840 1893 92,544 1894 104,289 
1895 105.000 1896 105.180 1897 105,180 1898 105,220 
1899 107.864 1900 106,483 1901 107,638 1902 111,704 
1903 115.303 1904 127.500 1905 149,300 1906 169,300 
1907 374.000 1908 450.450 1909 483.669 1910 504,942 
1911 506.187 1912 535.764 1913 551.454 1914 525.224 
1915 422.981 1916 422,630 1917 467,758 1918 578,733 
1919 685.203 1920 1,013,503 1921 1,123,273 1922 1,169,040 
Abw-Al-Ais'ad, M. A. (1993a: 71-76) 
Table 24 
The percentage of educational budget to state budget( 1883-1922) 
Year State budget Educational budget % 
1883-1888 68,000,000 492.000 0.7 
1889-1906 222.000,000 1.850.00() 0.85 
1907-1914 137.000,000 4.000.000 2.8 
1915-1922 229.000.000 5.883,000 2.5 
Ab«w-A1-Ais'ad. M. A. (1993a: 71-76) 
According to previous data the educational budget increased from 99,549 Egyptian pounds 
in 1883 to 1,169,040 in 1922. However, `the financial provisions were inadequate to 
sufficiently develop the system of education or to increase the number of educational 
opportunities' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad, 1993b: 67). Moreover, `there was no equal distribution of 
the budget between the urban and rural areas. This meant that village learners had less 
freedom than their peers in urban areas to obtain a place in school' (Abw-AI- 
Ais'ad, 1993b: 98-9). 
As discussed earlier it is true that learners' freedom in education was increased in terms of 
educational opportunity between 1923 and 1950. However, millions of learners remained 
out of school due to lack of funds. A close look at the data in table 25 shows that there was 
an increase in the educational budget, however, this increase was not adequate to meet the 
increase in the number of learners. As a result, `the rate of illiteracy went over 74% in 
1947' (Al-Figi, 1997: 203). 
151 
Table 25 
Development of educational budeet and its nercentaee to oercentaee of state expenses (1925-1950) 
Year 1925 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Budget 2.336,447 11,635,657 12,416,015 12.576,619 18,656.817 22.145,727 26,738,430 
% 6.83 12.21 12.11 13.30 10.17 11.81 12.98 
Harbi, M. and A1-`Azawi (1958: 58) 
Moreover, Harbi and Al-`Azawi state that `there was a misdistribution of the budget 
between educational stages. They mention that the biggest share of the educational budget 
was saved for secondary education to achieve the state's aim to train learners for the sake 
of development rather than achieving universal enrolment at the primary level. Primary 
budget was 39% in 1936 and this increased to 40% in 1952, although the state declared its 
intention to spend on free and compulsory primary education' (1958: 58). 
Also, after the 1952 revolution, the dramatic increase in enrolments at all levels did not 
meet with an equal dramatic increase in the educational budget (see table 26). The biggest 
share of the budget was spent on salaries. For example, `82% of the budget was spent on 
salaries in the primary sector in 1966. This increased to 92.6 in 1970. At preparatory level 
the budget was 88.5% and 84.5% at the secondary level in 1966' (Mursi, 1974: 78) and 
(Hassan, 1980a: 22). This means that only a small share of budget was spent on building 
schools and providing them with all facilities. 
Tablc 26 
Primary education budget (1953-1970) 
Year Budget year Budget Year Budget Year Budget 
1953 26.434.900 55 33,252.700 57 38,500.000 59 42.344,000 
54 28.731.100 56 36.173,000 58 39.326.000 64 68.095.306 
(ME) Ministry of Education, (1961: 52) and (ME) Ministry of Education (1964: 19) 
Unlike the previous regimes, the educational budget was not only inadequate but it also 
decreased, despite the increase in educational demand between 1970 and 1991. (see table 
27) 
Table 27 
The rate of nre-university education budect to the eovcrnuient budect 
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1991 
18.2 18.1 17.8 17.3 9.4 11.1 9.8 5.9 
Al-Bana, R. (1992: 73) and Nasif, A. (1984: 6) 
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Reducing the educational funds limited learners' freedom in terms of educational 
opportunities and enjoying a good quality of education. For example, although `the 
percentage of increase in a number of schools was 27.6,17.99,26.63 in primary, 
preparatory and general secondary respectively' (Surwr, 1989: 79-81) a large number of 
schools had to work double and treble shifts. For instance, `the percentage of schools that 
had to work double shifts was 65 in primary and 37 in preparatory an with increase of class 
size' (Ratib, 1998: 121). Secondly, as a result of the lack of fund learners' freedom in rural 
and poor areas less than their peers in the cities which produced inequality between them in 
terms of the number of schools available and their facilities. In 1983/1984, for example, 
`the primary percentage of enrolment in Cairo was 99.7 compared to 38.2 in Sena'. (`Ali, 
Hilmi and Aimam, 1996: 137). 
In conclusion, from the information given above it can be concluded that inadequate 
educational budgets limited learners' freedom in terms of educational opportunities. It also, 
limited their freedom in terms of having the required conditions because the types of 
educational process discussed in chapter three required an appropriate budget to help 
learners to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. 
4.4. Freedom in education regarding its value 
This section has two main aims firstly, to examine the idea of freedom in education 
regarding its value in theory and practice. Secondly, to investigate whether the claim for 
learners' freedom in Egypt is desirable and valuable for learners and society according to 
educational thought. The significance of this section is to give an indication of the 
suitability and validity of the implementation of freedom in education into the Egyptian 
context. 
The value of freedom in educational theory during 'Ali's and his successors' regimes was 
very narrow due to lack of educational opportunity and its quality. That is to say that the 
value of freedom in education was not recognised in the sense analysed in the last two 
chapters. However, educational thought at that time was concerned with some issues that 
153 
related to freedom in education. For example, `educational thought stressed the necessity of 
having free educational opportunity and considered it the responsibility of the state to offer 
these opportunities for both rich and poor. For the teacher's preparation, educational 
thought for the first time recognised the importance of training teachers how to deliver 
knowledge to the learners, instead of only particular subjects being known' ('Ali, 1989: 87- 
88). For girl's education many movements arose to claim freedom for girls to be educated, 
for example, that of Refa'ah Al-Tahtawi who believed in the freedom of education and a 
respectful life for girls. `He referred to the inability of the girl to fulfil her role due to the 
lack of education, which provides her with experiences' (`Awad, 1994: 217). Although he 
claimed freedom for girls to work, he put restrictions on this freedom, for example `she can 
work only in case she needs money when there is no one who can support her and the type 
of work should match her nature and ability' (Mursi, 1993: 164-85). 
There was no crystallised philosophy of education that took the child's freedom to be its 
main focus between 1882-1922. However, there was big debate over the child's freedom to 
have educational opportunity (as a result of British policy in limiting education). 'Ali 
(1989) notes six consequences as being characteristic of this period. Firstly, `a debate over 
the children's right to free and compulsory education, especially at the primary stage and 
the responsibility of the state to offer enough opportunities, an appropriate budget, and 
qualified teachers. It is the responsibility of the state to encourage families to send their 
children to school to protect their right. Moreover the state should organise opportunities so 
that education does not go against the needs of the families for their learners support 
especially in agricultural areas' ('Ali, 1989: 124-130). Secondly, educational thought argues 
that aims of education should focus on the `development of children's minds as well as 
their bodies to do free and creative thinking, evaluate things, opinions and knowledge, and 
discover and classify knowledge. It is the learners' right to be themselves and to make such 
choices and decisions' (`Ali, 1989: 131-135). Furthermore, educational thought recognised 
`freedom as a necessary condition for the development of the children's potentiality and 
found that authority and interference with learners' interests effects negatively affects their 
growth' ('Ali, 1989: 136-140).. According to educational thought, learners also need help 
from adults rather than being subject to authority. Thirdly, there was big debate over the 
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value of textbooks in which teachers and learners should not depend on a particular 
textbook but should use different resources. `Textbooks should only be a guide for teachers 
and learners to find new sources of knowledge to develop their free and creative thinking 
and form their own judgement of others' opinions and work' (`Ali, 1989: 142).. Educational 
thought considered the existing textbooks as a means to limit learners' freedom to 
investigate and discover knowledge on their own. Moreover the debate focused on the 
importance of having well-written textbooks through competitions in writing and 
translation. Fourthly, educational thought believed that `teachers should respect children's 
freedom, nature, individuality, opinions and personality' (`Ali, 1989: 144).. That is to say, 
that teachers should not use their authority for its own sake they should use it to protect the 
learners' freedom. Then, when it comes to punishment it should be compatible with the 
action. Fifthly, there were claims `for equality among gender and rural and urban areas in 
terms of having the same educational opportunities, teachers, schools and facilities' 
('Ali, 1989: 150). Sixthly, `educational thought discussed the need for co-operation between 
local authorities and the state' ('Ali, 1989: 155-6). 
Regarding women's freedom, at the end of nineteenth century a number of liberals, who 
believed in women's freedom made useful contributions on the issue of girls' freedom of 
education. For example, `Jamal al-Din al-Afghani believed that girls should have the right 
to be educated so as to be able to play their roles in their homes and take care of their 
husbands and children' (Yusif, 1999: 11). However, `he denied their freedom to study 
particular subjects such as medicine or engineering. He believed that girls did not have the 
required abilities to do so' (Mursi, 1993: 227). In this sense, Muhammad 'Abdo argued that 
`there is no way for social development when half of the population are uneducated and 
neglected' (Mursi, 1993: 247). As a result the Egyptian feminist movement started in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century. In talking about Amin, `Imara (989: 327-48) `found that 
Egyptian women; (A) had no right to share with men anything regarding their lives and 
children. (B) had to submit to their husbands' decisions and desires. (C) their place was in 
the home and they could not go out for any reason without their husbands' permission. (C) 
women were slaves to men who did not give their wives any respect. As a result, Amin 
stated that women's freedom meant freedom from the authority of men'. As a result of the 
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feminist movements a number of women gained a range of freedoms concerning education, 
work and political participation. 
Having partial independence in 1922 allowed `educationalists more freedom to think of 
education as a means to support and protect independence' ('Ali, 1989: 163). Secondly, 
Hassan (1971: 250) points out `that for the first time in the history of education, there was a 
crystallised philosophy focused on children's freedom in education. Educational thought 
discussed the importance and the necessity of moving towards the pattern of `child-centred 
education'. According to Hassan (1971: 143) `educational thought stressed the necessity of 
educational theory and practice taking children's interests as its main concern rather than 
adults'. As a result of this `there was a call to pay attention to school activities that play an 
important role in helping learners to find out their interests and talents' (`Ali, 1989: 187). 
Thirdly, there was a debate about democracy in education to achieve equal opportunity in 
education. The debate can be shown in two views. The first was crystallised by 'Isma`il Al- 
Qabani who `claimed democracy in education through applying free, unified and 
compulsory education for everyone at the primary level and limited this right at secondary 
and higher education levels through applying fees ' (Al-Qabani, (ND): 126). In this sense 
`Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rafi demanded that `primary education should be free and 
compulsory for all. Moreover, the state should be responsible for education from primary to 
higher education' (Al-Raf 1,1988: 362). Also, he added that 'expansion of education for all 
social classes is one of the most powerful methods to develop Egypt and it is the way to 
gain freedom and independence' (Al-Raf`i, 1984: 140). The second view was defined by 
Taha Husayn who `argued that primary education which is the basis of democratic life, 
should be universal and compulsory' (Husayn, 1993: 65,83). Therefore, he announced that 
education is like air and water (Wahbah, 1992: iv). By 1950, he supported the claim for free 
education at secondary level. 
Fourthly, `liberal educational thought was interested in finding ways to change social views 
towards girls' education through the claim for women to have the freedom to work as well 
as men. This claim helped the public to recognise girl's education as an investment and as a 
means for them to become economically independent. In consequence, families, especially 
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poor ones, were persuaded to send their daughters to school and allow them freedom to 
work. From this arose the demand to learn the same subjects as boys and have the freedom 
to enter universities' (`Ali, 1989: 217-220). 
Unfortunately, the claim for learners' freedom in education did not improve much between 
1952 and 1972 due to the political leadership which controlled everything in society, even 
educational thought. For Faiq (1986: 223-6), `educational thought was concerned with the 
problems of educational practice more than with a clear philosophy of education'. 
Therefore, this period was guided by no theory or philosophy of education. The political 
and economic changes that took place in 1973 brought more freedom for individuals and 
this reflected in the educational field as well. Educational thought discussed freedom in 
education in relation to three main areas, as summarised by `Ali (1995a). With respect to 
the aims of education, educational thought discussed 'the importance and the necessity of 
moving towards the pattern of child-centred education and claimed the learners' freedom to 
determine their own education according to their own interests or at least minimise 
interference and control over them' ('Ali, 1995a: 266). According to this claim the aims of 
education are recognised as developing free thinking, creativity, responsibility, self- 
learning, team work and democratic participation in society. However, 'the claim also 
focused on achieving a balance between the satisfaction of learners' and society's interests' 
('Ali, 1995a: 270). Secondly, educational thought 'claimed freedom for learners in terms of 
having free and equal educational opportunities at all levels' (`Ali, 1995a: 271). 
Educationalists stressed 'the responsibility of the state to extend basic education to 9 years, 
increase educational opportunity at all levels and offer alternatives, extend the school day, 
eradicate illiteracy and admit the right of the public to share in the making of educational 
decisions' ('Ali, 1995a: 272).. Thirdly, educational thought 'claimed the need for technology 
to enhance learning' ('Ah, 1995a: 274).. Fourthly, educationalists made clear `that having 
choices in education is important for learners to maximise their opportunities to meet their 
interests' ('All, 1995a: 276). 
With respect to the value of freedom in educational practice, there was no reflection of the 
idea of freedom. As previously investigated, education was aimed at transforming learners 
157 
into obedient clerks as the state wanted them to be. They did not have the ability to think 
critically, make decisions for themselves, or be responsible for their actions. Learners 
interested in what they were studying as the aims of education did not concern their 
interests. In other words it was not the state's concern to educate learners in a way that 
developed their thinking, experiences, knowledge or skills. In talking about the value of 
freedom for society, individuals failed to play their roles in the development process due to 
the poor quality of the education system at the time. This might lead to the conclusion that 
limiting the learners' freedom to study their area of interest was one of the strongest 
reasons behind the failure of the development. 
It might be argued that the lack freedom present in the education system, may be due to 
several reasons, depending on the period of investigation. It could be said that one of the 
reasons for this lack of freedom is political strategies. For example, during 'Ali's regime 
which lasted until 1952, political leaders used to do what they saw best for achieving their 
own aims, completely neglecting the development of individuals. After the revolution of 
1952, the reasons could be due to the absence of `a clear and comprehensive philosophy 
which both individuals and society require from education. Every new government has a 
new and different policy for education which causes confusion throughout the educational 
system' ('Ammar (1996a: 25). 
Regarding the second aim of this section, it might be concluded that the value of freedom 
in education has been discussed and expressed in educational thought. This indicates that 
the claim for learners' freedom in Egypt is not a new concept but rather a desirable one 
made by educationalists for both learners and society. However, despite this educational 
thought, educationalists did not reach a clear theory or proposal regarding freedom in 
education. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in educational 
theory and practice in Egyptian history from 1805 to 1991. In relation to the first aim it can 
be concluded that learners' freedom in the area of considering their interests to be the main 
concern of educational policy was limited. Learner's priority in education was not the main 
concern of the political leadership even after obtaining full independence and being a free 
society acknowledging individuals' freedom. Since 'Ali's regime and until the 1950s the 
purpose of education was limited to suit the needs of rulers more than individuals. After the 
revolution of 1952 education aimed to satisfy the needs of society rather than individuals. 
Regarding the second aim, educational thought discussed the idea of freedom in education 
and its value in the areas of developing learners' abilities to think freely, to make choices 
and decisions and be responsible for their actions. Also it recognised that the satisfying of 
society's needs does not go against the satisfaction of individuals. They are inter-connected 
and education should be concerned primarily with the first rather than the second. This 
indicates that it is possible for the idea of learners' freedom to be implemented in the 
Egyptian context. 
With respect to the second aim of this chapter, the idea of freedom in the history of Egypt 
was always related to the claim for individuals to have free and equal educational 
opportunity. In this respect Criblez argues that the demands for accessibility must satisfy 
two requirements: freedom and equality (1999: 117). For example these two conditions 
were very limited from the time of 'Ali's regime to the beginning of the 1950s when the 
revolution took place. This meant that until 1991 millions of children still had no schooling 
due to the lack of educational opportunity. As mentioned in chapters two and three, 
freedom in education primarily means that learners must have the opportunity to choose 
and decide for themselves without interference from others. 'Their freedom has to begin 
with the availability of places in the schools for learners, which is a basic need of 
education' (`Ali, 1997: 351). If the number and the variety of educational opportunities are 
limited, this in turn limits learners' freedom to choose a place in the school of their choice. 
Moreover, they will be obliged to accept such opportunities as the state offers. Hence, it 
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might be important to define freedom in education as a right for learners to have free and 
equal opportunities so they can make their own choices between such alternatives as exist. 
Regarding girls' freedom in education, it has been shown that their freedom is still less than 
boys' in terms of free and equal opportunity and they do not have freedom to study and 
work in particular fields like boys. The diminished freedom that they have has nothing to 
do with religious obligations, as mentioned in chapter one, nevertheless, it seems that girls 
are restricted by social values. 
Regarding the third aim, the investigation explained the restrictions that could limit 
learners' freedom. 
" Although it was laid down by law that the local authorities had the freedom and 
responsibility to share educational planning and practices, it focused only on putting 
such decisions into practice and played no role in decision-making. Moreover, learners, 
parents, teachers and schools had no freedom to share decision-making or even the 
freedom to object to the decision that had been made. 
" As for teachers' preparation it can be concluded that some policies affected the quality 
of the teachers and the value of the teaching profession compared to others professions. 
Firstly, the teacher's role until 1991 continued to be thought of as that of a person who 
passed on knowledge and information to learners without allowing them to share in the 
process of teaching and learning. Secondly, these policies made people think that 
teaching is very low profession in terms of social prestige and salary. Thirdly, teachers 
were not free to choose to be trained as teachers and the process of teaching treated 
them as persons who had only to deliver such knowledge to learners. Fourthly, 
admission policies prevented talented candidates from applying to teacher's institutes 
which limited learners' freedom to have a good quality of teacher. As mentioned 
earlier, these institutes started with weaker candidates. It might be argued that this type 
of teacher limited learners' freedom through exercising unjustifiable authority on them 
because they thought that they were the ones who know everything and the learners 
should listen to what they were saying. 
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As discussed, learners' assessment took the form of examinations held at the end of 
each year. Secondly, the purpose of the examinations was limited to obtaining a 
certificate that was the only means to obtain a government job. The importance of the 
certificate caused the learners to be frightened of the examination that made them spend 
the whole year preparing for them. Thirdly, the purpose of the examination questions 
was to find out how much knowledge the learners could memorise. As discussed in 
chapter three, the assessment's purpose in this sense limited the learners' freedom to 
exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. Fourthly, until 1991 the assessment 
regulations continued to limit learner's freedom in terms of having educational 
opportunity. 
An inappropriate educational budget limits the learners' freedom in terms of having 
free and equal educational opportunities. Also, as a result of a lack of a budget the state 
failed to allow learners; (a) freedom to determine the type of study they are interested in 
when the state obliged them to do what satisfied its aims (b) alternatives and options in 
the curriculum and its subjects in which they can make free choices. In other words the 
required conditions for learners and society to exercise freedom and obtain benefit from 
its value in education (non-interference and the availability of choices) were not 
implied in the educational policy and practice during the period of the study. 
As indicated in this chapter, the illiteracy rate remained high although the state tried to 
eradicate it by introducing adult education policies. This leads us to state that these 
efforts can not eliminate illiteracy unless there is universal enrolment in basic 
education. This might lead to argue that illiteracy could prevent the public from 
demanding a share in making educational decisions or claiming freedom for their 
children. 
With respect to the fourth aim, firstly, the value of freedom was not reflected in the 
educational practice. For learners, as investigated, the type of education aimed to turn them 
into obedient clerks as the state wanted them to be. They did not have the ability to do 
critical thinking, make decisions for themselves or to be responsible for their actions. 
Learners had no freedom to be interested in what they are studying because aims of 
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education did not concern their interests. In other words it was not the state's concern to 
educate learners in way that developed their thinking, experiences, knowledge and skills. 
Secondly, the value of freedom in education has been discussed and expressed in 
educational thought. This indicates that the claim for learners' freedom in Egypt is not a 
new one but it is a desirable claim made by educationalists for learners and society. 
However, educational thought did not crystallise such theory or proposal to apply freedom 
in education. 
Having investigated the idea of freedom in education in Egyptian educational history the 
next chapter will examine the idea of freedom in Egypt between 1992 to 2000, whereas the 
current chapter focused on the period up to 1991. 
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Chapter Five 
Freedom in education in Egypt (1992-2000) 
5.1. Introduction 
Egypt's current educational strategy, which presents a comprehensive framework for 
educational reform, was initially articulated in 1992. Thus the main concern of this chapter 
is to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in educational theory and practice in Egypt 
from 1992 to 2000 whereas the previous chapter focused on the period from 1805 to 1991. 
The aims of this chapter can be summarised as follows; firstly, to discover and analyse the 
conditions of freedom related to Egyptian society and its educational system for learners to 
derive benefit from the value of freedom in education. In other words to investigate how far 
learners have been interfered with and subjected to authority by adults in relation to their 
choices and decisions to study what they are interested in and to be or become what they 
want? Secondly, to discover such educational practices as reflect the aspects of freedom. 
This will help us to understand how the present educational system has come about which 
is necessary to establish a sound basis for the implementation of freedom in chapter six and 
seven. Thirdly, to discover the sort of restrictions that determine learners' freedom with 
regard to educational policy and practice. This will help in the avoidance of such 
restrictions and in the preparation for conditions that are important in the implementation of 
the idea of freedom in the Egyptian context in chapter six and seven. Fourthly, to identify 
the meaning, features and the value of freedom in educational thought in the light of the 
theoretical framework made in the first three chapters. The significance of this section is to 
give an indication of the suitability and validity of the implementation of freedom in 
education in the Egyptian context. To achieve the previous aims this chapter will be 
divided into two sections. The first is concerned with an examination of the conditions 
required for learners to obtain benefit from the value of freedom in education. The second 
section deals with the sort of restrictions that determine learners' freedom. 
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5.2. Freedom in education regarding its conditions 
This section will investigate and analyse the idea of freedom in education regarding its 
conditions (non-interference and the availability of making free choices and decisions) to 
achieve the first and the second aim of the current chapter. Firstly, it will investigate if 
learners' freedom to study what they are interested in and to be or to become something 
they want has been interfered with. In other words to answer the question of whether the 
state had taken the learners' interests into consideration? Secondly, it will explore the 
learners' freedom to make their own free choices to receive a particular opportunity in 
education according to their wishes and interests. This section gives some information 
about the actual practice in education (in the area of the purpose of education, curriculum 
planning, having free and equal opportunities and making decisions) which must be 
realised and understood before implementation of freedom in education takes place in the 
Egyptian context. 
5.2.1. Learners' freedom to determine what they are interested in studying 
According to Hargreaves, educational reform is often seen as a matter of national economic 
survival. Like Nassir's (1952-1970) and Sadat's (1970-1980) regime, Mubarak (1980-to 
date) believes that economic soundness can be reached through education, by concentrating 
on education in the field of applied mathematics, science and technology (2001: 252). In 
training learners for various professions, it is the interest of society and not those of the 
individual that are taken into consideration. For instance, Timwr (1999: 10) notes that the 
purpose of education is `to provide the type of individuals that society needs'. Similarly, 
`Ammar (1999b: 7) observes that `education in Egypt is influenced by two main schools of 
thought: firstly, the school of thought that emphasises an economic perspective. This group 
has a strong influence on the people who are in charge of education, as they control the 
economy and investments in the country. The second school of thought on the other hand, 
stresses the importance of developing the personality of the learners so that they can be 
autonomous in their choices and decisions and responsible for their actions as well as 
creative'. Similarly, Sh'aban (1999: 9) points out, `a society cannot develop without first 
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developing its citizens. Education should not only train individuals to take up responsible 
positions in society, but it must also equip them with the ability to be autonomous and 
creative'. As the influence exerted by this group is less powerful than that of the first group, 
the direction taken by education in Egypt is determined by who has more power in society 
at a given moment rather than by the interests of individuals in society. In this sense 
`Ammar (1999a: 13) argues that `thinking of education in this way does not produce 
thinkers, creative, self-learners or responsible people but learners who are like mere 
machines that do what the state wants them to do'. In talking about interference by parents, 
it is fair to say that parents and teachers have nothing to do with planning or even sharing 
discussions about education. As I will discuss, they only have to continue the chain of 
interference by the state to oblige the children to study what the state wants and earn 
certificates that allow them to have a food job in terms of social prestige and salary. 
For the state to achieve its goals it exercises authority over learners to learn for the sake of 
industrial development and the learners do not have the freedom to make choices regarding 
their interests. In the following sections I will examine in more detail the conditions that are 
necessary for learners to show benefit from the value of freedom in relation to determining 
curriculum and its content. 
5.2.1.1. Learners' freedom and curriculum design 
As mentioned earlier the purpose of Egyptian education is to prepare learners for the sake 
of industrial development. As stated by `Ali (1998: 185) and Shihata (1991: 128) `the 
curriculum is designed by the state for its own interests and needs'. This approach implies 
that the state determines the rules to force learners to do what society wants them to do by 
studying particular subjects. According to this tradition, the role of learners at school is to 
learn what the state wants (see the arguments of Kelly (1977) and Lawton (1981 for 
example). Regarding this approach, it is only the state that has the right (not the learners, 
teachers or parents) to decide what is to be included in the content which will help learners 
to acquire the knowledge and skills that are necessary for the development of the state. 
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According to this approach school knowledge is related to the developing needs of the 
economy (Moore, 2000: 19) and (Jenkins and Shipman, 1976: 23). It lies behind many of the 
calls for more science and technology in the curriculum (Langford, 1970: 107). This 
approach is guided by the product rather than by the process. What children learn, and how 
they behave, is central to the approach (Blyth, 1984: 32-4). In other words, planning the 
curriculum on the basis of what society may be said to be or to need, is to "attempt to use 
education to fit pupils into society, is to adopt an approach to education that is essentially 
utilitarian or instrumental" (Blenkin and Kelly, 1983: 48). In the same line Eraut (1981: 151) 
argues that there is always "pressure to introduce more science, to make the curriculum 
more vocational and to devote more time to links between schools and industry". Thus the 
purpose of education is the acquisition of knowledge by learners to develop industry for the 
state which needs "specialists of all sorts and generalists - generally cultivated human 
beings" (Adler, 1988: 43). 
According to this approach, in determining the curriculum and its content Egyptian 
education does not provide the required conditions since the learners cannot derive benefit 
from the value of freedom. Firstly, as argued by Freire and Shor (1987: 76), the problem of 
the state having full authority in the school curriculum is simply the producing of 
curriculum compatibility with control from above. That chain of authority ends in the 
passive, transfer pedagogy dominating schools and colleges. It also ends in teacher burnout, 
student resistance, and the continual eruption of liberatory reforms from below. Similarly, 
Phenix, for instance, (1975: 165) observes that 
students and teachers alike are prone to take the curriculum as they find it, as a traditional 
sequence of separate elements, without inquiring into the comprehensive pattern within 
which the constituent parts are located. 
This shows that instead of developing the learners' abilities, education serves to prepare 
learners as machines to do what the state wants them to do. In this sense, `education does 
not help to develop the learners' mind and teach them how to think, analyse and criticise' 
('Ali, 2000: 14). Similarly, this approach seems to dive more attention to science and 
technology rather than art and literature for the sake of industrial development. In this sense 
it can be seen that it focuses on the acquisition of knowledge by learners, as the most 
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important and necessary aim of education rather than development of the learners' 
intellectual abilities and feeling of happiness, and responsibility. Therefore, it is necessary 
to find out how far Egyptian education values knowledge and how it affects learners' 
freedom to obtain benefit from it. 
5.2.1.2. Learners' freedom and the value of knowledge 
For most learners, `going to school means memorising facts and information without 
understanding' (Abw Al-Wafa, 1997: 35), and the tediousness of this process usually results 
in learners feeling that the `educational experience is not a happy one, since it does not 
include interesting activities and so on which can capture their interest' (Al-Said, 1989: 2). 
Learners are overburdened with too much knowledge and homework and they cannot cope 
with the extra workload'. Although the human brain is extraordinarily powerful and 
flexible there are limits to how much knowledge it can process at once. `When these limits 
are exceeded, learners find it extremely difficult to assimilate all the new information they 
are taught' (ME, 1999f. 55), and as a consequence begin to feel that they are failures. As a 
result, a discussion reported in the Al-'Ahram newspaper by Al-Bindari (1999: 5) concludes 
that `the heavy workload in schools is the most popular reason behind the high suicide rate 
among learners once they receive their examination results. This also explains the high 
drop-out rate and discontinuation'. This reflects the fact that Egyptian education pays more 
attention to the amount of knowledge learners should learn at a required ade for the sake of 
industrial development. 
Considering knowledge as an aim in itself produces more restrictions over learners' 
freedom to enjoy the required conditions to be free in their education. For example, it 
provides a justification for a compulsory and common textbook. The argument here does 
not go against the pattern of having a common textbook, the idea is that `learners and 
teachers have little to say about these books, or what should be incorporated, and how they 
should be written. Such decisions are made for them, though in the name of their best 
interests. Learners are often the forgotten constituency' (NCERT, 1997: 18). One big 
problem with Egyptian textbooks is the fact that they are often poorly written. This might 
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refer to the problems and difficulties that arise because textbooks are written by committees 
and consultants rather than taking learners' and teachers' views into consideration. 
Firstly, textbooks are full of isolated facts that learners should know. Having textbooks that 
contain all the required knowledge `does not give learners the freedom, for example, to 
look for more knowledge, discover the relationship between different variables or learn and 
how they can use such knowledge in a meaningful and worthwhile way. Learners are also 
not allowed to study other books except the textbooks even if it contains wrong 
information, as sometimes happens' (Shihata, 1991: 128). This can be seen as a reason for 
the loss of motivation on the part of learners to make an effort to examine, to discover or 
even to think of particular knowledge. This way of designing textbooks produces problems 
in the universities, `as learners expect to find textbooks that they can read before the exam. 
When they do not find what they are looking for, they require lecturers to give notes similar 
to those they have been used to in schools' ('Abd Alla, 1991: 260). University learners also 
often complain about the system of examinations which is different from that of schools. 
Even after graduation they will still need to be told what they have to do, because they 
never had the chance during school and universities to think for themselves and make their 
own decisions. 
Secondly, `Ali (1998: 185) states that `only one dimension is considered and that is the 
perspective of the leadership and all other views are pushed to the background or 
completely neglected. For example, in the history curriculum, the selection of content is 
never a neutral enterprise, and choices reflect the priorities of those with the power to 
choose. The act of selection prioritises some content over others. In identifying a sense of 
chronology and time, an appreciation of continuity and change, and an understanding of 
cause and effect in human affairs, they placed the strongest emphasis on the second order 
concepts that define the essential nature of historical knowledge. Moreover, the content that 
is taught is the history of rulers, and types of policy rather than what ordinary individuals 
have done to help leaders to achieve their aims. The content also focuses on events rather 
than the reasons for the events and their consequences'. This way of presenting knowledge 
does not build self-confidence in learners, as the values that are inculcated are that only 
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leaders can achieve great things. This can give learners the idea that ordinary people cannot 
make a worthwhile contribution towards social change. This can result in a sense of 
powerlessness. They feel that to contribute towards social change, a person has to be in a 
position of authority or have money. Because of the way they are taught, learners are not 
aware of what group pressure can do, and they do not realise that as a group they can put 
pressure on the government to make changes. Very often, learners do not even object to 
decisions that are directly related to them. In fact, they are learning how to respect authority 
and obey rules and decisions so that they do not even have the desire to object. A similar 
example can be taken from the curriculum for the Arabic language. `This curriculum 
appears to give learners the perspective of the author of the curriculum, for instance, why a 
certain poem is aesthetic. In this case, giving the perspective of the author can be seen to 
hinder the learners' ability to make their own judgements about the aesthetic qualities of 
the poem' (Muhammad, 1991 b: 98). 
A third problem can be seen in Al-'Atar's argument (1999: 57) he states that `the kind of 
knowledge that exists in the textbook coerces and restricts the freedom of the learners' 
thinking. The learners are forced to memorise facts which are not related to their world'. 
For example, the conference on the development of the curriculum for the primary school 
recommended that `the aims of the math curriculum were to help learners to use 
mathematics in their real lives and to develop their attitude towards it by using it in their 
day-to-day lives' (EODC, 1993: 59). However, it has been found that the mathematics 
curriculum does not promote these aims. For instance, in 1999 Al-Aibyari (1999: 210-11) 
finds that `the problems used in the textbooks did not reflect the learners real-life situation, 
and therefore, they could not use the knowledge they had gained to solve these problems in 
real life situations' (Salah, 1999: 178). 
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5.2.1.3. Learners' freedom and curriculum subjects 
This section examines the nature of curriculum subjects to find out if they reflect other 
restrictions over learners that might limit their freedom to have the required conditions that 
are needed to derive benefit from its value in education. Firstly, according to the law no 
139 of 1981 (ARE, 1999a: 142,144,189) `pre-university school subjects such as music, food 
science, technical subjects in general education, needlework, physical education and 
religious education are not compulsory examination subjects (except religious education) 
and do not contribute in any way to the learners' final marks'. Even art which is a 
compulsory examination subject, it is looked on as an unimportant subject. Politicians are 
only concerned about scientific and technological knowledge, which is regarded as 
positively contributing to the history of the human race. Unfortunately, this leads to 
neglecting of these subjects in terms of designing new curricula or training teachers. As has 
been argued in chapters two and three, learners especially at early age, need neutral help 
and suggestions from adults to show them what options are available and their value in 
their lives. Then they have to be left free to make their own choices and decisions. The 
neglecting of such subjects by the law seems to affect the learners' views towards those 
subjects and any choice and decision they might make will not be made according to their 
real interests or choices. 
The state has similar policies to make learners interested in the industrial development 
needs by paying more attention to subjects such as mathematics, science and foreign 
languages rather than the humanities. This has been the case since Muhammad 'Ali to the 
present time. For example, in 1993, `the state began sending secondary school teachers 
abroad, to be trained only in the field of science, mathematics, English and French'. 
(ME, 1999b: 45). This highlights the neglect of subjects like literature, humanities, arts, 
music and physical education, as teachers teaching these subjects do not have the same 
opportunities. This goes against the core idea of freedom in education, as it prevents 
learners who are really interested in improving their knowledge and skills for example in, 
arts, music and physical education, from having the opportunity to learn from qualified 
teachers, as these subjects are given a step-motherly treatment. It seems quite natural from 
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such a policy that sciences have more value than social ones, and this put learners under an 
obligation from their parents to engage in the former rather than the latter. 
Secondly, learners do not have the freedom to make choices between subjects or between 
branches of a subject because all subjects and units are compulsory. Only in the secondary 
school do learners have an opportunity to choose between doing art or science. However, 
they are not free to choose what they want as presented above. Thirdly, subjects at school 
are very isolated when there is no link between the different subjects or similar subjects at 
different levels. As discussed by `Ali (1998: 186), `the teacher teaches a particular subject 
or unit without any reference to its relationship to the other components of the curriculum. 
The learners may study one subject after another with no idea of what his growth in 
knowledge and skill might contribute to an integrated way of life'. Fourthly, learners do not 
receive tuition about particular subjects or units such as design and technology, children's 
rights and human rights, globalisation, information technology, communications although 
these very important areas need to be taught in a rapidly changing world. 
5.2.1.4. The place of extra curricula activities and limitation of learners' freedom 
As has been argued in chapters two and three, learners need a suitable learning 
environment to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. In this sense it might be 
argued that having the opportunity to engage in different extra curricular activities is a 
chance for learners to learn and exercise freedom. Although the state considers extra 
curricular activities as central to a comprehensive education experience, in practice they 
have no place in the school. Even kindergarten learners have to gain knowledge instead of 
indulging free play, art, music, and physical activities. `What we can likely to notice in 
school is; (a) the elimination of physical education classes and the changing to others. (B) 
the destination of a school playground for a new building. (C) the absence of necessary 
training material and resources required for physical education. (D) the lack of a school 
library, (E) the absence of programmes for the discovery of gifted youngsters. (F) the 
shortening of the school day, which does not allow any opportunities for such activities. 
(G) the lack of specific budget for extra curricular activities. (H) the absence of teacher' 
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role. (I) the scared feelings of learners faced with examinations that require them to use all 
their time studying and prevents them from engaging such activities' (NCERT, 1995: 89- 
103) and (Mughis, 1996: 26). 
The absence of extra curricular activities might refer to `the limited vision of the role of 
schools which resulted in the demise of many school related extra curricula activities' 
(Baha' Al-Din, 1997: 124). Moreover, `there are wrong beliefs shown by parents that the 
role of the school is limited providing learners with knowledge and gaining full marks in 
the examination. Thus they believe that taking part in extra curricula activities wastes their 
children's time and does not help them to study and memorise all the required knowledge 
they need' (NCERT, 1995: 98). As a results of the absence of extra curricula activities 
learners' freedom is limited because they lose the opportunities to discover their interests, 
abilities and learn to be free, responsible, creative and autonomous. 
5.2.1.5. Type of teaching methods and the limitation of learners' thinking 
Because the curriculum is full of information and isolated facts, teachers find that giving 
lectures is the best way to teach, and their job is to help learners to memorise such 
information. It does not allow teachers and learners freedom to use different methods and 
techniques. According to `Ali (1998: 15) `the curriculum has been designed as to make 
lectures the teaching method for all lessons'. For example, Muhammad (1991b: 98) argues 
that `teaching Arabic literature in secondary school is designed to make learners memorise 
vocabulary and their meaning. In addition, the nature of the curriculum obliges learners to 
memorise even the explanation of some of the poems instead of helping them to feel the 
language and make their own judgements'. `Even teaching science and mathematics is 
treated as the same although they are concerned with the process of asking questions, 
investigating, inquiring and evaluating' (NCERT, 1998: 44). Therefore, it is common for 
learners to use private textbooks, which contain questions and answers as an easy way to 
memorise such information. Using lectures as the only teaching method limits learner's 
freedom to develop their intellectual abilities and feel free to make their own judgements, 
explanations, predictions, analysis and reconstruction of such knowledge and information. 
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Furthermore `it does not help learners to develop skills such as selecting or using 
equipment, displaying data, basic measuring techniques, observations, illustration and 
investigations' (NCERT, 1998: 44). 
5.2.2. Learners' freedom to have free and equal educational opportunity 
This section investigates and analyses the learners' freedom in education in terms of the 
availability of educational opportunities to achieve the second aim of this chapter. (A) this 
section attempts to find out if learners are left free from interference or being subjected to 
authority to receive the free and equal opportunity they are interested in (B), to discover 
such educational practices that reflect the features of freedom and unfreedom which can be 
promoted or eliminated in implementing freedom in the Egyptian context. (C), this section 
investigates girls' freedom to find out whether there are social or political restrictions 
limiting it, whereas chapter one indicated that there are no religious restrictions limiting 
girls' freedom. 
Firstly, `although law number 139 of 1981 stated that public education is free from primary 
school to doctorate level' (ARE, 1999a: 4), learners' freedom was limited by expenses `that 
are needed for textbooks, uniform, stationary, transportation and private tuition, especially 
as not all families in rural and poor areas could afford to pay for such things' 
(Diwidar, 1997: 36). This shows `the absence of freedom, democracy and justice in 
education. In this sense education can be seen to be for only a certain class in Egypt, i. e for 
those who can afford it' `Ali (1997: 351), `Ammar (1999a: 138-140) Khidr (2000: 73), 
Ahmad (1993: 98), and Ghalyun, (1990: 322). Lack of money can be considered as an 
unintentional restriction that limits learners' freedom to have free and equal opportunities. 
It is true that it was argued in chapter one that poverty is not one of the restrictions that 
limits individual's freedom. However, the situation is different in the case of children and 
their freedom in education. Children are young people who need education to develop and 
be prepared for the world and it is the state's responsibility to provide them with such an 
opportunity. 
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Secondly, in line with the historical analysis in chapter four `the state still does not consider 
the pre-school education or kindergarten as a part of the educational system' (ME, 1996: 71). 
This means that it is neither free nor compulsory, it is rather private for those who can 
afford it (see the discussion in 4.2.2.6. ). 
Thirdly, in 1999, as a result of the wide debate concerning the insufficient number of years 
at the primary stage to provide learners with the minimum basic knowledge and skills, 
learners enjoy more freedom when `the state once again revoked the decisions to delimit 
the primary stage to 5 years, by taking steps to introduce an extra year' (ME, 1999a: 22). 
Then basic compulsory free education becomes nine years divided into two stages; the first 
stage (primary) is 6 years. The second stage (general preparatory) or (vocational 
preparatory) is 3 years for all Egyptian learners between the ages of 6 and 15 years. 
However, thinking of education as a means to prepare learners as tools for development, it 
makes the sole concern of the state that of preparing the appropriate number of learners 
needed for such development. In other words there is no need for investment for all to be 
educated because development does not need everyone. This might explain why there was 
no big effort by the state to protect learners' freedom, although educational law number 
139 of 1981 (ARE, 1999a: 4-10) maintains that `every child has the right to compulsory 
education at age 6'. If parents do not send their children to school the state will fine them 
10 Egyptian pounds' which is a small amount compared to what the children can earn if 
they work. This means that the state takes no serious action against parents who do not 
send their children to school. 
Fourthly, `from 1991 to 1999, the number of primary and preparatory schools increased by 
1.3% and 25.2% respectively (see table 28). The number of secondary schools increased 
from 291 in 1993 to 314 in 1997' (ME, 1999f: 17-8) and (ME, 1999a: 58). Also the number 
of learners increased at all levels (see table 29). Moreover, the schools that work three 
shifts have disappeared and this increases the learners' freedom to have an equal 
opportunity in education. 
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Table 28 
Numbers of schools and oercentaees of increase (1991-1998) 
year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
School 25,616 26,217 26.877 28.205 29,743 30.570 31,179 32.150 
%* - 2 3 5 5 3 2 2 
(ME) Ministry of Education, (1999b: 21) 
Table 29 
Numbers of learners and oercentaees of its increase (1992-1999) 
Educational stage Year No. of learners Increase Increase % 
Kindergarten 1992 223.051 105,089 47.11 
1999 328.140 
Primary 1992 6,541,725 809,393 12.37 
1999 7,351.118 
Preparatory 1992 3,593,365 559,259 15.56 
1999 4.152.624 
General Secondary 1992 572,026 396,682 69.34 
1999 968,708 
Tecluiical secondary 1992 1.110.184 764.752 68.885 
1999 1.874.936 
(ME) Ministry of Education, (1999f: 704) 
However, although there is an increase in the number of schools, learners and the absence 
of the three-shift schools the number of schools is inadequate for universal enrolment at 
primary school. `Ammar, (2000: 20) notes that `although the number of schools have 
increased there are still millions of children out of school because the number of schools is 
inadequate to offer places for the total number of learners of school age, especially in the 
rural areas'. According to Ahmad (1999b: 106) in 1994 `there were 150,000 learners who 
could not enrol in school in that particular year, and another 150,000 who could not 
continue compulsory education and became illiterate as a result of the lack of education'. 
This means that `about 13.19% of learners at age 6 are still out of school due to the 
insufficient number of schools in the country' (NIE, 1999a: 25). This is why many schools 
still work double shifts and have a short school day (see table 30). It can be argued that 
there is inequality regarding the type of school the learners might attend. This is because 
learners who attend full time have more freedom than others to receive a good quality of 
learning. In this sense the shortage of schools can be considered a restriction that limits the 
learners' freedom to enjoy opportunities in education. 
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Table 30 
Numbers and percentages of nriinlrv schools that works one and two shifts 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
One shift 10.911 10,548 10.950 11.282 11,772 12.213 13.032 13,378- 
%* 71 67 69 70 73 76 83 86 
Two shift 4.450 5,099 4,911 4.806 4.416 3.939 2,585 2,188 
%* 29 33 31 30 27 24 17 14 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999b: 33) 
Secondary graduates' freedom to join higher education is also restricted because the state 
intends to limit this opportunity. `The given justification is that there is an unnecessary 
increase in learners' enrolment' (Badran, 2000: 120). However, in fact, this justification is 
not true because `the percentage of enrolments of the eligible population increased from 
just 17.7% in 1994' (CU, 1997,5) to 19% in 1997 (CU, 1999,15) `compared to 66% in USA, 
39% in Japan and France and 31% in Spain in 1997' (Al-`Adwi, 1998: 161). 
Fifthly, the procedures applying to learners in the secondary school according to Shukri 
(1999: 47) `divides graduates from the preparatory school into general and technical 
schools. Those who a go to secondary schools make up about 30% whereas those who go to 
technical school consist of about 70%'. This classification depends on the score learners 
achieve in the final examination in the preparatory school. There are sonne noticeable 
shortcomings with this policy. (A) this division limits the learners' opportunity to continue 
the higher education, as general secondary education is the way to join higher education. 
For those who do technical studies, the secondary school can be considered as an end stage 
because learners do not have the same opportunity to join higher education' 
(Mughis, 1996: 20). A number of educational opportunities are available to them and those 
determined by the state are very small compared to the general school. This means that they 
have to obtain a very high score. For some colleges their scores have to be higher than 
those of their peers in the general secondary school. (B) `although 70% of learners receive 
technical education, there is a surplus, as the economic market cannot provide employment 
for such a large number of people with the same sort of skills and qualifications' 
(NCERT, 1993: 22). This shows that `the policy has decided on this rate so as to reduce the 
number of learners who can enrol in higher education, in spite of the rate of enrolment 
dropping to 19.8% in 1998' (Shukri, 1999: 47). This policy makes the community think that 
`technical education has less value than academic because it starts with weaker learners, its 
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graduates do not have freedom to enter higher education and not qualified in their 
specialities because theirs is a poor education' (`A1i, 1984: 167). For instance, most 
graduates from 1986 to date do not have jobs. In 1993, `the percentage of those 
unemployed in technical schools was 75.9 % out of the total number of unemployed people 
in the country' (ME, 1997: 2). 
Moreover, technical secondary learners' do not have the required conditions to allow them 
to exercise and benefit from the value of freedom in education. For example, they do not 
have freedom; (a) to choose to follow this type of education. (B) to choose the technical 
field they are interested in from among the only three types that are available (industrial, 
agriculture or commercial) because they are classified according to their scores. (C) to 
receive similar opportunities to their peers have in the general schools. `In terms of learning 
circumstances and facilities learners do not have the freedom to receive well-organised and 
facilitated education as their peers have in the general secondary school' (A]- 
Shabasi, 2000: 113-51). `Although they are supposed to have a better education because they 
are the large group that one needed for development, which is the main concern of the state 
as discussed at the beginning of the chapter' (Mughis, 1996: 20). `This means that the state 
does not pay serious attention to this kind of education' (Muthis, 1996: 20). This leads me to 
the argument that money and time spent on this kind of education is wasted because of the 
low quality of its graduates. This proves that `the aim of secondary technical education is to 
reduce the number of learners in general secondary education who demand higher 
education but not because the development process needs them, especially as it is very poor 
education in terms of the quality of its graduates and the high rate of unemployment among 
them' (Al-Shabasi, 2000: 113-51). What makes the technical learners have less freedom is 
the fact that `most of learners who attend technical education are from the lower classes 
who cannot compete with their peers in the general secondary education in terms of private 
tuition and private textbooks to gain a high enough score to enrol in higher education' 
(Ahmad, 1997: 8). 
Sixthly, according to ministerial decision number 94 of 1989 (ME, 1989b: 2) `learners 
cannot transfer, for example, from secondary technical school to secondary general school 
177 
although they can transfer from general school to technical secondary school'. Ministerial 
decision number 258 of 1989 (ME, 1989a-. 2) also allows `learners who fail the final exam in 
the general secondary school to transfer to the second year of technical school. For 
example, learners who fail in science can transfer to arts if they pass the required exam'. 
According to Shukri (1999: 47) `although the purpose behind these decisions is to help 
parents and learners to cope with the drop-out problem, these decisions also reflect the 
value of general and technical schools and the arts and science streams. This again makes 
people think that technical education is less valuable than academic education, and that 
studying arts is less valuable than studying science'. This policy can be considered a 
restriction that prevents learners from studying what they like, as they feel that the 
humanities and technical education are of no value. 
5.2.2.1. Girls' freedom in education 
In line with the historical analysis in chapter four, there is still a gap between the enrolment 
rate for girls and boys (see table 3 1), especially in poor and rural areas. This is because 
boys in Egyptian society always have a greater priority in education than girls. It can be 
argued that `girls are restricted by the social view of women in Egypt, which gives 
preference to boys, regarded as hard, strong, dominant, aggressive, active, abstract and 
rational rather than girls, regarded as soft, weak, submissive, docile, passive, feeling, and 
irrational' (NCERT, 1992: 20-2). Parents who struggle to meet the cost of schooling are 
likely to send their sons rather than their daughters to school. As education is costly in 
terms of money for books and stationary, private tuition, transportation and so on, in most 
cases, especially in poor and rural areas, parents are more likely to send boys to school 
rather than girls. In this sense girls' opportunity to exercise freedom and derive benefit from 
its value is limited compared to boys. 
Table 31 
Numbers and percentages of male and female population 
enrolled in the first erade of orimarv education (1990-1999) 
Year Male % Feinale % Total 
1990 716.341 54.3 607,014 45.7 1.323,355 
1999 688.282 52 633,378 48 1,321,660 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999a: 26) 
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Numbers and 
Tablc 32 
erceniages o1 ooys ana iris enrolment in preparatory school 
Year Bovs Girls *Bovs % *Girls % 
1991 1.972,830 1,580,439 55.6 44.4 
1992 1,973,381 1.619.984 55 45 
1993 1,850,700 1.493,546 55.6 44.5 
1994 1,850.630 1.502.728 55.2 44.8 
1995 1,864.368 1.544.759 54.7 45.3 
1996 1.921.644 1.618,196 54.3 45.7 
1997 1,981,926 1.697.399 53.9 46.1 
1998 2.107.309 1,820.136 53.7 46.3 
1999 2.215.274 1.937.350 53.3 46.7 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999b: 31) 
x(1990-1998) 
In the secondary school, `the percentage of girls' enrolment increased from 44% in 1991 to 
46% in 1997' (ME, 1994b: 48), (ME, 1995: 56) and (ME, 1998: 35). The previous data in table 
32 indicates that the number of girls who enrolled in school is slightly less than that of 
boys. However, in higher education there is a gap between the percentage of boys' and 
girls' enrolment. Table 33 shows that the percentage of girls' enrolment was only 40.5% in 
1994. Moreover, `current education seems to find social studies is the suitable field for girls 
and technical and engineering for boys' (NCERT, 1995: 77-8). In fact, there is still a gap 
between the enrolment of girls and boys, especially, in the poor and rural areas. This gap is 
further reflected by other economic indicators. According to the 1995 Human Development 
Report, the share of women from the `total work force was only 25 % whereas the 
percentage for men was 75 %. At the same time, the percentage of women in parliament 
was 2% in comparison with 20 % in the developed countries and 10 % in Latin America'. 
Table 33 
Comparison between boys and girls enrolled in universities (1991-1994) 
Year Boys % Girls % girls to boys % 
1991 266302 61.7 165561 38.3 62.2 
1992 286904 60.9 184454 39.1 64.3 
1993 310975 59.9 208561 40.1 67.1 
1994 355876 59.5 242088 40.5 68.0 
(CU) Council of Universities (1997: 5) 
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5.3. Freedom in education regarding its restrictions 
This section investigates and analyses the restrictions that determine learners' freedom in 
educational policy and practice. The significance of this section is to avoid such restrictions 
and prepare for such conditions that are important in the implementation of the idea of 
freedom in the Egyptian context, in chapter six. To achieve this aim the following section 
will treat learners' freedom regarding the process of making decisions, teacher's 
preparation, the spread of private tuition examination' regulations, illiteracy, private 
education and the educational budget which might be seen as very important and effective 
restrictions on learners' freedom. 
5.3.1. Freedom in education and decisions-making 
According to educational law no 139, of 1981 (ARE, 1999a: 3-5) as amended by decree law 
no. 233 of 1988, the minister of education is `responsible for planning, follow up, 
evaluation, development and provision of educational materials as well as determining the 
standards and qualifications of teachers'. `National and local politics strongly influence the 
context within which schools and colleges operate. Central government determines the 
broad characteristics of the educational system and this influence is inevitably underpinned 
by the political views of the majority party' (NCERT, 1994: 11). `The law entrusts local 
authorities with the responsibility of implementation and follow up at the local level (while 
taking into consideration the national guidelines), supervision of activities during the 
school year, development and administration of examination according to the present 
guidelines for the various levels, and to the recruitment of teachers'(ARE, 1999a: 5-7). 
Centralisation in education is associated with decisions, directions and actions dictated by 
those in positions of authority such as directors, chiefs, ministers, and rules. This vertical 
structure of authority does not allow any opportunity for those in the lower ranks to make a 
worthwhile contribution. `They are expected to conform, obey and implement. This also 
applies to the system of educational administration at its various levels, directed not only 
by the Ministry's bureaucracy, but also by the decisions of the minister himself 
(`Ali, 1997: 353). 
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According to the information mentioned above, the minister of education is the final 
authority on every decision for education. As a result of centralisation in education, firstly, 
the learners have no opportunity to participate in decision-making or to object to decisions 
that have already been made. For example, `in 1988, the state reduced the number of years 
learners had to attend primary school from 6 to 5 years, and for economic reasons, did not 
share this decision with those who were involved learners, parents, teachers and 
educationalists. In May 1999, without consulting the mentioned groups, the state once 
again revoked the decision to delimit primary education to 5 years, by taking steps to 
introduce an extra year by the year 2000. It recommended revising and updating the 
curriculum in primary schools, especially after the introduction of the sixth year' 
(ME, 1999a: 22). Besides causing confusion and chaos for everyone, learners, teacher and 
parents, this hasty decision also costs valuable money, which could have been better spent 
improving the quality of education. As mentioned before, this decision was taken without 
consulting learners, teachers or parents. Some might argue that this kind of decision does 
not need input from, teachers and parents, and is one that needs expert opinion. But `Ali 
(1998: 14), reminds us of `the importance of distinguishing between issues that need expert 
opinion and other issues, which directly concern, teachers and parents'. In the case of the 
above-mentioned decision, if the state had allowed an opportunity for discussion and 
debate, perhaps, the chaos, confusion and loss of money that ensued as a result of it could 
have been averted. 
From the above, `it can be seen that learners, teachers and parents have no freedom to share 
in making decisions' (NCERT, 1993: 16). In the making of decisions, the state neither 
consults learners, teachers, parents nor educationalists, and educational decisions are 
usually sprung on learners, parents, and teachers without prior warning. `Ali (1998: 14) 
notes that `the relationship between the state and the community is just to let people know 
what the state has already decided to do not more'. 
Secondly, there is an opportunity for learners, teachers, parents and educationalists to share 
decision-making, the law allows the council of parents at every school to discuss education 
and share decisions making. But, in practice this council has no authority to discuss policy 
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itself. The actual purpose of the meeting is to demand financial support from parents for 
schools. Moreover, `Ali (1998: 13) points out that `the parents' council main job is to 
support the state's decisions which have to be acceptable to all groups including teachers, 
parents and educationalists'. 
In the same way, although the law considers teachers as part of the committee in 
developing the curriculum, their actual contribution can be seen to be minimal. Their 
contribution is limited to supporting the decisions made by other groups in the committee. 
For instance, `Ali (1998: 52) mentions that `teachers feel very embarrassed and are afraid of 
being critical of any of the views in the committee meetings. In addition, most of the 
contractors are usually their teachers' supervisors and compared to them, they feel inferior 
and not in a position to voice their views'. For sharing by educationalists in educational 
planning, for instance, `Ali (1998: 14) states that `there are contributions by experts in 
education, but that most of these people have no authority to object on such decisions made 
by the ministry'. This clearly shows the gap between theory and practice in educational 
policy. 
Thirdly, it is interesting to note that `although the state would have been aware of the 
consequences of the above-mentioned decision but was neither prepared nor ready to deal 
with the problems when they arose' `Ammar (1995: 71-4). Firstly, the state was unable to 
handle the large number of learners who were in their 5"' and 6"' year, as an alternative to 
the reduced year had not been planned ahead. The ministry also faced similar problems in 
1992/1993 and 1995/1996 in finding solutions to the doubling of learners in the preparatory 
and secondary schools respectively. In addition, there were also huge problems in the 
enrolment of learners in the university in 1997' (`Ammar, 1991: 11-2). This reveals that 
educational decisions are taken in haste and without the required preparation. 
Fourthly, not allowing all parties freedom to share in the decisions made by the state makes 
learners, teachers and parents confused about education. For instance, in the 1990s the 
curriculum was changed several times in a very short time span. In 1993, `the state 
curriculum was changed according to the National Conference on Curriculum Development 
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although the Centre for Curriculum Development which is a centre affiliated to the state, 
had already developed the curriculum and prepared new textbooks before the conference 
was planned. After the conference was held, the centre for curriculum development had to 
start all over again to prepare for a new curriculum and new textbooks which could be seen 
as an unnecessary waste of money and time' (`Ali, 1998: 12). This policy confirms two 
things: firstly, the exclusion of all parties from sharing decision-making and secondly the 
evidence that there is no agreement among the different authorities involved in preparing 
and revising the curriculum. 
5.3.2. Learners' freedom and teachers' preparation 
From the following data in tables 34 and 35 it is clear that, unlike previous times, the 
learner's freedom in terms of having a sufficient number of teachers has been maximised. 
For example, table 34 indicates that in 1998, the total number of teaching staff in the 
country as a whole amounted to 757,016 with an increase of 193,719 teachers at a rate of 
4.4%. 3 
Table 34 
Development of numhers of teachers (1992-1999) 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number 563.297 597,402 610.414 639.738 690.376 720.446 730.889 757,016 
(ME) Ministry of Education. (1999b: 45) 
Table 35 
Rates of learner to teachers in 1999 
Educational stage KG Primary Preparatory Secondary Industrial Agriculture Coininercia 
I 
Learner/teacher 22 23 21 --- F--12- 1 10 14 17 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999c: 16) 
Regarding improving the quality of teachers, educational policy considers teachers as a 
central factor in any educational reform. In 1994 `the ministry of education held a national 
conference that focused on upgrading and improving the status of teachers. 
Recommendations focused on the necessity of bringing about radical change in the 
concepts of selecting and preparing teachers, and how to provide them with educational 
methods that would enable them to catch up with the spirit of the age' (ME, 1999f 43). 
Moreover, since 1993, the ministry of education has started sending teachers abroad to be 
trained in different fields as shown in table 36. This is an opportunity for teachers to benefit 
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from the exposure and experience of being abroad and receiving training. This in turn was 
of benefit to the learners who were taking those particular subjects. 
Table 36 
Development of numbers of teachers' missions (1993-1998) 
year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number 339 596 813 1376 1099 1 3» 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999b: 45) 
However, `there is big debate concerning the quality of teachers and role of preparation' 
institutes. The trainees are more concerned with helping the candidates for four years in 
school of education to be qualified in teaching their subject rather than helping them to 
learn how to teach or to educate them as persons. The teacher is expected to demonstrate an 
understanding of the knowledge, concepts and skills of specialist subjects and the place of 
these subjects in the school curriculum. Also they should be able to demonstrate knowledge 
and understanding of the national curriculum and attainment targets and the programmes of 
study in the subjects they are preparing to teach, together with an understanding of the 
framework of the statutory requirements' (Shawqi and Abw Al-Su`wd, 1997: 300). This 
approach has also been discussed by Sallam, (1995: 67) and `Abd-Al-Raziq (1984: 15-6) and 
Al-Muslim (1993: 71) who are concerned with training teachers to be able to do other things 
apart from teaching. For example, `they have to be able to manage a class; they have to 
know how to do things without the class getting out of hand; to know how to set or mark an 
examination; how to record learners' progress; how to spot which children are working and 
which are not. However, it seems that knowing the subject is the most important thing 
among these skills the teacher has to be trained for. In addition, most if not all inspectors 
only assess how teachers prepare their lessons on paper and whether they are able to deliver 
all the knowledge in the textbook on time. They do not assess interaction between teachers 
and their students inside and outside the classroom'. 
Moreover, this approach in the teacher's preparation is reflected in the teachers' work, for 
example, `[yd (1999: 326-7) mentions that `social studies teachers are only concerned with 
the low skills of gaining knowledge and neglecting high skills such as analysis, re- 
construction, discovering relationships and evaluation'. In this sense `they always depend 
on the textbook in their teaching without reading any other sources, especially as they have 
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no links with teacher preparation institutes after graduation' (NCERT, 1997: 18). They are 
used to the traditional way of teaching where the teacher `stands up front talking and asking 
questions, and all of the children are supposed to learn in the same way and at the same 
time' (Suliman, 2000: 180-196). 
As examined in the previous chapter, the historical roots of this approach in the preparation 
of the teacher go very, very deep. From the historical analysis it should be noted that it was 
taken for granted that to teach a subject required nothing more than the possession of 
knowledge-or some portion of it- amassed in that discipline. This made for generation after 
generation of teachers who may have known their subjects but did not know how to teach 
them. Also they had never been educated as persons but as candidates who had to deliver 
this knowledge to their learners. 
5.3.3. Spread of private tuition and limitation of learners' freedom 
Private tuition can be considered as one of the most important and effective restraints that 
determines learners' freedom in terms of having equal opportunity and having the 
opportunity to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education. Regarding to its role 
in producing unequal opportunity, Hargreaves believes that "poor salaries encourage 
private tuition, which detracts energy away from the teacher in class" (2001: 253). 
`Teaching is a very poor profession in terms of social prestige and salary, although private 
tuition tends to be more lucrative' (Al-Shabasi, 2000: 1 13-5). Therefore, they used to find 
different ways to oblige learners to attend them. For example, before `the state abolished 
the required course work at all pre-university levels in 1988' (Surwr, 1989: 119) teachers 
had the authority to mark learners' course work (40% of the total mark of the subject). 
Unfortunately `they used to give full marks to the ones who joined private tuition and give 
the minimum score to those do not, even if the latter deserved the full marks. Others 
teachers have been accused of providing unclear or incomplete classroom instructing in 
order to ensure a student's need for tutoring to succeed in the examination' 
(Misiha, 1998: 132). `Teachers often moonlight by giving private tuition and have no desire 
to put an extra effort into their salaried jobs especially in secondary schools' (Nwr Al- 
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Din, 1997). Moreover, the shortened school day and the absence of effective and regular 
supervision on their work enables them to tutor their students after class 
Interestingly, even after `course work has been abolished and a law issued that punished 
teachers who obliged their learners to attend private tuition' (ARE, 1999a: 248) parents of 
their own free will sent their children in the hope that they would perform well in the 
examination. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the educational process depends on 
memorising knowledge and in turn the assessment questions come to give evidence on how 
much knowledge the learners are able to memorise. This makes it easy for most teachers to 
predict the examination' questions and prepare their learners who attend private tuition for 
such questions. Thus, parents select the one who made the closest predictions of the 
examination' questions. Actually, there is a match between what the teachers predict and 
what the learners have in the examination. In this sense, a so-called good teacher is the one 
who has experience in predicting exam questions and preparing learners for them. It is clear 
that private tuition is an easy way to achieve a good score in the final exam, especially in 
the secondary school as a means to enrol in one of the top universities. In such a situation, 
the learners' only job is to memorise the questions and answers to obtain a high score. 
Therefore, it is possible to find thousands of learners who scored over 95%, which raises 
the required score for every for college. Sometimes 100% of the total marks is the required 
score for top colleges such as medicine, which can not be explained without referring to the 
type of examination questions. Therefore, there is no relationship between the learners' 
score and the opportunity s/he receive. 
From the above, it can be argued, on one hand, that learners who `can afford private tuition 
have a good opportunity for education with the type of curriculum and the system of 
evaluation used' ('Ammar, 1996c: 106). Private tuition plays a major role in making certain 
educational opportunities available for learners who can afford it, and making the same 
opportunities unavailable for those who cannot. Although some learners have the ability to 
do well if liven the opportunity, they cannot do so because of lack of money. On the other 
hand, although affluent people have the freedom to pay for private tuition, this freedom 
violates the concept of freedom in education, as very often teachers choose not to do proper 
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teaching in order to force learners to attend their tuition classes. As a consequence, poor 
learners lose their right to a good education and to receive the same opportunities that 
affluent learners enjoy. This forces learners to depend on their own ability or to completely 
forget about education. 
Another serious issue related to the idea of freedom is using private tuition can be seen in 
'Ali's argument (1998: 196). In his view, private tuition inculcates `the value of money 
above all others, so that power, authority and high prestige takes precedence over social 
justice, peace, equality and democracy'. He further states that this happens when learners 
realise the advantages enjoyed by their peers who have the economic ability to receive 
good opportunities that they cannot have because of lack of money. This produces two 
kinds of individuals: those who hate rich people because they appear to be freer than they 
are, to do what they want with their lives; secondly, those who surrender their rights and 
freedom to those who have power and authority. A problem that arises in this case is that 
these two kinds of individuals cannot contribute to the development of the country. 
Although it is up to the system of education to help learners to develop their potential, in 
practice education is in a sense the cause of individuals turning away from society as a 
result of the lack of opportunity in education. Learners who can afford private tuition learn 
how to exercise this new value and become aware of the importance of money. With the 
backing of wealth, it is easy for most learners to feel absolute freedom to do what they want 
as they feel that nothing can interfere with their wish. 
Regarding the role of private tuition in limiting learners' freedom to exercise and benefit 
from the value of freedom in education, learners spend all their time memorising 
knowledge by means of question and answer. This way of teaching does not give learners 
the chance to be free to use their minds to think about what they study, but makes them 
take every single piece of information as fact without any attempt to investigate it or even 
to use it in different contexts. In short, it restricts their minds to memorise facts and 
information for the sake of the examination. 
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5.3.4. Freedom in education and assessment system 
The assessment system in Egypt can be considered as one of restriction over learners' 
freedom as it limits it in terms of educational opportunities and of deriving benefit from the 
value of freedom in education. Firstly, in the area of the limitation of educational 
opportunity, law 139`x' of 1981, (ARE, 1999a: 142) states that `learners in primary school 
from grades one to five have only one chance to repeat their examination. If they do not 
pass the exam, they will be automatically transferred to the next level'. `In the sixth grade 
learners also have only one chance to repeat the required state exam, and if they do not pass 
they will be transferred to a vocational preparatory school' (NCERT, 1993: 65). `Learners in 
the general preparatory school in grade one and two also have one chance to repeat. In case 
they do not pass they will also be transferred to a vocational school which requires learners 
to pass from level to level. In the last year of basic education, learners once again have only 
one chance to re-sit the examination. If they do not pass they will be given a certificate 
stating that they have completed their basic education' (ARE, 1999a: 144). In such a case 
they are excluded from school forever because they can not join the secondary school even 
as external candidates. 
From the point of view of the ministry, this kind of vocational education aims to give 
learners who have failed in the government examination the minimum vocational training 
they need to start work after completing the compulsory period at school. According to 
`Ammar (1996a: 38) it does not seem as `if this policy is helpful. It is just a matter of 
whether the school can keep learners until they complete the compulsory period'. As 
mentioned in chapter four, this type of education was started in the 1960s but it did not 
achieve its aims to prepare young learners for technical work, especially since the 
economic market does not need such learners because they are not sufficiently qualified. 
This is because these schools lack good equipment, qualified teachers, trainers, and above 
all learners have no motivation to study. In another sense it is difficult to think of 12 year 
old learners as failures because they could not pass the first government obligatory 
examination in their lives. It could be argued that having unsuccessful learners at this age 
does not mean that they are stupid. It means that the learner environment and circumstances 
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were not able to help them to keep up with their peers. The point here is that freedom in 
education is concerned with the question of why learners failed in the examination more 
than consigning them away to such poor education until they complete the compulsory 
period. Unfortunately, this policy limits the learners' freedom at a crucial stage to be 
happy, understand themselves and find out what they want to do with their lives. Moreover, 
it makes them always feel depressed and powerless to do anything useful. 
Similarly, `learners in secondary school also have only one opportunity to repeat the exam. 
Any learners who fail the exam have to leave school. If they want to continue their studies, 
they have to study at home and sit for the exam as external candidates' (ARE, 1999a: 13). 
The justification for giving learners only one chance to repeat is because it is costly to keep 
learners in school and to allow them to repeat another year. The point, which I want to 
make here, is that it is not important to give learners a certificate stating that they have 
completed their basic education. The most important thing is to develop their potential as 
much as possible. My point is that the state finds it preferable to transfer learners or to 
accept them as external candidates rather than finding out why they dropout and what the 
possible solutions are. Although it can be seen that the rate of repetition decreased from 
1992 to 1998 as shown in the following tables. This low rate still equals millions of 
learners who join the rank of the illiterate. 
Table 37 
The nercentaee of renctition in the nritnarv grades (1993- 1908) 
Year Gr. I 
Boy Girl Boy 
Gr. 2 
Girl 
Gr. 3 
Boy Girl 
Gr. 4 
Boy Girl 
Gr. 5 
Boy Girl 
1993 0.33 0.29 7.19 5.23 6.4 4.62 10.68 8.25 12.74 9.53 
1994 0.19 0.17 7.69 5.45 10.48 6.80 11.35 8.24 15.38 11.20 
1995 0.19 0.16 6.56 4.54 7.51 4.80 9.41 6.78 14.65 10.83 
1996 0.28 0.23 6.45 4.49 8.17 5.12 1020. 7.07 13.98 10.52 
1997 0.69 0.53 5.11 3.0 5.31 3.19 7.75 5.20 10.68 7.29 
1998 0.64 0.50 4.58 3.04 5.18 3.11 8.21 5.34 11.52 7.66 
(ME) Ministry of education (1999a: 36) 
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Table 38 
The percentage of repetition in the preparatory grades (1993-1999) 
Year Gr. I 
Boy Girl 
Gr. 2 
Boy Girl 
Gr. 3 
Boy Girl 
1993 13.22 11.56 8.23 6.78 16.11 12.07 
1994 16.84 14.27 9.53 7.75 14.51 10.33 
1995 15.17 12.40 9.21 7.08 14.99 10.81 
1996 12.37 10.15 7.31 5.73 13.56 9.64 
1997 11.96 10.00 6.01 4.46 13.51 9.69 
1998 12.84 10.12 6.65 4.69 14.74 10.69 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999a: 41) 
Another restriction can be observed regarding the secondary examination regulation. 
Firstly, according to law 193`d of 1981 (ARE, 1999a: 17), 'the certificate of the final exam in 
secondary school becomes invalid after one year'. In the light of the concept of freedom in 
education it can be argued that this law limits the learner's freedom in terms of stipulating 
that they should start their higher degrees immediately after completing the final secondary 
school exam. If the learners are unable to start the higher degree in the same year for social 
or economic reasons, they are compelled to repeat the same exam again. This is an 
overload on learners and their families' (NCERT, 1993: 17). Secondly, `learners in the 
secondary school all over the country have the same examination papers, although they 
may have been taught under different circumstances. For example, `village learners do not 
have the same quality of teachers and facilities as learners in cities, so it is somewhat unfair 
to give them the same examination' (Shukri, et aI, 1999: 101). In this sense the argument 
does not go against the pattern of having national examinations for all learners across the 
country. On the contrary, the argument goes against the inequality between learners in 
urban and rural areas in terms of learning circumstances that makes having a national exam 
unfair and one that restricts learners' freedom. 
Thirdly, in 1994, `secondary school learners had a very good chance to sit for the final 
examination twice in any number of subjects' (ME, 1994a: 2) and (ME, 1994c: 5). This `gives 
learners the opportunity to find out about their performance in the examination so they can 
do better in the second. It also it helps them not to feel scared about the examination 
because they have a chance to repeat it' (Al- Akhbar Newspaper, 1997: 5). In this sense it 
might be argued that this opportunity has increased the learners' freedom to discover their 
interests and performance in studying such subjects. However, because of the absence of 
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learners' view and an understanding of the aim of this opportunity, they were unable to 
gain any advantage from it. In research by `Abd Alla (1998: 95-6), he finds that, `because of 
a misunderstanding of this opportunity, learners spend 12 months memorising knowledge 
to sit for an examination in all subjects twice, even though they had the option of dividing 
up the subjects so as to do some in May and others in August. He also points out that 
learners were not able to perform as well as they thought they could in certain subjects they 
felt that they were interested in. He mentioned that this might be because of their inability 
to understand themselves and what they want to do and their inability to make the right 
choices'. In my view this inability refer to a misunderstanding of such opportunity by 
learners, their teachers and parents. 
Also, this opportunity `increased parents' and learners' worries instead of their being more 
comfortable at having two chances to do the same examination that was required for higher 
education' (Al-Akhbar Newspaper, 1997: 5). In my view, this opportunity was good for 
learners to learn how to make choices and decisions. However, before this opportunity had 
been given an appropriate amount of time for evaluation the ministry of education 
cancelled it in 1997. This is because the ministry was faced with the problem of admission 
to university and lack of time to correct examination papers twice and an unsuitable 
number of teachers able to work. This shows that they were unprepared for such decision 
before they put it into practice. The previous example shows the way the ministry 
implemented such decisions. Besides excluding the views of involved groups such as 
learners, teachers and parents it can be claimed that there was inadequate preparation for 
such decisions, for the problems that might be expected to appear and for alternatives that 
might be used. 
Secondly, in the area of limiting learners' freedom in terms of enjoying the conditions 
required to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education, according to Hargreaves, 
the purpose of the assessment in Egypt aims to test learners' knowledge of material in the 
textbooks, which is compulsory in all classes (2001: 254). This approach in assessing 
learners can be seen in Wilmut's (1980: 33) and Harlen's (1976: 32,38) work. According to 
them, assessment comprises not only the collection of information but the identification 
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and use of criteria for making judgements about that information. Therefore, assessment 
may involve the collection of evidence concerning learners' learning through tests or 
observation in order to know how best to help and encourage them. To secure this 
knowledge learners are assigned lessons which they have to study. Success is technically 
indicated by the ability to pass certain tests. 
Likewise Freeman and Lewis (1998: 10), Davis (1998a: 13-7), Harris and Bell (1990: 157- 
160), Black and Broadfoot (1990: 191-7) and Davis (1998b: 10-13) argue that assessment 
can be grouped under five headings: to facilitate matching and differentiating, to provide 
feedback to learners on their progress, to enable teachers to discover how effective their 
teaching has been, to measure the achievement of teachers and schools. The purposes of 
assessment are further described in Gullo (1994: 16-8) and Freeman and Lewis (1998: 12-3). 
For example, Gullo (1994: 16-8) subdivides these into four different purposes which are 
then grouped under two main categories. The first category specifically deals with the 
assessment of the individual child, and the second with evaluating the effectiveness of the 
programme to promote learning to improve teaching. He points out that: 
the first is the usefulness of determining what type of academic skills and factual 
knowledge the child has. Academic skills are the types of knowledge and problem solving 
abilities children have as a direct result of experiencing curriculum activities. The second 
[... ] is to determine their current level of development functioning. Knowledge about 
children's motor development, language development, or cognitive development is 
essential to enable teachers to design appropriate curriculum activities. Also to determine 
whether they might benefit from alternative curricular experiences. A third [... ] is to 
determine the effectiveness of educational experiences while it is in progress. The final 
[... ] is determining the effectiveness of an educational experience at its conclusion. 
According to the above quotation, it can be seen that assessment is usually carried out to 
help learners to recognise and build on their strengths and address their weaknesses. It is 
also helpful to the educational process as an indicator. The achievements of learners can 
indicate what improvements have to be made in the teaching process to help learners to 
achieve better in terms of knowledge acquisition. In others words, assessment can be 
understood to 
identify those purposes related primarily to policies internal to the school and another 
cluster relating to those policies that are external to the school. For example, diagnosis, 
feedback to students and teachers, student grouping, curriculum improvement and 
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individual target settings are purposes internal to the school, whilst certification and 
accountability are purposes largely external to the school (James, 1998: 24). 
However, in Egypt, the type of examination questions does not achieve even the previous 
aims of assessment because it does not give actual indications about the efficiency of the 
teaching and learning process. It is only concerned about finding out how much knowledge 
and information the learner could memorise. Hargreaves (2001: 259) notes that the 
assessment is a selective system and its goals are to make 
formal, written examinations, based on rote memorisation, the easiest instruments of 
assessment, especially since pupil outcomes from examinations are numerical and so on 
are straightforward to use, even with vast numbers of pupils. Examination traditionally 
motivated children to learn by heart in order to achieve high marks in written 
examinations. 
From the point view of freedom in education examination questions can not measure how 
far learners are able to exercise freedom in education and derive the benefit from its value. 
According to (Al-Lagani, 1991: 254) `the nature of the question limits the learner's ability to 
think and discover reasons and new relationship between isolated facts'. To ask a question, 
for example, what is the capital of England, limits the learners thinking as they have to 
memorise the answer and that is all it is also the only answer that learners can give. But if 
we ask a question such as, for example, Do you know why London, the capital of England 
has been built around the River Thames? This kind of question allows the learner to think 
about many possibilities as an answer to the question. At the same time the purpose of 
examination at all levels in schools, as `Ali (1996: 116) shows, is `to examine the learners 
capacity to memorise facts'. In 'Ali's view `the philosophy of assessment has nothing to do 
with how a particular course can help the learner to think, discover, and make responsible 
choices and decisions. This way of assessment encourages the growth of private lessons'. 
In addition, by some chance, if one or two questions are set differently, both learners and 
parents become worried and unhappy. As `Ammar points out, when learners are set 
questions that examine their capacity to think, they (and their parents) complain that the 
examination are not limited to the content of the curriculum' ('Ammar, 1999c: 6). Another 
problem that arises as a result of the current system of assessment is the problem of 
cheating at examination, Al-Ryias (1999: 12) shows that `some learners either copy from 
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their neighbours or cheat by looking at pieces of paper on which they have written down 
the answers'. Thus the examination has become a means of merely testing one's capacity to 
memorise and cheat rather than a system to assess the knowledge that has been learnt. 
When the learners pass an exam merely by guessing or cheating, it can be said to inculcate 
wrong values by giving students the sense that the end (passing the exam) justifies the 
means (guessing, memorising or cheating). 
5.3.5. Learners' freedom and the illiteracy problem 
`Illiteracy is one of the oldest and known problems in the history of education in Egypt. 
However, no effort has been made so far to reduce it' (Ratib, 1998: 114). `Population figures 
for the year 1996 indicate an illiteracy rate of 39.4 % out of which 29 % are males and 50.2 
% are females' (ME, 1999f 19). In other source, `for 1996 there was an illiteracy rate of 
47% of which 46.1% were males and 53.9 % females' (GAIAE, 1996: 194). According to 
Khidr (1997: 211), `the high rate of illiteracy in rural areas reflects the fact that the state 
pays more attention to education in cities rather than rural areas in which the majority of 
poor people in Egypt live. Hence, it is possible to consider illiteracy as both an intentional 
and unintentional restriction by the ministry over the learners in rural areas'. As discussed 
in chapter one, education increases the ability of learners, which in turn increases the 
learners' freedom to do or not to do to become or not to become. 
Table 39 
Illiteracy's Rate over 10 aee 
Year Boys % Girls % General % 
1990 35.5 55.2 47.1 
1996 29.00 50.2 39.4 
1999 24.00 45.00 34.2 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999f: 19) 
Moreover, lack of freedom for learners that is reflected in the absence of their view about 
what they are interested in studying leads to the conclusion that it is possible that the 
curriculum might not meet the interests of learners. As a result very often learners do not 
feel that education makes a difference to their lives. They feel that it is a waste of time, 
when they could utilise that time in a better way by earning money. Accordingly, they 
might infiltrate from school and join the number of illiterate people. Another indication 
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related to the idea of freedom seen here is that parents who are not educated can not help 
their children much to find out their interests and be free to make their own choices and 
decisions. This means that learners of uneducated parents will be left totally without help 
guidance and they might misuse their freedom. According to Loxley, there is a common 
belief that the students of uneducated parents have little chance to compete with families 
where there are educated adults (1983: 43). Also there is no guarantee that uneducated 
parents will understand the value of freedom in education and its conditions when they are 
not considered a source of authority or interference for their children. 
5.3.6. Learners' freedom and private education 
The shortage of state schools leads to opening the door for individuals or groups to invest 
in private education (see table 40). `Its system can be divided into two groups: one 
established by individuals and the other by the state' (ARE, 1999d: 16). The ministry gives 
special consideration to private education `because of the contribution it has made in all 
fields of education at all stages' (ARE, 1999d: 6-7). 
Table 40 
Numbers and nercentaecs of learners enrolment in private education (1991-1999) 
Year No. of learners enrolled Increase in number % of increase 
1991/1992 
1998/1999 
837.759 
1065,017 
227.258 27.12% 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999f: 74) 
`The percentage of learners in private schools compared to state schools in 1999 was 
53.65%, 7.47%, 4.04% and 8.26% in the pre-school, primary, preparatory and general 
secondary school, respectively' (ME, 1999c: 15). It can therefore be argued that, according 
to the concept of freedom, either private or government schools are free to provide 
alternative education in the form of private schools, for those who can afford the high fees. 
Cohen in his argument against private education claims that 
no-one must be allowed-in the first few laps at least- to gain a start which it will be 
difficult for anyone lacking that advantage to make up (1978: 124). 
However, this argument is only applicable if private education has no effect on learners in 
state schools who are unable to afford private education. The actual practice, however, 
demonstrates that private schools have an effect on the education offered in state schools. 
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For example, law 139`h of 1981 (ARE, 1999a: 25) `enables private schools to employ the 
best teachers who are already working in state schools. This, of course, limits the freedom 
of learners in state schools to learn under qualified teachers'. At the same time, `the 
existence of private schools and the good education received by learners in those schools, 
leads to feelings of bitterness, as those who are affluent have the opportunity of receiving a 
better education than those in state schools' (Khidr, 2000: 81). For Cohen the objection to 
the private schools 
might be thought to depend on the factual assumption that money buys a superior 
commodity... ;a satisfaction, greater chance of good examination grades or a place at a 
university. 
Even if private education provided a product that was in some important respect inferior to 
that which the state could supply, the argument, even here, does not go against private 
education but against its effects on learners in state schools in terms of having an equal 
opportunity. Learners who are poor and can not afford private education are still free to go 
to a state school. However, the good quality of education in private schools causes the 
market to prefer private education graduates more than state ones because of the quality of 
learners in the former, which is higher than in the latter. In this sense it might be argued 
that the existence of private education can be considered as one of the restrictions on 
learners to have the same educational opportunity, and this limits their freedom. 
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5.3.7. Learners' freedom and educational budget 
Egypt's new educational reform policy has been supported through increased government 
financial allocations earmarked specially for public education (see table 41). 
Table 41 
Pre-university educational budget (1990-2000) 
Year Allocated funds for education 
91/92 4,566,844.270 
92/93 5,949,738,134 
93/94 7,262,767,259 
94/95 8,807,830,260 
95/96 10.535,797,560 
96/97 12,107.080.860 
97/98 13,304.964.330 
98/99 14,677,865.330 
99/00 16,186,535,400 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999f: 12) 
According to the above table, the funds for education from 1990 to 2000 were increased by 
350.6%. However, a comparison between the funds for education in the 1990s and those in 
the last 4 decades shows that the funds for education in the 1990s were less. `The 
percentage of funds allocated for education from the total expenses of the government were 
12.24%, 22%, 15%, 10% and 6% in 1953,1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s respectively' 
(Al-Bana, 1992: 122) and (Anis, 1996: 56). It is clear that funds for education have 
successively decreased compared to previous years though the population has increased. 
The results of reduction and having unsuitable budgets for education can be seen in the 
limiting of learners' freedom to enrol in the primary school or to join school again if they 
left for a particular reason. In this way, the lack of a budget can be considered as a 
restriction in which thousands of learners in poor and rural areas can not travel the distance 
to school every day because there is no available school in their community, especially for 
preparatory, secondary or higher education. In addition, because of the absence of a budget 
the state can not provide learners with all they need in their studies or at least give them a 
really free opportunity. This is because, as mentioned before, education is not totally free 
where learners have to pay for many things. 
197 
As a result of non-existence of a budget millions of learners who leave school for one 
reason or another, find themselves in the situation where the school is not in a position to 
accept them again into the class, which is compatible with their age or their stage (see table 
42). So the result is that the child will lose their education forever and will join the millions 
of illiterate people. In the case of secondary school education too, Clause 23 of law 139th of 
1981 (ARE, 1999a: 11) stipulates that `learners cannot enrol in secondary school if they are 
above 18 years of age'. Once again this indicates that the government does not protect the 
individual's fundamental right and freedom to education. 
Table 42 
Numbers and Percentages ofbovs' and girls discontinuation in orinmarv and preparatory school (1991-1998) 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Primary bovs 102518 93,717 73.553 62.143 59.528 51.381 38.173 48,716 
Primary girls 82,205 67906 136616 39.456 33.291 26.954 18,794 24.457 
General % 3.85 2.47 3.09 1.44 1.27 1.05 0.76 0.98 
Boys % 2.9 2.6 2.00 1.6 1.5 1.3 0.94 1.21 
Girls % 6.5 2.3 4.46 1.2 1.00 0.78 0.54 0.70 
Pre aratory boys 176,794 70,034 64.081 53.787 73.051 62.783 50,842 53,700 
Preparatory girls 123,045 82,122 49.801 34.378 48.388 36.738 34.196 33.105 
General % 10.81 6.86 5.15 3.80 5.14 4.06 3.34 3.23 
Bovs % 11.54 5.73 5.3 4.19 5.67 4.7 3.72 3.73 
Girls % 9.9 8.24 5.00 3.3 4.5 3.26 2.9 2.65 
(ME) Ministry of Education (1999b: 32) 
5.4. Freedom in education regarding its value 
As examined in the current chapter in training learners for various professions, it is the 
interests of society and not those of the individual that are taken into consideration. The 
purpose of education is to provide the type of individuals that society needs. As a 
consequence, individuals might not become interested in what they are studying and they 
might not reach the level of education required for the development process. Secondly, 
neglecting the individual's interests can hamper the relationship between the state and its 
people, so that people may feel inclined to work for their own benefit rather than that of the 
state because they feel that society has not treated them fairly. In 'Ammar's view 
(1996b: 45), this is `exactly what is happening in Egyptian society now'. `Ammar states that 
`Egyptian society is divided into different groups, and that each group is using the authority 
and power they possess for their own benefit. This enables them to break the law and even 
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create new laws for their convenience. Even other groups who do not have this power 
become complicitous in helping the groups that have power to achieve their aims'. The 
government's lack of interest in the individual's interests can be seen to have `made young 
people in Egypt feel powerless and indifferent to what is happening in society' (Al- 
Said, 1989: d). It is almost as if young people today `are waiting for a miracle that would 
make their lives better. Nowadays most young people do not feel any connection with 
society, and as a consequence they do their best not for the country, but for their own 
benefit' (`Ammar, 1995: 151). They appear to be completely indifferent to how their actions 
might affect the country. This could be because society has neglected them, and they do not 
feel a sense of national identity, loyalty and pride towards their own country. In short the 
required conditions for learners and society to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its 
value (non-interference and the availability of choices) were not implied in educational 
policy during the period of the study. Learners, as discussed, have no freedom to determine 
their own education. In conclusion, it might be possible to argue that in the absence of the 
required conditions of being free, there is no value of freedom that can be achieved in the 
sense argued in chapter two. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in educational 
theory and practice in Egypt from 1992 to 2000. With respect to the first aim of this 
chapter, learner's priority in education was not the main concern of the political leadership. 
This suggests that the required conditions for learners and society to exercise freedom and 
derive benefit from its value (non-interference and the availability of choices) were not 
implied in the educational policy during the period of the study. Regarding the second aim 
the idea of freedom in contemporary Egypt is still related to the claim for individuals to 
have free and equal educational opportunity. It is true that learners' freedom in this sense is 
greater than before, but until the year 2000 millions of children were still excluded from 
attending school due to the insufficient educational opportunities and because of 
inappropriate budgets. This means that learners are obliged to accept whatever 
opportunities state offers. Hence, it might be important to define freedom in education as a 
right for learners to make their own choices among the alternatives that are existed. 
As for girls' freedom, as it is still less than boys' in terms of having free and equal 
opportunities and not having freedom to study and work in particular fields like boys. The 
reduced freedom they have is not because of religious obligations, as shown in chapter one, 
however, it seems that girls are restricted by social values. For example, someone might 
argue that some families still give more attention to their sons' education rather than their 
daughters'. Thus, it might be argued that family preference might be caused by 
unintentional restrictions made by the state. In others words when education is not totally 
free and there are no adequate opportunities in schools, families give priority to boys rather 
than girls. But if education was free and available to all it is possible that most families 
would treat their sons and daughters equally. This is especially important since most 
families in Egypt nowadays believe that life is becoming more complicated for both 
genders and education might be the only strategy left for survival. Also neglecting the need 
and importance of making such efforts to help families in rural and poor areas to change 
their views towards girls' education can be understood as one of the restrictions on girls. 
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Regarding the third aim, the study shown how that such restrictions can limit learners' 
freedom. 
" Although it is laid down by law that local authority has the freedom and responsibility 
to share educational planning and practice, it has focused only on implementing 
decisions and has played no role in decision-making. Moreover, learners, parents, 
teachers and schools have no freedom to share decisions-making or even the freedom to 
object against the decisions that had been made. 
" the approach is taken to design the curriculum and its content did not provide the 
required conditions where learners could benefit from the value of freedom, for 
example, (a) the curriculum pays more attention to the amount of knowledge learners 
should learn at a required age for the sake of development, because Egyptian education 
considers the gaining of knowledge as an aim in itself not as a means to others ends. (B) 
the textbooks are full of isolated facts that learners should know. Having textbooks that 
contain all the required knowledge `does not give learners the freedom, for example, to 
look for more knowledge, discover the relationship between different variables or 
learning and how they can use such knowledge in a meaningful and worthwhile way. 
(C) learners do not have the freedom to make choices between subjects or between 
branches of subject because all subjects and units are compulsory. 
" As, for teachers' preparation, knowing the subject is the most important element in 
teachers training. Teacher's role still considered as one whereby delivers such 
knowledge and information to learners without sharing with them in the process of 
teaching and learning. They are used to the traditional way of teaching where the 
teacher stands up front talking and asking questions, and all of the children are 
supposed to learn in the same way and at the same time. This approach in teachers' 
preparation makes teachers believe that they are the ones who know and have all the 
knowledge about everything. So learners have to listen and memorise what they are 
saying. This kind of education obliges learners to follow in other people's foot steps 
without thinking why they have to follow them and in the Tong run produces weak 
individuals who are afraid of criticism and change and who like to be silent and 
surrender to other people's ideas. In this sense education never leads to creativity or 
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innovation. Therefore, learners do not feel powerful and do not trust themselves to 
obtain knowledge or produce new knowledge on their own. As a result they always 
expect teachers to tell them what they have to do. This process is carried on from stage 
to stage so that when they become employees they wait for their boss to tell them what 
to do. Having this type of teacher preparation does not help learners to exercise 
freedom and derive benefit from its value. In short, this type of teaching is considered 
one of the restrictions on learners that limits their freedom. 
" The spreading of private tuition and textbooks prevents learners from having free and 
equal opportunities, from learning thinking skills and enjoying the value of freedom in 
education. 
" The purpose of the assessment and the regulations can be considered as one of the 
restriction on learners' freedom as it limits their educational opportunities and also their 
enjoyment of the value of freedom in education. 
" As suggested in this chapter the illiteracy rate was still very high. This might lead to 
argue that illiteracy might exclude the public from the opportunity to share in making 
educational decisions or claims for their children's freedom. Moreover, uneducated 
parents can not fulfil their role towards their children by providing them with the 
necessary conditions to for exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. 
" As has been demonstrated, freedom in education is not opposed to private education but 
its effects on learners in state schools in term of enjoying an equal opportunities. 
Learners who are poor and can not afford private education are still free to go to state 
school. However, the high quality of education in private schools means that the market 
prefers private education graduates to than state ones because the quality of learners in 
the former is higher than in the latter. In this respect, it could be argued that the 
existence of private education can be considered as one of the restrictions on learners 
regarding equal opportunity. 
" An inappropriate educational budget limits learners' freedom in terms of having free 
and equal educational opportunity. Also, as a result of the absence of budgets the state 
fails to allow learners; (a) the freedom to determine the type of studies they are 
interested in since the state obliges them to do what satisfies its aims (b) the alternatives 
and options in the curriculum and its subjects whereby they can make free choices. 
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0 The curriculum has been designed so as to make lectures the teaching method for all 
lessons. Because the curriculum is full of information and isolated facts, teachers find 
that giving lectures is the best way to teach, and their job is to help learners to 
memorise the information. It does not give the teachers and learners freedom to use 
different teaching methods and techniques. Also it makes learners very negative 
elements in the teaching and learning process which prevents any chance to exercise 
freedom and benefit from its value. 
" Extra curricula activities have no place in the school plan in which learners lose good 
opportunities to learn how to exercise freedom and benefit from its value. 
Regarding the fourth aim from the arguments made in the current chapter it seems clear 
that educational thought discusses freedom in education and its value in the areas of 
developing learners' abilities to think freely, make choices, decisions and be responsible for 
their own actions. This suggests that it is possible to implemented the idea of learners' 
freedom in the Egyptian context. Moreover, although educational thought demanded 
learners' freedom in education and called for their interests to be considered as the main 
concern of philosophy and the practice of education, there were many practices that could 
be seen to reflect these claims. This conclusion indicates that in educational planning and 
decisions educational thought was excluding from being shared. 
Furthermore, three general conclusions can be made from the analysis made in the current 
chapter. Firstly, on many occasions in this chapter I have pointed out that the failure behind 
such practices relating to freedom in education was caused by society which was not 
prepared for such change, because change in education needs understanding, support and 
sharing by all the groups involved, to fulfil its role. Secondly, in some places I have shown 
that educational reform in its comprehensive sense has no clear philosophy. There is no 
harmony between its processes and this leads to the unsatisfactory results of such reforms. 
Moreover, all the aspects of the reforms that have been taken place were simple 
modifications. This might be linked by the fact that `educational authorities are afraid of 
implementing radical change, because it involves a big risk. They prefer to implement 
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partial changes which have less risk associated with them and also may be achieved in a 
short time. Thirdly, there is a gap between theory and practice in education. 
From the analysis and examination that has been made so far in the forgoing chapters, it 
should be possible to build a theoretical framework of freedom in education that suites the 
nature of Egyptian society and its educational system, to improve its efficiency for the 
benefit of learners and society. 
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Chapter Six 
A theoretical framework of education based on freedom for 
the improvement of the efficiency of the educational system in Egypt 
6.1. Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to construct a framework of a theory of education based on 
freedom that suits the Egyptian context to improve the efficiency of its educational system. 
Although this theory depends on a western liberal interpretation of freedom in education as it 
has been made in the first three chapters it does not hold that it can not be suited to a different 
context such as Egypt. As discussed the previous chapters, freedom in education ought no 
longer to be seen as a doctrine that is put into practice and developed only in western 
societies for a number of reasons. Firstly, as can be seen in chapter one, there are similarities 
between liberal western and Islamic thought in relation to the concept of freedom and its 
value. Secondly, as argued in chapters four and five, the democratic order in Egypt and its 
education system presuppose some central distinguishing features of liberalism. For example, 
various rights are recognised, including the right to basic education, the right of equal access 
to educational institution. Freedom of belief, religion, expression and opinion in education 
are recognised. Thirdly, as noted in the previous five chapters, Egyptian literature has been 
used to analyse freedom in education and examine the place of freedom in education in 
Egyptian society. This means that freedom in education is desirable for Egyptian society and 
its goals. 
6.2. Framework of a theory of education based on freedom in Egypt 
According to the analysis of the concept of freedom and its implications in education that 
has been presented so far, it might be sensible now to construct a framework of educational 
theory based on freedom that, on the one hand, suits the Egyptian context and on the other 
hand guarantees a range of freedom that benefits learners and society. Firstly, this 
framework deals with the general components and aims of education based on freedom. 
Secondly, it treats of the structure of the educational system, school curriculum, assessment 
and teacher education. 
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6.2.1. Freedom for learners from interference and authority 
According to the analysis of freedom in education presented in the previous chapters 
learners should be left free from interference and authority in determining their own lives; 
they have to be left free to determine their education. Learners have to be themselves not 
what adults want them to be. They need freedom to learn to be independent and to know 
their own interests, fears, and wishes by making their own mistakes. Moreover, education 
based on freedom is concerned with educating learners as free individuals who can 
rationally think about others' opinions. This means that they should not obey others for the 
sake of obedience or because adults have more experience and know more than they do. To 
say that an agent has a freedom is normally to imply that others have a duty not to interfere 
with his exercise of that right" (Olafson, 1975: 174). In short, learners should be free 
physically and intellectually from any formulation to do or not, to become or not something 
they like. 
To achieve this, Egyptian learners should learn first how to be free, in particular because, as 
has been argued in chapters four and five they do not exercise freedom at all regarding their 
education. This is because after being restricted and interfered for such a long time they do 
not know how to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. Without exercising 
freedom young people might doubt that freedom in education can help them to achieve 
their aims for their own benefit and that of society. In other words, freedom in education is 
about teaching learners how to be free in making their own choices and decisions. To 
achieve this the proper method to teach learners how to act freely is through freedom. 
According to Huus to teach individuals to act freely, they should be taught in a free 
atmosphere (1965: 27) in which they gain the experience to share any decisions related to 
their education. This requires that the learners should be free to share educational planning 
and make decisions which guarantee that they fully exercise freedom and derive benefit 
from its value. For Tabberer (1998: 93)), learners should be given the opportunity to 
participate as active and informed citizens in a democratic society within an internal 
context. This requires, as Tomlinson argues, opening them to knowledge, ways of 
understanding and the development of abilities that create informed, caring and co- 
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operative citizens. It offers the development of intellectual capacities, economic skills, and 
personal qualities that every individual has the right to acquire (1994: 7). In this sense the 
state 
will have to arrange facilities and experiences for its members, and in particular its young, 
to acquire the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to make appropriate decisions for 
themselves and for their society (Pearson, 1992: 85). 
6.2.2. Freedom to have equal educational opportunity 
From the quantitative data that has been presented in chapter five, it can be seen that not all 
learners are free to enjoy an equal opportunity in schools. In education based on freedom 
Egyptian learners of all classes should be left free to receive an equal opportunity to 
advance socially and economically on an equal footing. By "all" here, I mean men and 
women, the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the educated and uneducated, the 
Muslim and non-Muslim in both rural and urban communities. For White (1995: 230) and 
Hodgetts (1996: 71) school should be open to all irrespective of colour, creed, intellectual 
ability, social class or economic status. For Norman (1982: 103), social conditions should 
be arranged so that everyone has an equal opportunity to live a worthwhile life. According 
to Entwistle therefore, equality of opportunity, requiring removal of hindrances to the 
development of learners' abilities, has to be planned through the educational system" 
(1978: 7). To achieve this, a number of suggestions should be considered. 
Firstly, as discussed in chapter four and five, education in Egypt is not entirely free since 
learners have to pay for many things. To eliminate this restriction education requires the 
freeing of learners to have educational opportunities without paying any fees which might 
limit their freedom of access to education (Dennison, 1996: 205-8). On the one hand, this 
not only concerns the school fees but it also requires that learners should not spend any 
money regarding their education' (`Ali, l999a: 99-101). On the other hand, the state will 
need to provide poor learners with things they might need for their studies, otherwise they 
will not be able to obtain the opportunities they want and that other learners might be able 
to enjoy. According to Illich (1971: 6) 
even with schools of equal quality a poor child can seldom catch up with a rich one. Even 
if they attend equal schools and begin at the same age. poor children lack most of the 
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educational opportunities which are casually available to the middle-class child. These 
advantages range from conversation and books in the home to vacation travel and a 
different sense of oneself, and apply, for the child who enjoys them, both in and out of 
school. 
According to Illich it is the responsibility of the state to provide learners with public 
resources. In this sense Coleman (1983: 195) argues for the importance of public resources 
to achieve equal opportunity because each child begins life with a set of private resources, 
genetic and environmental, which means that, in the absence of public resources, children 
have very unequal opportunities. 
Secondly, the number of schools should be increased to cover the whole country especially 
the rural and poor areas, so that every learner at the age of four has a place at school. If 
learners have to travel some a distance they should receive free transportation during 
school time so that poor learners are not restricted and prevented from going to school. 
Each school should be open for children who discontented or for learners who could not 
enrol in the school at the required age. All new and old schools should work a full day 
(between 9 and 3: 30) and do away with double and treble shifts, for all learners to have the 
same time for instruction and engaged in extra-curricular activities. Increasing the number 
of schools and making them available in every small area and village will in turn reduce the 
class size which will improve the process of learning and teaching. Also increasing the 
number of schools should meet with an increase in the number of qualified teachers to 
guarantee an equal opportunity for all. 
Thirdly, to protect and maximise learners' freedom the state will need to punish parents 
who do not send their children to school (see chapter five) with large penalties because 
child labour has big economic value: `they are cheap workers especially in the rural and 
poor areas' (NCERT, 1992: 22). Fourthly, for learners during their schooling to have 
equality of opportunity in terms of achievement, options in educational opportunities 
should be available to all: "the range of worthwhile options available to all-a range which 
in part constitutes the preconditions of freedom" (Jonathan, 1997b: 213). In this sense 
education based on freedom gives 
"everyone the chance to obtain the knowledge and skills 
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necessary to participate and succeed in the larger world according to their abilities and 
accomplishments" (Paris, 1995: 105). 
Fifthly, with respect to gender equality, it is important to remove all kinds of obstacles so 
girls having the same opportunity as boys. Equal opportunity between boys and girls might 
be achieved through; (A), transportation is one of the difficulties facing the girls when they 
decide to go to school because it is costly and because many families fear for the safety of 
girls travelling alone to school. Therefore, every small village in the country should have a 
school or transportation given them free. (B), `because of economic conditions in poor 
areas, families cannot support their girls as they do their boys' (Al-'Atar, 1999: 97). 
Therefore, it might be necessary for the school to provide girls with a school uniform or 
even to waive the requirement for it. It is true that there is strong justification for having a 
school uniform but in this case, achieving attendance should be the number one priority. 
(C), it might be helpful to provide poor girls with the free stationery they need. (D), as 
mentioned in chapters four and five, women have less value in society, therefore, it might 
be useful to use different lessons in different subjects to change society's view of women. 
These lessons should try to present some good examples from history and the past to show 
the contribution of women in all fields and the expected contribution in the future as well. 
(E), the gap between the enrolment rates of boys and girls should be an issue of national 
concern and should be given exposure in the media to help change attitudes towards 
women. 
Sixthly, as discussed in chapter five, there are further features of inequality evident in the 
existence of private schools and private tuition. However, in education based on freedom 
all reasons presented in chapter four and five, that oblige parents to send their children to 
private education and private tuition will be gradually eliminated. This is because the 
modification in aims, structure of the system, state of schools, curriculum, assessment and 
teacher's education in the light of freedom in education will make private tuition of no use 
and learners and parents will not need these lessons any more. Also by improving the 
process of learning and teaching at state schools the gap between state and private schools 
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will disappeared. Then having private education will not affect learners at state schools 
because both will provide almost the same opportunity. 
6.2.3. Aims of freedom in education at school level 
In addition to the general components that have been discussed in the previous section, a 
set of specific goals can be identified for Egyptian education, based on freedom, as follows: 
firstly, freedom in education aims to maximise learners' freedom by known reading and 
writing (Martin, 1981: 54). This is because, as mentioned in chapters four and five, illiteracy 
is one of the restrictions that prevents individuals from increasing their ability to reduce the 
gap between what they want freedom for and what they can do when there are no other 
restrictions on them. Also it is because being illiterate limits the ability of the individual to 
be independent and autonomous to manage their own life. It makes them always dependent 
on other people who might use this inability to fulfil their own aims, in other words, to 
limit individuals' freedom to enjoy the value of freedom. 
Secondly, according to the arguments in chapter two, education based on freedom aims to 
develop learners' minds and gives learners the chance to direct their own growth. In this 
sense schools, teachers, parents and knowledge are means to free their minds from any 
formulation (Martin, 1981: 54). Developing learners' minds requires teaching learners the 
general thinking skills (Nisbet, 1995: 290), (Wall, 1965: 60) and (Eggen and Kauchak, 
1988: 21-3) that are the foundations for exercising and enjoying responsible and worthwhile 
freedom. Education based on freedom allows the learners the opportunity to develop a 
lively, enquiring mind, giving them the opportunity to question and to argue rationally, and 
to apply themselves to tasks at school or at home by speaking and acting freely. Giving 
learners this freedom helps them to understand the world in which they live, and the 
interdependence of nations. In this sense Bonnett (1994: 13) argues that the development of 
the individual's thinking means that 
they know more than they did before, they can think what to do in new situations, they 
can discuss or explain something that they could not before, they see something 
differently. they feel differently about something, they can work something out for 
themselves, that they could not before and they have some new thoughts, feelings, 
understanding, appreciation. awareness. 
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Learning general thinking skills can develop learners' minds for example to; (A) exercise 
critical thinking about people, things or theories. According to Quicke (1988: 14) "the 
flowering of critical thinking demands that the freedom to experiment is taken seriously, as 
a guiding principle for teaching and learning". The value of exercising critical thought has 
been discussed, for example, by Oliver (1985: 131) and Peters (1975: 122). For Peters 
critical thought is a development of evaluation, autonomy of choice, creativity of the 
attempt to launch out on one's own and to impose one's own stamp on a product; integrity 
is shown in sticking to one's principles in the face of temptation, and strength of will in 
holding fast to a policy that has been adopted as one's own. 
It is important for learners not to necessarily accept everything they hear or read. They need 
to be critics who can identify possible flaws in their own as well as in other people's 
arguments. In this sense Passmore (1975: 25), Phillips (1997a: 261), (Yasin's, 1999: 8), 
(Khidr, 1999: 7) and Paris (1995: 128) argue that the current discussion on education often 
envisions schools as ideally producing critical thinkers, individuals with certain generic 
skills and competencies, who can step into a job situation and develop the more specific 
skills required by the job. They can readily change and develop their skills as job 
requirements shift or even move on to new jobs altogether. Dewey (1983: 334) argues that 
education means the creation of a discriminating mind, a mind that prefers not to dupe 
itself or to be the dupe of others.... (it means) the habit of suspended judgement, of 
scepticism, of desire for evidence, of appeal to observation rather than sentiment, 
discussion rather than bias, inquiry rather than conventionalised idealisation. 
(B) exercise evaluation skill, in other words, thinking skills also develop the learners' 
capacity to evaluate theories, knowledge and the standpoints of individuals., thus, for 
Dewey it is important to develop the skills necessary to evaluate other people's ideas and 
arguments (Dewey, 1910: 101-10). To achieve this, freedom is a necessary condition for 
learners to make their own judgement and mistakes without interference from adults. (C) 
exercise everyday problem-solving skills. According to Romberg (1994: 287) problem- 
solving is now normally intended to imply a process by which the learner combines 
previously learned elements of knowledge, rules, techniques, skills and concepts to provide 
a solution to a novel situation. It is important to learn some concepts and practise some 
procedures so that one is a reasonably skilled performer, but it is also important for all 
students to have an opportunity to solve problems whatever their level of capability. For 
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Ashman and Conway (1993: 46) and Tomlinson, (1994: 6) all young people in the future 
will need to be able to solve problems (including some not yet imagined). One might argue 
that being able to solve problems or even to think rationally or evaluate things, does not in 
any way equate with the general concept of intelligence. So every learner can be a problem- 
solver and be able to undertake high intellectual thinking even if he/she is not that 
intelligent. An excellent example stems from the work of Neisser (1976: 136-140) who 
argues for the need to differentiate academic intelligence from practical intelligence. 
Typically, intelligence tests tend to predict how well people do in academic settings. High 
scores on such tests, however, are no guarantee of successful everyday problem solving. In 
this sense Paris (1995: 128) defines a problem solver as 
the one who has learned how to learn, will be able to deal with the rapidly shifting 
workplace and be a continually productive worker. 
The technological demands of the workplace of today and the future will require 
understanding and the ability to formulate and solve complex problems, often with others. 
Businesses no longer seek workers with strong backs, clever hands, and shopkeeper 
arithmetic skills. According to NCTM (1989: 3-4) most workers will change jobs frequently 
and so need flexibility and problem-solving abilities to enable them to explore, create and 
accommodate changed conditions and activities, as well as to create new knowledge in the 
course of their lives. 
However, teaching general thinking skills might generate problems concerned with the 
knowledge learners should know because as Higgins and Baumfeld (1998: 397) argue, 
thinking skills programmes are concerned with the process of learning and not purely with 
the conditions of knowledge. Learning to think is learning to dissociate association and 
implication, what we want to be true and what we have good reason to believe is true. In 
this sense it might be argued that for teaching general skills to earn a place in the school 
curriculum does not mean that learners will not gain knowledge. In education based on 
freedom, as was argued in chapter three, the school curriculum should be used to develop 
general thinking skills and should not be a sole end in itself. 
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Thirdly, freedom in education aims to educate learners to become autonomous (see chapter 
two). Traditional educationalists see education as a means of transferring knowledge to 
children through the curriculum. In the 21" century, transferring information in this manner 
is becoming increasingly difficult with the rapid developments taking place in all fields of 
knowledge. Today, if a person is free to think and act autonomously, s/he can easily obtain 
knowledge about a specific topic/subject and gain new knowledge about it with little help 
from outside. The world of work is being transformed, particularly by the information and 
communication technologies. Fourthly, freedom in education aims to educate learners as 
responsible individuals for their own choices and decisions (see chapter two). Fifthly, 
education based on freedom aims to educate learners as creative individuals (see chapter 
two). Someone might argue that creative ability is determined by intelligence and freedom 
in education cannot help all learners to be creative. If they have received poor average 
scores on intelligence tests, they feel that they are poor or average creative people. In this 
sense, Bransford and Stein (1983: 5 1) state that some people assume that only people in the 
performing or other arts are creative. It seems reasonable to argue that there are degrees of 
creativity, in that it is not something that one either has or not. Many people erroneously 
assume that someone is creative only if he/she is like Einstein. However, if one looks for 
creativity only at that level of achievement, he/she will miss hundreds of opportunities to 
be creative each day. Someone might argue that children are naturally creative, and all 
adults continue to have this potential. An idea that you generate can be creative even if you 
were not the first person in history to think of it. What counts is one's ability to approach 
and solve problems in ways that are not routine for oneself. In this sense Bransford and 
Stein (1983: 52-5) argue that 
a creative idea is also one that is appropriate to the situation. The ability to identify a 
problem and an opportunity is one of the most important steps in the creative process. The 
second step is to define alternative goals. Different goals suggest different lines of thought 
and so have a powerful effect on the solution strategies that we consider. 
Sixthly, education based on freedom aims to educate learners to practise self-learning and 
lifelong learning as this is a required ability in talking about education for the future. In 
other words "prepare students for flexible adaptation to new problems and settings" 
(Bransford et al, 1999: 65). Self-learning and lifelong learning are required abilities and will 
be needed by all (Tomlinson, 1994: 6) in the future for learners and society to cope with the 
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`hug changes in the field of technology, communication, knowledge, economics, politics, 
media and social life' (Nwfal, 1997: 102-13). These abilities in the future will be considered 
as an established part of everyone's agenda (Tomlinson, 1994: 6) and (Day, 2000: 106). This 
is because the required abilities for the future to cope with the changing world go further 
ahead than the initial preparation for learners at their schools. With the changing of 
circumstances in the future education will be a self-process and a continuous requirement. 
Self-learning and lifelong learning can be seen as desirable aims to be achieved of 
education in themselves and also as means to such aims for example, as being autonomous, 
happy, responsible and creative. This is because as Oscanyan and `Ammar suggest, it needs 
a certain independence of thought. It implies that a learner who can do self-learning and 
lifelong learning is able to develop inquiry and interest without being guided, helped, led or 
motivated by another person (Oscanyan, 1977: 78) and ('Ammar, 1998a: 82-93). For learning 
to develop their sense and understanding of self-learning and lifelong learning, freedom is a 
required condition to enable them to make free choices of what they want to study, when 
and why without depending on others. For Day (2000: 106) and ('Ammar, 1998a: 82-93) a 
free environment, free of any barriers and availability of opportunities are essential 
elements for learners to be able to learn and exercise self-learning and lifelong learning. 
This requires that the state be responsible to open opportunities for individuals to satisfy 
their interests (Day, 2000: 106). 
Moreover, it might be possible to state that there are others products can be seen through 
the achievement of the previous components and aims. For learners they will achieve the 
feeling of happiness they seek for a number of reasons. Firstly, education based on freedom 
gives them the opportunity to be themselves and study what they are interested in to 
become or to be what they want. Secondly, it treats them as persons who have the right to 
an active participation in their lives, their education and others' lives as well. Thirdly, it 
makes them feel powerful, that they are an important group in society and they are not only 
machines to be trained for the state's purposes. Finally, education based on freedom 
guarantees interesting study and time at school in which learners feel happy through the 
teaching and learning processes. 
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For society, education based on freedom is a means to acquire desirable products. For 
example, (A) regarding learners as persons who have rights like adults and making them 
feel powerful is the means to educate for citizenship (White, 1982: 110). To "develop 
understanding and respect for one's cultural heritage, to preserve and to develop basic 
cultural skills, to recognise that children grow up in a multicultural society, to impart, instil 
and form in pupils those values on which our society is based, to create a community of 
shared values, to develop judgement in matters of morality, ethics and social justice" 
(Tabberer, 1998: 93). 
(B), education based on freedom takes learners' interests and development of their abilities 
as its number one priority. This makes learners feel that they belong to a particular society 
that considers their rights and interests. Accordingly, they feel and develop a sense of being 
responsible for sharing their society's needs, interests and policies and problems in which 
they have to spend effort to work towards solving its problems and development. In other 
words, freedom in education is a means to deepen the values of loyalty and belonging' 
('Ali, 1987: 156). (C) pursuing the global scientific and information revolution. (D) 
developing the productive skills of citizens. (E) linking theoretical training to critical and 
applied knowledge. (F) developing scientific and analytic skills necessary for decision- 
making. (G) preparing a generation of scientists. (H) being responsive to the occupational 
needs of society. (I) preparing learners for working in co-operation with others as team 
work. 
6.3. A proposed structure for the Egyptian educational system in the light of freedom 
in education 
On the one hand, according to the definition of freedom in education, learners should be 
free to obtain free and equal opportunity in education. On the other hand, as has been 
discussed in chapters four and five, there are some features in the Egyptian system that 
limit learners' freedom to obtain equal opportunities. Therefore, in education based on 
freedom a new system can be suggested to maximise learners' freedom as follows. The 
school year starts on the first of September each year and finishes in the middle of July. 
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Unlike the current system, the school year is divided into three terms; first term starts in the 
first of September and finishes in the middle of December. Second term starts in the second 
week of January and finishes in the middle of March. Third term starts in second week of 
April and finishes in the middle of July. According to this timetable learners can have 
holidays between each term to be engaged in any others activities they want. 
For learners to have an equal opportunity the system can be divided into two stages: 
compulsory and higher education. Compulsory education will be for all between the ages of 
4 and 18. Its duration is 13 years divided into four stages; (kindergarten) at age 4, primary 
at age 6; preparatory, at age 12; and secondary, at age 15. Having a long compulsory period 
maximises learners' freedom to acquire the minimum necessary preparation to join the 
market or higher education according to their wills and interests. Contrary to what Neill 
(1953,1961,1966,1992) and others argue, namely that obliging learners to attend school is 
wrong and goes against their freedom to do what they want, it can be proposed that 
compulsory attendance at school is not coercive or restriction on learners to come to school 
when they do not want (Callan, 1983: 51-2). Because when we talk about education we talk 
about young people who at the beginning need help and protection for their right until they 
understand the value of education for their lives. It is of course, as will be suggested later, 
required that life at school should be interesting and makes learners feel that there is a need 
for them to attend. It is also the responsibility of the state and parents to talk to learners 
about the difference education can make to them and their lives. This is totally different 
from exercising an obligation on learners to study something they do not like. 
Unlike in the current Egyptian system, the kindergarten, in a educational system based on 
freedom, would be a new stake that comes as part of compulsory education for all for 
children aged between 4 and 6 years old. This stage is considered to be one of the most 
crucial phases in the life of the child, since it represents the cornerstone in forming an 
individual's personality, future ability and potentialities. Making the kindergarten stage 
compulsory can be considered a strong, indicator of equal opportunity that maximises 
learners' freedom (see chapter four and five). Primary would be the stage that comes after 
the kindergarten for learners between the ages of 6 and 12 years old. The preparatory stage 
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would have learners between the ages 12 and 15 years. Unlike in the current system, the 
vocational school would have no place in education based on freedom. Also this school 
accepts learners who discontented in the previous stages for economic or social reasons and 
they want to continue their education, but are at the same stage as the ordinary learners 
although they might be older. This requires that each school should have special classrooms 
for those learners who have been discontented. 
The proposed secondary stage would cover three years of post-preparatory education for all 
learners between the ages of 15 and 18. It would be only one type, with the same targets for 
everyone at the required age across the country. This means that unlike the current 
Egyptian system, the technical secondary school has no place in education based on 
freedom in Egypt as a separate school and system. However, eliminating the technical 
school does not mean that there is no place for technical education in an educational system 
based on freedom. As will be suggested latter, technical education will exist as subjects at 
this stage which learners may choose to study. Secondary education can either lead to 
higher education or be an end point for those who want to join the labour market. Just like 
the preparatory school, the secondary school should have classrooms for those who have 
been discontented at the previous stages. Higher education would be available for learners 
between the age of 18 and 20,22 or 24, depending on the duration of each college or 
institution. This stage also would accept learners who have the secondary certificate 
whatever their age and whenever they gained the secondary certificate. Higher education 
would be divided into three types; universities, higher institutions and intermediate 
technical institutions, and would be an open opportunity for all who wanted to continue 
their education whenever they wanted and were able to attend. Someone might argue that 
maximising learner's freedom to join higher education might produce large numbers of 
higher education graduates. Accordingly, someone might argue that maximising learners' 
freedom in higher education produces a high rate of unemployment because the labour 
market cannot provide higher graduates with the job opportunities. It might be argued that 
if the unemployment rate increases in an educational system based on freedom, this will not 
be because of the greater freedom that learners are enjoying in terms of having better 
opportunities. It will refer to the deficiencies of the labour market and development process 
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to obtain benefit from those graduates. This was the case all the time in Egyptian society as 
a consequence of the mismatch between demand and supply of educated labour that 
increased after the revolution of 1952 and continued until recent times 
(Arabsheibani, 1991: 55). This was because there was no link between the specialisms of 
learners at school or universities and the needs of society. According to `Ali (1996: 22) 
`educational developments are proceeding without being linked either to the development 
needs of society or the needs of the individuals'. This deficiency may also explain why 
there is a lack of some specialists in some fields and an over-abundance in others. For 
example, `whilst there are far more commerce undergraduates than the market can absorb, 
there are relatively few studying technology or communication studies, although the local 
and the international market needs more people who are qualified in these areas' 
(NCERT, 1992: 25). In short the mismatch between demand and supply goes some way to 
explaining the high rate of unemployment amongst graduates rather than unemployment 
being a product of the rate of enrolment at higher education especially since it has been 
shown in chapter five, that the rate of enrolment is lower than 19% of learners who are at 
the required age. 
6.4. Freedom in education and the school curriculum 
For the previous aims of education based on freedom that suit the Egyptian context to be 
achieved by learners, there is a need for the curriculum to be designed to satisfy the 
interests of both individuals and society. As has been discussed in chapter three, learners 
should be involved in designing the curriculum and choosing its content to ensure that it 
will satisfy their interests and also learn how to be free through this process, which is the 
core of education based on freedom. Superficially, good practice in listening to the 
learner's voice in schools can be seen, for example, as Galloway and Davie maintains, in a 
curriculum which develops sharing and communication of knowledge, understanding and 
attitudes or in a structure that enable teachers to find out and respond to how pupils 
perceive the curriculum and school or classroom organisation (1996: 139). However, the 
main concern here is how to involve all learners in this activity. The answer to this question 
requires thinking of giving learners freedom to be heard by the politicians and practitioners. 
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It might be suggested that learners with help from their parents, teachers and head-teachers 
can organise meetings in every school to talk about their interests, what they are expecting 
from school, what they want to be and what negative aspects they can see in their current 
education. In short, it is an opportunity for learners in every school to be heard. Then 
learners again, with help from adults, especially at an early age, can write a report that 
includes their views and expectations from education. In this way all interested groups 
(learners, teachers, schools) will be involved in educational planning and making decisions. 
Then it is the role of the experts to consider the learners' perspectives as well as the state's 
interests. The most important consideration in this process is to provide learners with many 
options and varieties through which they can make their own free choices and decisions 
according to their interests without interference. As can be seen in chapter five, the current 
Egyptian curriculum does not provide learners with the opportunity to satisfy their 
interests. Therefore, there is a need to rethink the current Egyptian curriculum and its 
subjects to make a decision about the modifications that should take place to satisfy 
learners' and society's interests, in terms of rethinking the value of knowledge and its 
function and adding new subjects (see chapter three). In chapter three, an approach was 
suggested that might suit the Egyptian context and guarantee that the curriculum and its 
content will satisfy learners' and society's interests. In addition, the following section will 
deal with some considerations in relation to subject matter. This is because the idea of 
freedom in Egyptian education that was examined in chapter five, reflects the lack of 
learners' freedom in relation to subject matter. 
6.4.1. The nature of the curriculum subjects in primary and preparatory school 
According to the arguments presented in chapter three, most of the literature classifies 
human knowledge into seven categories; religious sciences, languages, social sciences, 
mathematics, technology, Arts and aesthetic. Although the analysis in the same chapter 
consider knowledge as a means to reach such ends, learners at school, from primary to 
secondary in the light of freedom in education are required to know about all these areas of 
knowledge not merely for the sake of knowing. According to the analysis of the idea of 
freedom in Egyptian education in chapter five, learners are so overloaded by too much 
219 
knowledge organised in different subjects that they have to memorise. Education based on 
freedom especially in the primary and preparatory school should provide a basis for 
knowledge that enables learners to acquire the essential skills needed in a fast-changing 
world. For Alexander (1985: 148) curriculum knowledge in the primary stage is not really 
an issue: the most important foci for professional training should be child development. In 
this sense, Makiya and Rogers (1992: 16) argue that 
pupils of nursery and lower infant ages come to school with expertise in solving 
problems, manipulating found objects, finding meanings in their surrounding and making 
choices, and with massively enquiring minds. The emphasis in the primary school is on 
unity of experience and fullness of life rather than on subjects. 
Thus, the "basic principles of learning are the same whether we are concentrating on poetry 
or arithmetic" (MA, 1956: 4). In this sense education based on freedom is concerned with 
the right of learners to know a little about every field of knowledge to be able to find out 
their real interests. Schools should provide all learners with a generic introduction to the 
basic disciplines of knowledge and the development of effective communication skills. 
Therefore, I am suggesting that learners should be given the opportunity to do subjects such 
as music, physical education, art, food science, needlework, design and technology, 
information and communication technology, geography, history, citizenship education, 
religious education, the national language (Arabic), a foreign language (English), 
mathematics and science. I have deliberately reversed the normal order of the subjects 
because music, physical education, art, food science, needlework are in that order because 
they are entirely neglected subjects in Egyptian education. Secondly, design and 
technology, information and communication technology are in that order because they are 
new subjects that would be added to an Egyptian curriculum based on freedom in 
education. Thirdly, geography, history and citizenship education are in that order because 
the current Egyptian curriculum has a subject called social studies which contains units of 
history, geography and citizenship education that do not allow learners the opportunity to 
study each subject to exercise freedom and derive benefit from each different area. 
Fourthly, the religious curriculum is in that order because, although it is compulsory in the 
current system, it has been neglected in terms of adding its marks to the final score and in 
terms of teachers and the curriculum. Finally, I have put the rest of the subjects that already 
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exist and have high value between the others because, as some argue, they have intrinsic 
value in the process of development. 
If the option subjects mentioned above were established as essential subjects, it is possible 
that politicians, some educationalists, teachers and even parents in Egypt might argue that 
these subjects are a waste of time; viewing them as unnecessary in school, and preferring 
mathematics and science for two reasons. Firstly, it is because these subjects are viewed as 
talent subjects which can and should take place out of school because not everyone can be 
talented. In response to this it might be argued that it is for precisely the same reason they 
have to be essential subjects at this stage, because not everyone can have the opportunity to 
do such subjects out of school and this leads to the sacrifice of many talented people. 
Especially that the gift for these subjects seems to show itself earlier than other skills and 
hence cannot be ignored as a crucial subject in school (Rogers, 1970b: 226). Secondly, such 
subjects might be opposed because learning and teaching them might be presented as 
having no value in the process of industrial development. In this subject, it is important to 
observe that in an education system based on freedom, learners should have the freedom 
and opportunity to do such subjects according to their interests without interference from 
others. Moreover, there are strong indications that these subjects, when they are designed 
and taught appropriately, give learners the opportunity to exercise freedom and derive 
benefit from its value. They contribute to developing learners' abilities to achieve the aims 
of education based on freedom which satisfy society's interests, as examined in chapter two 
and the beginning of the current chapter. The importance of these subjects in the 
curriculum cannot be over-emphasised because they are an essential element in the lives of 
children. According to Hope-Brown (1973: xi), MEC (1998: 6), Rogers (1970b: 226), Adams 
(1999: 17), Bailey (1999: 31), Prentice (1999: 146), Eisner (1972: 12), Tanner (1989: 3), 
Prentice (1992: 104-9), Sparkes and Fry (1992: 114-9 ) and Boyce-Tillman (1992: 120-3) 
they have a unique and significant contribution to make to the overall education of every 
child. If the potential and range of these subjects' experiences is not fully realised, then that 
child cannot be said to be properly educated for many reasons; (A) they offer a chance to 
participate in active and creative activities. (B) the emotional development of the children 
seems particularly heightened when these subjects have their rightful place in integrated 
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learning. (C) these subjects develop focused minds, keen memory, analytical and critical 
thinking, co-ordination skills and physical self-awareness. (D) they encourage creativity, 
sensitivity, awareness of others and self-discipline. (E) they promote collaboration and 
communication, as well as encouraging individual responsibility. (F) they can foster 
creative expression and waken the imagination. (G) they are also a medium through which 
learners can join with their peers, their family and the wider community in meaningful, 
enjoyable experiences. Engaging in such activities gives opportunities for learners to learn 
how to be free to make choices and decision. Also it helps them to respect other people's 
freedom and be responsible for their actions in ways which they might not be able to do in 
mathematics and science. (H) study of these subjects helps to develop a particular way of 
demonstrating intelligence. To engaged in these activities of quality is to participate in an 
intellectually demanding, rigorous and disciplined form of valued human endeavour, to 
which, from an early age, everyone should have access, (1) moreover, the products of these 
subjects are not about something totally out of society's needs, interest and problems. 
Although the above-mentioned option subjects would not be compulsory and learners 
would not be obliged to sit for examinations, this does not mean that they should be treated 
as of less value than mathematics and science. In an education system based on freedom 
they would be treated in the same manner as the compulsory subjects in terms of access to 
facilities and equipment, qualified teachers, and good planning for their curriculum and 
examination. To introduce such subjects to schools in that context and in order to 
strengthen their position requires two important things. Firstly, it is necessary to change the 
way that they are perceived by a large number of politicians, policy makers, parents, 
administrators, headmasters and teachers in Egyptian society. Secondly, 
if children are to have more choice, they will need to be systematically introduced to a 
wide range of possible ways of working. The best way to achieve this is to let children 
explore, experiment and investigate these ways of working for themselves. In order to do 
this children need clear practical structure within which to work and their teachers need a 
framework within which to teach (Nleager, 1995: 7). 
Similarly, Rogers (1970b: 220) argues that children should be given opportunities to handle 
a wide range of material and in working with them to discover their nature and their 
properties. 
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In addition to having the above-mentioned option subjects there would be compulsory 
subjects (design and technology, information and communication technology, geography, 
history, citizenship education, religious education, national language (Arabic), a foreign 
language (English), mathematics and science). The reason behind calling them compulsory 
is not that they are more valuable but it is because the options can not be taken up by all 
because they require special talents and gifts. The talented and gifted in art will gain more 
marks than who do not have the talent. As a consequence both learners will not be equal in 
terms of educational opportunity. I believe that having these subjects as compulsory is a 
kind of restriction that prevents learners from having an equal opportunity. 
Having suggested new subjects to be added to the Egyptian curriculum in the following 
section will introduce these new subjects and explain how . they play their role 
in an 
education system based on freedom. 
6.4.1.1. Maximising learners' freedom through design and technolog y 
Adding Design and Technology (DT) as a new subject to the primary and preparatory 
school curriculum will maximise learners' freedom by increasing the variety of 
experiences, skills and knowledge. It will also help them to learn through their own 
experiences. Primary school children need to learn much through practical experiences. 
This is often apparent when witnessing the pleasure children derive from a practical task. 
DT provides a more meaningful setting for this to happen. There is no doubt that DT will 
be a strange beast in the curriculum being proposed here. Some Egyptian educationalists 
might argue that it has been lurking in the shadows of the vocational preparatory 
curriculum for some years but in a different guise and with a different name. Others might 
argue that it has never been seen in this form before. Therefore, I will discuss in more detail 
the importance and nature of DT as a kind of justification for inclusion in the school 
curriculum. 
According to Johnsey (1998: 2) "Design and technology is a single curriculum subject with 
a mind of its own. It possesses a heart and soul that is unique and a strong underlying 
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rationale that is especially suited to the primary school. It is not like science, mathematics, 
art or IT and yet it has strong links with these areas of study and may, indeed, enhance 
children's learning in all curriculum subjects". It is an active study involving the purposeful 
pursuit of a task to some form of resolution that results in improvement (for someone) in 
the made world. It is a study that is essentially procedural and which uses knowledge and 
skills as a resource for action (DESWO, 1989: 1-7). Others would argue that technology 
should involve the use of predominately scientific knowledge and understanding. Thus 
O'Hear (1981: 51-2) and Naughton (1994: 8) suggest that technology is the application of 
scientific and other knowledge to practical tasks by an organisation that involves people 
and machines. This connection with scientific knowledge appears in some of the 
consultation documents preceding the current national UK curriculum orders for DT. 
Technology is the application of scientific and related knowledge to a problem, resulting in 
a solution that may involve the creation of a product. (NCC, 1992). 
There are three aspects of DT that teachers will want to promote in their learners as 
suggested by Johnsey (1998: 7), Metz (1992: 85) and Makiya and Rogers, (1992: 6). Firstly, 
understanding the procedures of design and technology. This involves the identification of 
the skills that combine to make up how learners and others design and make products. This 
understanding also involves knowing when and how to use these skills in different 
contexts. Secondly, knowledge and understanding in DT. This involves areas of 
knowledge, which are unique to DT as well as knowledge from other subjects. Thirdly, 
practical capability. This involves an understanding of how to handle material, tools and 
related processes. It also involves an ability to solve practical problems. This ability often 
comes with prolonged involvement with practical tasks such as those associated with many 
hobbies, DIY or careers involving manual dexterity. The importance of having DT as a 
subject in the primary and preparatory school can be seen in Metz (1992: 75-85) and 
Baynes's work (1992: 11,19). Baynes suggests: all DT "is an attempt to serve human needs, 
wants and aspirations.... Design and technology looks towards the future. Its job is to 
envisage what should be made. It attempts the difficult task of trying to see, and then to 
bring into existence, places, building, products and images that society believes it needs. " 
McCormick (1999: 217) argues that a key issue in this definition of design and technology, 
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is that "improvement in the made world therefore cannot proceed without identifying the 
fact that something requires improvement. 
This would seem to be a strong justification for teaching the subject to all children, in that it 
might provide skills and knowledge which would be useful in the future life of the pupil". 
Johnsey (1998: 7) adds that DT is essentially about carrying out tasks which make 
improvements in the world by satisfying needs or solving problems. This will involve 
children in making decisions for themselves when planning and executing their own route 
through the task. Moreover, children with design and technology capacity are able to 
recognise and explore people's needs and wants, develop ideas about how these might be 
met and develop products that meet those needs. (SCAA, 1995: 4). Children at this stage will 
be able to have research skills, generating ideas and modelling outcomes and also "skills 
for planning and organisation" (Johnsey, 1998: 58-70). The requirements for design and 
technology call for teachers to involve their learners in situations that enable them to 
engage in the following: solving problems, responding to a variety of needs, thinking 
divergently and convergently, making use of resources, manipulating and using a variety of 
materials and media, exchanging ideas, and evaluating ideas and products (Makiya and 
Rogers, 1992: 6). 
6.4.1.2. Maximising learners' freedom through information and communication tcchnolo*- 
There is general agreement between educationalists that the world beyond the classroom, 
and particularly in the place of work, has been irreversibly changed by Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT). It is likely that every occupation in the future will 
require capability with many aspects of ICT. Therefore, in order to maximise opportunities 
for living productive and fulfilling lives, children must be provided with both effective 
tuition in the use of ICT from an early age and take the opportunity to appreciate its 
potential. ICT according to Martyn (1999: 130) "refers to the purposeful use of 
technological tools to support learners' learning across a range of subjects. It is distinct 
from IT, which involves the development of technical skills and understanding across a 
ranke of electronic equipment and computer applications. The development of learners' IT 
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capability provides the foundation upon which effective use of ICT can be built". The 
importance of having ICT as a subject in the primary and preparatory school curriculum 
arises from its value in helping learners to think in different ways which is the main aim of 
the idea of freedom in education. It provides the learners with varieties of tools to discover 
knowledge and increase their learning skills. 
Some reasons for including ICT in the curriculum are noted for instance, by Underwood 
(1994), Whitebread, (1997), Martyn (1999), Wegerif and Scrimshaw (1997). For example 
Underwood argues that; (a) ICT "can be more than a workhorse, it has the potential to 
change our patterns of thinking and our ways of knowing (1994: 8). Similarly, Martyn 
(1999: 130) argues that as one of the most powerful tools ever invented, ICT offers huge 
potential to enhance children's lives... it has the power to motivate children, to assist them 
with many labour-intensive aspects of learning and to encourage the development of 
thinking in a variety of mind-changing ways. Whitebread (1997: 16-31) indicates that 
collaborative ICT-based problem-solving tasks involving decisions-making adventure 
games and modelling applications can promote higher-order thinking, through providing 
exciting, relevant and meaningful opportunities to discuss and debate, raise questions, listen 
to other points of view and evaluate them, analyse data, rationalise decisions, hypothesise, 
predict and modify ideas. (b) The use of ICT in context-free problem-solving activities has 
an important role to play in developing productive classroom talk (Wegerif and 
Scrimshaw, 1997: 3-5). (c) As children progress through the primary school, they become 
increasingly able to cope with thinking, the context of which is distanced from their 
immediate environment and the here and now of their lives. Through web sites and the use 
of email, learners can engage in meaningful virtual contact with children living in distant 
locations. Email facilitates exchanges of information that can make possible comparison of 
lifestyle, culture and experiences, and motivation is maintained because of the speed at 
which responses can be received. Through simulation software ICT can give learners the 
chance to experience, virtually, situations that they would not otherwise be able to 
(Martyn, 1999: 130). 
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6.4.1.3. Maximising learners' freedom through geography, history and citizenship 
In Egypt learners at Basic Education level study a subject known as social studies which 
contains history, geography and citizenship education. Although social studies as a subject 
gives too many students the impression that these subjects are merely an odd jumble of 
unrelated dates, places, and processes (Bennett, in 'Ammar, 1996c: 46), it still has its 
advocates and defenders in Egypt and in others countries. They argue on two fronts; `first, 
that immersion in familiar particulars of local life builds children's academic self 
confidence and esteem; and second, that, for reasons of cognitive and developmental 
psychology-our youngest students are not yet ready for real History, Geography, or Civics' 
('Ammar, 1996c-. 46). Neither claim is true. "Ravitch has amassed an impressive collection 
of expert testimony on expanding environments, all of it negative. Joseph Adelson, 
professor of psychology at the University of Michigan, confirms: there is nothing in 
cognitive science, or in developmental research, which supports the present way of doing 
things. Jerome Bruner of the New School in New York City agrees: there is little beyond 
ideology to commend the programme and its endlessly bland versions. Philip Phenix, 
educational philosopher and professor emeritus at the teachers College of Columbia 
University, calls Expanding Environments positively ill-suited to the needs of young 
children, wholly without warrant, and a recipe for boredom and sterility, doing poor justice 
to the expansive capacities of the human mind" (Bennett, in `Ammar, 1996c: 47). As 
mentioned in chapter two, freedom in education implies that young learners have the ability 
to make their own choices and decisions and to take responsibility. Of course it is possible 
to argue that although children have the right to study each subject separately and have a 
different understanding of knowledge and skills without fear, they are not mature enough to 
gain the required learning through the study of these subjects. In this sense Mahmuud 
(1995: 126-8) argues that `although young children may not be prepared to absorb 
sophisticated causal explanations of our world's complicated past and the present, most of 
them come to kindergarten already aware-through television and other media of people and 
places far beyond the street between home and school, and they are ready and eager to have 
their enormous appetite for further information satisfied'. For including Geography as a 
subject in the primary school curriculum, Hicks and Holden (1995: 100) argue that children 
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of this age are concerned not only about their personal future but also the future of their 
local community and the global future... children are trying to make sense of the world and 
their role in it and teachers should facilitate this process. Similarly, Cook (1999: 8 1) argues 
that, by the later years of primary school, children are able to cope intellectually with 
advanced concepts and that this developing ability can be extended further through 
engagement with geographical enquiry and study. This learning is crucial for the overall 
educational and personal development of learners between the ages of seven and eleven. 
With regard to citizenship, Ranson argues that the learner should have the experience to 
develop an understanding of the situation, or the other person; to have the ability to judge 
the appropriate ends and course of action, which presupposes a community based upon 
sensitivities and tact; and learning through action to realise food practice (1996: 223). 
Therefore, the citizenship curriculum should not focus on talk about moral principles, it 
should focus on learners' practices that contain their own set of moral principles. 
politically, therefore, the community must be so organised as to ensure maximal 
participation by its members. Machinery %vill have to be devised to respect the moral 
autonomy and responsibility of the citizens-an official opposition, a free press, periodic 
elections, safeguards for minorities etc. etc. Maximal participation will also mean that 
democratic decision-making is not restricted to central government (WVhite. 1982: 1 16). 
In this sense Halliday (1999: 53) argues that a curriculum for citizenship 
should be concerned to maximise opportunity to find touchstones by inducting learners 
into as many practices as possible so that they come to acquire those many forms of 
reasoning that enable participation in a democratic form of life. 
To do so the call for personal autonomy and civic responsibility are required 
(Aspin, 1997: 253) to encourage children 
to explore issues to do with power and politics and it is important to include factual 
information about the structures and process of government in any curriculum materials... 
children's lived experience... understanding that must be taken into account if we wish 
them to really appreciate the principles and purposes that underpin democratic practices 
(Howard and Gill, 2000: 357). 
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6.4.1.4. Maximising learners' freedom through religious education 
Although religious education (Islamic and Christian) as a subject in schools has been 
considered a compulsory subject and is a required examination subject it does not 
contribute to the final marks. On one side, in an education system based on freedom having 
religious education as a compulsory and required examination subject which does not 
contribute in the final marks actually provides for greater equality of opportunity between 
Muslim and Christian learners. Egypt is an Islamic country and Islam is the official 
religion. Therefore, having religious education as contributor to the final marks might go 
against the idea of freedom in education where the Islamic religion already receives more 
attention in terms of having its teachers, textbooks, in addition to the contribution the media 
can make to them as well. On the other hand, teaching and learning religion might be more 
important than other subjects in terms of exercising freedom in a way that does not harm 
anybody else, to learn responsibility for oneself and to have and make ones own moral 
rules. The rationale for having religious education to be included in the curriculum has 
been discussed widely in the work of educational philosophers such as Hirst (1974: 32-44), 
Hudson (1987: 109-116) and Phenix (1964: 4-8). According to them, the rational religious 
education in school would seem to encompass five areas; Religion as a form of knowledge; 
Religion as a distinctive form of human experience; Religion as having a role to play in any 
discussion on morality; Religious understanding as crucial in preparing learners for life in a 
multi-faith and multicultural society; Religion as making a significant contribution to 
structuring and understanding personal experience. Similarly, Broadbent (1999: 67) argues 
that for learners from 7 to 11 years old "religious education can offer a vigorous learning 
experience. It offers opportunities to develop knowledge of the local and wider community, 
to explore religious beliefs and practices, to raise questions and to develop a sense of 
personal identity. It offers opportunities to become researchers and investigators, to become 
skilled in moral decision-making, and confident in social interactions with peers and 
adults". 
Having discussed the nature of primary and preparatory subjects the argument now turns to 
discuss the nature of subjects at secondary schools. 
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6.4.2. The nature of the curriculum subjects in secondary school 
Unlike the current system, an education based on freedom in the secondary school would 
have varieties of different subjects (technical, science, mathematics and humanities 
subjects) out of which learners would choose five subjects to study according to their 
interests and what they want to do in the future. There would be no obligation for the 
learners to choose any specific subject. This would mean that instead of the traditional 
classification role of academic/technical division, the emphasis would be on "new and 
innovative kinds of connectiveness between knowledge areas and different forms of 
specialised study interwoven with a generic core of knowledge, skills and processes" 
(Young, 1996: 1 17). This would require: 
flexibility (the opportunity to make choices and combine different kinds of learning in 
new ways) and coherence (the sense of clarity that students need in order to be clear about 
their educational purposes and where a particular course of study (or cluster of modules) 
will lead to (Young, 1996: 117) 
In this sense each school should offer a ranke of specialisms in most of the academic, 
technical and humanities subjects. For learners in secondary school will choose according 
to their interests and what they want to be in the future. Therefore, unlike the current 
system there has to be a connection between the various subjects at secondary school and 
the subject required by the university. In other words, learners will have freedom first to 
find out what they are interested in and in what college they want to study it, then to make 
the choices between the available subjects. Subjects would be changed according to the 
interests of the learners and society as well. The main point behind having varieties of 
subjects is to meet the interests of the individuals and the society. With rapid changes all 
over the world, new subjects will be likely to attract the learners' interest. This gives the 
chance for the new subjects to be preferred. This also makes work opportunity available for 
the learners, as well as making investment in education a real and practical principle. 
Regarding the learner's choices between these subjects, it is necessary for them to be left 
free to decide for themselves with help from their parents and teachers to discuss their 
interests, the nature of each subject and the subject requirements for each college. This will 
help the learners to decide what they are interested in, and help them to make their own 
decisions. 
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6.5. Maximising learners' freedom through assessment practices 
Assessment based on freedom in education aims, on the one hand, to enable learners to 
know about their performance and their interests. Also it helps learners to choose the 
appropriate subjects in secondary school and the type of study in higher education that they 
want to do in the future according to their interests. On the other hand the purpose of 
assessment is for the state to evaluate the teaching and learning environment. However, in 
secondary school, assessment through national examination plays a central role in 
classifying learners into groups according to their scores. Learners already understand the 
significance of qualifications, and see the place of examination in the competition to gain 
jobs. They assume that they cannot gain employment without qualifications of the 
traditional sort. In the implementation of freedom in education there are some 
considerations here and certain preparations that need to be made. 
Firstly, in education based on freedom it might be possible to argue that there is no failure 
by learners, especially in the first nine years of their lives at school, when they learn how to 
read, write and think to be able to find out their real interests and what they want to be in 
the future. However, learners would sit for government examinations in grades six and nine 
in order to inform the learners, teachers and parents about their performance and interests. 
This proposal is made because failure in examination does not prove that learners are not 
good, rather it indicates that they need more help to adapt and learn. Therefore, learners 
would need only to pass these two examinations to be able to continue. Thus, it would not 
matter how well they scores, because the purpose of the examination would be to inform 
the learners about their interests that help them to choose between subjects in secondary 
school. 
Secondly, learners at all levels should do course work for each subject so their achievement 
would be decided by both examination and course work. Final scores would not be based 
on the final examination only but would be divided into 40% for course work and 60% for 
examination's papers. To make sure that teachers will not use the course work to oblige 
learners to attend private tuition or for learners to have justice in correcting course work, 
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teachers other than the normal class teachers would undertake the course work. The 
significance of having course work is that; (a) it gives the learners the chance to do creative 
work and to learn how to make their own choices and decisions, (b) it makes the parents 
and their children less worried about the outcomes of the final examination and therefore 
reduces the stress on the children as well because their assessment does not rely on the final 
examination, (c) it is also important to point out that going back to course work will not 
encourage private tuition for at least two reasons. The first, is that assessment questions 
based on freedom have nothing to do with how much knowledge learners can memorise 
through the pattern of questions and answers in which private tuition can help. The second 
reason is that because course work will not include monthly test as it did before in the 
Egyptian system, which encouraged learners to seek private education. It would include 
teacher-marked essays, projects, exercises and class tests. Course work gives freedom from 
the constraints of a traditional examination paper. Time and place are no obstacles to 
motivated learners, and there is not the tyranny of trying to recall fact frenetically crammed 
at the final moment. Course work allows learners to collect their own ideas and examples, 
to work them out at their own speed, and to collect their own concepts at their own pace. It 
allows learners the opportunity to work together as a team, with each member contributing 
according to ability. It allows learners to choose for themselves what they are going to 
work on. 
Thirdly, learners' achievement in each subject should be recognised within grades 
A*, A, B, C and D. Each of these grades would be constructed from a reasonable average 
instead of being as an exact mark in each subject and final score (as the current Egyptian 
system does). As enrolment in higher education has to depend on the learners' grades in 
each subject, this form of assessment will increase learners' freedom to acquire the 
opportunities they want, because in the current system very many learners lose their 
freedom to study something they are interested in because their score is just half or one 
mark less than that required. Fourthly, examination questions should be constructed to find 
out how learners think and how they use the knowledge they have to solve a particular 
problem. Fifthly, learners should have the right to be re-examined if they fail or if they 
wish to improve, any number of times, especially in secondary examinations that are 
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required for higher education. Learners who fail in one or more subjects should be re- 
examined in that particular subject only, and not in all the subjects as the current system 
requires, and learners should be evaluated by taking their actual marks not the minimum 
marks. It is important that learners should not pay fees for re-examination, to encourage 
them to achieve their goals by re-sitting examinations. 
Sixthly, education based on freedom should allow learners to use their certificate in grades 
9 and 15 any time they want to use it. It gives the learners freedom to join the next stage at 
school or higher education when they can and like. Seventhly, learners' final score in 
secondary school, which are required for enrolment in higher education, should be 
considered as the total marks in the three year. In this respect, there are some colleges that 
should devise their own selection criteria and not base their decision on secondary final 
examinations because for some studies it is a poor means of assessing suitability. It seems 
illogical to accept some learners in the arts or music colleges based on their scores in 
mathematics, science ... 
(etc) and not on their talent in art and music. Therefore, I propose 
that each college should devise its own selection criteria as a first requirement and utilise 
the school score as a secondary requirement. It also might be useful to allow learners to sit 
for another examination for each college. 
6.6. Teacher education in the light of the idea of freedom in education 
Education based on freedom cannot successfully takes place if teachers are unfree, 
autocratic or unwilling to adapt to change. As examined in chapter five unfortunately the 
characteristics of Egyptian teachers are not currently suitable to enable them to play their 
role in an education system based on freedom. In the implementation of freedom in 
education there are therefore some considerations and arrangements necessary in relation to 
the preparation and training of teachers. Firstly, unlike the current Egyptian system, it 
should be possible to train teachers by having them prepared in a school of education for 
candidates who have a first degree in a particular subject. This would ensure that the 
candidates had freedom to choose to be trained as teachers or to do otherwise. This is 
because teaching is not an easy job and it requires volunteers who are willing to play a 
233 
very important role. Also there should be well-structured interviews with these candidates 
before allowing them to be educated as teachers. Through these interviews the interviewer 
can decide if the characteristics of these candidates are suitable for him to do a teaching job 
or not. Such decisions can be made according to the arguments that have been presented in 
chapters two and three, namely that the candidate should work as a full-time teacher for 
another year under supervision before he/she can gain their teaching certificate. It is 
important that the relationship between new teachers and the school of education is to 
continue after graduation so that new teachers can have the opportunity for continuing 
advice or doing postgraduate studies. For Alexander (1985: 139) "school is not simply a 
place where students practice what they have been taught in colleges, but is where they 
actually learn and study: the intended schools-college relationship is now reciprocal". For 
the type of education the candidate can receive in a school of education see chapter three. 
Secondly, education based on freedom requires that teachers must have the confidence to 
be involved in tackling educational problems and contribute to the on-going policy debate 
(Garland, 1985: 71-3). Teachers ought to be a very important group in making decisions and 
they should share in the preparations for the implementation of freedom. Also their 
opinions should be considered in the analysis and solving of the problems that might 
appeared in the implementation of freedom. "A first step in this process is to help teachers 
to remind themselves that they do have a crucial role to play in making a difference to the 
lives of students" (Day, 2000: 110). As Tirri and Husu have argued, 
the parents, pupils, and colleagues must know teachers as people who are caring, 
responsible. and capable of looking after our children in schools (2002: 79). 
As Day has emphasised, 
teachers themselves must be more than pedagogical experts. Professional development 
opportunities in the future must provide support for classroom pedagogy that goes far 
beyond the mechanics of teaching... It is the creation and sustenance of the moral and 
professional purposes of teachers that should provide the main agenda for their continuing 
professional development (2000: 113) 
In this sense, as White (1985: 203) suggests teachers will need, first, to understand the aims 
of the whole educational system; they will need to reflect on how to fit their own teaching 
into this framework ensuring at the same time that it meshes in with what their colleagues 
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are doing in other schools. Shanker (1997: 118) argues for giving teachers the time to share 
ideas about teaching and problems they are having, time to ask such questions as 
what are they doing with their learners? What are their expectations? What is this 
textbook like? Is it better than that one? Without this kind of chance to reflect on their 
practice and discuss it with colleagues, teachers are likely to go on doing the same thing 
they have always done - and, incidentally, the same thing their own teachers did. 
In this sense O'Hanlon argues that it is important to allow teachers to learn from their own 
experiences in teaching and to improve their practice in the general advancement of their 
careers. This requires the fostering of contexts that enable teachers to engage in critical 
reasoning, like teacher education courses and in service training based on critical inquiry or 
action research (2000: 149). 
In another sense Fullan argues that for teachers to alter their practices, there must be 
changes in the actual materials they use, changes in their beliefs, and changes in how they 
teach (1982: 116-120). In doing so teachers should have access to, and be familiar with, 
some or all of the following high and low technological tools: radio; television - terrestrial, 
satellite and digital; tape recorders; CD players; video players; calculators; cameras - 
analogue, digital and video; computers; scanners; fax machines; the Internet; e-mail and 
video-conferencing. Each of these tools can be used by primary, preparatory and secondary 
teachers to enhance their teaching and to support the learning of their learners in various 
ways. This requires "initial teacher training for the use of information and communications 
technology to meet teaching objectives in all subjects" (TTA, 2002: I). `The introduction of 
new technologies to classrooms has offered new insights about the role of teachers in 
promoting learning. `Technology can give teachers license to experiment and tinker. It can 
stimulate teachers to think about the processes of learning, whether through a fresh study of 
their own subjects or a fresh perspective on students' learning. It softens the barrier 
between what students do and what teachers do' ('Abd Al-Nabi, 1997: 105). 
Education based on freedom should be concerned also about teachers being free to have 
flexible time to do their job and other activities in which they feel more comfortable. In 
other words there is no need for teachers to stay the whole day at school if they do not have 
classes. This will give them the time for studying and reflecting on the teaching, problems 
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they come across at school. Also teachers should not be overloaded by so many classes a 
day that they will not be able to treat all their classes equally. This requires a decrease in 
the number of learners to each teacher and this requires an increasing number of teachers. 
Fourthly, in line with the historical and present analysis of educational theory and practice 
in the implementation of freedom in education it is important to make a great effort to 
change society's views toward the teaching profession and teachers so that teachers are 
given the respect that they should have. This will help them to feel that they are a powerful 
and important factor in education based on freedom. Fifthly, teachers need to have a better 
payment for their job on one hand and on the other hand they should be treated as different 
and important in society. In other words they should have free access to all libraries, 
Internet centres, computer services, clubs. They might also be granted discounts in some 
others activities such as sports. 
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6.7. Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter was to construct the framework of a theory of education based 
on freedom that suits Egyptian society and its goals and that can improve the efficiency of 
its educational system. The framework that has been suggested in the current chapter suites 
the Egyptian context, on the one hand, on the other hand, it also guarantees a range of 
freedom that enables learners and society to derive benefit from the value of freedom in 
education. Firstly, this framework considered the general components and aims of 
education. Secondly, it addressed the nature of the educational system, school curriculum, 
assessment and teacher's education. The following chapter investigates conditions and 
difficulties that might affect the implementation of education based on freedom in Egypt 
and offers some suggestions that might help to reduce the gap between the educational 
situation, its circumstances and the required conditions necessary for the successful 
implementation of freedom in education. 
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Chapter Seven 
Pre-conditions and difficulties determining the implementation 
of the idea of freedom in education in the Egyptian context 
7.1. Introduction 
The main concern of chapter six was to construct a framework of a theory of education 
based on freedom that suits Egyptian society and its goals and that can improve the 
efficiency of its educational system. In this chapter it is important to note that there are 
likely to be some conditions and difficulties that might affect the implementation of 
education based on freedom. Therefore, this chapter examines the conditions and 
difficulties which need to be addressed for successful implementation of freedom in 
education in Egypt. Also, I will attempt to provide some suggestions that might help to 
reduce the gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the condition 
necessary for the successful implementation of freedom in education. 
7.2. Conditions required to implement freedom in education 
This section investigates and examines conditions that determine freedom in education 
when the implementation takes place and highlight the difficulties that might arise in 
implementing freedom in education in the Egyptian context. 
7.2.1. Maximising individual's freedom through democratic participation in decision- 
making 
Although Egypt has been turned into a democratic state, rather than an egalitarian 
socialist state, strong central control has remained in most fields, including education 
(Hargreaves, 2001: 258). `The state is the final authority on every decision in which 
learners, teachers, parents, educationalists and schools have no opportunity to 
participate in decision-making or to object against decisions that have already been 
made' (`Ali, 1972: 81). Given this situation, the implementation of an educational system 
in Egypt that is based on the concept of freedom presented in this study cannot really 
take place. This is because education based on freedom cannot be achieved unless there 
are a range of individual freedom in society itself. This is because in a society that 
grants freedom to its citizens everyone has the freedom to share in decision-making. 
Education based on freedom requires the democratic participation of all parties 
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(learners, parents, teachers, educationalists, politicians, administrators and schools) in 
decision-making, together `with the belief that each party can make a valid and valuable 
contribution' (Eraut, 1981: 152), ('Ammar, 1998b: 44) and ('Abd Al-Hamid, 1991: 63). 
Freedom to participate is a required condition for learners and politicians to enjoy the 
value of freedom in education, for teachers to share ideas about education and teaching 
and play their roles with satisfaction, for educationalists to be able to support or object 
to details regarding implementation, for head-teachers and administrators to facilitate 
activities related to the enjoyment of learners at school to enjoy the value of freedom, 
for parents to ensure that their children receive the best free and equal opportunity that 
can be offered, for schools, to have sufficient autonomy to manage their daily affairs 
and make decisions without referring to the national or the local authorities. 
Participation of all these parties requires that the educational authority should listen to 
everyone and consider their opinions in making their initial decisions. 
It might be possible to argue that there is general agreement that all mentioned groups, 
with the exception of learners, already have the right and the capability to participate in 
making decisions, although in a society like Egypt there is in fact no participation at all 
in the current system. However, the greater challenge is likely to be in arguing the 
validity of involving learners in making decisions and affirming the importance of 
learners' perspectives as a source for looking at education as a whole and in schools in 
particular. This requires tuning in to learners' experiences and views with the belief that 
they are capable of providing valuable insights. In the legislative sense the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Arajarvi, 1992: 20- 1) gives the right to children 
to express their views freely in all matters affecting them, and their views have to be 
given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity. Children should be 
provided with the opportunity to be heard in an judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting them, either directly, or through a representative or an 
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
In 1989 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the child brought the issues of 
protection and participation together: the right of young people to talk about their 
experiences and to be heard and to express a view about actions that might be taken in 
relation to them, was seen as a basis for protection. According to Rudduck and Flutter 
"children's rights have mainly, but not exclusively, been argued for by adults on behalf 
of pupils whereas pupil `participation and perspective' suggests a stronger input by 
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pupils themselves and a readiness among adults to hear and to take seriously what they 
have to say" (2000: 76). This right gives learners freedom to be recognised as social 
actors, as participants in society (Lansdown, 1994: 36). Moreover it makes them 
responsible for participation in decision-making regarding their own education 
(Smith, 1965: 254). Similarly, Freeman (1996: 36-37) argues that 
the right enunciated here is significant not only for what it says, but because it 
recognises the child as a full being with integrity and personality and the ability to 
participate fully in society... the views of children are to count when decisions 
ranging from education to environment, from social security to secure 
accommodation, from transport to television, are being taken. 
In another sense learners are very important as a source for collecting reliable data 
about their education and especially about the teaching and learning process. Marland 
(1996: 67), Charlton (1996: 50) and MacCallum, Hargreaves and Gipps (2000: 275) 
argue the importance of the pupil's voice for example, as an important element in 
furthering people's understanding of teaching and learning more generally. As freedom 
in education is now focused on learning rather than performance and standards' of 
achievement, Bennathan (1996: 90) and Duffield, Allan, Turner and Morris (2000: 263) 
argue that listening to the pupil's voice is very important to manage school 
improvement. Much research has been done that has produced good findings to support 
a rational case for using learning as a source of data. For example, in research to explore 
children's attitudes towards rules and discipline in school, Cullingford (1988: 3-4) states 
that learners were able to explore important issues clearly. In research by Campbell et al 
(2001: 173) learners were able to recognise very clearly the type of approach teachers 
used in teaching. When teacher focused strongly on actively engaging learners and 
creating a supportive environment, the learners focused on learner-centred aspects of 
the class. In contrast, when traditional expository teaching methods were used 
exclusively, learners focused on transmission and reproduction. These two examples 
show that learners have the ability to recognise very complicated issues and problems in 
education in ways that might be difficult for outside researchers to do. Also, it might be 
possible to say that they have sometimes the ability to suggest solutions for such 
problems. 
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Turning again to the essential point that concerns the necessity of democratic 
participation of all groups (especially learners, parents, teachers, head-teachers and 
administrators) in the implementation of freedom in education, it is essential to make 
schooling accessible to public judgement (Simons, 1987: 195). In this way, learners, 
teachers and parents will have the opportunity to be involved in decision-making (see 
Carnie, 1996: 50). Parents should have the freedom to be well informed regarding their 
children's education through, for example, an open evening with an interview with the 
class teacher; a detailed school prospectus including accounts of the educational policy 
and teaching methods of the school and a school report (Eraut, 1981: 158-9). Learners 
should be the most important group to attend these meetings and they should have the 
opportunity to ask any question they may have about the new changes. This also 
requires that each school should hold open meetings where the matter is debated 
amongst the teachers, learners and parents, the main proceedings reported to the local 
authority and thence to the national authority. This requires that educational authority 
should make efforts to involve everyone in educational planning and decisions. In this 
sense `Abd Al-Daim argues that ' political efforts are the most essential ingredients of 
genuine reform (1991: 82). In this way, the views of all parties would be heard and also, 
the parties should have received information concerning proposed changes and have an 
opportunity to consider possible outcomes. In other words implementing freedom in 
education has to be considered as a national challenge, in which everyone has a 
contribution to make. Furthermore, freedom is an idea and hope for everyone not just in 
education but in life. People, when they believe in such an issue, become very powerful 
in achieving their goals. I believe that freedom in education is an issue that can be a 
national challenge because as Dewey (1959: 31) argues, it is an issue in which everyone 
has an interest. 
7.2.2. Implementation of radical and comprehensive changes 
A theory of education based on freedom, as suggested in chapter six, has its 
implementation in the purpose and aims of education, the structure of the system, 
school curriculum, textbooks, teaching methods, assessment procedures and teacher's 
education. Implementation of freedom in education in the sense suggested in chapter six 
requires radical and comprehensive changes in all these areas rather than making partial 
changes. `Changes to different aspects of the educational system have to take place 
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simultaneously. For example, changes in the curriculum cannot be achieved without 
changing the format of assessment, teacher's education and vice versa' 
(NCERT, 1994: 87). This is because radical and comprehensive reform focuses on 
human resource requirement, goals and objectives, financing and budget, curriculum, 
educational management (Ginnburg, Wallace, and Miller, 1988: 331-4), Merritt and 
Coombs (1977: 254-7), Sack (1981: 42-3), Simmons (1983: 7-17) and Ginsburg, Cooper, 
Raghu, Zegarra (1991: 24-30). It might be argued that `modifications or partial reform in 
one of these processes rather than the whole does not produce satisfactory results' 
(NCERT, 1993 : 17). "The change is not that few changes have occurred, but rather that 
the changes which have occurred have not made a significant difference, because the 
spirit, on the whole, is what it always was" (Hare, 1978: 72). 
The need for radical and comprehensive changes comes as a result of the analysis of the 
nature of the Egyptian educational reform. Most if not all the reforms that have 
occurred so far have been partial where any changes in one aspect did not consider the 
required changes that should be made in another areas. For example, `secondary school 
learners were given the freedom to re-sit for examination if they wished to attempt to 
improve their marks' (ME, 1994c: 2). In 1998, school learners lost that freedom because 
it created many problems with respect to admission to universities and increased family 
expenditure on private tuition. Also, teachers did not have the time and strength to mark 
papers on time, and the proportion of candidates achieving the highest grade increased. 
All these problems came about because the change in the examination procedures was 
an isolated innovation and not accompanied by change to the curriculum. Also, there 
was not enough preparation for the change in schools and in universities. Therefore, 
learners lost a good chance to improve their achievement because of the way it had been 
introduced. 
In a different area, in 1993, the state decided to implement extra curricula activities in 
schools. Thus, the state decided to extend the school day in some schools for the 
learners to have enough time to do all the kinds of activities they wished without first 
establishing the ability of the school to make the demand. In the same year, the local 
authority in every county started their plan to apply this decision to all schools across 
the country' (NCERT, 1997: 45). Applying such a decision immediately did not allow 
schools enough time for preparation and did not provide learners and teachers with all 
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they needed for extra curricula activities. As a result, learners and teachers stayed in 
school doing nothing. Because of the lack of equipment and facilities learners became 
bored doing nothing. Teachers and administrators became tired of keeping learners 
under control and also they felt that their time was being wasted. After a few months of 
enforcing the decisions, the state returned to normal school hours. This example 
illustrates how a seemingly good idea such as extending the school day for learners to 
undertake extra-curricula activities failed, due to a limited version of reform. It also 
exemplifies the way in which many initiatives are put into practice. Local authorities 
readily comply with instructions from the central authority without sufficient planning 
or the carrying out of feasibility studies. 
7.2.3. Society's understanding of, and preparation for freedom in education 
According to the analysis of freedom in education made so far, everyone in society has 
their role to play. In other words, educational planning, decisions and practices are 
shared between learners, teachers, parents, politicians and educationalists. This requires 
that education based on freedom should be `understood by everyone in the society' 
(`Ali, 1993: 167), Nwr Al-Din (1997: 199), Al-Matbwli (1995: 145), Wragg (1976: 18-20) 
and Manswr (2000: 241). Implementation of freedom in education can be misguided and 
can cause serious problems not because there is something wrong with any of the 
educational processes, but rather due to a misunderstanding of these processes by any of 
the mentioned groups. Thus, for example, parents would be unaware of their role in 
helping their children, teachers would not be aware of what they should do with their 
students in different situations in the classroom, administrators would be confused about 
the planning of the school facilities, school timetable, school plan, etc. As has been 
mentioned in chapters four and five, `Egyptian society is not always aware of what is 
going on with respect to the educational changes or reforms and this is why some 
promising innovations have failed' (`Ali, 1993: 167). To avoid the same mistake, 
implementing freedom in education in Egypt requires an understanding by everyone in 
society, otherwise the implementation may fail. For everyone to understand such new 
reforms all the mentioned groups will need much preparation to be aware of the 
complexity of their rights, obligations and roles. They need to acquire more skills as 
they accept a more equal partnership with each other in education based on freedom. 
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Therefore, all kinds of media, using all the new technologies, should be responsible for 
the preparation needed, as well as schools. 
7.2.4. Commissioning research in order to develop more effective implementation 
This study has offered a theoretical framework of education based on freedom and its 
implications in the Egyptian context in terms of favoured aims and guidelines for a 
suitable curriculum, assessment strategies and teacher education. However, "it is often 
unclear whether such new development in educational thinking and practice are better, 
or worse, than the regimes they replace" (Davies, 1999: 109). This requires adequately 
evaluated means of carefully designed, executed and controlled trials, quasi- 
experiments, surveys, before and after implementation, high quality observational 
studies, ethnographic studies which look at outcome as well as process, or conversation 
and discourse studies that link micro structures and actions to macro level issues. For 
implementing such a new theory of education, research before, during and after that 
process is important to provide an information base for politicians and administrators, 
who can then add the necessary value judgements and thus legitimise their policies on a 
sound basis, work-out the implications of the new theories and evaluate them by 
checking the effectiveness of the innovations and intervention programmes and 
monitoring educational standards. Research techniques and trained personal would be 
needed to carry these out (Nisbet, 1981: 163-4). 
To do this, the educational research literature needs to be better registered, indexed, 
classified, appraised, and made accessible to researchers and teachers alike. Educators 
need access to this research and to be able to search and critically appraise it in order to 
determine its relevance (or lack of relevance) to their schools, learners, and educational 
needs. This is what is called evidence-based education. This has been discussed, for 
example by, Hargreaves (1997b: 407-10) and Hammersley (1997: 154-7) as the set of 
principles and practices which can alter what people think about education, the way 
they go about educational policy and practice, and the basis upon which they make 
professional judgements and deploy their expertise. Moreover, schools should be 
considered as a place for knowledge creation because better practices for teachers and 
head-teachers cannot be left solely to research institutions. In this sense Hargreaves 
argues that knowledge-creating schools are a path to more effective schools and to 
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better educational research. This requires that groups of schools should work on the 
same topic because what the single school can achieve is limited. This means that 
research must draw closer to teachers and head-teachers if they aim to obtain high- 
quality knowledge about effective teaching and learning (1999: 136-41). In this sense it 
is important to motivate teachers to be involved in practitioner research as they 
represent the human resource closest to classroom life. The following are some of the 
relevant issues which might be investigated. 
0 Observations of learners and teachers inside and outside the classroom 
0 Investigation of the understanding of the idea of freedom in education by learners, 
teachers, parents, administrators and the general public. 
" Modifications of the curriculum in the light of experience gained during 
implementation. 
" Evaluation of the new subjects introduced into the curriculum, as I have proposed 
for years one to twelve. 
" Study of how learners select subjects in secondary school. 
" Study of the new system of assessment and modification of it in the light of 
evaluation findings. 
" Analysis of teacher education and modification in the light of the guidelines 
presented in this study 
" Study of school management to find out the different strategies for the 
implementation of the idea of freedom in education. 
" Study of the possible school activities which might be added to schools and the 
resources required. 
" Investigation of new sources of funding 
" Study of the best ways in which the media can be used to introduce the new idea of 
freedom to everyone in the society. 
" Study of the feasibility of extending the school day and the school year. 
" Study of different ways to deliver the curriculum to learners. 
" Feasibility studies prior to the introduction of new academic and vocational subjects 
into the curriculum. 
" Study of appropriate methods of teaching to achieve the aims of freedom in 
education. 
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" Study of the freedom of the teacher to choose the content or part of the content for 
each subject. 
7.2.5. The importance of collecting reliable data prior to implementation 
One of the most important conditions to the successful implementation of freedom in 
education or any other idea `is to have reliable data about the current situation' 
(Ahmad, 1999a: 147). `Unreliable data makes it difficult to know the actual situation' 
(Ghanim, 1997: 173). I refer here to two types of data; firstly, quantitative data with 
respect to numbers of learners, schools, teachers, administrators and the facilities the 
school needs. Secondly, qualitative data concerning people's views about the 
deficiencies of the current system and their ideas and expectations of the new idea of 
freedom in education. Currently in Egypt, it might be possible to state that not all 
quantitative data are reliable or correct and this is why many projects have failed 
because reliable quantitative and qualitative data were not available or incorrect. 
Implementation of freedom in education requires the collecting, analysing and 
classifying of all the quantitative and qualitative data needed. Egypt badly needs a 
totally new style of collecting the different data since most of the data currently 
available are not reliable or organised. Collecting, classifying and organising such data 
should be responsibility of a National Council. However, each learner in the school 
should have a role in collecting data. To involve learners, firstly, they should know 
what they have to do and why. Secondly, they should realise how important their roles 
are for that mission. Then each school should have volunteer groups to classify all the 
data for the school with help from their teachers, headmasters and administrators. 
Giving learners the opportunity to share in doing so makes them feel powerful, proud of 
themselves, believe in themselves and feel how important their role is, even though they 
are young. This will be one step towards achieving one of the aims of freedom, which is 
concerned with being creative, autonomous, responsible and independent. Then other 
volunteer groups can take the responsibility to collect all documents from local areas, 
classify them and submit them to The National Council. 
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Regarding qualitative data, firstly, the school may convene meetings of parents, 
businessmen and the general public to elicit their opinions about the new ideas and 
prepare them for their roles within the new system. Learners, especially at secondary 
school, are able to organise such meetings and record the meetings. They are also able 
to chair discussions, summarise the main points and write a report to the local authority 
with help from their teachers. One of the functions of such meetings is to encourage 
everyone to support the school through contributions of opinions, funds or facilities. 
Therefore, every school will know the extent of the support the community is able to 
provide. Involving learners for such activities helps them to; (a) understand what 
freedom in education is about and they can explain it to their peers, (b) learn how to 
organise free discussions, how to exercise democracy in real situations, how to make 
decisions and how to believe in what they are saying and convince somebody else, (c) 
evaluate their own work and other people's work (d) learn skills, such as writing reports 
and classifying data. 
Many might think that these tasks would be too time-consuming for learners. The 
answer to this is performance of these tasks is a way to learn and achieve many skills. 
As suggested earlier in chapter six already, one hour of the school day is assigned to 
extra-curricular activities, and these responsibilities may be included amongst such 
activities. In that way, the means of fulfilling the idea of freedom would also partially 
meet the ends. Secondly, all groups involved in education should be considered as 
sources for qualitative data to discuss what they think of the current education and what 
they want for the future. This means that research has to be designed to interview all 
types of groups that can provide useful data before, during and after the implementation 
takes place. 
7.2.6. Examining the theory of freedom in education before nation-wide implementation 
It is true "that links between theory and practice are uneasy and uncomfortable 
bedfellows" (Hughes, 1985: 31). However, this relationship can be changed and 
improved by an understanding of theory and practice and how they relate to one 
another. As Hartnett and Naish (1976: 3) state, there is a general way of making a 
distinction between theory and practice, in terms of theory as theorising (i. e. reasoning) 
and practice in the sense of doing (i. e. actions). In this interpretation, important 
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questions about theory and practice are raised, for example: what is the relationship 
between theorising (reasoning) about what to do and how to do it, and actually doing it, 
and what is the role of the theory of activities or skills (understood as the rules, maxims, 
precepts, etc. governing them) in learning to perform the activities and skills in 
question, and in actually performing them? Similarly, Bush (1989: 3) argues that theory 
provides "a rationale for decision-making. It helps managers by giving them a basis for 
action. Without a frame of reference decisions could become purely arbitrary. It is not 
enough simply to note the fact of a situation and make a decision based on those facts. 
All such evidence requires interpretation. An appreciation of theory may also reduce the 
time required to achieve managerial effectiveness by obviating the need for certain 
levels of experience. In this sense theory may be regarded as a distillation of the 
experience of others" Theories are most useful for influencing practice when they 
suggest new ways in which events and situations can be perceived. Fresh insight may be 
provided by focusing attention on possible interrelationships that the practitioner has 
failed to notice, and which can be further explored and tested through empirical 
research. If the result is a better understanding of practice, the theory-practice gap is 
significantly reduced for those concerned. Theory cannot then be dismissed as irrelevant 
(Hughes and Bush, 1991: 234). Theory and practice are not two separate things. There is 
a relationship between them. It is possible that it might appear from the point of view of 
practitioners that there are some aspects in which this theory has to be changed or 
developed to accommodate real situations. In this sense Morgan (1986: 335-6) argues 
that there is a close relationship between the way we think and the way we 
act... practice is never theory-free, for it is always guided by an image of what one is 
trying to do. The real issue is whether or not we are aware of the theory guiding our 
actions. 
As has been discussed there is a huge gap between theory and practice in the 
educational system in Egypt. This gap arises from a misunderstanding of the theory or 
the absence of a rational and realistic plan for putting theory into practice. It might be 
relevant to mention that `many good ideas have been sacrificed in Egypt because they 
have been put in to practice without examining them first in a small number of schools 
to find out the difficulties that might arise' (NCERT, 1996: 45). Therefore, it is important 
to reduce the gap between theory and practice by implementing the idea of freedom in 
education first in a certain number of schools in different areas to test the theory in real 
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schools and classroom situations. Implementing the idea first in a small numbers of 
schools reduces the gap between the theoretical expectations and the actual achievement 
that might take place. Also, identifying the difficulties experienced by schools and the 
resources they require at such a pilot stage will save time and money in the later stages. 
7.2.7. The critical use of history and overseas experiences 
Egypt has a very rich history in education, allowing politicians and practitioners to look 
at history as an inspiration for the present and future. `It is informative to study the past 
to learn from the previous experiences of the society and the sources of some present 
problems. However, it should be remembered that not all successful innovations from 
the past may be borrowed for the present because of the change in circumstances' (Al- 
Jabri, 1994: 62). Using the past might provide many good experiences and provide good 
insights for the present problem. However, it is important to investigate well such 
experiences before brining them into the present. The reason behind considering this 
condition is that in Egyptian education there are some recent changes that have been 
borrowed from the past in order to solve specific problems without a critical 
examination of their suitability to the present and the future (see chapter five). This has 
led to unsatisfactory results and caused new problems alongside the problems that 
existed already before applying such borrowed experiences. 
In the same way, Egypt since the 1970s has put in place many educational reforms as a 
consequence of increasing dialogue with the western nations. This came about as a 
result of the belief that Egypt cannot survive and cope-with the advanced countries 
without assimilating the orientations of the modern world and its new patterns. It is true 
that `although education is an outcome of every society, it is enriched by the 
experiences of other societies and their achievements' ('Ali, 1999b: 40). In this sense, 
Shanker (1997: 120) argues, that in the absence of another model that is clearly better or 
even as good as theirs, we should look seriously at the model they follow and the results 
they have achieved. However, the current educational system in Egypt seems to have 
transferred some experiences directly from other countries, for example, applying 
technical education in secondary schools, or reducing primary education to five years 
instead of six. `Ammar (1998a: 18-9) and (Al-Jabri, 1994: 70) have commented, `the 
Egyptian relationship with western civilisation consists in adopting their models without 
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being aware about the rational thinking behind these models and considering whether 
they are suited to the Egyptian context'. It is true that there has been some 
developments but this has been on the basis of transference without critical analysis and 
adaptation. This thesis has therefore sought to take account of both the nature of the 
concept of freedom and the nature of Egyptian society in proposing a new educational 
system for Egypt that is based on notions of freedom. 
7.2.8. Preparation of the appropriate budget 
An appropriate budget is one of the most important factors in determining successful 
implementation. However, it might be possible to argue that preparing a suitable budget 
is an easy condition in comparison with preparing the whole society for such a new 
theory. This is because it is straightforward work and it does not take a long time. I 
believe that when it comes to education, appropriate funds should be assigned. As 
Peters argues, it is the educationalists' responsibility to insist on what ought to be done 
from an educational perspective and to argue against political obstacles; whether we 
win or lose such battles is another matter. The point is that we cannot formally approve 
of cutting the coat of our ideals according to the cloth of politicians (1966b: 173). 
With respect to the situation in Egypt, the education budget has been reduced since the 
1960s with a detrimental effect on the quality of education. 'This means that different 
sources of funds should be' found (Ratib, 1998: 119), Zidan (1983: 425), Manswr 
(2000: 237) and Ramadan (1985: 207-9). Moreover, the state should achieve equity and 
adequacy between schools. In this sense Augenbick, Myers and Anderson (1997: 76) 
recommend that the state should equalise support between schools for the construction 
and renovation of school facilities. Also, as Howell and Miller (1997: 48) argue, schools 
require stability in funding and budgets should be predictable. However, money is 
necessary, but not in itself sufficient, to assure improved student achievement. Rather, it 
is the way that money is used to acquire other resource inputs (e. g. teachers, materials, 
supplies) and the way these resources are utilised in the school and classroom that will 
ultimately determine the impact of money on student outcomes. Sources of funding 
available in Egypt might be achived in several ways, for example: 
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+ Implementing freedom in education requires public support and the willingness to 
motivate and encourage everyone to share in education and feel that the small 
amount of money s/he gives really makes a difference. Therefore, it may be 
necessary to have a national fund to collect the money from everyone who is willing 
to contribute. 
+ Different ministries can share in building schools and supplying schools with the 
materials they need. For example, the ministry of health can provide schools with a 
daily lunch. The social affairs ministry may take over the responsibility for 
supervision of the kindergarten stage from the ministry of education. The ministry 
of culture can provide schools with books and novels for learners to do free reading. 
The ministry of media can conduct programmes to change the way people think 
regarding the position of women. Also, these two ministries may plan and fund 
events for learners who aspire to study media, history or archaeology in secondary 
school. The ministry of transportation may provide free services especially in the 
village in order to eliminate one of the obstacles preventing village children from 
going to school. The ministry of religious endowments which is one of the richest 
ministries may help in building schools which is part of their duty alongside 
building mosques. The ministry of youth and sports may arrange free visits to sport 
clubs and arrange for different visits of famous players to schools to engage learners 
in sporting activities. 
" Part of the zakat money (zakat is a duty for every Muslim that he/she has to pay a 
certain amount every year to help the poor) can be used to build schools and provide 
them with facilities. In terms of religion, the zakat money should be allowed to be 
used in this matter because it helps poor learners to obtain free and equal 
opportunities. 
" International funds can play a role in supporting education, especially as there are a 
number of international agencies, to which the ministry of education may be entitled 
to apply. 
" As mentioned in chapter five, the ministry of education supplies private schools 
with teachers, the national curriculum and textbooks. Therefore, it might be useful 
to make some scholarships available for high achievers who would not otherwise be 
able to afford to enrol in private schools. 
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" It might be possible to encourage companies to support schools. They may provide 
schools with pens, pencils, paper, paint, exercise books, computer hardware, 
computer software, science equipment, art equipment, drama equipment, sports 
equipment, music equipment, etc. As Mountfield argues, a good relationship 
between the school and its business community may attract gifts in cash or kind. 
Equipment that is outdated for business purposes, or surplus materials that would 
otherwise be discarded, are frequently donated as gifts to schools. These gifts should 
be regarded as a welcome bonus, not as the prime purpose of the partnership 
(1993: 49). Similarly, Marsden argues that the relationship between a school and 
company is strictly commercial. If a company wishes to hire school premises or to 
advertise its goods and services to learners and parents, it should offer a payment or 
sponsorship in return (1997: 12). It is often to the advantage of companies to support 
schools, as there are returns for supporting the school or a particular project, such as 
company profits or improved public relations. "The company can help in kind at 
relatively little cost to itself. The company will receive permanent recognition for its 
support. The school presents its successes and achievements so that it appears to be 
worthy of support" (Marsden, 1997: 159). 
º The school can be a place for advertisements to receive more funds for supporting 
learners' activities, 
" Depending on the type of school, and on any conditions imposed by the local 
authority, the school may undertake fundraising activities such as a tuck-shop, 
stationery shop, providing a private nursery and the sale of school photos (see 
Mountfield, 1993: 81). 
9 The school might accept covenanted donations and gifts from parents (and possibly 
other members of the community). Also it might be useful to obtain donations from 
business who are working abroad. This requires, as Marsden (1997: 11,158) 
mentions, the motivation of a person who can spare a little extra money to 
contribute to a school appeal. There are motivating, factors which are common to 
parents and local companies. He suggests that the common factors are; they are 
approached individually, they feel that their support is greatly needed; they 
understand clearly the benefit of the project and think it is worthwhile; they are 
aware that others are supporting the appeal; they feel that the appeal will be 
successful; they see examples of contributions which are within their reach; they do 
not feel they are under pressure to contribute; their support will be permanently 
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recognised (not everyone requires or wishes this, but many do). Parents tend to be 
more motivated to make a contribution if they feel that their child will benefit and 
they are pleased with their child's progress at school. 
" To reduce some expenses learners might be required to return their textbooks by the 
end of the year in good condition. In this way they learn how to respect and consider 
the freedom of others to have textbooks in good condition, Also they will learn how 
to be responsible for their textbooks until they hand them to others. 
7.2.9. Maximising the school's freedom through effective participation in educational 
planning and practice 
`Within the Egyptian context, the school does not have freedom to manage its own daily 
affairs' (Al-Matbwli, 1995: 140). The head-teachers or teachers do not have freedom to 
deal with any matter or problem at school. They have to report any matter to people 
who occupy high rank and wait for their decisions. Of course this takes a long time and 
the delay makes any problem worse. Therefore, this policy does not require a high 
quality of leadership at schools because it needs only one who passes every small 
demand or problem to others of high rank and who wait for such decision to put them 
into practice. Therefore, `all head-teachers or local authorities have been chosen as the 
oldest teachers at schools' (Zanati, 2000: 132-3) and (Ramadan, 1985: 207-9). This means 
that most of them are quite old and they do not have the passion and desire to be 
involved in such hard work as implementing freedom in education. Most of them are 
appointed to their post two or three years before they are expected to retire. In the light 
of this system, it may seem difficult to apply freedom in education which represents a 
large challenge to people in positions of responsibility and authority. 
"It is simply more efficient and effective in the late twentieth century to restructure 
systems of education so that central bureaucracies are relatively small and schools are 
empowered to manage their own affairs within a centrally determined framework of 
direction and support" (Caldwell and Spinks, 1992: 14) and Mees, (1996: 44). In this 
sense the role of the state will be limited to the formulation of rights, duties and 
obligations and the organisation of funding (Hodgetts, 1996: 64). Therefore, each school 
should have the freedom to deal with its daily problems and all the facilities it needs. 
This requires a different style of leadership from both head-teachers and local 
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authorities, who can understand the nature of their roles. Hence, `it is not advisable to 
select them only according to their experiences in teaching and past training courses 
(the course duration is 6 days)' (Zanati, 2000: 278). Selection should also be made on the 
basis of their qualifications and experience in school management. For example, `they 
should be able to organise teamwork, work as part of a team, be able to work to 
deadlines, have confidence to deal with people at all levels, show meticulous attention 
to detail, be able to decide the school priorities, be able to organise their work 
programme, be able to raise and manage funds, be able to motivate all people at school 
to work and be able to apply the school rules fairly' (Zanati, 2000: 277-30). Although 
local management of schools involves devolving funding and resource management to 
governing bodies and school staff and greatly reduces the powers of local educational 
authorities (Bush, 1995: 4), the local and national authority still has responsibility for 
guiding the educational process across the country. Each county in Egypt should have 
responsibility for school-building, making funds available, making the requisite number 
of teachers available and so on. The national authority is by no means eliminated. On 
the contrary, the local authority will work according to the national guidelines but with 
more freedom to run their own schools. Moreover, the national authority has to provide 
for the poor local areas and support them, so that learners in these areas have the same 
educational opportunity as children in wealthier areas. This may be achieved through 
provision of teachers or equipment. 
7.2.10. The requirement of teaching and learning technologies 
Attempts to use computer technology to enhance learning began with the efforts of 
pioneers such as Atkinson (1968) and Suppes (Suppes and Morningstar, 1968). The 
presence of computer technology in schools has increased dramatically and predictions 
are that this trend will continue to accelerate. `The naive view of technology is that the 
mere presence of computers in schools will enhance learners' learning and 
achievement' ('Abd Al-Nabi: 1997: 98). However, as has been shown in chapter five, 
technology is almost absent in most Egyptian schools. Only a few schools in big cities 
and high standard classes have some computers and access to the Internet and these are 
not enough for all learners. Also this provision was introduce only a few years ago. That 
is why supplying new technology in all schools for all learners is really important for 
learners to have an equal opportunity to enjoy the value of freedom in education. 
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In terms of the function of ICT to provide learners with the required conditions to enjoy 
the value of freedom, several groups have reviewed the literature on technology and 
learning and concluded that `it has great potential to enhance learners' achievement and 
teacher learning, but only if it is used appropriately' (Silim, 1999: 121). For example, 
Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (1999: 195,217,218) present several reasons for 
supplying schools with the most useful technologies to support learning and teaching. 
Firstly, technology has the capacity to create new opportunities for curriculum and 
instruction by bringing real-world problems into the classroom for students to explore 
and solve. Technology can help to create an active environment in which students not 
only solve problems, but also find their own problems. This approach to learning is very 
different from that typical of Egyptian school classrooms, in which students spend most 
of their time learning facts from a lecture or text and doing the problems at the end of 
the chapter. 
Secondly, technology can make it easier for teachers to give learners feedback about 
their thinking and for students to revise their work. Thirdly, it is easy to forget that 
learners' achievement in school also depends on what happens outside of school. 
Bringing students and teachers in contact with the broader community can enhance their 
learning. For example, the Internet can help link parents with their children's school. 
School calendars, assignments, and other types of information can be posted on a 
school's Internet site. School sites can also be used to inform the community of what a 
school is doing and how they can help. Fourthly, Technology has become an important 
instrument in education. Computer-based technology holds great promise both for 
increasing access to knowledge and as a means of promoting learning. The public 
imagination has been captured by the capacity of information technologies to centralise 
and organise large bodies of knowledge; people are excited by the prospect of 
information networks, such as the Internet, linking students around the globe into 
communities of learners. 
Fifthly, computer-based technologies can be powerful pedagogical tools - not just rich 
sources of information but also extensions of human capabilities and contexts for social 
interactions supporting learning. The process of using technology to improve learning is 
never solely a technical matter, concerned only with properties of educational hardware 
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and software. Like a textbook or any other cultural object, technology resources for 
education function in a social environment, mediated by learning conversation with 
peers and teachers. Sixthly, the new technologies provide opportunities for creating 
learning environments that extend the possibilities of old but still useful technologies, 
such as books and the blackboard. Linear one-way communication media, such as radio 
and television shows, also open up new possibilities. Although there are many reasons 
to provide schools with the new technologies to support learning and teaching, `it is 
possible to say that technologies do not guarantee effective learning' 
('Ammar, 1998a: 75-7). It may be argued that inappropriate uses of technology can 
hinder learning, for example, students spend more time picking fonts and colours for 
multimedia reports than planning, writing, and revising their ideas. Therefore, new 
technologies have to be used in way that supports teaching and learning and helps the 
learner to achieve, and to give more freedom to the learner to research for new 
information and liberate their minds from the limited information available in 
textbooks. In this sense `using new technology requires modifications in the teacher's 
role, curriculum, textbooks and assessment process'(AI-'Atar, 1997: 85). `Supplying 
schools with new technologies requires that each school should provide their learners 
with all the new technology they can, because it might not be easy for parents to make, 
for example, the Internet available for their children' (NCERT, 1994: 23). 
7.2.11. Maximising learners' freedom through having universal enrolment in basic 
education. 
As was shown in chapter four and five, there is a shortage of schools in Egypt and this 
prevents learners, especially in rural and poor areas from joining school. This limitation 
is considered as a kind of restriction on learners to enjoy freedom in education. 
Therefore, it is the responsibility of the state, with help from the public to open more 
schools all over the country for everyone to have free and equal access. Moreover, all 
school should be equal in terms of allowing learners to learn under the same 
circumstances. One important note regarding Egyptian schools is that most if not all 
except private ones, are not in good condition. They consist of old high buildings with 
no sense of beauty. I believe that schools should be an attractive place for learners and 
teachers to work in a good atmosphere. Therefore, schools have to be repaired and 
supplied with all the facilities that are required. Also they need to be ready in terns of 
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space for practising extra curriculum activities. One of the important outcomes from 
improving schools is that having well-organised and facilitated schools will reduce the 
gap between the state and the private school environment. Reducing this gap will 
maximise poor learners' freedom to have free and equal educational opportunities. Also 
it will make parents feel confident that state school will provide their children with a 
good opportunity similar to, or maybe even better than private ones. Another 
implication of building more school especially in poor and rural areas is that this will 
help to increase the rate of girls' enrolment as well as boys and eradicate urban, rural 
and gender inequality and illiteracy. Accordingly learners' freedom will be maximised 
because, as discussed in chapter four and five, all the mentioned features will be 
recognised as restrictions on learners to enjoy free and equal opportunities. 
7.3. Difficulties determining the implementation of freedom in education 
After having discussed the required conditions for education based on freedom to 
achieve its aims it is important to highlight the difficulties that might determine how far 
education based on freedom can help to improve the efficiency of the educational 
system in Egypt. From the examination of educational theory and practice in Egypt in 
chapter four and five there are some difficulties that can be highlighted. Firstly, the high 
rate of illiteracy among adults. This is because illiterate parents may not be able to play 
their role effectively towards their children. They may also limit their freedom by not 
allowing them to attend school, particularly girls in poor and rural areas. What makes 
the problem worse is that reducing illiteracy will take a long time, which might affect 
the outcomes of the implementation of freedom in education. on the one hand this 
requires maximisation of efforts by the state, as well as all kinds of media and schools 
to help and prepare uneducated parents for their new role in education based on 
freedom. Schools can be used in the evening for adult literacy lessons, providing special 
programmes on TV and radio. Also, I believe that it is worthwhile to involve learners in 
secondary and higher education in this campaign. On the other hand, eradication of 
illiteracy has to be one of the state's priorities which requires a huge effort and budget. 
However, it is important to note that without having full enrolment for all learners at 
age 4 at schools, any effort will not be able to cope with the increase in the number of 
illiterate people who might join every year. 
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Secondly it could be argued that some negative social values existing in Egyptian 
society might be considered as a difficulty when the implementation of freedom in 
education takes place. This is because such values might influence learners' freedom to 
make such choices and decisions which do not come from them. Also it is because it 
takes time to change. For example, (a) a lot of families in rural and poor areas still think 
that girls' education should come as a second priority to boys'. Moreover, they believe 
that girls should follow certain studies such as nursing or teaching rather than 
engineering or law. (B) fear of examinations and the high value given to the certificate. 
This makes learners think of education as a process of memorising information for the 
sake of having a certificate rather than as a means to develop their potential. It is 
important to note here that unfortunately all kinds of media support this view through 
the emphasis they give to public examinations especially secondary school 
examinations which frighten both learners and parents. Also it assume that they are 
attempting the impossible. (C) the importance of private tuition in the sense examined 
in chapter five. Learners and their parents should understand that implementing freedom 
in education, in the sense suggested in chapter six does not call for private tuition 
because learners will no longer need tools to help them ineniorise knowledge. (D) the 
value of certain subjects such as mathematics, science rather than humanities, art and 
music which encourage learners to choose the former when they want to choose 
otherwise. For example, the medical and engineering profession are popularly regarded 
as prestigious although a huge numbers of doctors cannot find jobs and, as a result, 
some have abandoned the profession. On the other hand, the popular view of the 
nursing profession is negative, although there is a shortage of nurses and they receive 
high salaries. So, should a learner have the ability to enter either profession and have 
the freedom to choose, s/he may be under social pressure to train as a medical doctor 
even if s/he would prefer to be a nurse. (E) the value of the textbook and the belief that 
it has all that learners should know and that all the facts found in it are true and does not 
need to be questioned. (F) the value of private education and the view that it provides 
betterjobs which helps learners to gain the highest score they can. 
Thirdly, as mentioned in chapter four and five, the current Egyptian teachers can not 
play their role in education based on freedom. This requires a well-designed training 
course for the available teachers and a continuous form of assessment of their teaching 
in the classroom. Although all the previous consideration will have no place in 
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education based on freedom, they can still be considered as difficulties because they 
need a concerted effort and time to be eliminated, especially since they have a long 
history in Egyptian education. In other words, they might cause problems at the 
beginning of implementing education based on freedom, but in time they will change to 
be successful factors of such education. 
7.4. Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to discover and examine the conditions and difficulties 
which need to be considered for the successful implementation of freedom in education 
in Egypt. Also, the current chapter gave some suggestions that might help to reduce the 
gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the required conditions to 
be satisfied for the implementation of freedom in education. 
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Conclusion 
1. Conclusion 
In the light of the previous chapters the conclusion attempts to highlight the contribution of 
this study to the field of knowledge and practice in education in relation to the meaning, 
conditions, restrictions and value of freedom in education for the benefit of learners and 
society and to satisfy their interests. 
2. Contribution of the study to the field of knowledge 
The current study was an attempt to construct a theoretical framework of education based 
on freedom. This framework, firstly, treated the implications of freedom in education with 
respect to its conditions, restrictions and value in education. With respect to conditions of 
freedom, (a) it has been argued that non-interference with learners' choices and decisions is 
a necessary and required condition for learners to exercise their freedom in education to 
gain benefit from its value. However, interference is not justifiable only for the prevention 
of license on others, which is, of course, an important exception. Despite remarkable stories 
of children surviving without adult help it is still the case that because of their size, 
inexperience and less-developed rationality they are more vulnerable than most adults and 
need protection and guidance. 
Also, it has been argued that although restrictions of children's freedom are sometimes 
justified, this is not because children are inherently subject to adults' authority or incapable 
of freedom or in some way less worthy of respect and consideration than adults. 
Restrictions of children's freedom are important, just as restrictions of adults' freedom, and 
must be justified. If the justification for adults ever having the right to override children's 
wishes and make decisions for them is that this is in children's interests because they need 
protection and guidance, then adults' right to make decisions for children's should be 
limited to making decisions in children's interests and to the provision of the necessary 
protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to rights over children, regardless of 
what is in children's interests. 
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(B) it has been argued that the availability of making free choice and decisions is a 
necessary condition for learners to have freedom enabling them to acquire benefit from its 
value in education. But it is completely unrealistic to suppose that children are ever, as a 
matter of fact, free to do what they like simply because of the inherent decency and good 
sense of all concerned. The practical choice is never between simply doing as one likes and 
being constrained; it is rather between being subject to different types of constraint. 
With respect to the value of freedom, it has been argued that: (A) happiness is not the only 
aim of freedom in education when learners are allowed to do what they want. Happiness is 
only a product of being free to do what they are interested in; (B) autonomy, responsibility 
and creativity are valuable educational aims. Moreover, it has been noted that freedom is a 
necessary condition to achieve these aims; (C) It was shown that allowing learners more 
freedom brings greater academic achievement when the pressure of controls blocks it and 
when there are variety of options. This leads us to recognise that freedom in education has 
great value for society. Educating learners to be happy, creative, autonomous, responsible 
and achieving greater academic progress will be valuable aims for society to satisfy its 
needs and interests for the sake of development without forcing learners to do particular 
things. Through the arguments it is suggested that children should have freedom regarding 
their education not for its own sake but because it has value for them and their society. 
Secondly, the study proposes a theoretical framework of freedom in education in relation to 
educational processes. For example, (1) it is important to help learners to determine for 
themselves what they would like to do, what they need to know next and how to go about 
pursuing their individual investigations, but until they are equipped with the necessary 
skills and knowledge for this they should not be allowed complete freedom. The freedom to 
choose what line of study to pursue and how best to pursue it is inappropriate for children 
whose intellectual skills are relatively underdeveloped and who have insufficient 
experiences to know what choices are available. This means that several suggestions for 
possible choices should be sought by the teacher and considered by the children before the 
choice has to be made. In such circumstances adult suggestion, or adult instigation, which 
might theoretically be though to narrow the range of choices and limit freedom, in fact 
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enlarges it. Therefore, the study suggests that determining the curriculum content should be 
done in the light of the interests of the state so that children will acquire knowledge and 
skills the state wants them to have. Also it should be chosen according to the interests of 
learners as well, so they will work better and learn more effectively, because they will be 
interested in what they are required to do. However, it is important to note that learners' 
sharing in decisions should be essential and effective because they are the best judges of 
what interests them. They have the ability to make this judgement and commit to it. 
(2) The study has examined the idea that having a national and compulsory curriculum does 
not limit learners' freedom when it guarantees the required conditions for them to benefit 
from the value of freedom in education. Regarding the textbooks, it was seen that those 
textbooks having all the knowledge and information learners should acquire do not help 
them to achieve the aims of freedom in education. However, they are important for 
learners, teachers and the public as guidelines but should not be the only resource learners 
depend on since they must look at different resources with help from their teachers and 
parents. 
(3) The study provided evidence that exercising authority in the consideration of 
knowledge as an end in itself and forcing the learner to be slave to gain and memorise such 
knowledge, restricts the children intellectually and puts them in a particular formulation. 
However, education based on freedom pays attention to knowledge as means to reach such 
ends. 
(4) The study examined and analysed the fact that freedom in education does not mean that 
there should be no assessment as a result of allowing learners freedom to do what they like. 
In education based on freedom the assessment's purpose is to evaluate the teaching and 
learning process. Moreover, the types of examination questions should not aim to find out 
how much knowledge learners were able to memorise but to find out what changes took 
place in their minds after studying a particular course, especially since the outcomes of 
education based on freedom can not be assessed by having the traditional types of direct 
questions and answers. 
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(5) The study has argued that implementing freedom in education requires teachers to be 
educated as individuals, not merely trained for the profession of teaching. This required 
that teaching candidates (i) should have a free choice to do a particular course in the 
teacher's institutes (ii) be free to think and express their thoughts regarding their education. 
To prepare teachers to help learners to be independent thinkers requires a free atmosphere 
in which teachers can be taught and also be free during their own teaching. (iii) be free to 
make their own choices, judgements and decisions. In short, they have to be educated in the 
same way as they are going to teach. That is to say, freedom in education in the teacher's 
institutes is a required condition in which to produce free, creative, responsible, choosers 
and autonomous teachers who can achieve the aims of freedom in education in schools with 
their learners. This, also, requires teaching candidates to study and understand what 
freedom in education, its conditions and its value is, so that they can have a full 
understanding of the nature of their role in implementing this theory. 
3. Contribution of the study to the field of knowledge regarding Egyptian education 
Firstly, the current study provided an analysis of the concept of freedom in western and 
Islamic thought. The analysis of the concept of freedom in chapter one indicates that the 
two traditions have similarities in relation the definition of freedom, its conditions and 
value. 
(1), both traditions point out that any definition of freedom should treat three areas; who 
should be free, what constraints an individual should be free from, and what an individual 
is free for. With respect to the first area, both traditions argue that a certain minimum 
degree of rationality is necessary for a person to be free. Who is in a position autonomously 
to choose to do or not to do, who has the desire to do or not to do something and who can 
determine his own life and make his own decisions. This means that both traditions argue 
against the freedom of the irrational person who cannot act and accordingly cannot be 
responsible for his actions. Regarding the second area, both traditions consider that non- 
interference (intentional or unintentional) from others is a necessary condition to make an 
agent free. Also they discuss the effect of both external and internal obstacles on the 
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individual's freedom. The exercising the authority by the state over the individual to limit 
his freedom, both traditions argue for the need for justifiable authority to protect the 
individuals rights and civil liberties. Man can never live socially without some kind of 
authority and organised system of behaviour. Laws are made to protect ordinary people 
against those who acknowledge no such code or are free to abide by it only haltingly. For 
Islamic thought, it has been argued that religious restrictions cannot restrict freedom 
inasmuch as they cannot be treated as truly coercive the individuals have absolute freedom 
to choose what religion to follow, then, they have to act according to their choice. 
Regarding the third area, the two traditions discussed argue that freedom is valuable as 
such, or as having value independently of the value of things it leaves us free to do. There 
are others arguments, that imply that freedom is instrumentally, unconditionally or 
intrinsically valuable for the individual to do or not to do something he likes. In other 
words, the individual has the chance to make his own choices and decisions. Islamic 
thought stress on the value of freedom as a means to free the mind. Free will and freedom 
are means to concentrate, think, decide, and move. As such, they represent the cost of 
extraordinary evolution and progress among human beings as compared to animals. 
Reason, perception, will, and morality are the result of free will and freedom. According to 
this view, freedom is a necessary condition to think freely and act according by. 
(2), both traditions argue against the claim of absolute freedom. The unqualified demand of 
absolute freedom is unacceptable, as the people's freedom is always in conflict. (3) the two 
traditions distinguish between freedom and ability. Both arguments have established that 
the freedom increases the ability of the agent and having the ability makes someone's 
freedom worthwhile. 
In relation to women's freedom it has been shown that women in Islam have the same 
rights and freedoms as men. Also Islam have more freedom and rights to women than they 
had before the existence of Islam. However, practices in many Islamic societies do not 
consider these rights and freedoms. Therefore, women suffer from discrimination in favour 
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of men. This means that features of women's unfreedom do not take the form of religious 
obligations or restrictions but they are political and social. 
Secondly, the study provided an original inquiry of the history and present situation of 
educational theory and practice investigating and analysing the idea of freedom in Egypt 
from 1805 to 2000 in relation to its conditions, restrictions and value. This inquiry used the 
historical and current quantitative and qualitative data to show the growth of freedom and 
its value in education. In many places the study provided statistical data which was 
collected and organised by the researcher to show the place of freedom in the areas of free 
and equal opportunity with respect to number of schools, teachers and facilities. There are 
many conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation, (1) learner's priority in 
education is not the main concern of the political leadership. The purpose and aims of 
education are limited to suit the needs of the ruler or the state rather than individuals. It is 
only the state that has the right, not the learners, teachers or parents, to determine the 
content of education to make learners acquire the knowledge and skills which are necessary 
for the state to be developed. 
(2) The required conditions for learners and society to exercise freedom and benefit form 
its value (non-interference and the availability of choices) were not implied in the 
educational policy during the period of the study. 
(3) Freedom in education in the history of Egypt and the present was always related to the 
claim for individuals to have free and equal educational opportunity. This means that until 
the year 2000 these were still millions of children out of school due to a lack of educational 
opportunity. There are no kind of educational opportunity that allows learners freedom to 
choose a particular possibility in a particular school. This means that learners are obliged to 
accept such opportunities as the state offers. Hence, it might be important to define freedom 
in education as a right for learners to have free and equal opportunity so they can make 
their own choices between such alternative exist. 
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For girls, their freedom is still less than that of boys in terms of having free and equal 
opportunity. Also they do not have freedom to study and work in particular fields as like. 
The lack of freedom they have does not refer to religious obligations as examined in 
chapter one, but they might be restricted by social values. For example, someone might 
argue that some families still have more attention to their sons' education rather than their 
daughters'. The preference of the family might refer to unintentional restrictions that have 
been made by the state. In others words, when education is not totally free and there are no 
adequate opportunities in schools, families give priority to boys rather than girls. But if 
education is free and available to all, it might be possible to believe that most families will 
treat their sons and daughters equally. Also, it might refer to the belief that education is not 
as important for girls as boys because, at particular age, she will marry someone who will 
look after her and her children. 
(4) The approach is taken to design the curriculum and its content does not provide the 
required conditions where learners cannot derive benefit from the value of freedom. Firstly, 
the curriculum gives more attention to the amount of knowledge learners should learn at a 
required age for the sake of development because Egyptian education considers the gaining 
of knowledge as an aim in itself not as a means to others ends. Secondly, textbooks are full 
of isolated facts that learners should know. Having textbooks that contain all the required 
knowledge `does not give learners the freedom, for example, to look for more knowledge, 
discover the relationship between different variables or to learn they can use such 
knowledge in a meaningful and worthwhile way. Thirdly, learners do not have freedom to 
make choices between subjects or between branches of subjects because all subjects and 
units are compulsory. 
(5) The curriculum has been designed so as to make lectures the teaching method for all 
lessons. Because the curriculum is full of information and isolated facts, teachers find that 
giving lectures is the best way to teach, and their job is to help learners to memorise the 
information'. It does not give the teachers and learners freedom to use different teaching 
methods and techniques. Also it makes learners very negative elements in the process of 
teaching and learning which prevents any chance to exercise freedom and derive benefit 
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from its value. As for extra-curricular activities, they have no place in the school plan and 
so learners lose excellent good opportunities to learn how to exercise freedom and derive 
benefit from its value. 
(6) In the history of Egyptian education, admission policies in teachers' institutes affect the 
quality of the teacher and the value of the teaching profession compared to other 
professions. Firstly, these policies make people think that it is a very inferior profession in 
term of social prestige and salary. Secondly, teachers are not free to choose to be trained as 
teachers and the process of teaching treats them as persons who have only to deliver 
information to the learners. Thirdly, admission policies prevent talented candidates from 
applying to teachers' institutes which limit the learners' freedom to have a good-quality 
teacher. As it has been mentioned, these teachers' institutes start with weaker candidates. 
Although these policies have changed, the negative social attitudes towards teachers and 
the teaching professionals continue to be recognised. 
As for as the preparation of teachers is concerned, knowing the subject is the most 
important factor in teachers' training. Teachers' role is still recognised as that of a person 
who delivers such knowledge and information to learners without sharing with them in the 
process of teaching and learning. They are used to the traditional way of teaching where the 
teacher stands up front talking and asking questions, and all of the children are supposed to 
learn in the same way and at the same time. This approach to teachers' preparation makes 
`teachers believe that they are the ones who know and have all the knowledge about 
everything. So learners have to listen and memorise what they are saying. This kind of 
education makes learners follow in other people's steps without thinking why they have to 
follow them and in the long run produces weak individuals who are afraid of criticism and 
change and who like to be silent and surrender to other people's ideas. In this sense 
education never leads to creativity or innovation. Therefore, learners do not feel powerful 
and do not trust themselves to obtain knowledge or produce new knowledge on their own. 
As a result they always expect teachers to tell them what they have to do. This process is 
carried out from stage to stage so that when they become employee they wait for their boss 
tell them what to do. Having this type of teacher preparation does not help learners to 
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exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. In short, this type of teacher will be 
considered as a one of the restrictions on learners that limits their freedom. 
(7) The spreading of private tuition and textbooks prevents learners from having free and 
equal opportunities, learning thinking skills and enjoying the value of freedom in 
education. 
(8) Assessment practices restrict learners' freedom in terms of having educational 
opportunities and also in terms of enjoying the value of freedom in education 
(9) Illiteracy prevents public from the demanding a share in making educational decision or 
claim for their children's freedom. Moreover, uneducated parents can not play their role 
towards their children to help them have the required conditions for exercising freedom and 
get benefit from its value. 
(10) It can be seen that freedom in education does not go against private education but 
against its effects on learners in state schools in terms of having an equal opportunity. 
Learners who are poor and can not afford private education are still free to go to a state 
school. However, the good quality of education in the private school causes the market to 
prefer private education graduates more than state ones because the quality of learners in 
the former and higher than in the latter. In this sense it might be argued that the existence of 
private education can be considered as one of the restrictions on learners to having an equal 
opportunity. 
(11) An inappropriate educational budget limits learners' freedom in terms of having free 
and equal educational opportunity. Also, as a result of the lack of a budget, the state has 
failed to allow learners freedom to determine the type of studies they are interested in, 
where the state has obliged them to do what satisfies its aims and. 
(12) The role of the local authority focuses only on putting such decisions into practice and 
has no role in decision-making. Moreover, it was shown that there is no sharing at all by 
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learners, parents, teachers and the school in making educational decisions or even in having 
freedom to object to such decisions as have been taken. This leads to state that having a 
share by these groups are a very important factor in limiting learners' freedom to be heard 
regarding their education. 
(13) Egyptian educational thought is concerned with freedom in education and its value in 
the areas of developing learners' abilities to examine free thinking, choices, decisions and 
be responsible for their actions. Also it have been argued that the satisfactions of society's 
interests does not go against that of individuals' interests. This indicates that it is possible 
to implement the idea of freedom in education in the Egyptian context. Moreover, while 
educational thought demands learners' freedom in education and call for their interests to 
be considered as the main concern of the philosophy and the practice of education, there are 
many practices than can be seen to reflect these claims. This conclusion indicates that 
educational thought excludes the idea of sharing in educational planning and decisions. 
(14) On many occasions it was shown that the failure behind such practices related to 
freedom in education was because society was not prepared for such change, as such 
change in education needs understanding, support and sharing from all groups to be 
involved to perform their role. 
(15) In some places it was shown that educational reform in this comprehensive and 
particular sense has no clear philosophy. There is no harmony between its processes, and 
this leads to the unsatisfactory results of such reform. Moreover, all aspects of reforms that 
have taken place were partial in one or two aspects rather than looking at the whole 
processes. 
Thirdly, the study formulated a framework of a theory of education based on freedom suits 
the Egyptian society and its goals which can improve the efficiency of its educational 
system. On the one hand, it guarantees a range of freedom that allows learners and society 
to derive benefit from its value in education. This framework, firstly, treated the general 
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components and aims of education. Secondly, it dealt with the nature of the educational 
system, school curriculum, assessment and teacher's education. 
Thirdly, in chapter seven the study investigated the conditions and difficulties which need 
to be considered for a successful implementation of freedom in education in Egypt. Also, it 
offered some suggestions that might help to reduce the gap between the educational 
situation, its circumstances and the required conditions to satisfy the implementation of 
freedom in education. 
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